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INTRODUCTION 
Motivation for the research 
Public sector reform initiatives have resulted in a variety of governance 
arrangements for public services delivery. Besides the traditional direct 
production of public services by government departments, the externalization of 
public services delivery has created a range of corporate forms and managerial 
solutions. The governance forms such as government-owned companies, public-
private partnerships, contracting-out or private companies are often used by 
public authorities to react to external pressures and challenges related to public 
services provision (Pollitt et al. 2001, Doherty and Horne 2002, Torres and Pina 
2002, Dexia Crediop 2004, Reichard 2007, Grossi 2007).With this shift in 
public governance, the public authorities have become only one among many 
actors making and delivering public policy (Kennett 2010). Boundaries between 
public and private spheres have become less clear and the government’s 
command over policy has been changed (Kjaer 2004, Newman 2005). These 
changes in public governance associate closely with discussions about public 
services performance (Hartley and Skelcher, 2008, Skelcher 2008, Osborne 
2010) and give rise to questions on the relationship between governance and 
performance, since the public sector reforms in Western democracies have been 
initiated in the name of performance improvement (Van Dooren et al. 2010). 
Therefore, the emerging governance forms are expected to influence the per-
formance of public services provision. 
Internationally, the performance agenda emerged in public sector theory and 
practice in the 1990s (Hood 1991, Pollitt and Summa 1997, Talbot 1999), 
although its roots extend further back in time (Van Dooren et al. 2010). As 
Radin (2000) notes, ‘if there is a single theme that characterizes the public 
sector in the 1990s, it is the demand for performance.’ Bouckaert and Halligan 
(2008) observe that the penetration of performance measurement in the public 
sector continued in the 2000s with no sign of abating. The practice of measuring 
performance in the public sector has become more intensive and extensive with 
almost no public service managing to escape (ibid.). Moreover, there are several 
factors that suggest a continuing focus on public services performance and 
attempts to improve this. Firstly, in light of the global fiscal crisis, continuing 
pressures on public budgets are forcing governments to improve the efficiency 
of the use of their scarce resources and cut back on the public services provided 
(Levine 1978, Pandey 2010). Secondly, the expectations and demands of 
citizens in regard to service quality are not decreasing but rather increasing, and 
this is raising the standards by which public services are judged by the public 
and the media (Hartley and Skelcher 2008). Consequently, the need to deliver 
and demonstrate value for money in public services will continue to be 
reinforced (Van Dooren et al. 2010). In light of this, the present thesis, in its 
focus on the relationship between governance and performance, contributes to a 
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field of research that is topical and expected to be important for maintaining and 
enhancing public services in the years ahead.  
The literature on this topic contains a large number of empirical studies that 
explore the relationship between corporate governance and company per-
formance with considerable effort devoted to this field in the USA since Enron 
collapsed in 2001 (Bozec et al. 2010). However, there are relatively fewer 
academic articles that investigate the relationships between corporate 
governance and performance in the context of public services (Skelcher 2008). 
To illustrate this, a search in the EBSCO database throws up 6 924 items in 
response to the keywords ‘corporate governance’ and ‘performance’ (January 
2012). The number of items remains notably smaller (i.e. 292) when the same 
search is supplemented with the keyword ‘public services’1. In an article that 
attempts to identify new research frontiers in corporate governance, Ahrens, 
Filatotchev and Thomsen (2009) reveal that there is very little knowledge on 
how corporate governance features (e.g. specific ownership, board or incentive 
structures) or conditions (e.g. firm size, industry type, age) actually lead to 
better economic performance. In the context of public services, Skelcher (2008) 
also shows that there little systematic research has been conducted on the 
relationship between governance and performance – the debate lacks ‘an 
integrated corpus of empirically based knowledge.’ In the same vein, a meta-
analysis of the work in this field by Hill and Lynn (2005) concludes that the 
majority of the results are about management-performance relationships, while 
very little research explores the influence of governance on performance in 
public services. Moreover, the studies exploring the relationships between 
governance and performance largely test the links between easily measurable 
‘hard’ governance attributes (e.g. the size of the board) and financial results, 
while they neglect the issue of the relationships between the actors related to 
decision-making processes (Heracleous 2001, Edwards and Clough 2005). 
Consequently, these approaches do not facilitate the development of practical 
understandings on creation of performance in public services. The present thesis 
seeks to fill this gap by applying a more holistic research approach and mapping 
the patterns of the influence of governance on public services performance.  
A literature review indicates that the existing research that presents evidence 
about governance practices and their influence on performance in the Estonian 
public sector stem largely from three research directions. First, there are a 
number of governance studies conducted in the domain of public administration 
that focus on state level governance problems such as the capacity and func-
tioning of the civil service (Randma 2001, Drechsler 2004, Saarniit 2005/2006, 
Lagerspetz and Rikmann 2009, Palidauskaite et al. 2010), the development of 
                                                                          
1  The number of found items depends on the combination of used keywords and the search 
results vary if the general keyword ‘public services’ is replaced with keywords referring to 
particular public services (e.g. with ‘health care’ – 100 items, with ‘utility company’ – 41 
items).  
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state administrative structures (Sarapuu 2011) and the agencification trends in 
Estonia (Randma-Liiv et al. 2011). In the context of the dissemination of the 
ideas of New Public Management (NPM) (Hood 1991) in local governments, 
Tonnisson and Wilson (2007) analyze the changing nature of local government 
management in Estonia, while Murumägi et al. (2010) and Mäeltsemees (2010) 
specifically explore the legal and economic problems of using public-private 
partnerships (PPP) in Estonian municipalities. The second direction of gover-
nance research conducted in Estonia is related to studies in economics about 
factors influencing corporate ownership changes during and since the years of 
mass privatisation in the 1990s (Jones and Mygind 1999, Kalmi 2003, Jones et 
al. 2005, Hannula 2006, Rozeik 2008). In the same vein, drawing on a panel of 
data for a large random sample of Estonian companies, Jones and Mygind 
(2002) and Jones et al. (2003) explore the privatisation effects on the productive 
efficiency of companies; however, without any special consideration of the 
performance of public services companies. Finally, the third group of gover-
nance related studies in the literature reviewed from Estonia focuses on public 
policy and regulatory governance issues in specific public services sectors. 
These studies consider natural monopoly and competition issues in terms of 
economic theories, and analyze regulation practices in sectors such as public 
transport, energy, telecommunications, broadcasting and postal services in 
Estonia (Sepp and Tomson 2010, Sepp and Eerma 2011, Jõesaar 2011). In the 
context of public transport provision, a study by Haldma et al. (2008) also 
investigates the use of elements of performance management and governance 
tools by local governments when delivering transport services through publicly 
and privately owned companies. However, none of the abovementioned studies 
explore how local governments set up and use both the corporate and regulatory 
governance mechanisms in public services provision, and how the different 
governance patterns determine financial and non-financial performance in 
public services. This dissertation aims to fill this gap through in-depth research 
conducted in the Estonian water sector. 
The specific focus of the present thesis is on the relationship between gover-
nance and performance in the water sector because considering the variety of 
stakeholders in relation to water services this sector provides good insights into 
the complexity of public services governance. Water and sanitation services are 
crucially important for the health and well-being of the population as well as for 
economic development and the state of the environment. From the economic 
point of view, water services exhibit the characteristics of a natural monopoly 
(Parker 1999, Van Dijk 2008, Berg and Marques 2011). In practice, with no 
consideration of the manifold aspects of water services and no proper 
governance system in place, any attempt (e.g. privatisation) to improve per-
formance can easily result in no benefits or complete failure as witnessed in 
many cases around the globe (Hall et al. 2004, Casarin et al. 2007, Vinnari and 
Hukka 2007). Berg and Marques (2011) point out that the extent of the existing 
literature on water utilities ‘does not fully reflect the importance’ of the issue. A 
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literature review among international articles indicates that the evidence about 
the relationship between governance and performance in the water sector comes 
largely from quantitative studies testing for the influence of market structure 
(e.g. size, density), ownership structure, regulations and performance bench-
marking on the efficiency of water services delivery (Abbott and Cohen 2009, 
Walter et al. 2009, Berg and Marques 2011). However, as discussed by Shirley 
(2008), there are considerably less comparative qualitative studies that capture 
the complexity of water services governance in providing knowledge about how 
differences in governance (e.g. private sector involvement) determine the 
performance of water services provision. In the local context, only a few 
academic studies have been published that shed light on corporate governance 
and performance issues in the Estonian water services sector. The case studies 
by Balslev Nielsen and Hoffmann (2003), Hall (2003) and Vinnari and Hukka 
(2007) discuss the privatisation of the largest water company in Estonia and 
analyze the outcomes of that process. A quantitative study by Peda et al. (2011), 
drawing on panel data of a sample of Estonian companies, explores ownership 
and size effects on the performance of the water companies. And yet studies can 
be found that provide an overview of the legal and institutional frameworks 
(Hukka 2004) and the principles of water pricing (Banhard 2001) in the 
Estonian water services sector. This dissertation seeks to fill the gap in the 
literature and provide a thorough insight into the governance practices and 
performance problems in the Estonian water services sector. 
Water services have been traditionally produced and delivered by the public 
sector in most countries of the world in order to secure quality services at 
affordable tariffs, and ensure the necessary investments (Hall and Lobina 2007, 
Vinnari 2008). Still, local governments worldwide have made efforts to involve 
the private sector one way or another in water services production. In Estonia, 
where water services in 90% of its towns and cities (i.e. regional centres) are 
produced by fully publicly owned water companies, there also exist other 
production modes in the smaller towns and rural municipalities. These include 
specialised water companies with mixed (public and private) ownership, pro-
duction delegated to private companies or direct production by local govern-
ment agencies (departments). Despite its relatively small total population (1.34 
million people), the water sector is fragmented in Estonia, including over 200 
companies of various sizes operating under different governance regimes 
established by local governments (Peda et al. 2011). The variety in ownership 
structure, corporate size and regulations applied by local governments, cons-
titutes a unique research field for conducting a comparative performance study 
in that sector.  
Although the capital city of Tallinn provides a unique research perspective, 
it sold the majority of the shares in its water services company to international 
partners and later listed the shares on the stock exchange (NASDAQ OMX 
2012). Moreover, eight years after the privatisation, public criticism emerged of 
the water company’s high profitability, increased water prices and slowness in 
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constructing infrastructure. Consequently, provoked by the high profitability of 
the Tallinn water monopoly, the parliament of Estonia adopted a special law in 
2010 aimed at forming a central independent water regulator for price control at 
the Estonian Competition Authority (Monopolidele hinnapiirangute…2010). In 
light of recent regulatory initiatives in the Estonian water sector, it is important 
that the true sources of the problems are properly identified. To do that, the 
features of governance along with their consequences need to be mapped and 
related shortcomings highlighted. Therefore, the practical implications of the 
present thesis could also provide policymakers and regulators with useful 
information on the complex relationships between governance and performance 
in the Estonian water sector. This information should be considered when de-
veloping governance mechanisms and policies for the multifaceted performance 
improvement in water services.  
 
 
The aim and research tasks 
The aim of the present thesis is to provide a more in-depth understanding of 
how different patterns of corporate governance influence the financial and non-
financial performance of water services provision in Estonian municipalities. 
The dissertation contributes to the scientific debate on the changing roles of 
public authorities in public services provision, and the set up and use of 
governance mechanisms for influencing the performance of the public services. 
In terms of the regulatory governance of water services, particular interest is 
given to interactions between water companies and local governments and how 
they achieve their divergent goals. This knowledge becomes useful for 
policymakers, regulators and other interest groups in developing strategies and 
discovering ways to improve the performance of water and other public utility 
services provision. 
To achieve this aim, the following research tasks were set: 
1. To explore the relationships between the main concepts (i.e. corporate 
governance, accountability and performance) applied in the study and to 
reveal the performance expectations from the theoretical perspectives of 
corporate governance; 
2. To explore the theoretical background to indicate how the setup and use of 
corporate governance mechanisms and performance management tools can 
influence decision-making and consequently corporate performance; 
3. To explore the literature on the externalization of public services and the 
specific features of water services provision in order to understand the 
complexity of governance and performance relationships in water services; 
4. To identify the peculiarities of the Estonian water sector, and to draw 
together the main features of EU and national regulations that constitute a 
framework for water services provision in Estonian municipalities;  
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5. To undertake a quantitative study of the influence of ownership on the 
efficiency of Estonian water companies in order to assess the superiority of 
particular ownership forms over others;  
6. To conduct a comparative case study on how the applied corporate and 
regulatory governance mechanisms under different ownership structures in 
water companies influence their financial and non-financial performance; 
7. Finally, to synthesize the research results to identify implications for 
improving the governance system to enhance performance in the Estonian 
water services sector and make suggestions for further research.  
 
 
The originality of the research 
In the literature, academic studies that examine the relationships between 
corporate governance and performance use largely statistical research methods 
regressing selected numerical or quantitative variables for testing hypotheses. 
The exclusive use of such research approaches creating dependent and inde-
pendent variables and using archival data on selected governance and per-
formance features fail to deliver insights into the processes involved in 
governance that lead to particular behaviours and performance outcomes 
(Heracleous 2001, Edwards and Clough 2005, Skelcher 2008, Tosi 2008, 
Ahrens et al. 2009). For instance, one can assume that managers of publicly 
owned companies are not in pursuit of high corporate profits, but how this 
works remains unclear without field studies of corporate governance practice. 
Therefore, the current dissertation applies a novel mixed quantitative and 
qualitative research method to provide a deeper understanding of how corporate 
governance mechanisms influence performance. The quantitative part includes a 
regression analysis, and tests the probability of different ownership structures 
leading to higher efficiency; the qualitative part comprises a comparative case 
study and examines the governance patterns practiced under particular 
ownership structures and their impact on performance.  
The need to prioritize case studies that can provide a more in-depth under-
standing of performance in water services has been articulated by a number of 
scholars (see Shirley 2008, Araral 2008). In the literature, there are many 
studies that compare the performance of public and private water companies 
(see Renzetti and Dupont 2004, Abbott and Cohen 2009, Walter et al. 2009, 
Berg and Marques 2011) using econometric models; however, as argued by 
Araral (2008) ‘very few serious studies examine prices, affordability and pro-
fitability’ in the context of water services. This dissertation, as opposed to existing 
ownership-performance studies in the water sector, relies on a comparative case 
study analysis of the influence of governance on both financial (e.g. 
profitability) and non-financial performance (e.g. service affordability, water 
quality), and explores the achievement of trade-offs between them. Connecting 
different streams of governance and performance literature, such as corporate 
governance, regulatory governance, public services management, performance 
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measurement and management, the dissertation proposes a novel framework 
(see Figure 18, p. 101) that allows us to understand and analyze the influence of 
governance on performance in public utility services holistically.  
The argument for observing the influence of governance on performance, 
particularly in the water services sector, is associated with the specific situation 
in Estonia, where water services are produced by a relatively large number of 
water companies operating under various ownership structures (public, private, 
mixed) and local government economic regulations. Yet the main corporate 
governance and accounting regulations are common for both private and 
publicly owned companies in Estonia, which offers a unique opportunity to 
compare and analyze the carry-over of corporate governance and management 
initiatives from private water companies to publicly owned ones that are often 
seen to be lagging behind private business practices (Wettenhall 2001). 
Last but not least, as revealed by Walter et al. (2009) in their comprehensive 
literature review article, there is a scarcity of scientific benchmarking studies of 
water utility performance conducted in Northern and Eastern Europe. According 
to the knowledge of the author of this dissertation, none of the studies covers 
the governance mechanisms and performance record of privately and publicly 
owned water services providers in the Baltic region and Estonia in particular. 
Thus, one novelty of the dissertation is related to its attempt to shed light on 
financial and non-financial performance considerations in Estonian water com-
panies. Although the empirical studies in the dissertation are conducted in a single 
country, they offer various insights and provide a broader understanding of the re-
lationship between governance and performance in the context of water services. 
 
 
The structure of the dissertation 
The present dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter creates the 
theoretical basis for the research. In the second chapter, the research framework 
and research methods along with the data collection principles are introduced. 
The third chapter consists of the empirical analysis followed by a discussion of 
the study results. The overall structure of the dissertation is presented in Figure 1 
showing the links between the chapters and the knowledge resulting from them. 
Chapter one begins by providing the concepts of governance, accountability 
and performance used in the study and explores the theoretical background of 
governance-performance relationships. Since governance, accountability and 
performance are broad concepts, their various dimensions will be discussed to 
clarify the nature of the relationships between them. In the same chapter, the 
theoretical expectations in terms of performance outcomes are drawn from the 
main corporate governance theories. Some of the theories (e.g. agency theory, 
stakeholder theory, stewardship theory) provide insights into the interests of 
those involved in governance, while others into the role of ownership structure 
(property rights, public choice theory, transaction cost, industrial organization 
theory) in determining performance.  
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Figure 1. The structure of the dissertation (source: compiled by the author) 
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Subchapter 1.2 takes the discussion of governance-performance into the context 
of public services provision by expanding the focus from governance 
interactions within a single company (micro level) to interactions between the 
company and local government (meso level). In light of the externalization of 
public services, differences in the roles of contractor (local government) and 
provider (company) will be discussed along with the challenges and promises of 
governance mechanisms in avoiding performance eroding conflict. The 
subchapter ends with a review of empirical evidence from previous studies 
about the relationships between governance and performance in public services 
provision.  
Finally, subchapter 1.3 in the theoretical section of this dissertation explores 
the specific characteristics of water services provision (e.g. monopoly), 
addresses the implications of water services externalization and discusses the 
governance arrangements applicable by (local) governments in order to direct 
the performance of the water companies. The subchapter ends with a review of 
empirical evidence from previous studies about the relationships between 
governance and performance in water services provision. 
On the basis of the concepts and premises established in the first chapter, the 
second chapter presents the research questions and the research framework for 
studying the relationships between governance and performance. Subchapter 2.2 
introduces the mixed quantitative and qualitative research methods used in this 
dissertation. A more thorough description is provided of the Data Envelopment 
Analysis and comparative case study analysis. Finally, the principles for the 
data collection and the motivation for selecting the particular case companies 
are introduced. The issues of validity and reliability are also discussed as 
important for evaluating the legitimacy of the research. 
In the third chapter, the tentative framework will be used to conduct empiri-
cal studies to explore the influence of governance on water services per-
formance in three Estonian municipalities. At the beginning of chapter three, an 
overview of the peculiarities of the Estonian water sector is provided, and the 
main features of the legislation regulating Estonian water sector performance 
are discussed. In subchapter 3.2, the results of the statistical analysis undertaken 
to test the influence of ownership and corporate size on the efficiency of 
Estonian water companies per se are revealed and discussed. Subchapter 3.3 
presents the three case descriptions of the case study along with case 
summaries. Thereafter, the discussion of results from the qualitative study 
follows in subchapter 3.4. Finally, propositions contributing to the theory are 
presented along with policy implications and recommendations for improving 
water services governance in Estonia. The final section of the dissertation 
discusses avenues open for future research into the relationships between 
governance and performance in water services. 
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1. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR  
THE ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE 
1.1. Main concepts and theories applied in the study 
1.1.1. The concepts of corporate governance,  
accountability and performance 
Corporate governance has been a prominent issue over the last thirty years, 
although the theories underlying the development of corporate governance and 
the areas it embraces date from much earlier and are drawn from a variety of 
disciplines including finance, economics, accounting, law, management and 
organizational behaviour (Monks and Minow 2001, Mallin 2004, Clarke 2007). 
The scientific debate on corporate governance issues has produced a number of 
different definitions (Cadbury 1992, Tricker 1993, Dimsdale and Prevezer 1994, 
Charkham 1994, Lannoo 1995, Monks and Minov 1995, Shleifer and Vishny 
1997, OECD 2004). Probably the shortest and most direct definition of cor-
porate governance stems from the Cadbury report (1992), which states: ‘Cor-
porate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled.’ An elaborated prominent definition is provided by the OECD in its 
Principles of Corporate Governance published in 1999 and revised in 2004:  
‘Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate 
governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the com-
pany are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring per-
formance are determined.’ 
A common feature of the various corporate governance definitions is that cor-
porate governance is a system and it consists of a set of mechanisms, such as 
boards, nexus of contracts, company law, monitoring by large owners, and the 
threat of hostile takeovers, creditor monitoring, managerial incentives and 
product market competition (Thomsen 2008, Zumbansen 2010). As the OECD’s 
(2004) definition indicates, the emphasis on relationships is central to extended 
definitions of corporate governance: it is directed towards the managers of the 
company and one or many stakeholders and their power are involved (Collin 
2006). According to this definition, corporate governance encompasses two 
important approaches: the narrower shareholder focus and the broader stake-
holder view (Mallin 2004). The narrower perspective of corporate governance 
focuses primarily on the relationship between shareholders and the management 
and aims to find out whether the shareholders exert sufficient control over the 
managers to ensure that their objectives and not the managers’ are pursued in 
the company. Internationally, different corporate governance systems are estab-
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lished and applied (e.g. Anglo-American model, dualistic German model de-
scribed in subchapter 1.1.3.) to determine the formal delegation of power and 
control structures for companies (Clarke 2007). The broader view of corporate 
governance does not only consider shareholders, but also other stakeholders 
(e.g. customers, the community) that have an interest in the company’s activities 
and performance (Filatotchev and Wright 2005). Therefore, as Gedajlovic 
(1993) states, ‘the executive and non-executive directors must balance the plu-
ralist claims of those with a vested interest in the corporation in order to secure 
their required contribution.’ 
The term corporate governance, with its genesis in the private sector and 
traditionally focused on the shareholder-company relationship, is increasingly 
used in the context of the public sector (Edwards and Clough 2005, Bovaird 
2005). In that context, corporate governance has most often been concerned 
with the relationships between policymakers and the managers of public sector 
organizations given the task of fulfilling policies – delivering public services 
(Osborne 2010). Edwards and Clough (2005) note that due to significant dif-
ferences in the organization and governance of public sector entities (e.g. 
departments, agencies, corporations) and private companies, the term ‘public 
sector governance’ is often used instead of ‘corporate governance.’ In the same 
vein, the term ‘public governance’ is used which according to Skelcher (2008) 
refers to the ‘different corporate arrangements applied to the organizations 
through which public policy is shaped, made and executed.’ Similarly, Lynn, 
Heinrich and Hill (2001) define public governance as the ‘regimes of laws, 
administrative rules, judicial rulings, and practices that constrain, prescribe, and 
enable government activity,’ where activity is defined as the production and 
delivery of publicly supported goods and services (Coates 2004). According to 
Bovaird and Löffler (2003), public governance means ‘the ways in which stake-
holders interact with each other in order to influence the outcomes of public 
policies.’ This definition of public governance encompasses two comple-
mentary aspects of the quality of public governance (Bovaird and Löffler 2003): 
(1) the achievement of quality of life outcomes that matter to the stakeholders 
and, (2) the achievement of processes of interaction between these stakeholders, 
which are in line with agreed criteria or norms (Bovaird 2005). 
Governance is also often employed to describe a paradigmatic shift away 
from ‘governing’ or ‘government’ (Rhodes 1996, Adshead and Quinn 1998, 
Mayntz 2002, Bovaird and Löffler 2003). Rhodes (1996) explained governance 
as a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of 
governing or a changed condition of ordered rule. The change stands for the 
evolution of a different interface among actors, whose traditional basis of 
operation used to be government, civil society organizations or markets 
(Halachmi 2003). With this shift, government has become one player among 
many in a policy arena (Kennett 2010) that has become more crowded and 
contested with more actors involved. The boundaries between public and 
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private spheres have become less clear and the government’s command over 
policy has been changed (Kjaer 2004, Newman 2005).  
As public governance concerns have become more widespread and impor-
tant, there are various specifications of the term ‘governance’ in the literature, 
illustrating the fragmentation of the governance concept in the public sector 
context. For example, Osborne (2010) distinguishes five strands in public gover-
nance – socio-political governance, public policy governance, administrative 
governance, contract governance and network governance – that all provide 
insights into public policy implementation and public services delivery. 
Sectoral governance refers to the governance of ‘coherent areas of the 
economy’ such as energy, water or environmental policy, influenced by national 
and international legislation (Brunnengraeber et al. 2006). Good governance is a 
concept mainly used in the context of development policy and refers to specific 
conditions to which international financial and development organizations, such 
as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), tie their co-
operation and funding (Knack 2003, Bovaird 2005, Brunnengraeber et al. 2006). 
The specifications local, regional and national governance all refer to particular 
political and administrative levels in public governance. All the given specifi-
cations shed some light on what is encompassed within the relatively vague 
concept of ‘governance.’ What is important in this dissertation is the recognition 
that corporate governance either in the private or public sector is a relational 
concept (Bovaird and Löffler 2003, OECD 2004, Bovaird 2005) and that gover-
nance is necessary in order to convey the interests of the stakeholders (e.g. 
owners, policymakers, financiers, customers) in an organization into the 
performance of the organization.  
 
Accountability 
The roots of the contemporary accountability concept lie in the decades after the 
1066 Norman conquest of England, when William I required all the property 
holders to render an account of what they possessed (Dubnick 2002). Being 
initially related to bookkeeping for tax purposes, the accountability concept has 
now moved far beyond its origins and become a trademark of good governance, 
both in the public and in the private sector (Bovens 2006). In the corporate gover-
nance literature, the accountability concept is primarily associated with power 
delegation from shareholders (principals) to managers (agents) and the need to 
have a mechanism in place for holding managers accountable for their decisions 
and if necessary to impose sanctions, ultimately by removing them from power 
(Lindberg 2009). This idea is compressed by Brooks (1995), who provides a 
universally applicable definition for accountability as follows: 
‘Accountability is a mechanism to ensure that individuals can be called to 
account for their actions, and that sanctions are incurred if the account is un-
satisfactory.’ 
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Similarly Bovens (2006) provides a rather concise definition of accountability: 
‘A social relationship in which an actor feels an obligation to explain and to 
justify his or her conduct to some significant other.’  
Bovens’ (2006) definition implies the process of being called ‘to account’ 
(Mulgan 2000), which takes place between the accountor (agent) and the 
accountee (principal) (Stem 2000, Pollitt 2003). Analytically, this process can 
be divided into three parts (Bovens 2006): 
1. The accountor feels a formal or informal obligation to inform the accountee 
about his conduct by providing data about the performance of tasks, about 
outcomes or about procedures; 
2. The provided information can lead to the interrogation of the accountor to 
question the adequacy of the information or the legitimacy of the conduct;  
3. The accountee passes judgement on the conduct of the actor. In the case of a 
negative judgement, the accountee can impose some sort of sanction. The 
possibility of sanctions is viewed as a constitutive element of accountability, 
which marks the difference between a non-committal provision of infor-
mation and being held accountable (Mulgan 2003, Strom 2003, Bovens 
2006, Schillemans 2010). 
 
Hence, the gist of accountability can be summarized in two major questions as 
follows: what is the actor accountable for and to whom? (Bovens 2006, Collier 
2008a).  
Accountability in the public sector is described as a heterogeneous, complex, 
chameleon-like and elusive concept (Sinclair 1995, Barberis 1998, Mulgan 
2000, Greiling and Spraul 2010). Bovens (2006) notes that the accountability 
concept has become a rhetorical device serving ‘as a synonym for many loosely 
defined political desiderata, such as transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency 
and integrity’. Nevertheless, Mulgan (2003) argues that accountability ‘has 
come to stand as a general term for a mechanism that makes powerful insti-
tutions responsive to their particular publics.’ In the public governance context, 
there are five distinct purposes of accountability (Bovens 2006): (1) democratic 
control, (2) integrity of public governance, (3) performance improvement, 
(4) maintaining and enhancing legitimacy and (5) purification by providing 
public catharsis. These functions indicate that accountability is not only about 
control, but also about prevention, building trust, individual and organizational 
learning in pursuit of continuous improvement in governance and public 
management (Aucoin and Heintzman 2000, Roberts 2001, Bovens 2006, 
Budding 2008).  
The question of, what is the actor accountable for and to whom becomes use-
ful when classifying types of accountability. There is a number of ways to 
classify accountability relationships: based on the accountee, based on the 
accountor, based on conduct, based on obligation (Bovens 2006). The following 
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types of accountability are distinguished in the public governance literature 
based on the nature of the accountee – to whom (Dubnick and Romzek 1987, 
Glynn and Murphy 1996, Bovens 2006):  
1. Bureaucratic and managerial accountability – to superiors. In bureaucratic 
accountability, subordinates have to follow orders and focus on the priorities 
of their superiors at the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy. Managerial 
accountability represents a shift from these orders to management and 
results, which is the gist of managerial accountability. 
2. Legal accountability – to civil or administrative courts based on specific 
responsibilities from legal standards. 
3. Professional accountability – to professional peers implying relationships 
with professional associations that lay down codes with standards for 
acceptable practice.  
4. Political accountability – to elected representatives and political parties. In 
this context, accountability can be described as a chain of relationships 
(Strom 2000), where citizens delegate power to elected politicians, who (in 
the case of a parliamentary democracy) delegate the authority to the govern-
ment, the government delegates it further to administrative units. The 
account-giving functions in an operate direction as a chain from executive 
public servants to voters. In the case of political appointments, political 
parties and party leaders can function as important informal political forums 
(Bovens 2006). 
5. Social accountability – to various interest groups (stakeholders), such as 
clients, citizens, charities etc. Such a direct relationship between public 
agencies and civil society is suggested in many democracies as a response to 
diminished trust in public sector institutions (McCandless 2001).  
 
However, accountability is not limited to a single two-party principal-agent 
relationship, and vice versa, governance actors can be accountable to a number 
of parties inside and outside their organizations, and this reveals a connection 
between the accountability concept and stakeholder thinking (Niskala and Näsi 
1995). Collier (2008b) notes that the stakeholder-agency approach (Hill and 
Jones 1992)2 has the potential for enhancement in order to explore the 
accountability of a governing body to multiple stakeholders, which can become 
useful in shedding light on the stakeholders’ relative power and importance in 
pursuit of performance.  
In light of the spread of NPM ideas, a recent major shift witnessed in the 
public sector has been a move from process-oriented accountability to results-
oriented accountability (Schwartz 2002). The substance of results-oriented 
                                                                          
2  Hill and Jones (1992) consider an organization as a nexus of contracts that encompasses 
contractual relations between all stakeholders whilst recognising power differentials. The 
stakeholder-agency approach views managers as agents of other stakeholders ‘policed by 
governance structures’ (Collier 2008b).  
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accountability, also referred to as performance-based accountability, is 
performance – it aims to demonstrate and give account of results against 
established targets (OECD 1997). Thomas (1998) and Llewellyn (1998) 
emphasize that the prior assignment of responsibilities (i.e. agreeing upon 
goals) is a prerequisite for calling somebody to account. Greiling and Spraul 
(2010) point out that the provision of information within the accountability 
relationship can be supply or demand-driven. In the case of demand-driven 
provision, the accountability requirements are predetermined by the accountee 
in line with classical vertical bureaucratic planning and control mechanisms. 
However, Van Dooren et al. (2010) argue that accountability initiatives are not 
usually entirely predetermined, neither are they completely voluntary (i.e. 
‘accountability is negotiated and the measurement object is negotiated’). 
Moreover, Van Dooren et al. (2010) also claim that trust-based control systems 
can become a good substitute to performance-based accountability. Such control 
systems are based on traditions, on professions, on standard-operating 
procedures, and they are seen as being relatively cost-effective, embodying 
considerable ownership within the responsibilities (ibid.). 
In the literature, accountability discussions often importantly refer to the 
term ‘transparency’. Koppell (2005) points out that transparency is one dimen-
sion of accountability. Bovens (2006) argues that ‘transparency is instrumental 
to accountability but not constitutive of accountability.’ This view is in line with 
Aucoin and Heintzmann (2000), who see transparency as a requirement for 
accountability. Brito and Perrault (2009) provide a comprehensive definition of 
transparency, viewing it as a process that: (1) requires us to disclose 
(2) substantively and truthfully (3) our performance (4) to those who are entitled 
to know. They emphasize that transparency can be a means of eliminating infor-
mation asymmetry, and therefore, helps achieve accountability (ibid.). The defi-
nition of transparency offered by Brito and Perrault (2009) also indicates that 
‘only if the principal can measure the agent’s performance – and not simply 
monitor their activity – can the agent be held accountable.’ Lowenstein (1996) 
argues that ‘good disclosure has been the most efficient and effective mecha-
nism for inducing managers to manage better’ because (1) under disclosure the 
managers as agents will have an incentive not to act against the goals of 
superiors (principals) and (2) in the case of performance-related pay, managers 
have a clear incentive to perform well. Consequently, the agent is interested in 
improving results, which are disclosed and evaluated.  
In the public sector, the OECD (2002) notes that transparency is a part of 
good governance ‘meaning that reliable, relevant and timely information about 
the activities of government is available to the public.’ The OECD (2010a) sug-
gests that having an internet website and continually improving its content is a 
means of ensuring public transparency. For publicly owned companies, internet 
websites, like annual reports, are suggested as appropriate communication 
channels to maintain an open dialogue with the stakeholder about finances, 
environmental issues and social responsibility (ibid.). Van Dooren et al. (2010) 
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stress that the publication of information increases pressure on organizations. 
Therefore, ‘external accountability requires high validity and reliability because 
of high stakes of bad or good results for the organization’ (ibid.).  
To sum up, it can be argued that the concept of accountability complements 
the concept of corporate governance (Solomon 2010). Accountability is viewed 
as a social mechanism for directing and controlling (i.e. influencing) a gover-
nance actor in pursuit of the interests of some significant other. It has the 
potential to serve as a facilitator of the governance relationship between them. 
Therefore, considering the aim of the present dissertation, the previous 
discussion leads to a relevant question about what the features of the established 
accountability systems are and how they influence the behaviour of governance 
actors and consequently corporate performance. 
 
Performance 
In its broadest sense performance refers to an intentional behaviour, which can 
be individual or organizational (Sonnentag and Frese 2002, Dubnick 2005, Van 
Dooren et al. 2010). A relevant and frequently cited definition of performance 
by Campbell et al. (1993) states: 
‘Performance is what the organization hires one to do, and do well.’ 
This definition of performance indicates that performance stands apart from 
mere behaviour, but encompasses behaviour (action), which is guided by some 
purpose (e.g. an organizational goal). Moreover, it also indicates that per-
formance embodies ‘judgemental and evaluative processes’ and that only 
actions that can be measured constitute performance (Sonnentag and Frese 
2002). In the literature, a number of authors conceptualizing performance 
distinguish an aspect of action (the quality of action) from an aspect of the out-
come (the quality of the achievement) in relation to performance (Campbell 
1990, Campbell et al. 1993, Sonnentag and Frese 2002, Dubnick 2005, Van 
Dooren et al. 2010). By relying on these two different aspects of performance 
(along dimensions of low and high), Dubnick (2005) distinguishes between four 
perspectives of performance as revealed in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Types of performances 
 Focus on quality of performance 
achievement 
Low High 
Focus on quality of 
performance actions 
High P2 Competence P4 Productivity 
Low P1 Production P3 Results 
Source: adapted from Dubnick (2005) 
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According to the typology in Table 1, the first perspective of performance (P1, 
production) focuses attention on tasks being carried out by the performing 
agent. This most basic form of performance is associated with the process of 
production in the broadest and narrowest senses of that term (Dubnick 2005) 
irrespective of whether the production was successful (Van Dooren et al. 2010). 
The second form of performance (P2, competence) views performance as the 
quality of actions, not so much as the quality of achievement, and is associated 
with the competence and capabilities of the performing individuals or insti-
tutions. The third form of performance (P3, results) is about what is produced, 
as opposed to the process of production itself (P1) or the efficiency of the pro-
duction process (P4). The results are typically presented in quantitative terms. 
Finally, performance as productivity (P4) implies ‘the ratio of output to input 
for a given production unit under given conditions, (i.e. the production func-
tion)’ (Dubnick 2005). This approach to performance elevates both the quality 
of the action as well as the achievement.  
The four types of performance revealed in Table 1, cover most of the 
meanings usually applied to the concept of performance in the literature. In the 
public sector context, a typical approach to defining performance is to use the 
production model (see Appendix 1) by Bouckaert and Halligan (2008), which 
views performance as outputs and outcomes of production activities inside 
organizations. Van Dooren et al. (2010) emphasize that outputs and efficiency, 
which can be adequate conceptualizations of performance in the private sector, 
remain unsatisfactory in the public sector because ultimately outputs are 
expected to have effects in society. Moreover, the maximization of financial 
profit is not usually an objective of public sector organizations (Bouckaert and 
Halligan 2008). However, output considerations remain important in the public 
sector because public sector organizations have to evaluate their output mix in 
order to understand whether they are providing the right bundle of public ser-
vices (Van Dooren et al. 2010).  
Alternatively, performance is often defined in the public sector as the reali-
sation of public values, such as equity, robustness, openness and transparency in 
the public sector context (Van Dooren et al. 2010). Boyne (2010) argues that 
public sector organizations are likely to be judged as performing well if their 
stakeholders believe that they are producing not only the right results (e.g. high 
scores on performance indicators), but that they are doing this in the right way. 
In the same vein, Kickert (1997) emphasizes that performance in the public 
sector has to deal more with value patterns, such as legality and legitimacy than 
business-like efficiency or effectiveness criteria. To be regarded as legitimate, 
public sector organizations need to meet the expectations of influential stake-
holder groups in their environment (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Boyne 2010). 
However, Collier (2008a) notes that sometimes performance can be viewed as a 
theatre or drama acted out for the public stage to satisfy politicians, the public 
and the press by legitimizing public sector organizations. 
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All in all, Skelcher (2008), conceptualizing performance in public services, 
distinguishes three major types of performance as shown in Table 2. First, the 
organizational performance of public service entities focuses on efficiency, 
effectiveness, productivity, service quality and compliance with normative acts. 
Second, democratic performance refers to the extent to which the governance 
arrangements of an organization enable the exercise of legitimacy, consent and 
accountability (Mathur and Skelcher 2007). 
 
Table 2. Types of performance in public services 
Type Definition 
Organizational 
performance 
The substantive outputs and outcomes of a public organization 
 
Democratic 
performance 
The extent to which public organization is able to demonstrate 
mechanisms for legitimacy, consent and accountability 
System performance 
 
The extent to which a system of public organization is 
integrated 
Source: Skelcher (2008) 
 
 
Finally, system performance characterizes the whole functioning of the govern-
ment system and its ability to coordinate activities and resolve collective action 
problems across jurisdictions.  
However, in the discussion of public sector performance, Bouckaert and 
Halligan (2008) distinguish three ‘levels of depth’: micro, meso and macro 
level. Micro level is defined at the level of the organization, while meso per-
formance refers to the performance of particular policy areas or networks and 
the macro level deals with the performance of national or regional governments. 
According to this distinction, micro, meso and macro performance are a nested 
configuration, where the smaller performance dimension fits within the larger 
one (ibid.).  
To sum up, the concept of performance has a broad scope in the public 
sector (Van Dooren et al. 2010). Simply put, performance may be what is done 
and how it is done, the results of what is done or a mere presentational device in 
the public sector (Collier 2008a). On the basis of Dubnick’s (2005) performance 
typology, this dissertation will address the outcome aspect of performance (the 
quality of achievement), in other words, the productivity and results perspective 
of performance. In terms of the ‘levels of depth’ in performance (Bouckaert and 
Halligan 2008), the research focus will at first be on the micro level of 
organizational performance; however, the meso level and legitimacy as part of 
democratic performance (Skelcher 2008) will also be explored. 
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Relationships between governance, accountability and performance 
The discussion has so far sought to conceptualize corporate governance, 
accountability and performance, and has begun to indicate some theoretical 
relationships between them. Bringing together the concepts explored above for 
further analysis, Figure 2 provides a simplified illustration of how corporate 
governance and accountability can be positioned in the process of influencing 
corporate performance. In the narrower perspective, corporate governance (the 
area within the outer rectangle in Figure 2) focuses on the governance relation-
ship between the shareholder and the manager in the company. In this relation-
ship, the interests of the shareholder and the manager may vary and these varia-
tions are reflected in decisions, which consequently can influence corporate 
performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. General relationships between the concepts of corporate governance, 
accountability and performance (source: compiled by the author)  
 
 
While focusing on the shareholder-manager relationship, corporate governance 
as a system consists of a set of governance mechanisms (the inner rectangle in 
Figure 2). The governance mechanisms can be used by the shareholder to 
control and direct the manager’s behaviour (decisions), thus influencing corpo-
rate performance. The perspectives of particular corporate governance mecha-
nisms in influencing the achievement of the objectives of shareholders and other 
stakeholders in a company will be discussed further in subsection 1.1.3. To 
facilitate control over the manager’s behaviour and to ensure that the share-
holder’s interests, and not the manager’s, are pursued in the company, account-
ability as a social mechanism is put in place. This serves to bridge the share-
Corporate governance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shareholder               Manager 
(Principal)                  (Agent)
  
Corporate governance mechanisms 
 
 
 
      
      
  
 
          
       
 
 
Accountability  
 
  Performance 
Goals 
30 
holder’s goals and the manager’s delivery against them (the dotted circle in 
Figure 2), and holds the manager to account for the decisions and the achieve-
ment of the goals. By making the manager responsible to the shareholder, this 
accountability makes it possible to influence performance. All in all, of impor-
tance in this dissertation is the recognition that when corporate performance in 
general can be influenced through establishing a corporate governance and 
accountability system, differences in corporate governance and accountability 
practices can also result in differences in performance. The present dissertation 
aims to explore how the differences in the design and use of corporate gover-
nance mechanisms influence corporate performance. 
In public services, Hartley and Skelcher (2008) provide a robust theoretical 
framework on the interplay between the governance and performance concepts 
in a particular policy context as illustrated in Figure 3. According to this, gover-
nance concerns the arrangements for establishing values, identifying needs, 
establishing the public purpose and overseeing and monitoring performance 
through management action. Management is seen as the system for using 
organizational resources for public purposes and for producing performance 
outcomes (for external and internal users), some of which can be assessed 
through performance metrics. Governance composes the framework for value 
creation, while the management answers how value creation within this frame-
work is executed and developed. The management processes take place in 
distinct policy contexts, which can be highly professionally defined (ibid.).  
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Relationships between the concepts of governance, management, policy and 
performance in public services (source: Walker and Damanpour 2008) 
 
 
Also a more detailed governance model by Schedler and Siegel (2005) seeks to 
provide links between governance, management and performance in the public 
sector as revealed in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Relationships between the concepts of governance, management and per-
formance in public sector (source: adapted from Schedler and Siegel 2005) 
 
 
Schedler and Siegel (2005) point out that it is complicated to draw a clear 
distinguishing line between the governance and management perspectives in the 
public sector, where governance and public management issues are inextricably 
linked. Each part of the public governance model in Figure 4, from the ‘frame 
conditions’ at the top to ‘performance and impacts’ at the bottom, is described 
as a complex decision-making area that is connected to the other decision-
making areas. The parts of the model are assumed to have a direct or indirect 
relationship to each other. The ‘social and political conditions’ determine the 
objects and the subjects in the problem solving process. The governance part 
(the area inside the dotted rectangle in Figure 4) is viewed as a system of rules 
that is not limited by legislative regulations alone, but also includes the social 
norms different actors are required to follow. As illustrated in Figure 4, there is 
an interrelation between the various elements of that section. The legislation, 
informal structures and available resources determine the incentive mechanisms 
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between the participating actors, including their direction and coordination, and 
finally also the value of their efforts. These efforts lead to performance, which 
can have a particular impact in society. Finally, the actual performance and 
concurrent impacts influence the legitimacy of the whole governance system.  
Importantly, the governance models in Figure 3 and Figure 4 indicate that 
‘governance-performance causality is complex’ (Skelcher 2008) and per-
formance itself can influence the governance arrangements. The issue of cau-
sality is crucial in corporate governance-performance research because without 
a strong causal link there is no basis for suggesting that governance influences 
performance, rather than vice versa. In the corporate governance literature to 
date there is no consensus on the nature of the causality in the governance-
performance relationship (see Love 2010), leaving this issue open for further 
research. Skelcher (2008) questions the implicit assumption in public services 
reform initiatives that ‘changes to governance arrangements will impact posi-
tively on performance outcomes.’ He suggests a number of alternative hypo-
thetical causalities between the forms of public governance and performance, 
such as ‘the governance form arises because of performance’, ‘performance 
undermines the form of governance’ and ‘the governance form and performance 
are unrelated’ (ibid.). In the same vein, Dubnick (2005) argues that the common 
assumption that accountability leads to enhanced performance is still ‘un-
articulated and untested.’ Nevertheless, drawing together the concepts and 
literature presented in this subchapter, the tentative research framework that will 
be used for the analysis of governance-performance relationship in the empirical 
part of the dissertation implies a casualty where governance does influence 
performance.  
In summary, the main concepts linked in this dissertation (i.e. corporate 
governance, accountability and performance) are broad and varied. For the pur-
poses of the present dissertation, corporate governance and accountability are 
viewed as a framework that embodies a set of mechanisms (tools) influencing 
how governance actors interact with each other in public services companies. 
Through these interactions (e.g. reporting, decision-making) the performance 
(outcome) of a single organization or a network of organizations is achieved. 
Such a conceptualization emphasizes the importance of the following aspects in 
research about the influence of corporate governance on performance: (1) gover-
nance actors, (2) governance mechanisms, and (3) interactions between gover-
nance actors. Consequently, these aspects lead to a number of relevant questions 
to be answered while conducting the research in the present dissertation. At first 
it is important to identify the key governance actors and the applicable 
governance mechanisms in and around the public services companies explored. 
Thereafter, considering that the governance actors ultimately pursue their own 
interests, it is important to the research to identify the actors’ specific interests 
in the companies. Differences in the interests of governance actors give rise to 
the principal questions in the present dissertation: What are the relevant features 
of the applied governance mechanisms? How do these features influence the 
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interactions between the governance actors and enable them to achieve their 
goals (i.e. determine performance)? As noted earlier, the governance-
performance relationship is complex and it would be complicated to draw a 
simple (linear) relationship between them. This consideration is important for 
selecting the right research method – as will be explained later in chapter 2 – in 
order to capture the gist of the governance-performance relationships.  
 
 
1.1.2. Performance expectations from the theoretical 
perspectives of corporate governance 
The previous subchapter introduced the main concepts applied in the present 
research and established links between the concepts of corporate governance 
and performance. The aim of this subchapter is to review the main corporate 
governance related theories in order to understand the interests of governance 
actors (agency theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory) and the role of 
ownership (property rights, public choice theory, transaction cost, industrial 
organization theory) in influencing corporate performance. 
 
The interests of governance actors in influencing corporate performance 
The leading theoretical approach to understanding corporate governance, 
despite its limitations, is undoubtedly agency theory (Maassen 2002, Clarke 
2007). Agency theory considers a company as a ‘legal entity that serves as a 
nexus for a complex set of contracts (written and unwritten) among disparate 
individuals (Jensen 1983, Spence and Zeckhauser 1971, Ross 1973). Each of 
these individuals aims to maximize his or her own utility (Alchian and Demsetz 
1972). The agency relationship is defined as a ‘contract under which one or 
more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making 
authority to the agent’ (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In the corporate governance 
literature, the typical view is that shareholders through the board are the princi-
pals and the management (CEO) is the agent (Tosi 2008). Under ideal cir-
cumstances, the principal can hire an agent whose interests are aligned with 
his/hers; however, the more typical situation is pointed out in the second row of 
Table 3 that the interests of the principal and the agent, both rational indi-
viduals, are divergent (ibid.). 
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Table 3. A comparative overview of theoretical expectations of the interests and 
performance of governance actors  
Theory Brief description Performance expectations Authors 
Agency 
theory 
The interests of the 
principal (owner) and 
the agent (manager) – 
both self-utility 
maximizing individuals 
– are divergent. The 
work and risk averse 
manager has 
information that the 
owner does not have in 
his/her possession that 
creates information 
asymmetry 
Owner’s wealth (profit) is the 
main performance objective 
of a company. Agency 
problems – moral hazard and 
adverse selection – hinder the 
owner from achieving his/her 
objectives in the company. 
Monitoring and/or incentive 
alignment is necessary to 
mitigate the agency problems 
for the owner to achieve the 
desired performance 
Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972),  
Ross (1973),  
Jensen and 
Meckling (1976),  
Fama and Jensen 
(1983),  
Jensen (1983), 
Maassen (2002), 
Mallin (2004), 
Clarke (2007),  
Tosi (2008) 
Stake-
holder 
theory 
The manager is 
simultaneously seen as 
an agent to multiple 
stakeholders 
(principals) not only to 
the owners of the 
company. Stakeholders 
contribute and expect 
benefits in the company
Managers need to reach a 
trade-off between the various 
interests of different 
stakeholders – there is not 
one singular corporate 
objective while performance 
encompasses achieving more 
objectives than maximizing 
owners’ wealth (profit) alone 
Hill and Jones 
(1992), Näsi 
(1995a, 1995b), 
Carroll (1996), 
 Clarkson (1998), 
 Macey (1999),  
Jensen (2000),  
Freeman et al. 
(2010) 
Steward-
ship 
theory 
The goals of the 
steward (manager) and 
principal (owner) are 
aligned and the 
manager is motivated 
to act in the interests of 
the owner without 
extrinsic rewards or 
control 
Managers do not 
intentionally shirk and exert 
moral hazard – the owners 
achieve their objectives under 
trust-based relationships 
without using mechanistic 
control mechanisms in the 
company 
Block (1996),  
Davis et al. 
(1997), 
 Maassen (2002),  
Cribb (2006),  
Van Slyke (2007) 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
 
Consequently, principals face two major agency problems with their agents: 
1. Moral hazard, which is insufficient effort put forth by the agent or the 
misuse of company resources by the agent. This can occur when the contract 
is based on imperfect measures of individual behaviour (Shavell 1979).  
2. Adverse selection, which is the misrepresentation of ability by the agent. 
This can occur if agents are motivated to misrepresent their private infor-
mation to achieve their own goals (Tosi 2008). 
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Asymmetric information is the cornerstone of conflicts between the principal 
and the agent (Jensen and Meckling 1976). As the basis of agency theory is the 
self-interested utility-maximizing actors, the central question arises of how the 
principal can prevent the agent from maximizing his/her own utility (Jensen 
1994). The definition of the principal-agent relationship as a contract between 
counterparties (Jensen and Meckling 1976) shifts the focus to the proper design 
of contracts to limit the opportunistic behaviour of the agent. The contracts 
between the agent and the principal are expected to specify agreements about 
what the agents (managers) can do with the funds and how the returns will be 
divided between them and the principals (shareholders). However, a problem 
related to designing contracts is that ‘most future contingencies are hard to 
describe and foresee, and as a result, complete contracts are technologically 
infeasible (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Maassen (2002) argues that the design of 
contracts is complicated by perhaps the most uncertain factor in the relationship 
between principals and agents: the agent’s behaviour. 
Solving agency problems causes costs – agency costs – for the principal. 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983) agency costs ‘include the costs of struc-
turing, monitoring and bonding a set of contracts among agents with conflicting 
interests. Agency costs also include the value of output loss because the costs of 
the full enforcement of contracts exceed the benefits.’ Agency theory assumes 
that some monitoring and/or incentive alignment is necessary. The principals 
minimize the agency costs by balancing the cost of monitoring, the cost of risk 
shifting and the cost of unresolved agency problems (Tosi 2008). Monitoring is 
the direct or indirect observation of the manager’s action or behaviour (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). When the expected results are measurable, the agent’s 
objectives can be aligned with the principal’s objectives by making pay contin-
gent on the results so it would be possible through the compensation (award) 
system to solve moral hazard and adverse selection problems. But linking the 
agent’s pay to performance may shift risk to the agent since the results do not 
depend solely on the agent’s behaviour. If risk sharing were optimal, monitoring 
would not be necessary since the contract is self-enforcing through agent and 
principal objective alignment (Singh 1985, McGuire 1988). Monitoring can 
solve both adverse selection and moral hazard problems. In general monitoring 
involves gathering information on (McGuire 1988): 
1. The manager’s (agent’s) effort; 
2. Exogenous factors influencing company performance and; 
3. The outcomes. 
 
If information on all three were available, there would be no agency problem 
since a contract can be based on the appropriateness of the agent’s actions (Tosi 
2008). Without knowledge of the agent’s actions, the principals are exposed to 
moral hazard or adverse selection. Without knowledge of the external factors 
that may influence the degree of the agent’s performance, the owners cannot 
judge the appropriateness of the agent’s efforts, and may reward (or punish) the 
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agent for circumstances outside the agent’s control. Without knowledge of the 
results, the principal cannot evaluate the relationship between the agent’s 
actions and other external factors influencing the results (ibid.). Zajac and 
Westphal (1994) find that monitoring and incentive alignment might have dif-
ferent effects and that they are used by companies in different ways. They claim 
that companies often view incentive alignment and monitoring as substitutes 
and that companies with relatively weaker incentive alignment have more 
monitoring instruments in use, and vice versa. However, Tosi (2008) argues that 
the relationship between monitoring and incentive alignment seems to be more 
complex than the complementarity or substitutability articulated in agency 
theory, and that it is necessary to know more about whether and under what 
conditions more intensive monitoring, as differentiated from incentive align-
ment, will produce results consistent with the theory.  
All in all, agency theory, focusing on governance actors’ divergent interests 
embodies a conflict and assumes that agents cannot always be trusted to maxi-
mize the principal’s utility (Maassen 2002). Donaldson (1990) emphasizes that 
agents cannot be trusted before they are under the principal’s control via 
instruments (corporate governance mechanisms) that make it possible to mini-
mize agency problems. The perspectives of corporate governance mechanisms 
in mitigating agency problems in a company will be discussed further in the 
next subsection 1.1.3. Nevertheless, agency theory can be applied to different 
organizational forms as long as there is a separation between agent and prin-
cipal. As noted by Eisenhardt (1989a), the agency structure is applicable in a 
variety of situations ranging from macro level issues such as regulatory policy 
to micro level cases such as blame, impression management, lying and other 
expressions of self-interest.  
If agency theory views the managers of a company narrowly as the servants 
of the shareholders, then in the stakeholder approach as pointed out in the 
third row of Table 3, managers are seen as agents of multiple stakeholders 
instead of shareholders alone. The contract between managers and owners is 
just one of the nexus contracts that make up the firm. According to Freeman et 
al. (2010), the question of what the management should do and who should 
matter in their decision-making is a central question in stakeholder theory. 
Freeman, the founder of the stakeholder approach, defines a stakeholder as 
follows: 
‘A stakeholder in an organization is (by definition) any group or individual who 
can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives.’ 
(1984) 
The stakeholders have a stake in the company that can be reflected in voting 
power, economic power or political power that the stakeholders can use (Free-
man 1994). According to Carroll (1996) ‘a stake is an interest or share in an 
undertaking.’ Näsi (1995b) refers to a claim ‘being a demand for something due 
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or believed to be due.’ The Scandinavian school emphasizes the contribution 
made by the stakeholder to the company and the reward, which the stakeholder 
demands in exchange for this contribution (e.g. money, goods, information, 
status, power, prestige etc.) (ibid.).  
In the literature, primary and secondary stakeholders3 are typically distin-
guished (Carroll 1996, Clarkson 1998, Freeman et al. 2007). The primary stake-
holders have a formal, official or contractual relationship with the company, and 
they are vital for company survival and success, while secondary stakeholders 
have a more indirect relationship with the company and are not critical for com-
pany survival (see Appendix 2). Hill and Jones (1992) argue that managers are a 
group of unique stakeholders, due to their position at the centre of the nexus of 
contracts, who enter into contractual relationships with all other stakeholders. 
Therefore, they also point out that it is up to managers to make strategic deci-
sions and allocate resources in a manner most consistent with the claims of 
other stakeholder groups (ibid.). Näsi (1995a) emphasizes, that taking care of 
the stakeholder balance is the most important operational goal for professional 
management. Donaldson and Preston (1995) argue that ‘stakeholder manage-
ment requires, as its key attribute, simultaneous attention to the legitimate 
interests of all appropriate stakeholders, both in the establishment of organiza-
tional structures and general policies and in case-by-case decision-making.’ The 
literature addresses five important questions to managers for effective stake-
holder management (Carroll 1996): (1) Who are the stakeholders? (2) What are 
their interests? (3) What opportunities and challenges do the stakeholders pre-
sent to the firm? (4) What responsibilities does the organization have to the 
stakeholders? (5) What actions should the firm take to best respond to stake-
holder challenges and opportunities? 
Mitchell et al. (1997) propose three critical elements of stakeholder salience 
that refer to the degree to which managers give priority to competing stake-
holder claims (Wickham and Wong 2009): 
1. Power – itself does not necessitate high salience in a stakeholder-manager 
relationship. Power gets its authority through legitimacy and its exercise 
through urgency.  
2. Legitimacy – needs the other two elements, power and urgency to gain its 
power and voice. 
3. Urgency – in combination with at least one of the other two elements, will 
raise the level of salience in a stakeholder-manager relationship. 
 
The task of simultaneously pursuing the interests of shareholders and various 
stakeholders can be rather contradictory. The critics of stakeholder theory offer 
that by having many different masters, the managers can easily do what they 
                                                                          
3  Stakeholders can be constructed in several other categories such as internal v. external, 
active v. passive, economic v. social, core v. strategic v. environmental (Carroll and Näsi 
1997). 
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want and engage in self-dealing (Freeman et al. 2010). Health and Norman 
(2004) argue that ideas that ask managers to improve social and environmental 
‘bottom lines’ in addition to net profit would sharpen the multitask incentive 
problem because responsibilities to multiple stakeholder groups could generate 
multi-principal problems. Mallin (2004) raises the question that, if the directors 
of the company are held responsible for the shareholders and various stake-
holders, ‘then what would be the corporate objective?’ In the same vein, other 
critics (Jensen 2000, Sundaram and Inkpen 2004) claim that it is essential for a 
company to have a singular objective (Freeman et al. 2010). Jensen (1989) 
argues that it is not possible for the company to have multiple constituencies for 
whom they have to maximize returns, and that shareholders should be con-
sidered most important in managerial decisions. Jensen (2000) and Sternberg 
(2000) point out that if managers are accountable only to shareholders, it would 
be easier to assess their performance.  
However, Freeman et al. (2010) argue that stakeholder theory is explicitly a 
managerial theory and developed ‘to help managers acknowledge and deal with 
the complex reality.’ They emphasize that stakeholder theory provides ‘a more 
realistic view of business.’ Yet, Donaldson and Preston (1995) note that the 
stakeholder approach is useful in research for descriptive, normative and 
instrumental reasons. Philips et al. (2003) note that stakeholder theory can be 
applied to companies of any size, and not only to companies, but also partner-
ships, nonprofit and government organizations. 
Finally, stewardship theory, as opposed to agency theory in the fourth row 
of Table 3, assumes goal alignment between the actors, and is seen as an 
important framework for structuring relationships (Block 1996). Stewardship 
theory ‘defines situations in which managers are not motivated by individual 
goals, but rather are stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives of 
their principals’ (Davis et al. 1997). Thus, the goals of stewards and principals 
are aligned and a steward is motivated to act in the interests of the principal. 
According to Van Slyke (2007), mechanisms that motivate individuals to 
behave as stewards include organizational structure, autonomy and responsi-
bility, empowering governance structures and trust. Lambright et al. (2010) 
argues that unlike the agents in agency theory, who focus on extrinsic tangible 
rewards, stewards focus on intrinsic intangible rewards. Nevertheless, as Cribb 
(2006) argues, the stewards also have survival needs (e.g. regular salary), but 
they differ from agents in that they recognise a trade-off between personal and 
organizational needs. 
All in all, stewardship theory, focusing on governance actors’ aligned in-
terests embodies a consensus perspective, which assumes that managers 
(agents) ‘do not intentionally shirk and exert moral hazard (Maassen 2002). 
Thus, there is no role for formal corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. corpo-
rate boards) in aligning the conflicts of interest between managers and share-
holders in a company. As Van Slyke (2007) argues, the principal-steward rela-
tionships are rather ‘output-based relationships in which responsibility and trust 
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are the foundations for long, mutually aligned contractual relationships’. Vice 
versa, control through corporate governance mechanisms can be counter-
productive, as noted by Cribb (2006), indicating that the steward is not trusted, 
which can reduce the motivation of the steward to work for the company. 
Therefore, in contracting relationships stewardship theory views accountability 
mechanisms such as monitoring, auditing or reporting as superficial (ibid.). 
In summary, it can be argued that agency theory, stakeholder theory and 
stewardship theory summarized in Table 3 provide various perspectives on the 
interests of governance actors regarding corporate performance. Agency theory 
involves a theoretical conflict in interactions between the key governance 
actors, where the agent is not intrinsically pursuing the performance goals set by 
the principal. In order to align the governance actor’s goals and mitigate agency 
problems that can erode corporate performance, agency theory suggests 
applying governance and accountability mechanisms in the principal-agent 
relationship. This gives rise to an important question for the present research in 
terms of what mechanisms and how should they be established by the principals 
in order to ensure goal alignment and avoid the agent’s opportunistic 
behaviour? Moreover, stakeholder theory expands the narrow principal-agent 
relationship and argues that a manager (agent) must attend to the interests of 
various stakeholders (principals) not only the shareholders. This can be a rather 
contradictory task because of the stakeholders’ multiple and divergent interests 
regarding corporate performance. Therefore, in the multi-principal context an 
important question for research arises of how governance mechanisms can be 
used to balance the various interests of stakeholders and achieve multiple per-
formance goals? Finally, stewardship theory, relying on a different assumption 
about human behaviour in comparison to agency theory (i.e. no intentional 
shirking by the steward or moral hazard is assumed), suggests promoting trust 
and responsibility rather than applying mechanistic control tools over stewards 
(managers) to influence corporate performance. This leads to important ques-
tions about whether the managers are behaving more like agents or stewards and 
in what way is stewardship achieved in companies? Therefore, through different 
theoretical filters, these three theories of corporate governance address the 
importance of goal alignment between the governance actors in influencing 
corporate performance. The question that emerges in the context of the present 
dissertation is which governance mechanisms can facilitate this and under what 
conditions. 
 
The role of ownership in influencing corporate performance 
The previously explored corporate governance theories did not emphasize the 
role of ownership in influencing corporate performance. The following theo-
retical approaches summarized in Table 4 when used together make it possible 
to provide deeper insights into the ownership-performance relationship con-
sidering the particular context (industry) of the company.  
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Table 4. A comparative overview of theoretical expectations of the influence of owner-
ship on performance 
Theory Brief description Performance expectations Authors 
Property 
rights theory 
Private owners 
compared to public 
owners have more 
clearly defined 
incentives to pursue 
efficient decision-
making by managers 
within the company  
Privately owned companies 
are relatively more efficient 
than publicly owned 
companies, because their 
owners benefit personally 
from actions that improve 
the efficiency and 
profitability of the 
companies  
Alchian (1965), 
Demsetz 
(1967), 
De Allesi 
(1983), 
Asher et al. 
(2005) 
Public 
choice 
theory 
Public servants and 
managers act in their 
own self-interest that 
may cause greater costs 
and conflict with the 
performance enhancing 
goals of the company 
Publicly owned companies 
are relatively less efficient 
than private companies, 
because the managers in 
publicly owned companies 
substitute their own goals 
over the efficiency of the 
companies  
Tullock (1965), 
Niskanen 
(1968, 1971), 
Ostrom and 
Ostrom (1971), 
Stretton and 
Orchard (1994) 
Transaction 
cost theory 
The choice of 
ownership form is a 
function of the 
transaction costs 
derived from the 
delegation of authority 
in public services 
provision  
Efficiency improvement 
from private ownership 
emerges when transaction 
costs are small – no 
difference in efficiency in 
monopoly markets when 
transaction costs are 
relatively high 
Coase (1937), 
Sappington and 
Stiglitz (1987), 
Williamson 
(1985, 1999), 
Menard (2005), 
Warner and Bel 
(2008) 
Industrial 
organization 
theory 
Alignment of managers’ 
and owners’ objectives 
influenced by the 
market structure is the 
rationale for differences 
in efficiency between 
privately and publicly 
owned companies 
The influence of factors that 
facilitate the alignment of 
managers’ and owners’ 
objectives is weak in 
monopoly markets – no 
difference in efficiency 
between monopoly 
companies with public and 
private ownership 
Kay and 
Thompson 
(1986), 
Vickers and 
Yarrow (1988), 
Bel et al. (2010) 
 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
 
According to property rights theory, private owners, as residual claimants, 
have more clearly defined incentives to motivate managers towards efficient 
decision-making within a company as revealed in the second row of Table 4. 
Ownership gives them the right to obtain benefits from managing a company’s 
assets efficiently and effectively. Conversely, bureaucrats, politicians and 
41 
citizens have diminished property rights in respect to the gains associated with 
improved public sector company performance, which will lead to reduced 
incentives to push for improvements. The bureaucrats may have the control 
rights under public ownership, but not the profit rights, and thus cannot directly 
benefit from the profits generated by efficiency improvements.  
Moreover, together with property rights, Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
have applied the theory of incomplete contracts to the theoretical framework of 
public services provision by publicly or privately owned companies. They have 
also suggested that private provision provides more incentives to improve effi-
ciency, but that this may happen at the expense of service quality. Therefore, to 
ensure service quality under private ownership, some additional supervision by 
public sector authorities is required (Guttman 2000, Bozeman 1987). 
Public choice theory, as shown in the third row of Table 4, emphasizes that 
managers of publicly owned companies potentially exhibit inefficient 
behaviour. Public choice theory typically argues that public sector managers 
behave like typical neoclassical individuals and act in their own self-interest, for 
example, by attempting to maximize the size of their own budgets. Public pro-
duction as such is considered to be inefficient and excessive (Niskanen 1971). 
Thus, the combination of poor supervision seen in the concept of property rights 
theory, and self-interested managers arising from public choice theory, is 
together expected to create managerial discretion and inefficient behaviour in 
publicly owned companies. 
The presence of mixed ownership, embodying elements of public and private 
ownership, complicates the ownership-performance debate (Oum et al. 2006). 
However, from a theoretical perspective, the results of mixed ownership on 
corporate performance are not clear (Bös 1991). Mixed ownership might be an 
optimal combination mitigating the disadvantages of pure public and private 
ownership (Schmitz 2000, Marra 2006), but it may also embody the worst of 
both worlds (Ehrlich et al. 1994, Vining and Boardman 2008).  
In comparison to property rights and public choice theory, transaction cost 
theory as applied to public services delivery in the fourth row of Table 4 pays 
more attention to the nature of the service, the contracting process and the mar-
ket (Warner and Bel 2008). According to the fundamental features identified by 
Coase (1937), transactions occur inside the firm when market transactions incur 
higher costs than internal transactions. Williamson (1985, 1999), followed by 
the new institutionalists (Menard 2005), characterize transactions through three 
major aspects that may result in costs being incurred: (1) uncertainty regarding 
how the transaction develops and its results, (2) the frequency with which trans-
actions are repeated, and (3) the relative requirement of long-term investments 
specifically related to the transaction, or “sunk costs”. Thus, depending on the 
characteristics of the particular public service with regard to these aspects, the 
opportunities for cost savings will differ. Whether private or public production 
should be preferred depends largely on transaction costs derived from the dele-
gation of authority (Sappington and Stiglitz 1987). Monitoring and control have 
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a crucial role, and cost minimization refers to both the transaction and trans-
formation (production) costs implied by private production. Efficiency 
improvement from private production is likely to emerge when transaction costs 
are small.  
Finally, industrial organization theory in the fifth row of Table 4 empha-
sizes the importance of the relationship between incentives and ownership that 
under a given market structure may cause differences in efficiency between 
privately and publicly owned companies. According to industrial organization 
theory, private ownership should be preferred to public when (1) owners benefit 
from devoting time and money to obtaining the information needed for super-
vision, (2) firms are exposed to the possibility of being taken over, and (3) firms 
are at risk of bankruptcy (Bel et al. 2010). Market structure has a central role in 
determining how these three characteristics can improve the alignment between 
the interests of owners and managers. These facets are not, however, common 
to monopoly markets (Kay and Thompson 1986, Vickers and Yarrow 1988).  
In summary, of importance to this research is the recognition that based on 
the discussed theories ownership structure can influence corporate performance. 
According to property rights and public choice theory privately owned compa-
nies are likely to outperform publicly owned companies. As opposed to 
property rights and public choice theory, transaction cost and industrial organi-
zation theory emphasize that the influence of ownership structure on corporate 
performance depends on the nature of the industry the company is involved in. 
Moreover, they indicate that privately owned companies are not likely to out-
perform publicly owned companies in monopoly markets when transaction 
costs are relatively high. However, these theoretical perspectives lead to an 
exploited, albeit important question in the present governance-performance 
research about whether privately owned companies are more efficient than pub-
licly owned companies per se. Moreover, in light of the previously discussed 
agency and stewardship theories, the relevant question arises of how the 
influence of ownership structure depends on the governance mechanisms 
applied in the particular industry context? 
 
 
1.1.3. Corporate governance mechanisms  
influencing company performance 
In a broader sense, governance mechanisms are defined as ‘any institutional 
arrangement that serves to influence the exchange process’ (Hesterley et al. 
1990). Corporate governance mechanisms arise as a response to agency prob-
lems (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Love 2010), and have two main functions in a 
company: coordination (i.e. obtaining mutual benefits) and safeguarding against 
conflicts (Bijman 2006). In the literature, the majority of corporate governance 
studies focuses on agency problems between shareholders and managers 
(Filatotchev and Nakajima 2010), which stem from the separation of ownership 
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and control4. To cope with these internal agency problems associated with 
managers’ opportunistic behaviour, the misalignment of goals and distortions of 
managerial incentives, the shareholder can deploy internal governance mecha-
nisms in a company. The board of directors, internal auditors, charter provi-
sions, internal ownership, block-holders and executive compensation are often 
referred to as internal governance mechanisms in the literature (Gillan et al. 
2007). Moreover, the literature also describes external governance mechanisms, 
such as the market for corporate control, legal and regulatory rules, investor 
monitoring, labour and product markets, the external stakeholders exercise over 
the company (ibid.). Yet corporate governance mechanisms are categorized as 
formal versus informal mechanisms. Formal mechanisms are seen as any 
instrument codified by a contract or explicitly embodied within a legally 
enforceable or regulatory framework (AOM 2006), such as incentive contracts 
(Barkema and Gomez-Mejia 1998), disclosure regulations (Hillman and Dalziel 
2003) and the market for corporate control (Fama 1980). Informal mechanisms 
are viewed as any influence upon opportunistic behaviour that is implicit or 
non-binding legally (AOM 2006), such as institutional norms (North 1990), 
reputation (Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990), and trust (Das and Teng 1998, 
Gambetta 1998, McQuaid 2010). Trust is viewed as a vital component in corpo-
rate governance and the absence of trust can be deeply corrosive, as argued by 
Clarke (2007). The interaction between the different corporate governance 
mechanisms, which may be substitutes or complements, is argued to determine 
the effectiveness of the entire governance system in a company (Jensen 1993, 
Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Among the various governance mechanisms, corpo-
rate boards stand out as ‘the fulcrum of corporate governance’ (Clarke 2007) 
with a central position in solving and avoiding agency problems. Moreover, the 
concepts of the board and corporate governance are often even used as syno-
nyms in corporate governance literature (Thomsen 2008). That is why the 
remainder of the current subchapter primarily focuses on exploring the theo-
retical perspectives of how the board influences corporate performance. 
  
The board in models of corporate control  
The international development of corporate governance has resulted in two 
major corporate governance models that incorporate the board(s) to the control 
delegation (Mallin 2004): the Anglo-Saxon one-tier model and the German two-
tier (dualistic) model. As shown in Figure 5, under the one-tier model, adopted 
with some variations in the UK, the US and Canada, the shareholders delegate 
                                                                          
4  Berle and Means (1932) coined the phrase ‘the separation of ownership and control’ in 
their landmark book The Modern Corporation and Private Property, which has remained the 
most widely used expression and dominant of thinking in the literature on corporate 
governance (Margotta 1989, Hawley and Williams 2000). 
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some of the control to the board, where executive and non-executive directors 
act together – in one organizational level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. One-tier versus two-tier corporate governance model: control delegation 
between the layers (source: adapted from Clarke 2007) 
 
 
The dominant view on boards is that boards act as a control mechanism to 
reduce the potential divergence of interests between the corporate management 
and the shareholders (Stiles and Taylor 2002). Some boards are dominated by a 
majority of executive directors, while others are composed of a majority of non-
executive directors (Maassen 2002). In addition, the board can have a board 
leadership structure that separates the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and chair 
positions of the board, but there can be also a board leadership structure that 
combines the roles of the CEO and the chairman (ibid.). 
The two-tier governance model as opposed to the one-tier model includes 
control delegation between three layers as shown in Figure 5: shareholders, 
supervisory board and management board. This model adopted with some 
variations in continental Europe (e.g. Germany, Finland and also in Estonia) 
separates the execution from the monitoring function (Maassen 2002). If the 
supervisory board is composed of non-executive board members that may 
include not only shareholder representatives, such as employee representatives 
in Germany (Grossi and Reichard 2008), the management board is usually 
composed of executive directors. Simultaneous membership in the supervisory 
and the management board is not permitted by corporation laws in the two-tier 
system (Jungmann 2008). While the CEO does not belong to the supervisory 
board, its board leadership structure is formally not dependent on the executive 
Management board 
Supervisory board 
Shareholders Shareholders 
Board of directors 
One-tier model Two-tier model 
Power delegation to the board Power delegation to the supervisory board 
Power delegation to the management board 
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function of the board (Maassen 2002). In principle there is a clear separation of 
tasks in the two-tier governance model: supervision (decision control) is the 
main function of the supervisory board, whereas (decision) management issues 
are reserved for the autonomous management board (Jungmann 2008). All in 
all, in both the one-tier and two-tier governance models the board has a central 
role to play in exerting control. It embodies a significant formal power in the 
corporate governance models, though, as argued by Aghion and Tirole (1997) 
and Tirole (2001), formal control does not necessarily imply real control. 
 
The role of the board5 
The growing theoretical debate on the board’s strategic contribution was origi-
nally initiated by Fama and Jensen (1983), who stated that companies make a 
distinction between ‘decision management’ and ‘decision control’ activities. 
‘Decision management’ relates to executive directors conducting the company’s 
functions, such as the initiation of proposals and their implementation, while 
‘decision control’ refers to the tasks of non-executive directors, such as 
approving and overseeing the performance of the decision management func-
tion6. In the case of the two-tier model, these two functions are formally sepa-
rated between the management and the supervisory board. Such a separation 
becomes important from the shareholders perspective of corporate governance 
because this is based on the assumption that the more independent the super-
visors are from the management, the better they serve the interests of share-
holders (Maassen 2002). In the context of the agency theory discussed in sub-
chapter 1.1.2, the separation of management and control should avoid the agent 
without ownership in the company enhancing his or her own interests through 
decisions that are not optimal for the principal. Thus, the board is viewed as a 
governance mechanism intended to ensure that the interests of shareholders and 
managers are aligned, and if necessary that ineffective managers be removed 
(Barnhart et al. 1994, Park and Shin 2003). In addition to overseeing, the tradi-
tional tasks of the board are also related to CEO appointment and remuneration 
(Mallin 2004, Thomsen 2008). 
Besides the classic board function – control – two other types of roles – 
‘service roles’ and ‘strategic roles’ – are also often attributed to boards in the 
literature on corporate governance (Mintzberg 1983, Zahra and Pearce 1989, 
Gopinath et al. 1994, Johnson et al. 1996, Jonnergård et al. 1997, Hung 1998). 
In terms of the service roles, the members of the board are viewed as con-
tributing to the company as follows (Mintzberg 1983, Johnson et al. 1996, 
Thomsen 2008): 
                                                                          
5  Here and hereinafter the term ‘board’ stand for the board of directors as per one-tier 
governance model and the supervisory board as per German two-tier model. 
6  In their model Fama and Jensen (1983) describe initiation, approval (ratification), 
implementation and monitoring (evaluation) as the four steps in decision making. 
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 Giving advice to the management during the strategy planning and imple-
mentation process; 
 Networking, i.e. building and keeping contacts with important partners that 
provide resources for the company (e.g. financiers); 
 Building and maintaining the company’s image in the eyes of the general 
public; 
 Co-opting important external stakeholders. By incorporating influential 
stakeholders from the business environment into the board, the company 
aims to strengthen its links with the influencer and diffuse their power.  
 
In terms of the strategic role of boards, it is proposed that boards not only 
approve strategies and monitor their fulfilment, but also participate in strategy 
making because the interests of board members and managers are not neces-
sarily divergent (Demb and Nebauer 1990, Davis et al. 1997). This position 
contradicts the view that boards should remain independent and separate from 
strategy development (Fama and Jensen 1983, Goodstein et al. 1994, Ezzamel 
and Watson 1997, Hendry and Kiel 2004). However, in the literature, the role of 
the board in preparing and implementing strategy has been debated for years 
(Andrews 1981, Judge and Zeithaml 1992, McNulty and Pettigrew 1999) with-
out consensus on appropriate practice in terms of the strategic contribution the 
board can make (Daily et al. 2003, Jensen and Zajac 2004, Pugliese et al. 2009). 
Pugliese et al. (2009) conclude in their comprehensive review article with 
reference to Zahra and Pearce’s observation from 1989, that ‘there is contro-
versy over the nature of [the] directors’ strategic role. From the theoretical per-
spective a conflict perspective (agency theory) and a consensus perspective 
(stewardship theory) can be recognised as discussed earlier in subchapter 1.1.2, 
which respectively provide arguments against and for the active participation of 
the board in strategy development.  
 
Elements of the board  
The board is a system formed by board elements (Clarke 2007). Carter and 
Lorsch (2004) distinguish three key elements in a board: (1) board structure 
referring to board size, leadership and the committees; (2) board composition 
referring to experience, skills and other attributes of board members, and 
(3) board processes referring to how the board conducts meetings and makes 
decisions. Maassen (2002) distinguishes board characteristics as a separate 
board attribute that comprises the background, gender and age of board 
members, but also their social and educational backgrounds, tenure and work 
experience. Carter and Lorsch (2004) refer to the relationship between board 
elements and performance:  
47 
 ‘The more effective the elements in the board’s design are aligned with each 
other and with the board’s role…the more likely the system is to produce 
behaviours that will make the board effective.’  
The combination of board attributes, according to Zahra and Pearce (1989), is 
determined by internal and external contingencies, such as environmental and 
industry factors. Other authors (see Maassen 2002) have recognised other 
important contingencies such as legislation, shareholder activism, ownership 
structure, and legal and regulatory systems. In the context of the present 
research, it is important to recognise that contingencies can influence how the 
elements of the board are organized and consequently how the board members 
fulfil their roles and in the end how they contribute to corporate performance. 
A significant part of corporate governance debates in the literature is related 
to board diversity and independence (Milliken and Martins 1996). Diversity of 
board membership (i.e. variety in the composition of board members) is con-
sidered desirable and performance enhancing for two reasons: (1) the diversity 
increases discussion, the exchange of ideas and provides the board with new 
insights and, (2) from the stakeholders’ perspective various stakeholders’ repre-
sentatives in the board can protect the shareholders interests (Kang et al. 2007). 
Independence is generally understood as the absence of any relationship or cir-
cumstance which could affect the judgement of the board members (Mallin 
2004) and this is a highly recommended element for the effectiveness of the 
board (Chandler 1975, Clarke 2007, Kang et al. 2007). Nevertheless, there is no 
final consensus on the exact definition of an independent (or external) director 
(Kang et al. 2007). The UK Combined Code (2003) on corporate governance 
considers a board member independent if the member is not a former employee 
of the company within the last five years, does not get additional remuneration 
from the company except from the board fees, has no close family connections 
with company managers, has not served the board for more than ten years and 
does not represent a significant shareholder. The independence of board mem-
bers presumes that these members can make a positive contribution to the 
board’s monitoring responsibilities, which leads to improved corporate per-
formance (Beasley 1996, Anderson et al. 2004, Kang et al. 2007). However, a 
contradiction to this traditional assumption is that if most of the board members 
should be independent with no relationship to the company, they are not likely 
to know much about the business and need to learn from and rely on executive 
management (Clarke 2007).  
Furthermore, in order to ensure the overall independence of the board, it has 
been advocated that the chairman7 of the board should also be an independent 
member (Kang et al. 2007) because the chairman is considered a key actor in 
corporate governance relationships (Clarke 2007). In the two-tier governance 
                                                                          
7  Hereinafter the term ‘chairman’ refers to the chairman of board of directors as per one-
tier governance model and the chairman of supervisory board as per German two-tier model. 
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model, the responsibilities of the chairman are separated from responsibilities of 
the CEO, another key governance actor, and not embodied in one and the same 
person. The CEO’s role is considered a full-time post, responsible and 
accountable for operational activities, the setting and implementing of corporate 
strategy and ultimately for the performance of the company. The chairman, 
however, is viewed as a part-time, independent position to ensure that the board 
works effectively and to evaluate the performance of the CEO (Cadbury 1992, 
Higgs 2003). However, Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2007) argue that ‘chal-
lenged is the assumption that the role of chairman is universally comparable’ 
emphasizing that the role of the chairman in a company may vary. Nevertheless, 
the literature highlights several features attributable to an effective chairman: 
great involvement, sound knowledge of industry specifics, independence of 
mind and previous experience in corporate boards (Coombes and Wong 2004). 
Yet Kakabadse et al. (2006), in one of the few empirical studies conducted on 
chairman-CEO relationships, add that ‘effective governance application is 
dependent on the chairman and CEO nurturing a supportive and transparent 
relationship and manner of interaction.’ In the same vein, Westphal (1999) sug-
gests that ‘in fact board effectiveness and ultimately, firm performance may be 
enhanced by close, trusting CEO–board relationships combined with moderate 
to high levels of CEO incentive alignment.’  
In the public sector context, considering that publicly owned companies 
embody contradictory interests, the role of board members is more challenging 
and complex than in privately owned companies. Consequently, recommen-
dations in various corporate governance codes are to a great extent concerned 
with board functions and board structures (OECD 2005, OECD 2011a, OECD 
2011c). The OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned 
Enterprises from 2005, based on experience of its member countries, shares one 
major governance challenge of publicly owned companies: 
‘To find a balance between the state's responsibility for actively exercising its 
ownership functions, such as the nomination and election of the board, while at 
the same time refraining from imposing undue political interference in the 
management of the company.’ 
According to the political view of publicly owned companies, having politicians 
in the board is problematic due to political interference in the decision-making 
process, which distorts the goals defined for the managers (Shleifer and Vishny 
1994). In other words, politicians in the board are viewed to serve their own 
political goals aiming at ensuring success in elections and tenure in political 
power (Boubakri et al. 2008). The goals pursued by politically-oriented board 
members are not necessarily in line with profit and value maximization (ibid.). 
Moreover, the effects of politically appointed boards on performance may 
depend on whether the board members belong to a right- or left-wing political 
party. According to conventional wisdom, left-wing political parties favour 
the interests of stakeholders (non-financial performance) over shareholders 
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(financial performance) (Callaghan 2009). Or as Monsen and Walters (1983) 
state ‘right-wing socialists have always wanted to see nationalized companies 
be efficient and enterprising’ emphasizing the difference in political views 
about the performance of state owned companies. However, the OECD 
Guidelines (2005) suggest that the board members of publicly owned 
companies should have the relevant competence and experience, and it is 
advisable that they are recruited from the private sector. On the basis of Italian 
and German publicly owned companies, Grossi and Reichard (2008) argue that 
membership of municipal council members in the corporate boards seems to be 
questionable because politicians rarely have the experience or necessary skills 
required to manage companies. Furthermore, the OECD (2005) recommends 
that board members ‘should not act as individual representatives of the 
constituencies that appointed them’ and they should ‘be capable of independent 
judgement.’ Still, Wettenhall (1985) argues that an independent board may 
‘shelter its misdeeds’ if there is little control by politicians, which again suggest 
holding publicly owned companies subject to public controls (Wettenhall 1968, 
Thynne 1991, 1995). Moreover, Menozzi et al. (2010) indicate that publicly 
owned companies under an independent board can face a specific performance 
influencing ‘double agency’ problem that might arise between managers and 
board members, on one hand, and between politicians and the ultimate owners 
of the company, the citizens, on the other hand. However, Shirley and Nellis 
(1991) conclude based on their observations that politicians cannot avoid 
interfering in publicly owned companies regardless of barriers established to 
prevent this. Consequently, the problem of political discretion is considered to 
remain a major problem relative to the problems of managerial discretion 
influencing the performance of publicly owned companies (Boycko et al. 1996).  
In summary, various corporate governance mechanisms with different 
natures can be distinguished, and these interact and may be used as substitutes 
or complements in a company. An understanding of how the different govern-
ance mechanisms interact is important in interpreting their role in solving and 
avoiding particular agency problems. However, it can be concluded that corpo-
rate governance mechanisms may improve corporate performance through 
better coordination and supervision over managers in the following ways (Love 
2010): (1) with better supervision, managers are more effective in their opera-
tions and spend fewer resources on non-productive activities; (2) there are more 
value-maximizing decisions and investments made in the company. Among 
other corporate governance mechanisms, the board appears as a central gover-
nance mechanism available for shareholders’ use in the pursuit of their per-
formance objectives in the company. Of importance to this research is the 
recognition that board contingencies, elements and roles in combination 
influence how the board members fulfil their roles and ultimately how the board 
influences corporate performance. Regarding boards, the discussion in this 
subchapter leads to a number of relevant questions to consider: (1) What is the 
functional emphasis of the boards? (2) What are the peculiarities of the board 
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members? (3) How do these aspects influence corporate performance? More-
over, in this context what is the interaction between the chairman and CEO as 
key governance actors? 
 
 
1.1.4. Generation, incorporation and the use  
of performance information to influence performance  
through governance mechanisms 
As noted earlier, information asymmetry is the cornerstone of agency conflicts 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976) and the availability of performance-related infor-
mation plays an important role in aligning governance actors’ interests through 
established governance mechanisms. In a principal-agent relationship, however, 
before the performance information can be disclosed to the principal (stake-
holders), it must get generated and delivered by the agent (manager). Therefore, 
considering the integrative potential of performance information, the present 
subchapter seeks to explore the theoretical requirements for performance 
measurement and management systems to supply stakeholders with appropriate 
performance information to control and influence corporate performance. 
Moreover, in the literature the term ‘performance’ is variously associated with 
‘information’, ‘measurement’ and ‘management,’ which are often used inter-
changeably. For a clear separation between the concepts, in this dissertation 
uses performance measurement to mean activities aimed at obtaining infor-
mation on performance, while performance management is about incorporating 
and using the performance information in decision-making and control (Van 
Dooren et al. 2010, Collier 2008a). In other words, performance measurement 
means activities that quantify performance, while the result of these activities is 
performance information (ibid.). 
In the literature, a variety of purposes for performance information are 
suggested. Van Dooren (2006) argues that a total of forty-four potential uses of 
performance information can be distinguished. Behn (2003) suggests eight 
different managerial uses of performance information, such as evaluation, 
control, budgeting, motivating, promoting, celebrating, learning and improving. 
Van Dooren et al. (2010) summarize via a more compact categorization by 
pointing out the following purposes for performance information: (1) learning – 
to find out what works and why (not), (2) steering and control – motivating and 
sanctioning, and (3) account giving – communicating and explaining past 
performance. The present research deals with issues of performance information 
mostly in the context of ‘steering and control’ and ‘account giving.’ 
As noted earlier, before saying someone is accountable for any performance, 
there should be a prior assignment of responsibilities, in other words, per-
formance goals and targets (Thomas 1998, Llewellyn 1998, Koppell 2003, Brito 
and Perrault 2009). Setting performance targets is viewed as the first step in a 
performance measurement process. Otley (1987) and Kloot (1999) distinguish 
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three basic building blocks in performance measurement: (1) the performance 
that an organization is seeking to encourage, (2) the standards and, (3) the 
rewards or penalties related to achieving performance targets. Van Dooren et al. 
(2010) present an (ideal-type) analytical performance measurement model, 
which depicts performance measurement as a process of five related steps as 
shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. An ideal-typical performance measurement model (source: Van Dooren et al. 
2010) 
 
 
The first step – targeting – questions what will be measured. From a simplistic 
view, if you start out with a goal in mind, you are more likely to reach it. This 
has been the main idea and assumptive strength behind the Management by 
Objectives model (MBO) (Drucker 1954), which declares that if a desired out-
come is defined as a goal or objective and the progress towards reaching the 
goal or objective is measured then the chances of reaching that outcome are 
enhanced. The MBO concept introduced the SMART criteria8 (Doran 1981) 
that are considered as good predictors of effective goals; that is, goals that shape 
behaviour. Kaplan and Norton (1992) in their widely used balanced scorecard 
model consider the following four dimensions of performance for targeting: 
(1) financial perspective, (2) internal business perspective, (3) customer pers-
pective and, (4) innovation and learning perspective. Van Dooren et al. (2010) 
argue that measurement can be targeted at the interests of the most important 
stakeholders. 
                                                                          
8  The acronym SMART stands for the characteristics of an effective objective: Specific, 
Measurable, Actionable, Reasonable and Time-bound. Objectives that meet the SMART 
criteria are more likely to shape behavior than those that are low in these characteristics 
(Doran 1981).  
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The second step – the selection of indicators – is the question of how to 
measure and deals largely with the selection of appropriate performance indi-
cators. The selection of performance indicators is dependent on how per-
formance information will be used. The production model of performance (see 
Appendix 1) is often seen as the basis for defining indicators (Van Dooren et al. 
2010) in the public sector context. Performance indicators are generally iden-
tified as input, process, output and outcome (Hatry 1999). Input is a measure of 
the resources (e.g. funds, employees, time) provided for the activity being 
measured. Process indicators measure activities by comparing what is done with 
what should be done according to standard procedures over a period of time. 
Output indicators measure the quantity and quality of the end product, while 
outcome indicators measure the degree to which the end product achieves the 
project (program) objectives (ibid.). The production model of performance by 
Bouckaert and Halligan (2008) also addresses the creation of ratio indicators 
combining the different dimensions of the model (e.g. input-to-output 
indicators). Moreover, in the literature there can be found a number of criteria a 
good performance indicator should meet, such as ‘sensitive to change’, 
‘precisely defined’, ‘understandable for users’, ‘documented’, ‘relevant’ and 
‘complies with coordinated data processes and definitions’ (Van Dooren et al. 
2010).  
However, the third and the fourth step in the performance measurement 
model in Figure 6 are respectively about data collecting and analysis to turn 
collected data on actual results ultimately into meaningful performance infor-
mation for decision-makers. A typical approach here is to compare the actual 
results with initial targets or competitors’ results, which are useful for account 
giving (Van Dooren et al. 2010). But the results can also be broken down or 
consolidated when conducting the analysis. The last step – reporting – refers to 
the question of what is the right reporting format for a particular target group. 
Van Dooren et al. (2010) suggest that annual reporting could be a good instru-
ment for reporting to stakeholders and interest groups, while oral commu-
nication with scorecards would be suitable for reporting to the top management. 
News flashes and publicity are suggested as instruments for reaching the 
general public through the media (ibid.).  
Indeed, performance measures can be an important tool for understanding 
performance, but without a process for using this information, it is of limited 
value. Van Dooren et al. (2010) also propose a hierarchical three-cycle model 
for the integration of performance information into public sector management. 
Generally, their model follows the logic of Deming’s model, commonly known 
as the PDCA (Plan, Do, Check and Act) cycle (Deming 2000).  
The three related cycles as revealed in Figure 7 become important for 
managing performance in the public sector. At first the performance infor-
mation will be incorporated in the policy cycle by determining the objectives 
and targets for resources, activities, outputs and outcomes in a strategic plan 
(ibid.). In the literature there are a number of authors suggesting that 
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performance measures should be derived from strategic plans (Globerson 1985, 
Mintzberg and Quinn 1988, Kaplan and Norton 1992). Argento and Grossi 
(2010) view the strategic plans as the landmark for defining the financial and 
non-financial objectives of public services providers. These plans must be 
monitored and consequently evaluated, performance information gets incor-
porated into monitoring and evaluation documents for assessing past per-
formance (Van Dooren et al. 2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Incorporation of performance information (source: Van Dooren et al. 2010) 
 
 
The second cycle – the financial cycle – embedded in the policy cycle translates 
the priorities into budgets. Bryson and Boal (1983) state that goals will be taken 
seriously in the planning process only if the budgets depend on them. In the 
ideal-typical situation, the strategies and budgets should correspond to strategic 
plans and incorporate the same information in a different way (Schedler and 
Siegel 2005, Van Dooren et al. 2010). Berry and Wechsler (1995) argue that it 
might be problematic in the public sector to maintain a long-term view of 
activities, when public budgeting is mostly annual basis. Budget implemen-
tation should be controlled through the accounting system. Ter Bogt (2001) 
claims that only integrated information about proposed (e.g. budgeted) and 
realized performance (e.g. accounted) can contribute to effective control. The 
final element of the financial cycle is related to conducting performance audits. 
The third cycle of the performance management model – the contract cycle – 
is related to the question of who (e.g. which agency) will perform one or 
another particular task under contract. The contract cycle is determined by the 
financial cycle. There the obligations and rights of the key actors or organi-
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zations in the contracts are stipulated (Van Dooren et al. 2010). The contracts 
should state the expected output and outcomes produced by the agency in return 
for earned revenues. Schedler and Siegel (2005) argue that objectives will only 
be effective if they are accordingly linked to motivation and sanction mecha-
nisms. To implement the contract there should be a monitoring system in place, 
which also includes reporting on the basis of key performance indicators. 
According to the model, contract implementation is evaluated in the context of 
accountability and actual results are measure against targets in the contract. 
Finally the realisation of targets will provide input for the next contract cycle 
(Van Dooren et al. 2010).  
In summary, the discussion above indicates that clearly stated objectives 
and appropriate performance measures, which allow the principal to measure 
progress towards the objectives, are needed to control and influence corporate 
performance. Moreover, in order to ensure accountability for (multifaceted) 
performance and enhance the achievement of various interrelated goals in dif-
ferent principal-agent relationships, it becomes important to link different 
management processes, such as planning, budgeting, measurement and 
reporting, and result-based decision-making, through a systematic use of per-
formance measures. An integrated performance measurement and management 
system can contribute to achieving this task. Yet, considering that different 
actors may be accountable for the achievement of different (long-term and 
short-term) goals, a performance measurement and management system seeks to 
enhance coherence between them. However, for the purposes of the present 
dissertation, this leads to an important question about what and how 
performance information is generated, incorporated and used in governance 
relationships? Furthermore, ultimately the question is of how this enables the 
principal to control and influence corporate performance. 
 
 
1.2. Shifts in public services provision and 
performance expectations  
The dissertation has to this point provided the main concepts and theories 
applied in the study, such as corporate governance, accountability and per-
formance, and explored the theoretical background of governance-performance 
relationships. Subchapter 1.2 takes the governance-performance discussion 
further into the context of public services9 provision by expanding the focus 
from governance interactions within a single company (micro level) to inter-
actions between a company and local government (meso level). In light of 
public services externalization, differences in the roles of contractor (local 
                                                                          
9  The term ‘public services’ usually stands for services provided by (local, regional and 
central) government to its citizens, associated with a social view that certain services should 
be available to all, regardless of income.  
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government) and provider (public service company) will be discussed along 
with the challenges and promises of governance mechanisms in avoiding per-
formance eroding conflicts. Subchapter 1.2 ends with a review of empirical 
evidence from previous studies about the relationships between governance and 
performance in public services provision.  
 
 
1.2.1. Externalization of public services in pursuit  
of performance improvement 
Debates on the government’s role in public services provision can be traced 
back at least as far as Adam Smith (1759), who argued in his first book The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments about the need for institutional solutions that suit 
the problems that arise rather than institutions serving some fixed formula or 
dogma (Ramesh et al. 2010). There are a number of features of public services 
provision that distinguish them from private business and have implications for 
aspects of governance. As Hartley and Skelcher (2008) point out, (1) public 
service organizations ‘do not choose their market’ but must provide services to 
anyone who meets the eligibility criteria; (2) public services are ‘under the 
formal control of politicians’ who are elected representatives of wider con-
stituencies and, (3) public service organizations also ‘operate in arenas of 
‘market failure’ where the market is thought to be unlikely to operate effec-
tively.’ Therefore, public services have been traditionally provided directly by 
governments.  
Since the early 1980s, the public sector in Western democracies has been 
under constant pressure to improve its performance in pursuit of greater 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness, and to revive the shrinking trust in 
public institutions. Internationally, a wave of government reforms, usually asso-
ciated with the NPM concept, can also be observed from the 1980s onwards 
(Kettl 2000). NPM reforms have been driven by two main ideas: (1) the 
introduction of market approaches to public sector management, and (2) a shift 
from activity control to results control (Hood 1995, Pollitt and Summa 1997, 
Budding 2008).  
Along with managerial reforms, there have also been institutional reforms 
aimed at reducing the role of the central government in economic fields 
(Argento et al. 2010). Based on the NPM ideology, one of the most remarkable 
public sector reform initiatives of the last decade in EU countries has been the 
externalization of public services through corporatisation, contracting out, 
public-private partnerships and privatisation (Doherty and Horne 2002, Torres 
and Pina 2002, Dexia Crediop 2004, Reichard 2007, Grossi and Reichard 2008). 
Stimulus for the reform programme stems from the belief, strongly advocated 
by public choice theory, that governments are too large, inefficient, ineffective 
and unresponsive to change (Pollitt and Summa 1997). Since the goal of exter-
nalization is the improvement of performance in public services provision, i.e. 
56 
higher service quality and lower costs, it becomes critically important for each 
partner to define which type of partnership he will be involved in (Broadbent et 
al. 2003, Vaillancourt Rosenau 2000). Grossi (2007) points out that when exter-
nalizing public services, it becomes necessary to link the financial aspects of 
externalization choices with a pragmatic vision of their consequences for both 
users and politicians. The decision to externalize public services cannot be a 
unilateral decision made by politicians; user expectations and public service 
needs (i.e. security, quality and quantity) must be considered in the decision-
making process (ibid.). Therefore, externalization can be viewed as a solution to 
reconciling the different interests of internal and external stakeholders.  
A view currently emerging in the literature about privatisation and deregu-
lation experiences of the last two decades outlines the importance of context and 
contingencies when deciding on private sector involvement in public services 
delivery (Ramesh et al. 2010). So Araral (2008), building on the work of 
Ostrom (2005), points out three main contextual factors that become important 
in decision-making between private or public production: (1) characteristics of 
the service, (2) characteristics of the actors, and (3) the institutional context. In 
terms of service characteristics, the axiom is that if the service is not easy to 
specify and monitor (information problem), direct government provision would 
be more efficient and responsive to citizens needs. In regard to the char-
acteristics of the actors, the interests (e.g. return targets), ideas and power of the 
key actors involved (e.g. service producers, investors) should be taken into 
account in order to minimize various risks (e.g. regulatory, political and 
commercial risks). The considerations related to the institutional context are 
based on aspects from the theory of incomplete contracts, transaction cost 
theory (Williamson 1999, 2000; Hart et al. 1997) and industrial organization 
theory (Bel et al. 2010), which argue that asset ownership and contractual 
arrangements matter for the outcomes of privatisation because as discussed 
earlier in subsection 1.1.2 contracts are incomplete, information is imperfect 
and transactions costs evident (Ramesh et al. 2010).  
From the strategic perspective, local authorities as providers of public 
services have a number of options for reacting to external pressures and 
challenges. For long public services provision is not just a choice between two 
options – traditional direct public or fully private provision. Reichard (2007) 
argues that with regard to a particular public service, a local government can 
choose between the following options when facing external pressures: 
1. Continue to produce the service with internal means according to traditional 
patterns of internal production (i.e. within the public sector with public 
employees and budget funds). 
2. Modernise its structures and procedures and prepare its units for future chal-
lenges. 
3. Contract-out or privatise in order to get rid of the obligation of providing the 
service and the related responsibilities. 
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4. Accept the challenges in the market and put its service under the regime of a 
competitive arrangement (i.e. compulsory competitive tendering). 
5. Increase cooperation with partners from both the public and private sectors. 
 
Moreover, Reichard pointedly depicts the main strategic options for public 
authorities in terms of institutional choices in the form of a triangle with 
hierarchy (H), market (M) and cooperation (C) in the corners as illustrated in 
Figure 8 (ibid.). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Institutional solutions in public services provision (source: Reichard 2007) 
 
 
Figure 8 indicates the tendency where the direct production of public services 
by local governments and traditionally strong collaborative and corporatist rela-
tions between local authorities, have been replaced by more competitive 
patterns. Local public providers are in competition with private companies. This 
has happened in the local infrastructure service sectors with increased com-
petition between public utilities and private for-profit providers. These are the 
sectors where processes, costs, outputs and qualities can easily be specified and 
measured. Typical cases for such public service sectors are waste disposal, 
street cleaning, office cleaning, building maintenance, water, energy or public 
transport (Reichard 2007). Cooperation and competition, as shown in Figure 8 
are two highly interrelated modes of steering in the setting of governance-type 
structures (Oppen and Sack 2005, Reichard 2007).  
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However, Reichard (2007) argues that there is no single solution for public 
services provision and the different alternatives are interrelated. As pointed out 
by Araral (2008), the decision depends on the specific context of the local 
authority and on the nature of the public service. Yet it must be considered that 
sometimes it is possible to combine some of the solutions; for example, to  
co-operate with others and to intensify measures of ‘marketisation’ like the 
notion of ‘co-opetition’ (Nalebuff and Brandenburger 1996). All in all, for the 
purpose of the present dissertation, it is important to recognise that in light of 
externalisation there are different institutional options for governments 
providing public services. Moreover, it is argued that the modes of externali-
zation, depending on particular conditions, do influence the multifaceted 
performance of public services provision. This raises a relevant question for the 
present dissertation to explore the perspectives of particular modes of 
externalisation (public, public-private and private) and how they influence the 
performance of public services provision. Relying on the model of institutional 
choice in Figure 8, the remainder of the present subchapter provides an insight 
into the major modes of externalization and seeks to explore the theoretical 
expectations of their influence on the performance of public services provision. 
 
Corporatisation 
Corporatisation is a central element in Figure 8, referring to the transformation 
of government agencies into government-owned private law companies in order 
to introduce corporate management techniques. Government-owned (or publicly 
owned) companies are independent legal entities, established by public bodies, 
pursuing revenue-producing commercial-type activities (Torres and Pina 2002). 
Yeung (2005) characterizes government-owned companies as a form of 
government in business – the government wholly or partially owns a particular 
organization that directly produces or provides goods and services to satisfy 
certain collective needs in a community. These companies irrespective of their 
organizational forms are expected to achieve economic and operational effi-
ciency, and at the same time meet social or policy objectives and be accountable 
to the general public (Bozec et al. 2002). Figure 9 illustrates that governance of 
a publicly owned company is subject to influences from (and sometimes 
conflicts among) the state, market and civil society (Le and Buck 2011). All these 
influencers are very different by nature in terms of sources of power, values, 
rationales and norms, which necessitate seeking the right balance of diverse 
interests, the right balance between control and autonomy (Yeung 2005).  
Corporatisation is seen as one option for improving the performance of 
public services provision by (1) providing managerial autonomy from political 
interference, and (2) by making monitoring the company’s performance easier 
than it was when the company was hidden inside a government department (Xu 
et al. 2005, Vagliasindi 2008). Collin and Hansson (1991) argue that the 
corporate form can fulfil one of the three functions for governments: 
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1. Rationalization, when the capitalist corporate form is considered to help 
management focus on costs, but the organization is still considered a public 
sector operation. 
2. Competitiveness, when the corporate form makes it possible to avoid certain 
features of public sector organizations that are considered to hamper an 
organizations capacity to become competitive on a capitalist market. 
3. Privatisation, when the corporate form prepares the company for private, 
capitalist owners, this makes it easier to value the company and easier to 
transfer the ownership.  
 
 
Figure 9. Governance of a publicly owned company: influences from the state, market 
and civil society (source: adapted from Yeung 2005) 
 
 
Public-private partnership 
Located on the hierarchy-cooperation axis in Figure 8, the term public-private 
partnership (PPP) has a diversity of meanings in the literature (Linder 1999, 
Bovaird 2004, Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011). In the broader sense, PPPs 
are defined as ‘working arrangements based on mutual commitment (over and 
above that implied in any contract) between a public sector organization with 
any other organization outside the public sector’ (Bovaird 2004). Brinkerhoff 
and Brinkerhoff (2011) point out that such a conceptualization of PPPs high-
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contractual relationship’. The partners bring competence to the working 
arrangement, thereby creating synergy (ibid.).  
In the literature a number of PPP classifications can be found based on their 
purpose and various dimensions (Hodge and Greve 2007). The present disser-
tation focuses on a specific form of PPP – long-term infrastructure PPPs, also 
referred to as institutionalized PPPs by the European Commission (Greve and 
Hodge 2010). The institutionalized PPP is argued to be the most developed 
form of PPP because it involves the creation of a separate legal entity, such as a 
company, with mixed public-private ownership (Grossi and Rocher 2005). 
Institutionalized PPPs mainly concern lucrative sectors (Greve 2003, Brinker-
hoff and Brinkerhoff 2011) like water, energy, highways, ports and so on, where 
they bring together governments and the private sector to finance, construct and 
operate infrastructure facilities. 
The rationale for government partnerships with the for-profit private sector 
encompasses both instrumental and normative aims (Brinkerhoff and Brinker-
hoff 2011). From an instrumental perspective, partnering with the private sector 
can afford the government access to technical expertise and established net-
works for complementary resource sharing. Engaging capital from private part-
ners is a means for governments to circumvent financial straits (Dexia Crediop 
2004). For infrastructure PPPs that access private financing, public-private risk 
sharing is one of the drivers both as a means of leveraging investment in public 
goods and of providing performance incentives. From an incentives perspective, 
PPPs may have an explicit objective of incorporating ‘business-like’ practices 
and thinking, including bottom-line enforcement mechanisms and competition. 
A major reason why governments choose to enter into institutional public-
private partnerships is the expectation of higher productivity because mixed 
companies are expected to operate at lower costs than fully publicly owned 
companies (Marra 2006). Yet, retaining some ownership allows the public 
authority to gather more information about the actual costs of the public service 
company (i.e. diminished asymmetry of information) with more control over 
service management (Schmidt 1996).  
Nevertheless, in practice many PPPs do not achieve the planned public bene-
fits and may yield unintended consequences either due to poor implementation 
(e.g. due to problems with government regulations) or biased incentives 
(Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011). Consequently, a corporation with mixed 
public-private ownership is a potential conflict point between the partners 
(Grossi 2007). Conflict may arise when social value (i.e. satisfaction of the 
community) is not adequately reconciled with economic value, which should 
not necessarily be ascribed solely to the pursuit of profits. Still, this does not 
mean that public and private interests are un-reconcilable; however, the creation 
of a system of governance and adequate planning becomes critical to 
accomplish each partner’s objectives and to build rapport among partners 
(ibid.). All in all, from the theoretical perspective, institutionalized PPPs are 
about attempting to achieve performance that may not be obtained by 
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government or private companies acting separately. As yet, the results of mixed 
public-private ownership on company performance are not clear (Bös 1991). In 
public services, mixed ownership might be an optimal combination mitigating 
the disadvantages of pure public or private ownership (Schmitz 2000), but it 
may also embody the worst qualities of both worlds (Vining and Boardman 
2008). Vining and Boardman (2008) argue that public and private partners have 
conflicting goals (Trailer et al. 2004), which is likely to raise transaction costs 
and lead to negative externalities or reductions in service quality. Moreover, due 
to conflicting goals, the PPPs can result in ‘high contract bargaining costs, 
opportunistic behaviour by one or both sides, failure to achieve goals, and part-
nership dissolution’ (ibid.). Consequently, for the present research, this leads us 
to an important question of what governance mechanisms should be set up and 
how in order to produce an effective institutionalized PPP without performance 
eroding conflicts between the partners. 
 
Privatisation  
The term ‘privatisation’ depicts the institutional choice located most drastically 
away from the traditional direct provision of public services by governments on 
the hierarchy-market axis in Figure 8. The earliest written record of the word 
‘privatisation’ in English occurred in 1959 (The Oxford English…1989, Bel 
2006) long before the current NPM movement emerged. In a broader sense, the 
term ‘privatisation’ is defined to ‘alter the status of (a business or industry) from 
public to private control or ownership’ (Webster’s Third New…1961). In the 
same vein, a remarkable privatisation theorist, Savas (1987), defines privati-
sation as ‘the act of reducing the role of government, or increasing the role of 
the private sector, in an activity or in the ownership of assets.’ Domberger and 
Jensen (1997) provide a narrower definition of privatisation, considered also in 
this dissertation, when they argue that privatisation refers to the transfer of the 
ownership of physical assets from public to private ownership. In the context of 
the various definitions, Grimsey and Lewis (2004) emphasize that the term ‘pri-
vatisation’ is often used synonymously with ‘contracting out’ in the literature, 
especially in the US; however, contracting out does not generally involve the 
sale of publicly owned assets (Domberger and Jensen 1997). 
However, the arguments for privatisation have pointed out improved 
services, smaller costs, greater expertise and managerial flexibility and lower 
inefficiencies (Bennet and Johnson 1981, Savas 1982, Donahue 1989, Kettl 
1993, Goldsmith 1997). Perhaps one of the most debated issues in the context of 
privatisation is whether the change in ownership would lead to higher efficiency 
and service quality, or improvements stem from the pressure of competition. 
Savas (2000) advocates that ‘the primary goal of any privatisation effort is, or 
should be, to introduce competition and market forces in the delivery of public 
services.’ However, Vickers and Yarrow (1988) find that how much 
competition there will be after privatisation depends on the structure of the 
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industry and government policies. In the same vein, Domberger and Jensen 
(1997) stress that because privatised companies may or may not operate in a 
competitive market, ‘privatisation is essentially independent from the promotion 
of competition.’ Reichard (2007) suggests that efficiency improvement is rather 
dependent on the functioning of competitive regimes than on the transfer of 
ownership to private investors. Van Slyke (2003) concludes that privatisation 
success appears to depend on the specific type of services, the existence of 
developed and competitive markets, the specificity of the contract and the 
ability to enforce accountability and outcomes.  
Forster and Mouly (2006) notice that privatisation can be synonymous with 
the movement away from the provision of goods and services for the public to 
the provision of goods and services for profit. In the same context, Hart, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that private provision provides more incen-
tives to improve efficiency, but that it may happen at the expense of service 
quality. Warner (2010), in opposition to the pro-privatisation theorists (Savas 
1987), claims that privatisation is not a reduction in the role of the state, but 
rather a shift in its role (Schamis 2002) toward using new governance tools (e.g. 
contracts, price and quality regulations) to engage markets more effectively in 
public services delivery. Thus, privatisation does not mean that governments 
can externalize public services and walk away; instead governments must 
remain actively engaged in public services provision (Warner 2010). Otherwise, 
downsizing in government workforces can lead to a bundle of ‘hollow state’ 
problems as referred to by Milward (1994) and Milward and Provan (2000, 
2003). Moreover, Morphet (2008) points out some general problems related to 
the introduction of privatised services, which stem from specific causes. The 
first is where a poor service is privatised without any other action taken to 
improve it. The second type of failure is where the local authority does not have 
a clear understanding of the ‘client’ function. All contracts need standards for per-
formance measurement and acceptable means for dealing with contract failure 
(ibid.). Therefore, it can be argued that privatisation can enhance the performance 
of public services provision only if some necessary prerequisites are met.  
In summary, local governments have a variety of new institutional choices, 
how to arrange public services provision. One tendency is that instead of the 
direct provision of public services by the government itself, the services are 
produced and delivered by specialized companies with public, private or mixed 
public-private ownership. All the new institutional externalization choices 
embody promises of improved performance regarding efficiency and effective-
ness in public services provision; however, the effects largely depend on the 
other governance arrangements applied (e.g. contracts) and the particular 
industry context (e.g. level of competition). For the purpose of the present 
research, this discussion leads to an important question of what governance 
mechanisms should be applied by governments and how in order to result in 
effective externalization through publicly, privately and jointly owned mixed 
public-private companies. 
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1.2.2. Changed institutional roles of local governments  
in public services provision 
As apparent from the previous discussion, externalization in public services 
leads to changed roles for governments. Obviously government participation in 
public services provision does not imply that the government itself must neces-
sarily carry out the production of these goods or services. As Atkinson and 
Stiglitz (1980) explain: 
“We need to make an important distinction, between public production and 
public provision. Both are often confused, though logically and in practice they 
are distinct. The government provides for national defence, yet much of the pro-
duction of the goods purchased for national defence is within the private sector”.  
In other words, the provision of public services can be viewed as the specific 
legal responsibility of governments, while the production of these services as a 
technical and economic activity may be carried out by public or private insti-
tutions. The same idea represents the core of the normative ‘Ensuring State’ 
(Gewährleistungsstaat) concept that emerged in German-speaking countries 
(Reichard 2007). According to this concept, the local government acts primarily 
as an ensuring (guaranteeing) actor of public services (Mastronardi and 
Schedler 2004, Schuppert 2000). In this role local government is seen to act as 
follows (Reichard 2007):  
 Local government decides on certain tasks and services (granting a service 
level); 
 Local government invites tenders from public or private organizations with 
regard to the production and delivery of a particular service; 
 The allocation of responsibilities – granting responsibility remains with the 
government, production and delivery responsibility can be allocated to a 
public or a private organization; 
 The local government monitors and controls the whole process of service 
delivery. 
 
The general logic is that a particular public service should be produced and 
delivered within an appropriate institutional arrangement; that is, by a certain 
public sector organization or by a private company. However, in order to set 
this normative Ensuring State concept in practice, it is considered necessary to 
restructure the entire political-administrative setting of the municipalities (ibid.). 
A major implication of applying the Ensuring State concept would be the 
introduction of the contractor-provider split, distinguishing the contractor’s 
(local authority) and the provider’s (separated internal unit or external provider) 
roles in public services delivery.  
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Local government’s role as contractor 
When a local government decides to give up the direct production and delivery 
of public services, the service provision process becomes a network structure, 
where different types of autonomous counterparts are tied to the local govern-
ment (1) by a contractual or (2) by both a contractual and an ownership relation-
ship (Grossi and Mussari 2008). In the first case, the external provision entity 
enjoys a good level of freedom from the local government and could potentially 
provide misleading information on the activities carried out (Argento and 
Grossi 2010). However, local government must obtain reliable information to 
exercise effective control over the service provider and assess the respective 
costs (Erridge 2003), which addresses the need to define suitable corporate 
governance rules (Neale and Anderson 2000). Contracts are suggested as proper 
legal instruments for locking in rules and achieving coherence and predictability 
in the governance relationships. In the public sector context, Lane (1999) points 
out that contracting involves a number of important properties that are all 
viewed as performance enhancing in public services: voluntary, goal-oriented, 
incentive based, concrete and specific and of a limited time horizon. As poten-
tial advantages of using contracts, even if direct monitoring costs can be rela-
tively high (Jensen 1993), it makes it possible to stipulate clear conditions about 
what has been agreed to, what is to be delivered, who is to pay and what 
additional obligations have been consented to (Lane 1999).  
However, the contractor-provider split, as depicted in Figure 10, illustrates 
the separation of the different roles – ensuring and providing – in public 
services. The contractor (e.g. local government) carries the guarantor respon-
sibility and the providing entities (e.g. public services company) are responsible 
for production and delivery of the services (Mastronardi and Schedler 2004, 
Schuppert 2000). The relationship between the contractor (guarantor) and the 
service provider is flexible and based on contracts, which stipulate the major 
requirements for the providing entity. As noted earlier, the role of local 
government in the contractor-provider relationship is rather seen as the ensuring 
and guaranteeing institution of public services not as the major producer. In this 
context the local government is left with the responsibility of (1) defining 
strategies and priorities, and (2) coordinating and monitoring the delivery of 
services in an efficient and effective manner in accordance with the service 
contract (Grossi and Reichard 2008, Grossi and Mussari 2008).  
Reichard (2007) argues that the semi-autonomous public services provider 
could be governed through a holding core, composed of a coordinating 
administrative department and political-administrative establishment under the 
local government. The holding core has the function of coordinating and 
controlling its own service providing units and furthermore to transact with 
other (external private) partners.  
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Figure 10. Contractor-provider split in public services provision (source: adapted from 
Reichard 2007)10 
 
 
Obviously, the separation of ‘contractor’ from ‘provider’ requires new skill and 
orientation from the local government because consequently it has to ‘steer’ the 
provider and organize contracting activities. Grossi and Reichard (2008) suggest 
that the role of guarantor requires suitable planning mechanisms and coordi-
nation concepts. A local authority responsible for granting certain public 
services is required to have a clear vision and understanding of the role and 
tasks of its various service producing units. It has to determine the future posi-
tion of the service providers in the market and set clear and realistic per-
formance targets for them (ibid.). Moreover, every provision unit must be aware 
of the expectations (i.e. goals) of its contractor (Reichard 2007), which implies 
a clear communication of planned outputs and impacts elevating the themes of 
accountability and reporting to a position of critical importance (Neale and 
Anderson 2000, Ryan and Ng 2000, Chan 2003, Ezzamel at al. 2005). Con-
sequently, as indicated in the literature (De Bruijn 2002, Argento and Grossi 
2010), an effective performance measurement system is necessary in local 
governments to provoke perverse effects of information disclosure in contrac-
tual relationships with public services companies. 
 
 
 
                                                                          
10  Originally Reichard (2007) marks it as ‘purchaser-provider split’ to distinguish between 
the purchaser side (contactor/guarantor responsibilities) and the provider side (production 
and delivery of public services) in a municipal setting.  
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Dual roles of local government in a public services company 
When a local government remains tied to the public services company after the 
externalization both by a contractual relationship and a (partial or full) owner-
ship relationship, the problem of a conflict of interest arises for the local 
government due to its dual role as owner and contractor (Neale and Anderson 
2000). In a publicly owned company responsible for public services provision 
the local government has to fulfil the role of owner (shareholder). As the owner 
of the company, the local government exercises its property rights and is 
committed to the maintenance and growth of the value of assets. Moreover, 
even if the publicly owned company does not have profit as its main objective, 
as owner the local government is interested in a return on capital invested 
(Grossi and Reichard 2008). Thus, the performance interests of the local 
government as the owner of a public services company are similar to that of an 
investor in a private company, while for the local government as contractor 
(guarantor) financial performance (e.g. corporate profit) should be relatively 
less important than the achievement of social objectives (non-financial per-
formance). 
Hence, a publicly owned company is faced with multiple conflicting 
objectives, such as balancing financial (economic) with non-financial (social) 
objectives (Araral 2008). As public owner, the local government’s aim is profit; 
it tries to preserve the corporation. Instead, as service guarantor (contractor), the 
local government aims to ensure the supply of services at reasonable prices and, 
is less interested in the realization of profits (ibid.). Of importance to the present 
research is the recognition that these two roles of the local government embody 
a conflict of interest, which influences financial and non-financial performance 
in public services. Shirley and Nellis (1991) consider this as a fundamental 
problem in public services, when a government acts at the same time both as 
(local) regulator and shareholder of a publicly owned company. Moreover, 
McQuaid (2010) argues that situations where the local government and its 
subsidiary are required to be both actors within a purchaser-provider contract 
and strategic partners leads to a confusion of roles and incentives. Argento et al. 
(2010) argue that such a conflict of interest applies not only to the companies 
that are fully owned by local governments, but also to the mixed public-private 
ownership companies, including those listed on the stock exchange. The authors 
emphasize that the problem of conflicts of interest is especially strong in water, 
waste and transportation sectors, when national authorities are missing and the 
local governments are the only real regulators (ibid.). Moreover, due to the 
tense relationship between the dual roles of local government, it is suggested 
that a clear distinction be made between the two roles when designing a 
corporate governance system (Grossi and Reichard 2008, OECD 2011a) and 
developing a corporate (ownership) strategy for publicly owned companies 
(Bernier and Simard 2007, OECD 2011c). To influence both the financial and 
non-financial performance of public services companies, local governments are 
required to make a combined use of both corporate governance mechanisms 
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(e.g. boards, statute, shareholders’ agreement) and performance management 
tools (e.g. performance indicators, budgets, annual and interim reports) for 
steering and controlling corporate performance (Argento and Grossi 2010).  
In summary, resulting from the externalization of public services, a major 
change in the role of local government is to act as a contractor (service 
guarantor) that plans and monitors public services provision using specialised 
companies. This change in the role of local government introduces a set of spe-
cific governance mechanisms in the public governance system – contracts – 
necessary to direct and control performance in public services provision. Thus, 
depending on the ownership structure of the public service provider, it can be 
tied to the local government either by a contractual or by both a contractual and 
an ownership relationship as summarized in Figure 11.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Conceptual framework of the relationship between governance and per-
formance in public services provision (source: adapted from Grossi and Mussari 2008) 
 
 
According to Figure 11, both the ownership and contractual relationships need 
to rely on a multi-dimensional performance measurement and accountability in 
order to make it possible for the local government to control and direct the 
balance between financial and non-financial performance in public services 
provision. However, a fundamental conflict of interest influencing corporate 
performance relates to the dual role of local governments as contractor and 
owner of the company that provides the public services. Consequently, setting 
up mechanisms to solve the conflicts stemming from the contradictory financial 
and non-financial interests of local government in a public services company, is 
a major challenge in public sector corporate governance. For the purpose of the 
present dissertation, this discussion leads to important questions about what the 
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roles of local government and provider are in this governance relationship and 
what aspects are regulated in the contracts signed between the parties involved. 
Moreover, in the case of the public provision of public services, how do local 
governments overcome the conflict related to their dual roles in public services 
companies and what is its influence on corporate performance?  
 
 
1.2.3. Relationships between governance and performance  
in public services: evidence from previous studies 
The discussion in the present dissertation thus far, exploring the theoretical 
works of researchers working in the field of governance, finds support for the 
supposition that governance can influence corporate performance. The aim of 
this subchapter is to draw together the main empirical findings from previous 
studies of the relationship between governance and performance in the field of 
public services provision.  
Several research streams can be identified in the literature among the empiri-
cal research focusing on the governance-performance relationship in public 
services. First, a vast amount of empirical research on the governance-per-
formance relationship focuses on the influence of ownership on the performance 
of public service entities with respect to efficiency and productivity. Based on 
the applied research approach, these studies can be classified into two groups 
(Villalonga 2000): quantitative cross-sectional studies of ownership type 
effects, and quantitative longitudinal studies of privatisation effects. However, 
most of the empirical research of efficiency under private vs. public ownership 
have been in the form of cross-sectional comparisons of both types of com-
panies in sectors where they coexist (Cuervo and Villalonga 2000, Letza 2004, 
Bel and Warner 2008). Comprehensive literature reviews by Shirley and Walsh 
(2000), Megginson and Netter (2001), Hill and Lynn (2005) indicate that pri-
vate companies tend to outperform – ceteris paribus – publicly owned com-
panies in terms of efficiency. Similarly, the studies by Boardman and Vining 
(1989) and Vining and Boardman (1992) provide evidence that publicly owned 
companies are less efficient than privately owned companies. Wilson (2000) 
reveals that the greater economic efficiency of private compared to public 
suppliers of most public services is mainly the result of three factors: (1) lower 
labour costs, (2) more effective management and (3) stronger competition. 
Boycko et al. (1996) find that in publicly owned companies excess employment 
is a potential source of inefficiency, while politicians have an incentive to inter-
vene in the operation of such a company for the benefit of its employees, since 
they are more likely to support incumbent parties that protect the company. 
Moreover, Vining and Boardman (2008) find that private companies in public 
services provision ‘have a greater incentive to be ruthless because they keep the 
fiscal residual.’  
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A prominent meta-review of 153 cross-sectional studies by Villalonga 
(2000) also indicates that private companies are mostly more efficient than 
publicly owned ones (i.e. there are 104 studies in favour, 14 against and 35 
neutral). However, these results are suggestive, but not conclusive. As argued 
by Letza (2004), such results do not explicitly support the view that privately 
owned companies are more efficient than public organizations. Moreover, 
Cuervo and Villalonga (2000) show that a similar inference can be made by 
looking at privatisation case studies, but also longitudinal studies of privati-
sation effects on efficiency in both developed (D’Souza and Megginson 1999, 
Cuervo and Villalonga 2000) and Eastern European countries (Cuervo and 
Villalonga 2000, Djankov and Murrell 2002, Jones and Mygind 2002, Jones et 
al. 2003).  
In the context of PPP, a fundamental study that has investigated relationships 
between mixed public-private ownership and efficiency was carried out by 
Boardman and Vining (1989). They found that mixed companies perform at the 
same or slightly higher operational efficiency than publicly owned companies, 
while private companies are the most efficient (ibid.). Moreover, a further study 
by the same authors, Vining and Boardman (2008), referring to a number of 
empirical studies, indicates that companies with mixed public-private ownership 
often achieve neither ‘high profitability nor worthwhile social goals’ due to the 
conflicting goals of the public and private partner. Also, the studies show that 
the conflicting goals in PPP (Trailer et al. 2004) are ‘likely to raise transaction 
costs and lead to negative externalities or reductions in quality’ (Vining and 
Boardman 2008). 
In the literature, the second distinguishable stream of research in the field of 
the governance-performance relationship in public services focuses on the 
influence of contracting (-out) and related incentives on corporate performance. 
The main findings from the USA, the EU and Australia can be concluded as 
follows (Domberger and Jensen 1997, Hill and Lynn 2005, Reichard 2007, 
Skelcher 2008, and Brown et al. 2000): (1) performance standards and per-
formance incentives that are implicitly or explicitly stipulated in contracts 
influence the behaviour of contractors and service providers. Their response to 
these incentives appears in selecting clients; that is, ‘cream-skimming; in the 
misrepresentation of information to the principal; in reallocating resources 
across inputs, and in enhancing productivity toward the measured goals’ (Hill 
and Lynn 2005); (2) cost reduction and efficiency improvement as a result of 
contracting(-out) depend on contingencies, such as the presence of a formal 
contract review process, the size of the public service provider, market con-
ditions, and penalty provisions included in the contract (ibid.). Moreover, case 
studies by Brown et al. (2000) indicate that beside efficiency improvements, 
enhancement in client orientation, transparency and accountability can be 
achieved by ‘in-house’ commercialization when introducing the contractor-
provider split in public services provision; therefore, without using ‘the more 
extreme alternative of privatisation.’ 
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However, there is evidence from empirical studies, which indicates that 
externalization and the ownership structure of the public service provider are 
not significant influencers of efficiency per se (Aulich 2011). The results of 
these studies seem to indicate that the performance of the private provision of 
public services depends to a large degree on the nature of the service (Ernst 
1994, Hodge 2000, Cannadi and Dollery 2005) and competition in the market 
(Domberger et al. 1986, Domberger and Jensen 1997, Hodge 2000, Vining and 
Boardman 2008). On the example of waste collection services, Domberger et al. 
(1986) find that under competitive contracting there is no difference in costs 
between public and private provision, but in municipalities where there is no 
competitive contracting, costs of public provision are relatively higher. 
Similarly, Szymanski and Wilkins (1993), Hodge (2000), Gomez-Lobo and 
Szymanski (2001) all indicate that competitive pressures in/for public services 
provision keeps costs lower and eliminates the X-inefficiency (Niskanen 1971) 
in public services. Moreover, Bel and Warner (2008) find that private provision 
has failed to deliver consistent cost savings in public services sectors with weak 
competition (e.g. waste collection) indicating also that potential ‘cost savings 
crucially depend on the nature of public service markets.’  
Opponents of the externalization in public services argue that relatively 
higher efficiency, if any, can be achieved at the expense of the quality of the 
public services (Domberger and Jensen 1997). An early empirical study by 
Walsh (1991) of English local governments finds, vice versa, that the exter-
nalization of particular local public services through contracting out and privati-
sation has led to the introduction of explicit inspection processes and a clear 
emphasis on service quality standards. In the same vein, Domberger et al. 
(1995) and Domberger and Jensen (1997) indicate that due to an increase in 
competition resulting from externalization, the prices of various local public 
services, such as cleaning and waste disposal, will be lower, while the service 
quality is maintained or even enhanced. Nevertheless, Hart et al. (1997), 
referring to a different type of public service – prison services – find that exter-
nalization and private management are likely to be less successful in public 
services with significant non-contractable elements of quality. Similarly, Hodge 
(1998) and Perrone and Pratt (2003) indicate that the results of externalization 
and private provision in complex social public services, such as incarceration, 
are regarded ‘as ambiguous at best’ (Lember 2004). 
The third clearly distinguishable research stream in the literature regarding 
the corporate governance-performance relationship is concerned with the 
influence of the characteristics of the board on corporate performance. In the 
public sector context in particular, a research topic that has been increasingly 
investigated in recent times relates to the presence of politicians on corporate 
boards. Menozzi et al. (2010) analyze the influence of board composition on 
corporate performance based on a sample of 114 Italian local utility companies. 
The authors find that politically connected directors, representing the state or 
the local government, exert a positive and significant effect on employment, 
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while they impact negatively on the financial performance of the companies 
(ibid.). Moreover, Boubakri et al. (2008) indicate, based on a sample of 245 
privatised companies observed in 41 countries between the years 1980–2002, 
that there is a negative relationship between the financial performance and 
political connections of corporate management. Similarly, Fan et al. (2007), 
considering 790 new partially privatised companies in China, find that those 
with politically connected CEOs in charge underperform their peers without 
political connections. Alternatively, the empirical studies exploring how a 
manager’s political background can influence the corporate performance of 
private companies, find a positive significant relationship between political 
connections and financial performance. Faccio (2006), relying on a large sample 
of 20,000 companies in 47 countries, indicates that corporate value increases 
when the top manager of a private company (e.g. CEO, board members) enters 
politics. In the same vein, findings from studies on major US (Goldman et al. 
2009) and German companies (Niessen and Ruenzi 2009) indicate that political 
connections of managers increase corporate value and lead to better financial 
and stock price performance. Nevertheless, Bertrand et al. (2004), based on a 
sample of French companies, find that the companies with politically connected 
CEOs were slightly less profitable than companies managed by CEOs with a 
purely private sector background (Menozzi et al. 2010).  
Finally, in public management literature, empirical studies with a focus on 
performance management issues can be found exploring the influence of per-
formance measurement and disclosure practices on the performance of public 
sector organizations. The prominent authors in the performance management 
field, Bouckaert and Halligan (2008) and Van Dooren et al. (2010), argue that 
generally there is little empirical evidence on whether performance management 
indeed influences performance in public sector organizations. Still, there have 
been some studies that provide insight into the relationship between per-
formance measurement initiatives and performance in the public sector. A meta-
analysis by Rodgers and Hunter (1992) on MBO practices in public sector 
organizations indicates that all considered studies report productivity or other 
performance gains after the introduction of clear goals and feedback regarding 
performance. Moreover, on drawing together results from other empirical 
studies on goal clarity and measurability in public sectors (Lan and Rainey 
1992, Hendrick 2003, Chun and Rainey 2005, Boyne and Chen 2007), it 
appears that clear goals are positively related to organizational performance – 
precise targets are likely to lead to higher achievement levels in public services 
provision by central and local government agencies.  
In the Estonian context, there have been a number of empirical studies con-
ducted in the domains of public administration (e.g. Randma 2001, Drechsler 
2004, Tonnisson and Wilson 2007, Lagerspetz and Rikmann 2009, Pali-
dauskaite et al. 2010, Sarapuu 2011, Randma-Liiv et al. 2011) and economics 
(e.g. Jones and Mygind 1999, Jones et al. 2005, Rozeik 2008, Haldma et al. 
2008, Haldma and Lääts 2011, Sepp and Eerma 2011), that have addressed 
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specific aspects of public governance and management (see also page 9); 
however, most of the empirical research does not provide evidence about the 
impact of governance arrangements on the financial and non-financial results of 
public services provision. Still, in the context of a state-owned postal company, 
Sepp and Eerma (2011) indicate that opening the postal market for competition 
entailed the motivation for efficiency improvements, the reduction of costs and 
offering novel services. Randma-Liiv et al. (2011), on finding the diminishing 
financial autonomy of government agencies however, note that its effects on the 
performance of the agencies are still unclear. Moreover, there can be found 
several studies conducted in the domain of organisational management that 
provide evidence of the relationship between specific management aspects and 
the performance of general educational schools in Estonia. So Irs and Türk 
(2012) and Türk et al. (2011) indicate that higher monetary incentives are likely 
to result in greater motivation among teachers and improvements in their work 
performance. Aidla and Vadi (2008) show that school administration attitudes 
about school performance criteria have an effect on pupils’ national exami-
nation results, but these also depend on school size and location. However, none 
of the abovementioned studies explore how Estonian local governments set up 
and use both the corporate and regulatory governance mechanisms in public 
services provision, and how the different governance patterns determine finan-
cial and non-financial performance in public services.  
In summary, the present literature overview of empirical evidence on 
governance-performance relationships reveals the multi-dimensional nature of 
this research topic, and consequently, it provides various results. The empirical 
studies exploring the relationship between governance and performance largely 
test the links between particular easily measurable ‘hard’ governance attributes 
(e.g. ownership) and organizational performance (e.g. efficiency) using quanti-
tative research methods. Due to the multifarious nature of both variables – 
governance and performance – the studies included in the present overview also 
control for connections between various governance attributes and performance 
dimensions. In the public services context, a central question in the given 
studies is whether externalization and private sector involvement in public ser-
vices provision makes a difference in the performance of public services provi-
sion. Obviously, the most commonly used performance dimension in the 
empirical studies is efficiency (or productivity), while the ownership structure 
(public, private and mixed public-private) of the public service provider consti-
tutes the governance variable. There are significantly less studies controlling for 
the externalization effects on other, sometimes not so easily measurable per-
formance dimensions of public services, such as service quality. However, the 
results of the empirical studies indicate that private sector participation in the 
public services has generally improved the efficiency of services provision (as 
suggested by property rights and public choice theory); however, not always, 
and the results are contingent on the nature of the service and the presence of 
competition in the services sector (as suggested by transaction cost and 
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industrial organization theory). Moreover, the studies indicate that financial and 
non-financial performance in public services provision may depend on the 
features of contracts concluded between the service purchaser (contractor) and 
provider. Clearly stipulated performance targets, sanctions in the case of failures 
to deliver and a contract review process (as suggested by agency theory) are the 
contract features viewed as performance enhancing tools in public services 
governance. Finally, a distinct research issue closely associated with public 
services companies questions the influence of politicians (or political con-
nections) on corporate performance. The results show that in the case of 
publicly owned companies or recently privatised companies with a politically 
active manager and board members, efficiency and financial performance will 
be lower than in companies run by a manager and board members with pure 
private sector backgrounds. Alternatively, in the case of private sector com-
panies, the political background of the CEO and board members often enhances 
the financial performance of their companies. Thus, these empirical studies 
provide intriguing results, which make it possible to suggest that political repre-
sentation in corporate governance bodies is not necessarily good or bad from the 
corporate performance point of view per se.  
All in all, based on the empirical results of the studies explored it is possible 
to find support for different expectations about the influence of governance on 
corporate performance stemming from the corporate governance and per-
formance management theories discussed in the previous subchapter of the pre-
sent dissertation. Moreover, it appears that the results of externalization in 
public services are contingent and there does not exist a single performing 
governance solution across different public services companies. Therefore, in 
order to make propositions that contribute to the theory and with practical 
implications hereafter in this domain, it becomes necessary to have a deep 
insight into and consider the characteristics of particular public services. Con-
sequently, the remainder of the present dissertation will focus on the 
governance-performance relationship in a specific public services sector – water 
services.  
 
 
1.3. Governance and performance  
of water services provision 
1.3.1. Specific characteristics of water services and  
their performance 
Water services and water as a good have a number of specific characteristics 
that differentiate them from other public services and keep them on the (local) 
government agenda. The aim of this subchapter is to introduce the main 
characteristics of water services provision and discuss their peculiarities. 
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Water is essential for life. It is important for human health and well-being as 
well as for the environment and economic development. Bad water quality, 
especially water contamination can lead to disease and other health problems 
(Garcia et al. 2007). Therefore, the right to safe and clean drinking water and 
sanitation is recognised as a human right ‘essential for the full enjoyment of life 
and all human rights’ (United Nations 2010). From this point of view, water 
supply and sanitation can be viewed as a social issue; however, an alternative 
view is to consider water as a private economic good. Savenije (2002) points 
out a number of distinct characteristics that make water rather a specific eco-
nomic good: (1) water is essential, (2) water is non-substitutable, (3) water is 
finite, (4) water is fugitive, (5) water is a system and, (6) water is bulky and not 
easily tradable. Moreover, Opschoor (2006) argues that water issues are multi-
layered.  
The concept of the water cycle, illustrated in Figure 12, is useful for 
explaining the different layers in water issues. First, ground or surface water 
needs to be collected from water resources (e.g. catchments, basins, etc.) and 
purified (Argento and Van Helden 2009). Water resources play a significant 
role in the functioning of ecosystems (Opschoor 2006). Secondly, drinking 
water is delivered to water users as a good. After consuming the water, waste-
water from the users (e.g. households, companies) and rainwater are collected 
through the sewerage system and directed to wastewater treatment plants where 
they are treated (sanitation). Subsequently, water is discharged into surface 
water resources and so the cycle will repeat again.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Water cycle (source: Argento and Van Helden 2009) 
 
 
Between water as a good and water resources there exist water provision 
systems and mechanisms: the water services industry (Opschoor 2006). The EU 
Water Framework Directive (WFD) defines water services as follows (EC 
2000):  
Rainfall   Surface water  Overflow 
Ground water 
Drinking water 
Waste-water 
treatment Sewerage 
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‘Water services means all services which provide, for households, public insti-
tutions or any economic activity: (a) extraction, impoundment, storage, treatment 
and distribution of surface water or groundwater, (b) wastewater collection and 
treatment facilities, which subsequently discharge into surface water.’ 
In this dissertation, the term ‘water services’ is used in line with the WFD defi-
nition and stands for the supply of drinking water and sanitation by authorized 
water companies. Schouten (2009) examines the ambiguity of water services 
and points out several important features: 
1. Traditionally water services provision is conceived as a public good11 
(Mahdoo 2007); however, as Schouten (2009) argues, according to neo-
classical economic theory, water services should be viewed as private 
goods – they exhibit excludability, high and low rivalry, and there are 
charges for users. Opschoor (2006) points out, that water as such is typically 
seen as an impure public good – ‘a common pool resource that is non-
excludable but rivals in consumption.’ 
2. Water services can be viewed as merit and economic goods. The provision 
of water services is argued to be a merit good12 because of the public interest 
(economic and environmental externalities) at stake (Schwartz and Schouten 
2007). At the same time, in a United Nations setting, Dublin Principle13 
Number 4 declares that ‘water has an economic value in all its competing 
uses and should be recognised as an economic good.’ Before that, the OECD 
(1987) had already stated that water is an economic good, emphasizing that 
economic resources have to be applied to the natural resource in order to 
make water available in the form, quality, location and time users need it. 
However, Schouten (2009) argues that looking at water as a merit and an 
economic good should not be considered contradictory but complementary.  
 
Considering water as a (private) economic good does not mean automatically 
that water services provision is to be left to market forces (Opschoor 2006). 
Moreover, water services provision exhibits characteristics of natural monopoly 
and is therefore advocated not to be left to operate in a completely unregulated 
market (Hukka and Katko 2003, Quesada 2011). Consequently, because water 
services are a private good, a merit good and an economic good and also subject 
to market failure, water services are prominently on the political agenda of 
many (local) governments, essentially making it a ‘political good’ (Schwartz 
and Schouten 2007). 
                                                                          
11  Samuelson (1954) defines a pure public good in terms of non-exclusion and non-rivalry 
in consumption.  
12  A merit good (Musgrave 1959) is a commodity that an individual or society should have 
on the basis of some concept of need, rather than ability and willingness to pay. 
13  The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development known as the Dublin 
Principles was adopted by the United Nations at the International Conference on Water and 
the Environment (ICWE) in Dublin in 1992.  
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Water services as a natural monopoly 
Water services provision through water utilities14 is often cited as an example of 
a natural monopoly (Depoorter 1999, Parker 1999, Hukka and Katko 2003, 
Quesada 2011). The core concept for defining a natural monopoly is the subad-
ditivity of costs (Baumol 1977), which is realised if no combination of multiple 
firms can collectively produce industry output at a lower cost than a monopoly 
(Berg and Tschirhart 1988). Monopoly power often stems from economies of 
scale that imply that costs are a decreasing function of output (Posner 1969). 
Economies of scale are achieved when, over a certain period of time, the 
average cost of production per unit is reduced as a result of increasing the size 
of the operation.  
Water utilities as natural monopolies entail a large initial investment that due 
to internal economies of scale leads to declining unit costs (Sharkey 1982), and 
therefore, it is more efficient to have one relatively large service provider than 
several smaller ones (Kim 1987, Kahn 1988). Relatively large production 
volumes as the basis for obtaining consistent economies of scale, is a key 
characteristic of a large water utility. In the case of small and medium-sized 
water utilities, mergers or aggregation agreements are advocated to obtain 
economies of scale (Sørensen 2007, Grossi 2008). However, in the literature 
studies on water services provision also find that at some level, without con-
sensus on the number of users or the volume of water supplied, economies of 
scale disappear (Fraquelli and Giandrone 2003, Mizutani and Urakami 2001, 
Fraquelli and Moiso 2005). Yet, another advantage related to the growth in size 
of water utilities is that it can result in greater contractual power with stake-
holders (e.g. financiers). Based on the resource-based view (Barney 1991), the 
size as well as type of capital are important features of financial resources, 
which can affect the implementation of corporate strategies. Greater capitali-
zation allows for greater financial leverage with banks and consequently better 
financing conditions for investments (Grossi 2008). Consequently, in the natural 
monopoly context a question relevant for the present research arises concerning 
what influence does corporate size have on the performance of water companies 
(e.g. efficiency). 
Closely related to idea of a natural monopoly are some other important 
features attributed to water utilities: 
1. Water services provision is exceptionally capital intensive – capital costs 
including interest and depreciation often constitute 65–70% of all annual 
costs in water utilities (Hukka and Katko 2003). Hassein and Khalifa (2007) 
note the ratio of fixed assets to annual tariff revenue can be 10:1 in the water 
industry, compared to 3:1 in telecommunications and 4:1 in the electricity 
sector. As such, payback is lengthy and the cost of investment in the water 
                                                                          
14  The term ‘water utility’ refers to an organization that maintains the water infrastructure 
and provides water services using that infrastructure (e.g. a water company). 
77 
sector can only be recovered over many years (Idelovitch and Ringskog 
1997). 
2. The high degree of sunk costs in the form of fixed costs, which tend not to 
vary with the production volume, amounts to approximately 80% of 
operating expenses in water utilities (Hukka and Katko 2003, Kessides 
2004). 
3. Water and sewerage systems are intrinsically tied to geographical locations 
(Hall and Lobina 2007). This makes the systems subject to conditions 
determined by the external environment. Natural variables, such as location, 
the quality of water resources and geological formations influence technical 
solutions in water services production (Vinnari 2008). 
4. Locational specificity of a water utility complicates common carriage (Sei-
denstat 2000), which is ‘a system in which competing service producers use 
a common pipe line to convey the water/wastewater, and the owner of the 
network could take care of billing the customers’ (Vinnari 2008).  
5. In technical terms, water and sewerage systems are infrastructures that ‘are 
physical assets arrayed in systems that provide essential public services’ 
(Pietilä 2006). Pietilä (2006) argues that water and wastewater services are 
strongly path dependent, which means that structures should last tens of 
years or even up to a hundred years. Vinnari (2008) points out that con-
sidering the long lives and partly underground location of the water infra-
structure assets (e.g. pipe network), it becomes complicated to estimate their 
actual maintenance, repair and reconstruction needs. Importantly, invisible 
deterioration of water infrastructure assets influences water prices. 
6. Beside economies of scale, water utilities are also subject to economies of 
density, meaning that increasing the number of households connected to 
given pipe network, leads to declining unit costs (Renzetti and Dupont 
2004). 
 
From the water user’s (stakeholder) perspective, one ‘real’ difference between a 
natural monopoly and a competitive market is that under monopoly conditions 
there is an absence of alternatives regarding water services providers. Con-
sidering the importance of water services for the functioning of society and that 
water utilities are natural monopolies, there is usually some public sector inter-
vention advocated in water services provision (De Miguel and Mulas 2007). 
The central economic concern related to water services provision is that due to 
imperfect competition, the monopoly situation leads to reduced output, rela-
tively higher prices and causes wealth transfers from water users to providers 
(Vinnari 2006). At the higher price at which the monopolist tries to maximize 
profits, a group of potential customers will be excluded, as they will not be able 
to afford the product (Depoorter 1999). Therefore, for the purpose of the present 
research, an important question is raised concerning how to control and direct 
monopoly water companies for efficient and effective water services provision? 
However, as discussed in subchapter 1.2, public sector intervention does not 
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mean that public authorities should necessarily carry out the production and 
delivery of public services such as water by themselves because there are a 
number of other institutional options for local governments to influence out-
comes in public services. The institutional water services provision options will 
be discussed further in the present subchapter.  
 
Performance in water services provision 
The essentiality of water and the specificity of water utilities refer to the multi-
dimensional nature of performance in water services (Argento and Grossi 
2010). Pietilä (2006) identifies three primary stakeholder groups with different 
performance interests in water services: (1) water users, (2) water service pro-
viders and (3) political and administrative institutions. As illustrated in Figure 
13, all these major stakeholder groups – consumers, operators and the 
establishment – being in pursuit of their own interests, interact in the 
environment that influences their activities and behaviour (ibid.).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. The balance of market forces in water services (source: Hartvelt 1997 from 
Pietilä 2006) 
 
 
Shirley (2006) emphasizes the competing nature of stakeholders’ interests 
regarding the performance of water utilities as follows: (1) consumers con-
nected to the water system want quality at reasonable prices, (2) consumers not 
connected to the water system want access, (3) developers want to expand the 
building stock, (4) environmentalists want to control development, (5) industrial 
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firms want adequate water supplies for their needs and (6) farmers want con-
tinued access to water at low prices. Moreover, the ultimate aim of politicians is 
to maximize their electoral results. 
On the basis of Dubnick’s (2005) performance typology presented earlier in 
Table 1, the performance of water services provision considers the outcome 
aspect of performance (the quality of achievement), in other words, the produc-
tivity and results perspective of performance. In the literature, the performance 
of water services provision is assessed and compared through a variety of per-
formance indicators. Based on purpose, the performance indicators related to 
water services provision are usually divided into categories such as physical, 
quality of service, financial, operational, personnel and water resources (Alegre 
et al. 2006, Mkhitaryan 2009). In a World Bank setting, Van den Berg and 
Danilenko (2011) measure the performance of water utilities based on a set of 
indicators for operational efficiency, financial sustainability and customer 
responsiveness. All in all, based on the literature there can be four major types 
of performance indicators used for the assessment of water utility performance 
(Renzetti and Dupont 2004): 
1. Productivity – economically defined as the ratio between output and input 
(Mohanty 1998) relates the goods or services produced to the resources used. 
The term of productivity is often confused with the term efficiency, 
however, efficiency is linked to the utilization of resources and it mainly 
influences the input of the productivity ratio (Rutkauskas and Paulavičienė 
2005). Productivity recquires both efficiency and effectiveness (Sumanth 
1998). Productivity measurement involves the construction of index 
numbers, which can be used to indicate (Del Gatto et al. 2011): 
 partial; or 
 total factor productivity (TFP).  
Partial productivity indicators relate a water company’s output to a single 
input factor, e.g. the volume of water supplied per employee (labour produc-
tivity) or capital (capital productivity). TFP can be measured as the ratio of 
output per period for all inputs used; it is the ratio of a total aggregate output 
quantity index to a total aggregate input quantity index (Abbot and Cohen 
2009). However, in fact, TFP is more often measured as the rate of TFP 
growth during the period (Renzetti and Dupont 2004). 
2. Efficiency – indicates the use of resources so as to maximize the production 
of goods and services (see Appendix 1). Efficiency can be stated in technical 
terms or in economic terms, the former being a necessary condition for the 
latter (Herce 2004). Farrell (1957)15 explicitly decomposed productive (eco-
nomic) efficiency into two components – technical efficiency and allocative 
efficiency – as depicted in Figure 14. 
                                                                          
15  The Farrell (1957) decomposition is a fundamental cornerstone of the theory of 
efficiency measurement. 
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Figure 14. Decomposition of efficiency (compiled by the author based on Webster 
et al. 1998) 
 
An entity or unit (e.g. company) is considered technically efficient if it pro-
duces the largest output possible given the quantity of input used or if, for a 
given mix of inputs, it employs the least amount of those inputs necessary to 
produce a given level of output. Additionally, allocative efficiency takes into 
account the costs of the inputs to produce the given output. Hence, when 
technical efficiency analysis focuses on technological or engineering oppor-
tunities, allocative efficiency makes it possible to evaluate ‘whether costs are 
being minimized to produce a given level of output’ in a water utility16 (Berg 
2010). Another decomposition shown in Figure 14 occurs at the level of 
technical efficiency (under constant return to scale – CRS), where distin-
guishing scale (scale efficiency – SE) and non-scale effects (efficiency under 
variable return to scale – VRS) makes it possible to obtain an insight into the 
sources of inefficiencies. While VRS reflects the managerial ability to in-
fluence efficiency (Thansassoulis 2000), SE describes that part of in-
efficiency which can be attributed to an entity or unit because it diverges 
from its most productive operating size (Banker 1984). The issue of SE 
remains important in the water services because water utilities are usually 
considered to confront economies of scale (Berg 2010) as discussed 
previously in the present subchapter.  
3. Profitability – relates the net profit generated by a water company to its 
equity capital, assets and sales, measured respectively as the annual: 
 rate of return on equity (ROE); 
 return on assets (ROA); and 
 return on sales or net profit margin (ROS).  
These universally applicable ratios make it possible to assess the financial 
performance of any company. Moreover, the World Bank points out the 
importance of assessing other aspects of the financial performance of water 
                                                                          
16  There are a number of methodologies, such as stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), data 
envelopment analysis (DEA), and estimation of cost functions, used for calculating 
efficiency levels and benchmarking water utilities (Zhu 2009, Berg 2010).  
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companies besides profitability (Hassanein and Khalifa 2007), such as 
liquidity (current ratio = current assets/current liabilities) and capital struc-
ture (financial leverage ratio = long-term debt/shareholders’ equity).  
4. Quality and customer responsiveness – describe the non-financial per-
formance of water utilities, usually indicating:  
 the quality of drinking water (e.g. compliance with established health 
protection norms);  
 levels of wastewater treatment (e.g. compliance with established environ-
mental standards); and 
 the quality of the service (e.g. water availability per day, water pressure) 
provided by a water company (Tynan and Kingdom 2002).  
Moreover, there are two other important performance dimensions – water 
affordability and access – that describe the responsiveness of water utilities 
to their customers’ interests. Affordability and access are considered key 
concepts in water services provision from the equity point of view, both 
issues strongly related to water pricing (García-Valiñas et al. 2010). Hence, 
 affordability ratio – relates a household’s costs on water services, which 
are the function of water tariffs and consumption volume, to its pur-
chasing power (ibid.). The OECD (2010b) notes that ‘affordability can be 
assessed by comparing the price of water services (the water bill) with the 
capacity-to-pay among final users,’ while this capacity can be measured 
using indicators such as disposable income, household expenditures or 
expenditures on other important services. Macro (or aggregate) and micro 
affordability can be distinguished, where the former shows water 
affordability at the state level, while the latter can be disaggregated by 
income group, area or household type (OECD 2003). However, there is 
no absolute level of affordability (ibid.). International organizations, such 
as the OECD and the World Bank, have suggested that expenditures on 
water services should not exceed 3–5% of a household’s income (OECD 
2003, 2010b); 
 access ratio – indicates the part of the population that has access to water 
services under a water utility's responsibility (Shirley and Menard 2002, 
IBNET 2011). Access is influenced by affordability (OECD 2003) – if 
water users cannot afford the services, they will be excluded from access. 
The share of the population with access to water services (as percentage) 
illustrates the development of water infrastructure due to being dependent 
on pipe network coverage in a service area (Tynan and Kingdom 2002). 
 
The above listed key performance indicators of water utilities make it possible 
to monitor and evaluate the achievement of multiple (often conflicting) financial 
and non-financial objectives in water services provision. Hukka and Katko 
(2003) emphasize that economic and technical efficiency is only ‘a narrow indi-
cator of the performance and viability of a water utility.’ They argue that 
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viability as a holistic definition can be used to assess the performance of a water 
utility; however, the major consideration is the achievement of its set goals and 
objectives (Rees 1984). Therefore, the empirical part of the present dissertation 
in chapter 3 analyzing complex governance-performance relationships in the 
Estonian water sector, considers various types of performance indicators such as 
(1) technical (operational) efficiency scores and (2) profitability ratios of the 
water companies along with (3) water and wastewater quality indicators and 
(4) affordability and access ratios of the water services when analyzing the 
performance. Consequently, for the purpose of the present dissertation, this 
leads to relevant questions about what performance indicators are used by the 
local governments and water companies to monitor and evaluate the achieve-
ment of their financial and non-financial objectives in water services.  
 
 
1.3.2. Corporate and regulatory governance mechanisms 
influencing performance in water services 
Natural monopoly and water being a merit good have been used as the major 
arguments for the public ownership of water companies (Parker 1999, Van Dijk 
2008). As noted earlier (subchapter 1.2.2), in the case of the provision of public 
services by a (partly or fully) publicly owned company, a local government can 
be tied to it both by a contractual relationship and an ownership relationship. 
The ownership relationship with a water company enables the local government 
to use an important corporate governance mechanism – the board – to influence 
corporate performance, as discussed in subchapter 1.1.3. However, the tra-
ditional model of water services provision, where the services are produced by a 
publicly owned water company (or directly by a local government department) 
embodies the risk of politicization (Casarin et al. 2007), which can erode the 
performance of the water company. Foster (2005) argues that publicly owned 
water companies are rather treated as part of the political apparatus than allowed 
to operate as an efficient service provider. In the same vein, Boycko, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1996) emphasize that these companies are useful in keeping politi-
cians in power. The politicians have control over the publicly owned water 
company through the appointment of board members and provided financing, 
but in return they may expect artificially low water tariffs, new investments and 
contracts that are politically targeted (Foster 2005). Furthermore, besides the 
below-cost water pricing due to populist pressures, there are two other major 
incentive problems associated with the public water services provision (Araral 
2008): (1) non-credible enforcement of performance contracts in the case of 
conflicting interests, and (2) perverse organizational incentives from weak com-
petition, agency problems and performance measurement problems. Con-
sequently, publicly owned water companies are often considered inefficient and 
unable to meet the citizens’ demands resulting in low quality of service and 
limited access to water at relatively high costs (Araral 2008).  
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Therefore, Shirley (2006) concludes that due to the specific characteristics of 
water – essential, local, dull and mysterious – water services provision also 
requires a specific design of governance policies and mechanisms. She argues 
that because of water being essential, there is a need for: (1) a system that 
allows voters to hold politicians accountable for ensuring an affordable supply, 
(2) contractual rules that protect consumers from abuses of monopoly power 
and, (3) a regulatory framework that enforces contractual rules (ibid.). More-
over, Shirley (2006) also suggests that the contracts should (4) reasonably 
allocate the costs and benefits across interest groups, avoid political pressures in 
water services provision and, (5) due to water being dull, provide incentives for 
water companies to operate efficiently and expand to meet demand over time. 
Hence, natural monopoly characteristics, externalities and welfare concerns 
comprise a rationale for (local) government regulation in water services pro-
vision (Hukka and Katko 2003, Abbott and Cohen 2009).  
However, in light of the earlier exploration of the performance expectations 
from corporate governance related theories (see Tables 3 and 4 in subchapter 
1.1.2) and board characteristics (subchapter 1.1.3) and considering the dual role 
of local governments in publicly owned companies (subchapter 1.2.2), this dis-
cussion gives rise to important research questions in terms of (1) what are the 
primary objectives of different types of owners in the water companies, and 
(2) what characteristics do the members of the board embody in water 
companies? Ultimately, (3) is there a significant difference in efficiency 
between the water companies with different – public, private and mixed public-
private – ownership?  
 
Economic regulation of water companies 
Regulation is part of a nation’s public policy usually introduced to protect 
public interest (Kinnunen 2004, Spiller and Tommasi 2005). Baumol (1995) 
argues the aim of an economic regulation is to protect ‘the public from the 
detrimental consequences of inadequacies of competition.’ In the context of 
water services Ehrhardt et al. (2007) define economic regulation as following: 
‘The rules and organizations that set, change, monitor, and enforce allowed 
tariffs and allowed service standards for water providers.’ 
According to this definition, the economic regulation of water companies does 
not deal with water tariffs separately from services quality – the service stan-
dards the water companies must comply with for revenues they collect from 
water users. Moreover, Schouten (2009) shows that in water services, the regu-
lation prescribes water service providers on the type and quality of services to 
be produced, the population they want to sell it to and the price they can charge 
for their services. Figure 15 illustrates how economic regulation in water 
services overlaps with other areas of regulation, such as social, environmental 
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(reservoirs pollution) and safety (public health) regulations. The overlapping 
areas around the core (e.g. water standards, service coverage) indicate issues 
that can also be considered part of economic regulation (Ehrhardt et al. 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Economic regulation of water companies: addressing the monopoly problem 
(source: adapted from Ehrhardt et al. 2007) 
 
 
Parker (1999) points out that achieving a compromise between the regulatory 
objectives is not easy when the aim of a regulation is to balance (a) maximizing 
consumer surplus, (b) ensuring adequate profits for the water company to 
finance investment needs, (c) preserving the quality of the service, and 
(d) taking into consideration social and environmental issues17. However, the 
focus of economic regulation, also referred to as price controls on natural 
monopolies, is primarily prices and entry to specific industries or markets 
(Joskow and Rose 1989). Joskow and Rose (1989) indicate that (water) price 
regulation may be optimal from a normative perspective, ‘if the monopoly firm 
will choose average prices and profits that are too high (excess profit), and 
individual prices that may be too high or too low (inefficient rate structure).’ If 
prices are too low to recover costs, the water company may not be able to meet 
the required service standards, or the (local) government will be required to 
provide subsidies (Ehrhardt et al. 2007). Hence, economic regulation in the 
water sector can be viewed as a way to restrain the monopoly power of the 
water companies and to ensure that they operate efficiently for optimal societal 
                                                                          
17  In the EU member states, the performance of water services provision has been 
significantly influenced by EU environmental legislation that prescribes minimum water 
quality standards and requirements for wastewater collection and treatment. The directive on 
drinking water quality (98/83/EC) and the urban wastewater directive (91/271/EEC) have a 
direct impact on water companies’ profitability and water services affordability by imposing 
huge costs and requiring capital spending programs for the modernization of the water 
purification stations and wastewater treatment plants in a relatively short period (Hall and 
Lobina 2007). 
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outcomes18 (Vickers and Yarrow 1988, Pongsiri 2002, Parker 2003, Kessides 
2004, Domney et al. 2005). Therefore, in light of the efforts to achieve a 
balance between different stakeholders’ (see Figure 13) performance objectives 
and considering the multifarious performance indicators used for the assessment 
of water utility performance (p. 79–81), the discussion leads to an important 
research question of what the trade-off is between the financial and non-
financial performance dimensions in the water companies.  
 
Water price regulation methods  
Shirley and Menard (2002) argue that an optimal price (economic) regulation 
provides water companies with the incentive to invest and improve efficiency, 
while providing the largest possible share of the resulting savings to water 
users. To that end it is suggested that the (local) government as regulator 
(contractor) set optimal returns that motivate water companies to perform as 
efficiently as possible in order to increase profits (Marra 2007). Moreover, 
Kinnunen (2004) emphasizes that different price regulation methods for 
controlling water monopolies embody different degrees of incentive for effi-
ciency improvements. Therefore, as Parker (1999) points out, for effective 
regulation its objectives must be clear and unambiguous.  
The two most commonly used regulation methods in water services have 
been: 
 the rate-of-return regulation; and 
 the price-cap regulation.  
 
The rate-of-return regulation (also known as bottom-up and cost-plus approach) 
determines a level of revenues that must make it possible for the water company 
to recover its costs and permit a given rate of return on their capital stock 
(Kinnunen 2004, Renzetti and Dupont 2004, Marra 2007). This (cost-based) 
regulation method often fails to provide expected results due to asymmetric 
information on the actual costs of the regulated company. Besides, this regu-
lation method does not give a socially efficient solution because the incentive 
for efficiency improvements is missing (Kinnunen 2004). The method has been 
criticized for perverse incentives to monopolists to expand their capital stock 
beyond what is allocatively efficient when the rate of return exceeds the cost of 
capital (Newbery 2001, Renzetti and Dupont 2004). However, this method has 
been historically popular in the USA with a relatively long history of private 
ownership of public utilities, where the main objective of the regulation has 
                                                                          
18  There exist opposing views that focus on government failures, not on market failures and 
that advocate very limited regulation of monopolies. The criticisms are very much based on 
information asymmetry between the regulator and the regulated company, emphasizing that 
the regulator’s information about the company (e.g. true costs) remains always incomplete 
(Jordan 1970, Stigler 1971, Becker 1983, Peltzman 1989).  
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been fairness in the distribution of profits between shareholders and consumers 
(Parker 1999).  
The price-cap regulation is based on the idea that monopoly water com-
panies cut their costs if they get rewarded with greater profits (Marra 2006, 
2007). This price regulation described by the formula RPI-X (retail price 
index – coefficient X) sets an upper limit for the water price (corporate 
revenues) and allows the water company to keep the profits that the company 
can gain through cost reductions during the regulatory period19 (Kinnunen 
2004). The negative coefficient X in the price formula reflects productivity 
improvements that should result in a lower water price for the next regulatory 
period (Renzetti and Dupont 2004). The problem is that a water company that is 
not interested in the lower price cap has an incentive to increase its costs for the 
time of the new regulatory review (Kinnunen 2004). Therefore, implementing a 
price-cap regulation in the context of asymmetric information would be a 
complicated task for the local government as regulator. It can lead to a situation, 
where the efficiency gains achieved by the water company during the regulatory 
period will not be shared with its customers at all. The price-cap regulation 
method is used in the UK, where the government introduced it during the 
privatisation of water utilities, in order to establish incentives for efficiency 
improvement in the former state owned water companies (Parker 1999).  
Moreover, Rogers et al. (2002) argue that water tariff design (form) plays an 
important role in striking ‘the most desirable balance’ between the regulatory 
objectives. Tariff structures comprise different tariff elements (i.e. connection 
charge, fixed charge, volumetric charge, block charge, minimum charge) that 
used in particular combinations help to achieve the regulatory objectives. For 
example, the two-part tariff structure, which involves both a volumetric variable 
component and a fixed component, is often used in water pricing schemes to 
provide the water company with a stabilized income flow (ibid.). In this case, 
the fixed charge protects the water company from changes in water demand, 
while the variable component charges water users according to their 
consumption volume and encourages saving.  
Yet, a specific issue in water pricing is related to the objective of cost re-
covery, which requires the water services to be treated as a private good and 
priced to cover costs, including investments and externalities (Araral 2008). 
Rogers et al. (2002) indicate that the need for full-cost pricing is important from 
the point of view of sustainable and efficient water management. Nevertheless, 
as they also claim, water tariffs do not often cover even the full supply costs, 
and sometimes the value of water is lower than the cost of supply (ibid.). 
Moreover, due to the specifics of water and sewerage infrastructure assets (i.e. 
long lives, underground location) it is complicated to estimate the actual main-
tenance and replacement needs of these assets. Conventional depreciation in 
                                                                          
19  In the UK the regulatory agency The Office of Water Services (OFWAT) sets prices for 
5 years (Dore et al. 2004).  
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accounting terms represents the recovery of historical acquisition costs over the 
lifetime of an asset (Vinnari 2006), which does not necessarily reflect the actual 
replacement costs of the asset. Calculating the depreciation costs to be included 
in water prices on the replacement value, not on the historical acquisition costs 
of the infrastructure assets again would lead to an increase in water prices. 
However, the inherent difficulty of reliable asset valuation and depreciation 
provides opportunities for investment deferral and asset stripping (ibid.). In the 
UK context, Parker (1999) notes that different interpretations of the level of 
depreciation charge permitted to be entered into a water company’s cost struc-
ture have caused tensions between the water companies and their regulators. 
To sum up, economic regulation (rules) of monopoly water companies is one 
of the major governance concerns in water services. The different regulation 
methods and tariff structures for controlling the behaviour of water companies 
in the public interest embody a different degree of incentives for efficiency 
improvement and play a crucial role in influencing their financial performance 
(profitability). Therefore, for the present dissertation an important question 
arises concerning what regulation methods (e.g. water price formula) are 
applied to water companies and how these influence the water companies’ per-
formance. In particular, what types of costs and to what degree the water 
companies are permitted to recover with water tariffs? However, regulatory 
rules must become fixed and stipulated, before they can be applied to water 
companies. 
 
Regulatory contracts in water services 
In the literature, it is suggested that among various governance mechanisms 
(e.g. licenses, statutes, decrees etc.), a contract can be a good legal instrument 
for locking regulatory rules in between the local government and water com-
pany for achieving coherence and predictability in water services provision 
(Shirley and Menard 2002, Foster 2005, Ehrhardt et al. 2007, Araral 2008). The 
advantage of using contracts is seen to stem from the incorporation of both the 
‘supply and costs’ (Lane 1999) in one regulatory contract20 (e.g. services 
contract), which means that both the service standards and the price mechanism 
are stipulated therein. Foster (2005) points out that complementing the price 
stipulation with the quality-of-service regulation in the contracts is much more 
significant in cases where the private sector participates in water services 
production because privately owned water companies may have an incentive to 
compromise the quality of the service as a cost-cutting measure. Moreover, 
Shirley and Menard (2002), examining the gains of different water sector 
reform experiences, argue that regulatory contracts that – (1) reduce information 
                                                                          
20  Regulatory contracts can be viewed as ‘the explicit and implicit agreements that define 
the relationship between a government and a regulated monopoly, and the institutions that 
govern this relationship’ (Shirley and Menard 2002). 
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asymmetry between the regulator and the water company (2) provide high 
powered incentives to motivate the water company to comply with the 
contract’s goals; and (3) signal credible commitment from both parties – can 
bring remarkable efficiency gains. Also, they imply that the design of contracts 
can compensate for some of the weaknesses in regulatory institutions (e.g. local 
governments); however, private provision of water services under weak insti-
tutions is not advisable and is likely to cause problems with water services 
affordability (ibid.).  
To make a contract effective, the stipulated rules have to be monitored and 
enforced. Ehrhardt et al. (2007) argue that poor monitoring undermines 
customer protection and erodes the legitimacy of water services governance in a 
municipality. To avoid opportunistic behaviour on the part of water companies, 
it is suggested that clear performance measures complemented with incentives 
and sanctions are stipulated in the contracts (Shirley and Menard 2002, Brown 
et al. 2006). Foster (2005) indicates that penalties have proved to be a relatively 
more effective sanction for privately owned water companies, while they have 
not had much influence on motivating managers of publicly owned water 
companies.  
However, a fundamental governance problem of contracting in water ser-
vices is related to asymmetric information between the water company and the 
local government (regulator), because the regulated water company has a strong 
incentive not to supply information or distort the information delivered to the 
regulator (Foster 2005). To overcome this problem, information requirements 
are usually specified in some detail in the contracts (ibid.). Regular, timely and 
consistent reporting by the water company as a key element of the contract 
should make it possible to detect early problems in water services provision 
(OECD 2010b) and make it possible to exert control over the company. Never-
theless, asymmetric information and contractual incompleteness are still among 
the major reasons why (local) governments cannot often reach efficient 
contractual agreements (Lane 1999). In water services, a high degree of in-
completeness in contracts is created by the specificity of water infrastructure 
assets, long contract periods and large investment volumes (Hukka and Katko 
2003, Brown and Potoski 2005, Hall and Lobina 2004), as discussed earlier in 
subchapter 1.3.1.  
In summary, a regulatory contract can be viewed as a tool for establishing 
the rules of the game, which enables the local government to influence per-
formance in water services provision (Parker 1999). For the purposes of the 
present dissertation, this discussion leads to important questions concerning 
(1) what are the main stipulations regarding water prices, performance measures 
and accountability requirements set in the regulatory contracts used, and (2) can 
the local governments execute effective control over the performance of water 
companies under these stipulations in the contracts? Together with the earlier 
discussion on perspectives of accountability (subchapter 1.1) and the use of 
contracting in public services provision (subchapter 1.2), the abovementioned 
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questions serve as a basis for the research questions concerning the setup and 
use of contracts and accountability systems in influencing the performance of 
water companies.  
 
 
1.3.3. Externalization and the changed institutional roles  
of local governments in water services provision 
The aim of this subchapter is to discuss a modal shift in water services provi-
sion and shed some light on performance expectations under different insti-
tutional arrangements in water services provision. 
During the last two decades (local) governments worldwide have made 
efforts to reform infrastructure services and involve the private sector one way 
or another in water services provision (Casarin et al. 2007). Private capital is 
often seen as being necessary to finance investment programmes in times of 
austerity or introduce new management practices and technologies (Parker 
1995, Marra 2007). Nevertheless, approximately 90% of the world’s population 
is provided with water services directly by public authorities or water com-
panies owned and controlled by them (Hall and Lobina 2007, Steadman 2012). 
The private sector has been relatively more involved in water services provision 
in urban settlements, where 25% of dwellers around the world are served by 
private companies. In Western-Europe, approximately 45% of the population is 
served by water companies with private sector involvement (Euromarket 2004, 
Hall and Lobina 2007), while this percentage is just around 15% in the USA 
(Perard 2007). Water services are fully privatised in England and Wales (Parker 
1999). Private water supply provision is particularly important also in France, 
Spain, Italy and Greece. In the 1990s, French and British water companies also 
began to expand into the Central and Eastern European countries such as the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Slovakia and also 
Estonia (Hukka and Katko 2003, Hall and Lobina 2007).  
In the EU, a large diversity of management systems has been identified in 
drinking water production and distribution services (Eureau 1997). Van Dijk 
and Schouten (2004) propose a classification, where they distinguish four main 
types of institutional governance arrangements in water services provision – 
Direct Public Management, Delegated Public Management, Delegated Private 
Management and Direct Private Management – as shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16. Changes to institutional arrangements in water services provision (source: 
Van Dijk and Schouten 2004) 
 
 
The four institutional arrangements in Figure 16 reflect the degree of separation 
between the local government and the water services provider, which generally 
decreases in strength when moving from 1 to 4. The four cells in Figure 16 
indicate the extent to which the local government has handed control of 
funding, investment and management decisions over to the water services 
provider (Schouten 2009). In the case of Direct Public Management, the local 
government is responsible for water services provision and executing manage-
ment tasks. There is no contract between the local government and the water 
services provider and it is difficult to distinguish them as separate parties. Water 
tariff setting is mostly conducted by the local government. In the case of Dele-
gated Public Management, the local government appoints a water services 
provider in the form of a separate publicly owned company to execute the 
management of water services at arms’ length. Water tariff setting is mostly 
delegated to the water services provider and the local government acts as a 
shareholder in the company. Delegated Private Management means that the 
local government delegates the management tasks to a private entity on the 
basis of a temporary contract (e.g. concession contract), but the infrastructure 
still belongs to the local government. The private entity has the role of the water 
services provider. Water tariff setting is mostly stipulated in the contract 
between the parties, which also prescribes control mechanisms and procedures. 
The last institutional option of water services provision in Figure 16, Direct 
Private Management implies that the local government limits itself to control 
and regulation. All tasks, responsibilities and ownership (of infrastructure) are 
    Degree of 
separation 
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placed in the hands of private parties. This is the most radical change compared 
to the traditional direct public production and delivery of water services. The 
privately owned water services provider has a sort of license to operate 
(Schouten 2009). Water tariffs are set by the water services provider controlled 
and regulated by the local government. 
Another major change to the traditional model of water services provision is 
the separation of the functions of policymaker, regulator and service provider as 
illustrated in Figure 17. The introduction of a separate regulatory agency is a 
key element of many water sector governance reforms, viewed as one option for 
mitigating political interference by the (local) government in water services 
provision (Foster 2005).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. The reformed model of water services governance (source: adapted from 
Foster 2005) 
 
 
A separate regulatory agency (independent regulator) is introduced to insulate 
the water company from political interference. It is the duty of the regulator to 
require that the water company conducts its business in line with set operational 
and financial rules. A key function of the regulator is to set water tariffs at a 
level that allows the water company to recover its efficient costs of operation, as 
well as earn a reasonable rate of return, while at the same time monitoring the 
achievement of quality and coverage targets by the company. Politicians in 
(local) government are left to provide a strategic direction to the water sector 
(ibid.).  
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Berg and Holt (2001) emphasize that when creating a separate regulatory 
agency, policymakers should consider both agency design and regulatory 
processes. The design of the regulatory agency relates to the clarity of the roles 
in relation to other government institutions. Regulatory processes result in rules 
and policies that influence the behaviour of water companies, as well as water 
sector performance (ibid.). Parker (1999) argues that the relationships between 
the regulator and the regulated water company are interactive and evolving, 
which implies that they cannot be specified fully ex ante in any contract and that 
trust is important for an effective regulation (Lapsely and Kilpatrick  
1997). Moreover, Parker (1999) points out that a well-functioning regulatory 
governance system balances accountability, transparency and consistency. 
Similarly, Berg and Holt (2001) note that citizen participation, transparency and 
predictability in decision-making characterize an effective regulatory process in 
water services. The regulatory agency’s autonomy and accountability are 
viewed as interlocking design features, and regulators that are totally autono-
mous without public accountability are not considered acceptable (ibid.). How-
ever, as Parker (1999) notes, ‘at the heart of the accountability there is also the 
right to appeal’ given to regulated water companies. Finally, Foster (2005) 
concludes that under such a governance system as illustrated in Figure 17, water 
services provision can be delegated either to a privately or publicly owned water 
company21. In the literature there is consensus among authors that a strong insti-
tutional environment is a necessary prerequisite for private sector involvement 
in water services provision to properly protect public interests (Parker 1999, 
Hukka and Katko 2003, Foster 2005, Shirley 2006, Casarin et al. 2007, 
Schouten 2009). 
Nevertheless, Bartle and Vass (2007) criticize the establishment of spe-
cialized regulatory agencies in water services. They argue that there is a strong 
need to reduce information asymmetry, but with the independent regulatory 
agencies this increases within the ‘public authority between the local gov-
ernment department (low information) and the regulatory agency (high infor-
mation).’ Bartle and Vass (2007) also claim that policymaking at the local 
government level suffers from ‘low’ information. In the same vein, Stern (1997) 
proposes that in new democracies, transparency and predictability of regulation 
with a clear assignment of functions can be better achieved by a less ambitious 
approach than that using a fully independent regulator. Similarly, Ehrhardt et al. 
(2007) argue that when this governance model is transferred to transitional 
countries, regulatory independence is often undermined by political inter-
ference.  
                                                                          
21  The UK regulatory system with the independent regulator OFWAT established during 
the privatisation of water companies in England and Wales is a well known example for that 
(Parker 1999). 
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All in all, Hukka and Katko (2003), having analyzed the institutional 
arrangements in different countries, conclude with four distinct models of water 
services provision in practice:  
1. Finnish-Scandinavian-Dutch model: pluralistic, regulated public monopoly. 
Private sector competition for non-core operations; 
2. English-Welsh model: dualistic, regulated private monopoly. Owner 
company’s vertical integration in non-core operations; 
3. French model: mayoral, competition for regulated municipal monopoly 
rights between monopolies. Operator company’s vertical integration in non-
core operations; 
4. Developing and transition economies: one party system, centralized un-
regulated public monopoly. Lack of private non-core service producers. 
 
Hukka and Katko (2003) argue that only under the Finnish-Scandinavian-Dutch 
model and the French model do local governments have real decision-power in 
water services provision. These two models also provide some opportunities for 
competition. In the case of the English-Welsh model using private water 
monopolies, they summarize that ‘profit maximization is the actual driving 
force’ (ibid.). An important aspect that all four models commonly address is the 
regulation – in the first three models, water companies are subject to economic 
regulations, in the last model the regulation is missing. Interestingly, in the 
Estonian municipalities explored and discussed further in chapter 3, water 
services provision is organized under different governance models, some follow 
a sort of combination of the Finnish-Scandinavian-Dutch and the developing 
and transition economies models, while others have applied proxies of the 
English-Welsh model, distinguished by Hukka and Katko (2003).  
To sum up, water services can be provided under various institutional 
arrangements. Important features of the institutional arrangements are related to 
the autonomy of the water companies (decentralization) and private sector 
involvement in water services provision. The introduction of separate regulatory 
agencies is a fundamental change to the traditional governance model in water 
services, seeking to better balance the interests of different stakeholders. Of 
importance to this research is the recognition that the externalization and 
establishment of an independent water regulator are considered to insulate the 
management of the water company from political interference that erodes the 
performance of water services provision. However, the different degree of local 
government control over management, investment and funding decisions gives 
a rise to a relevant question about the power of water companies in influencing 
the financial and non-financial performance of water services provision. More-
over, considering that the (supervisory) board is a major corporate governance 
body of a company as discussed earlier in subchapter 1.1.3, this allows us to 
conclude a research question about the roles of the board in influencing the 
performance of the water companies. Since these reform initiatives can be 
viewed as attempts to introduce some market-like management pressure on 
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monopoly water companies to push them towards greater efficiency and effec-
tiveness in their operations, for the purposes of the present dissertation, the 
ultimate questions remain as follows: (1) how have the private sector 
involvement in water services provision and, (2) the (non-) separability of 
policymaking from regulating in local governments influenced the performance 
of water services provision in Estonian municipalities. 
 
 
1.3.4. Relationships between governance and performance  
in water services: evidence from previous studies 
The discussion of the present dissertation on the basis of the theoretical works 
by governance researchers, finds support for the supposition that governance 
can influence corporate performance in the water sector. The aim of this 
subchapter is to draw together the main empirical findings from previously 
conducted studies on the relationship between governance and performance in 
the field of water services provision.  
 Several research streams can be distinguished in the literature, among 
empirical research focused on the governance-performance relationship in water 
services. First, the majority of empirical research on the governance-per-
formance relationship focuses on the influence of ownership on the performance 
of water services providers with respect to efficiency and productivity. These 
studies mostly consider ownership as either fully public or private, because the 
public-private partnerships in the middle of the two polar extremes are difficult 
to characterize empirically, and therefore, have ‘not been studied systemati-
cally’ in water services (Renzetti and Dupont 2004). Most of the empirical 
studies looking at efficiency under private vs. public ownership have been in the 
form of cross-sectional comparisons of both types of water companies in 
countries where they coexist. As revealed in Table 5 below, most of the initial 
(cross-sectional) work on ownership-performance was undertaken in the United 
States where there exist a large number of both publicly and privately owned 
water companies. Later in the 1990s, after the privatisation of the English and 
Welsh water companies, a number of (longitudinal) studies exploring the pro-
ductivity and efficiency changes resulting from the ownership change in those 
water companies was published. However, the results of the empirical studies 
shown in Table 5 are somewhat ambiguous and far from conclusive – some of 
the previous studies have found empirical evidence supporting higher efficiency 
on the part of publicly owned water companies (point 1), while other authors 
consider that privately owned water companies outperform the publicly owned 
ones (point 2). Inconclusive evidence on the influence of ownership on the 
efficiency of water companies is found as well (point 3 in Table 5). Moreover, 
in the context of water company privatisations, there is some evidence that 
indicates limited improvement in the efficiency of water companies after priva-
tisation (point 4 in Table 5), while other studies (point 5 in Table 5) did not 
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witness any improvement or even found a decline in overall efficiency (see Saal 
et al. 2007). 
 
Table 5. Evidence from studies on ownership effects on efficiency in water companies 
 
 Results States Authors 
1. Public more 
efficient than private 
USA Mann and Mikesell 1976, Bruggink 1982, 
Lambert et al. 1993, Bhattacharyya et al. 
1994, Bhattacharyya et al. 1995, Shih et al. 
2006 
2. Private more 
efficient than public 
USA,  
African states 
Morgan 1977, Crain and Zardkoohi 1978, 
Raffiee et al. 1992, Bhattacharyya et al. 
1995, Estache and Kouassi 2002, 
Kirkpatrick et al. 2006  
3. No significant 
difference in 
efficiency between 
public and private 
USA,  
African states, 
Asia-Pacific 
states, Spain, 
Brazil  
Feigenbaum and Teeples 1983, Byrnes et al. 
1986, Teeples and Glyer 1987, Battese and 
Coelli 1995, Estache and Rossi 2002, 
Houtsma 2003, Garcia-Sanchez 2006, da 
Silva e Souza et al. 2007, Wallsten and 
Kosec 2008 
4. Efficiency or 
productivity 
improvement 
resulting from 
privatisation 
 
UK, 
Argentina 
Bosworth and Stoneman 1998, Saal and 
Parker 2001, Estache and Trujillo 2003  
5. No efficiency or 
productivity 
improvement 
resulting from 
privatisation 
UK Shaoul 1997, Saal and Parker 2000, Saal and 
Parker 2004, Saal et al. 2007 
Note: the efficiency/productivity assessments conducted through regression analysis, data 
envelopment analyses and stochastic frontier analysis.  
Source: compiled by the author 
 
 
There have also been some quantitative studies where the ownership variable is 
interacted with other variables to test its effects on efficiency. For instance, 
Bhattacharyya et al. (1995) brought into the ownership-efficiency discussion the 
aspect of size, finding that publicly owned water companies are more efficient 
at large production levels, while privately owned water companies are more 
efficient at small production levels. In a recent study on the efficiency of 
Chinese water companies, Wang et al. (2011) find that the involvement of 
foreign companies in water services provision, rather than domestic private 
companies, significantly improves efficiency. They explain this with the desire 
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of the international water companies to have a good reputation through 
improved performance in their operations (ibid.).  
Moreover, Hassanein and Khalifa (2007) compare the profitability of 
publicly and privately owned water companies in the United States. They find 
that the average ROA ratio for private water companies (28.6%) significantly 
exceeds that of publicly owned water companies (15.7%) indicating higher sales 
and utilization of assets to generate sales. At the same time the average ROS for 
publicly owned water companies (15.8%) exceeds that of privately owned water 
companies (10.4%). Shaoul (1997) assesses the profitability of the English and 
Welsh water companies before and after privatisation finding an increase both 
in costs and profits. The total (pre-tax) profits for the UK water companies 
increased on average by 142% over the 1989/1998 period (Dore et al. 2004). 
Moreover, they find that the profitability of the privatised English water com-
panies was very high in the international context (of Sweden, Spain, Hungary 
and France), indicating that their average rate of return on capital (23%) was 
almost three times that of publicly owned water companies in Sweden22 (8%) 
(Gustafsson 2001, Dore et al. 2004). In the same context, Dore et al. (2004) 
indicate that the privatised water companies in England and Wales had costs 
that were twice the size of those of publicly owned water companies in 
Scotland. 
As noted in subchapter 1.2.3, the critics of privatisation in public services 
argue that relatively higher efficiency, if any, can only be achieved at the 
expense of quality (Domberger and Jensen 1997). However, in the context of 
the UK water companies, Parker (2003) finds no evidence that efficiency 
improvements would have been at the expense of service quality. Shaoul (1997) 
being critical of the privatisation of water companies indicates that there was 
only little improvement in service quality (e.g. customer complaints, water use 
restrictions) in the UK. Menard and Saussier (2000) compare the compliance of 
French water companies under direct (public) and delegated (private) manage-
ment with water quality regulation. They find that there is no difference in the 
compliance with set quality standards between the water companies under 
public and private management (ibid.). Moreover, Dore et al. (2004) analyzed 
the outcomes of water services privatisation in both France and the UK and 
concluded that water quality had improved, but at a higher cost in terms of 
water prices and higher returns on private capital. They find that in France the 
water prices of private water companies were 40% higher than publicly owned 
water companies, which they argue may be caused by different methods of 
depreciation and under-pricing by the publicly owned water companies (ibid.). 
Similarly, Lobina and Hall (2001) indicate that during the first decade after 
privatisation the average water bill increased by 46% in England and Wales. 
                                                                          
22  In both countries there was full cost recovery allowed for the water companies (Dore et 
al. 2004).  
97 
Also, in the Spanish context, Martínez-Espiñeira et al. (2009) find that private 
water companies set higher water prices on average than publicly owned ones.  
In the literature, the second distinguishable stream of empirical research in 
the field of the governance-performance relationship in water services focuses 
on the influence of public authority (e.g. local government, independent regu-
lator) regulations, incentives and control over the performance of water 
companies. As in the previous research stream, here most of the studies are also 
conducted in the context of the UK water sector (Abbott and Cohen 2009). As a 
main finding, it can be concluded that the role of tight economic regulation is 
crucial in achieving efficiency improvements in water services (Parker 2003, 
Abbott and Cohen 2009). The studies by Saal and Parker (2000, 2001, 2004) 
and Saal et al. (2007) indicate that (technical) efficiency and productivity 
improvements in the privatised UK water companies occurred mainly after 
substantial regulatory tightening in the form of a price-cap review in 1995, not 
immediately after privatisation in 1989 (Parker 2003). Moreover, in the United 
States context, Aubert and Reynaud (2005) find that the efficiency of water 
companies is influenced by the type of regulation applied (price cap vs. rate of 
return) – the highest efficiency is achieved in the case of the rate of return 
(price) regulation when the regulator can gather extensive information (Abbot 
and Cohen 2009).  
In EU countries, beside national and local regulations, the performance of 
water companies has been found to be significantly influenced by EU environ-
mental legislation – the directive on drinking water quality (98/83/EC) and the 
urban wastewater directive (91/271/EEC) – which prescribes minimum water 
quality standards and requirements for wastewater collection and treatment. In 
the literature there are a number of authors indicating that these EU directives 
have imposed large costs and required multi-billion euro capital investments for 
the modernization of the water purification stations and wastewater treatment 
facilities throughout Europe (Cowan 1998, Ashton 2000, Parker 2003, Renzetti 
and Dupont 2004, Dore et al. 2004, Hall and Lobina 2007). Consequently, the 
stringent EU regulations are found to be a major reason why prices increased in 
real terms (by over 40%) in water services as opposed to other regulated 
industries after privatisation in the UK (Parker 2003, Dore et al. 2004). Thus, 
the effect of privatisation on expenditures in water companies became over-
shadowed. However, as a result of the required investments, compliance with 
EU water quality standards improved from 76% in 1989 to almost 92% in 2000 
(ibid.). 
The third distinguishable group of research articles in the literature regarding 
governance-performance relationships in water services is concerned with water 
services governance reforms and failures around the globe. Important features 
of these studies relate to the water companies’ autonomy (decentralization) from 
politicians in (local) governments. In light of Mexican water sector reforms, 
Anwandter and Ozona (2002) find that decentralization and the establishment of 
a separate regulatory agency over water companies do not constitute an effi-
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ciency (competition) enhancing institutional arrangement, if there remain the 
informational asymmetries between the regulator and the water companies. 
Moreover, in the context of developing and transitional countries in Asia and 
Africa, Ehrhardt et al. (2007) indicate that the separate regulatory agencies in 
such countries are vulnerable to political interference (e.g. in Manila, the 
Philippines) and consequently not ensuring coherence between the required 
service quality and (low) water prices. Instead, contracts as less ambiguous 
governance mechanisms than independent regulatory agencies were found to 
better prevent short-term political interference in the (developing) new democ-
racies (Stern 1997, Ehrhardt et al. 2007). There are a number of studies 
analyzing the reasons for success and failure in particular instances of the 
privatisation of water companies. Shirley (2006) and Casarin et al. (2007) find 
in light of the privatisation of the Buenos Aires water company that the inability 
of policymakers to consider the political and institutional implications of the 
specific characteristics of water services, adversely affects the privatisation 
outcomes. In the same vein, Shirley and Menard (2002) find that privatisation 
under poor regulation is a major reason for re-negotiations and cancellations of 
private investments. Hall and Lobina (2006) and Ehrhardt et al. (2007) indicate 
that many private investors had failed in the water services and ended-up with 
contract terminations because the regulatory systems by governments did not 
assure the required rate of return (or even recovered costs). Moreover, Araral 
(2008) analyzes a public water utility reform in Cambodia and shows that a 
publicly owned water company is likely to be more efficient, effective and able 
to meet growing demand if ‘the fundamentals’ are right in terms of water price 
(cost-recovery pricing) and governance (autonomous company operating under 
commercial principles and using performance measures). Also, they indicate the 
importance of political leadership to be credibly committed to substantial 
improvements in water services. Finally, in the Estonian context, Vinnari and 
Hukka (2007) analyze the partial privatisation of Tallinn Water and find that the 
city government did not achieve its goals regarding the privatisation (i.e. extra 
infrastructure investments) because the policymakers exhibited limited pro-
ficiency and effectiveness in preparing tender documents (e.g. not including 
investment terms and conditions at the initial tendering stage) and contracts, 
such as the shareholder’s and services contracts. 
Moreover, in the local context, only a few other academic studies (Banhard 
2001, Balslev Nielsen and Hoffmann 2003, Hall 2003, Hukka 2004, Peda et al. 
2011) have been published that shed light on corporate governance and per-
formance issues in the Estonian water services sector (see also page 10). How-
ever, none of the abovementioned studies provide evidence of how Estonian 
local governments set up and use both the corporate and regulatory governance 
mechanisms in water services provision, and how the different governance 
patterns determine financial and non-financial performance in water services.  
In summary, the present literature overview of empirical studies of the 
governance-performance relationships in water services reveals that the studies 
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largely test ownership effects on water company performance by using quanti-
tative research methods. A central research question of the given studies is 
whether externalization and private sector involvement in water services pro-
vision makes a difference in the efficiency and productivity of water services 
provision. There are significantly less studies controlling for the externalization 
effects on other performance dimensions in water services, such as the service 
quality. All in all, the results of the empirical studies diverge and do not provide 
conclusive evidence on the superiority of public or private ownership regarding 
the efficiency and productivity of water companies. Nevertheless, the studies 
indicate that as a result of externalization, water tariffs and corporate profits 
along with service quality have often increased in water services. Moreover, the 
empirical studies reveal that the improvement of financial and non-financial 
performance in monopoly water services provision depends largely on the type 
and strictness of price control and environmental regulation (i.e. rules) applied 
to publicly and privately owned water companies. Finally, the results of these 
studies provide support for the view that for successful externalization in water 
services, it is important to have proper governance institutions in place, which 
are able to mitigate information asymmetry between themselves and the water 
companies to ensure the achievement of the often divergent performance goals 
of both parties (e.g. service quality and corporate profits). Establishing a sepa-
rate regulatory agency to supervise water companies is neither a sufficient nor 
necessary condition for effective performance enhancing governance in water 
services. Rather, the commitment of the political leadership becomes inevitable 
for performance improvements in water services provision. 
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2. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
2.1. Research framework and research questions 
The aim of this subchapter is to draw together the concepts and literature pre-
sented in the theoretical part (chapter 1) of this dissertation. The previous 
discussions on governance, performance and their relationships in public 
services provision and more particularly in water services are incorporated into 
a framework that will be used for analyzing the influence of governance on 
performance of water companies in the empirical part of this study (chapter 3). 
To do that, the research questions are formulated and drawn together as pre-
sented further in this subchapter. 
Corporate governance (p. 20–22), accountability (p. 22–26) and performance 
(p. 26–28) are the key concepts applied in this study. In its narrower perspec-
tive, corporate governance focuses on the governance relationship between the 
principal (owner) and the agent (manager) in a company. In this relationship, 
the interests of these governance actors may vary and the variations reflect in 
decisions, which consequently can influence corporate performance. However, 
the owner can use corporate governance mechanisms for controlling and 
directing the manager’s behaviour (decisions); thus influencing corporate per-
formance (p. 42–43). Among the various corporate governance mechanisms 
corporate board(s) (p. 43–49) has a central position in solving and avoiding 
agency problems. To facilitate the control over the manager’s behaviour and to 
ensure (through the board) that the owner’s, not the manager’s interests, are 
pursued in the company, accountability as a social mechanism is put in place. It 
serves to link the owner’s goals and the manager’s delivery against them and 
holds the manager to account for the decisions and the achievement of the goals. 
Making the manager responsive to the board (owner), the accountability enables 
the owner to influence the performance of the company. In the context of the 
broader view of corporate governance there are also other stakeholders con-
sidered (e.g. customers, local government), and not only owners, that have 
interests in the company’s activities and performance. Of importance to this 
dissertation is the recognition that, when in general corporate performance can 
be influenced through establishing a governance and accountability system, 
differences in the governance and accountability practices can also result in 
differences of performances. 
The previously discussed corporate governance related theories (p. 33–42) 
provide various insights into governance actors’ interests (e.g. agency theory, 
stewardship theory) and the role of ownership structure in influencing corporate 
performance. Some of the theories (e.g. property rights and public choice) argue 
that privately owned companies are likely to outperform publicly owned 
companies in terms of efficiency, while others (e.g. transaction cost and 
industrial organization theory) suggest that in a specific monopoly context 
privately owned companies are not relatively more efficient per se. Figure 18 
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outlines a tentative governance and management framework of a regulated 
public service company, such as a water company, that shows how the influence 
of ownership structure on the financial and non-financial performance of the 
company depends on the set up and use of governance mechanisms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: the bold arrow lines on the figure depict the relationships under investigation  
Figure 18. Framework for analyzing the influence of governance on the performance of 
public services company (source: compiled by the author) 
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This research framework depicts connections between the key governance 
actors, their major interests and the major governance mechanisms in use by the 
actors when pursuing their own objectives (i.e. performance) regarding the 
water company.  
According to Figure 18, a water company operating under national corporate 
governance and regulatory legislation (the upper rectangles) can have public, 
private or both public and private owners (the rectangle on the right). The 
different types of owners (e.g. local government, private company) can have 
different interests regarding the economic and social objectives of the water 
company (p. 39, p. 78-79); however, one ultimate aim of the owners relates to 
profit and the preservation of the company (p. 66). Nevertheless, differences in 
the owners’ interests are reflected further in their decisions regarding the set up 
and use of corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. the composition and the role 
of supervisory board) for ensuring the required performance. Moreover, the 
previous discussion of theories suggested that privately owned companies can 
outperform publicly owned companies in terms of efficiency, but this remains 
questionable in the context of monopoly water utilities (p. 42). The results of 
empirical studies diverge and do not provide conclusive evidence on the 
superiority of public or private ownership regarding the efficiency and pro-
ductivity of water companies (p. 95). Considering this, the opening research 
question (RQ1) aims to test the theoretical expectations of the ownership-
performance relationship stemming from corporate governance related theories 
as follows: 
 
RQ1: Is there a significant difference in efficiency between water 
companies with public, private and mixed public-private ownership? 
 
And as we explore the governance related causes behind differences in the 
financial and non-financial performance of water companies, the second 
research question (RQ2) is proposed as follows: 
 
RQ2: What are the primary objectives of the different types of 
owners in the water companies? 
 
Moving along the black arrows from right to left in Figure 18, it indicates that 
the owners delegate some of their power (control) to appointed members of the 
supervisory board, who represent their interests in the water company. Under 
the two-tier corporate governance model, the functions of management and 
control are formally separated between the management and the supervisory 
board that should avoid the manager (CEO) enhancing his or her own interests 
through decisions that are not optimal for the owner (p. 44–45). The members 
of supervisory and management board embody particular social and educational 
background, skills and work experience (p. 46–49) that enable them to execute 
their duties in the water company. The supervisory board as a corporate 
governance mechanism intends to ensure that the owners’ and managers’ 
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interests are aligned. The traditional tasks of supervisory board are also related 
to manager appointment and remuneration and if needed, the supervisory board 
removes ineffective managers. Moreover, besides the classical control function, 
the supervisory board members can also fulfil service roles and strategic roles 
(p. 45–46). Therefore, the third (RQ3) and the fourth research question (RQ4) 
are posed as follows: 
 
RQ3: What characteristics do the members of supervisory board and 
management board embody in water companies? 
 
RQ4: What are the roles of the boards in influencing the perfor-
mance of water companies? 
 
As revealed in Figure 18, the water company is managed (the square with the 
circle of arrows in it) not only under the conditions of corporate governance, but 
it also operates under specific regulatory conditions in the water sector (the 
rectangles on the upper right). The model of the contractor-provider split (p. 65) 
separates the different roles of the local government and the water company – 
ensuring and providing – in water services. As the contractor (or regulator), the 
local government plans and monitors water services provision by the specialized 
water company. Moreover, as a service contractor, the local government is 
primarily interested in non-financial performance, such as service quality, 
affordability and access to water services. Consequently, a specific conflict of 
interest arises for the local government in a publicly owned water company due 
to its dual role as an owner with economic objectives and a service contractor 
(guarantor) with social objectives (p. 66–67).  
However, in pursuit of its interests as contractor (regulator), the local 
government can introduce a set of specific governance mechanisms – regulatory 
contracts – into its water services governance system to direct and control the 
performance of water services provision (p. 63–64). The contracts (e.g. services 
contract) can be viewed as a tool for establishing important rules of game; that 
is, stipulations on water price, service quality, network expansion and impor-
tantly, accountability requirements in the governance relationship between the 
local government and the water company (p. 87–88). Moreover, the tasks of the 
regulator regarding setting the water tariffs and monitoring the achievement of 
quality and coverage targets by the water company can be delegated from the 
local government (policymakers) to a separate regulatory agency (p. 91). The 
introduction of an independent regulatory agency is a key step in many water 
sector governance reforms, viewed as an option that (1) mitigates performance 
eroding political interference by (local) government, and (2) better balances the 
interests of different stakeholders in water services. Therefore, the fifth research 
question (RQ5) is formulated as follows: 
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RQ5: How does the setup and use of regulatory contracts and insti-
tutions influence the performance of the water companies? 
To facilitate control over the manager’s decisions and to ensure that the owner’s 
interests are pursued in the water company, a performance-based accountability 
system is set up in the company (the circle of arrows in Figure 18). The 
substance of performance-based accountability is performance, and it aims to 
demonstrate and give account of results against established targets (p. 24–25). 
However, accountability is not limited to a single two-party principal-agent 
relationship. On the contrary, governance actors, such as the manager or chair-
man of the supervisory board, can be accountable to a number of parties inside 
and outside (e.g. local government) their company; hence, accountability is a 
social mechanism for directing and controlling (i.e. influencing) any governance 
actor in pursuit of the interest of some significant other (p. 26). Accountability 
has the potential to serve as a facilitator of the relationship between governance 
actors. Therefore, considering the aims of the present dissertation, this dis-
cussion leads to the sixth research question (RQ6) as follows: 
 
RQ6: How do the accountabilities make it possible for the gover-
nance actors to achieve their objectives in the water company? 
 
All in all, depending on the ownership structure of the water company, this can 
be tied to a local government either by a contractual relationship (private 
ownership) or by both a contractual relationship and an ownership relationship 
(public, mixed public-private ownership) (p. 67). In either case the water 
company managers are faced with the multiple, often conflicting, objectives of 
the owner(s) and the regulator, seeking to balance the financial (economic) and 
non-financial (social) performance of the company (p. 84). Corporate boards 
and regulatory contracts (e.g. services contract) are the key governance mecha-
nism that in combination, used by the governance actors for influencing 
decision-making in the water company, determines the trade-off between 
financial and non-financial performance in water services provision (the 
rectangle down on the left with contrary arrows in Figure 18). Therefore, in 
light of the discussion in the present subchapter, the seventh and final research 
question (RQ7) is stated as follows: 
 
RQ7: What are the trade-offs between financial and non-financial 
performance in the water companies? 
 
The discussion above indicates that in order to provide a deeper insight into the 
influence of governance on the performance of water services provision, the 
empirical research has to be conducted in various domains of corporate and 
regulatory governance, accountability and performance in the water sector. 
After having presented the conceptual framework and research questions, the 
following subchapter describes the adopted research methods and data collec-
tion for the empirical research. 
105 
2.2. Research methods 
The empirical research of the present dissertation is conducted using both quan-
titative and qualitative research methods; thus, it embodies the elements of a 
mixed-method research (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998, Teddlie and Tashakkori 
2003). Tashakkori and Creswell (2007) define mixed-methods as ‘research in 
which the investigator collects and analyses data, integrates the findings and 
draws inferences using both qualitative and quantitative approaches or methods 
in a single study’. Halcomb and Andrew (2009) point out that mixed-methods 
research is not simply the ad hoc combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methods, but the qualitative and quantitative data collected must be integrated at 
some stage in the research process into a single study. Moreover, Creswell et al. 
(2003) emphasize that in a mixed research, the qualitative and quantitative data 
can be collected concurrently or sequentially and that either one or other set of 
data can be given priority (Morse 1991, Morgan 1998). The rationales for using 
a mixed-method research usually include arguments for providing a basis for 
triangulation (Denzin 1978), expanding and complementing (illustrating/ 
clarifying) the results obtained through one research method with the use of 
another method (Spratt et al. 2004). However, Tashakkori and Creswell (2007) 
and Johnson, et al. (2007) argue that mixed-methods research is evolving and 
the discussion of what it actually is ‘should be kept open’ (Doyle et al. 2009). 
Figure 19 summarizes different research methods used with organizational 
samples, which are divided between the two parts of the empirical research. 
 
     Research stages   Methods used                  Sample 
 
 
 
PART 1. 
RQ1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART 2. 
RQ2-RQ7 
 
 
 
Figure 19. The parts of the empirical research and components of the research 
methodology (source: compiled by the author) 
 
Quantitative 
analysis of the 
influence of 
ownership and  
size on the 
efficiency  
(in subchapter 3.2) 
 DEA analysis 
 Homogeneous bootstrap 
 ML estimation of a 
truncated regression model  
 ANOVA analysis 
43 water 
companies 
(number of 
observations = 
118) 
Qualitative multi-
case study analysis 
of how the setup 
and use of 
governance 
mechanisms shapes 
performance  
(in subchapter 3.3) 
 Desk study 
 Semi-structured  
interviews 
   Questionnaire     
 Observation 
3 cases  
including 6 
case 
organizations 
(3 water 
companies 
and 3 local 
governments) 
Triangu-
lation 
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Quantitative analysis  
The first part of the empirical research (subchapter 3.2) in the present disser-
tation comprises a quantitative analysis of the influence of ownership and 
corporate size on the technical (operational) efficiency of Estonian water com-
panies. The quantitative analysis of panel data aims to provide an answer to the 
first research question (RQ1) formulated in the previous subchapter – is there a 
significant difference in efficiency between water companies with public, 
private and mixed public-private ownership? Moreover, considering the fact 
that water utilities tend to be natural monopolies, the effect of size and 
ownership-size interaction on the efficiency of the water company is also tested. 
In the context of the mixed research method, the quantitative study can be 
viewed as a preliminary and complementary study for the qualitative case study 
analysis that seeks to map the patterns of how governance influences per-
formance in water services. The efficiency gaps between water companies from 
the quantitative study were considered during case study selection and when 
conducting the desk-study and preparing interview questions for the qualitative 
analysis. 
The quantitative analysis of this dissertation will proceed in three major 
stages. The first step involves the application of Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) to obtain year-by-year efficiency scores for the sample water companies. 
The DEA method determines simple relationships among variables – water 
companies that produce far less output than others with the same input levels 
are deemed to be relatively inefficient.  
DEA is a non-parametric linear frontier method that is widely used in effi-
ciency measurements, especially in studies of utility industries. Non-parametric 
methods differ from parametric methods by not requiring any specification of 
production or cost function in advance, which is a great advantage (Zhu 2009). 
In a DEA model, the measure of efficiency of any company is obtained using 
the ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs subject to the condition that 
similar ratios for every company are equal to or less than unity (Zhu 2009). This 
relationship is expressed mathematically in Equation (1), which presents a 
maximization exercise (Corton and Berg 2008):  
 
݉ܽݔ … ߣ଴ =
∑ =ଵ ߙ௥ ௥ܻ ଴௦௥
∑ =ଵ ߚ௜ ௜ܺ ଴௠௜
  ܵ. ܶ.  
∑ =ଵ ߙ௥ ௥ܻ ௝௦௥
∑ =ଵ ߚ௜ ௜ܺ ௝௠௜
 ≤ 1 
 
ߙ௥, ߚ௜ ≥ 0; ݆ = 1 … ݊; ݅ = 1 … ݉; ݎ = 1 … ݏ                           (1) 
 
Here, Y0 and X0 are observed output and input variable vectors of the company 
under evaluation; α and β are the weights to be applied to all units; i represents 
an input within a set of m, r an output within a set of s, and j one of the n 
companies.  
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The output from a DEA exercise is the proportion by which the observed inputs 
could be contracted if the company were to operate efficiently. While the same 
volume of output can be produced optimally with fewer inputs, this is referred 
to as an input-efficiency approach (Farrell 1957). It is common practice to use 
input orientation in efficiency analyses of network utilities because the compa-
nies are generally supplying services to a fixed geographical area, and hence the 
output vector is essentially fixed (Coelli and Walding 2005). 
Throughout the quantitative analysis the efficiency scores computed under 
both the variable returns to scale (VRS) and the constant return to scale (CRS) 
assumptions will be used. Efficiency under CRS is deemed to be overall effi-
ciency, as it can be deconstructed into two components, VRS and scale effi-
ciency (SE), providing an insight into the source of inefficiencies. VRS, also 
known as “pure efficiency”, has its boundary within CRS and reflects the 
managerial ability to organize inputs in the production process (Thanassoulis 
2000). The ratio of these two efficiency measures (CRS/VRS) shows the impact 
of scale on efficiency for each company. The SE describes that part of ineffi-
ciency which can be attributed to a company because it diverged from its most 
productive operating scale size (Banker 1984).  
After obtaining the DEA scores, the average impact of external factors (e.g. 
ownership form) will be estimated. This is accomplished through the second-
stage parametric regression analysis, where external factors are regressed on the 
derived efficiency scores, which are truncated; that is, limited to the interval 
[0, 1]. Simar and Wilson (2000) suggest that the appropriate routine here is the 
maximum likelihood estimation of a truncated regression model complemented 
by bootstrap simulations. Bootstrapping has proven attractive in analyzing the 
sensitivity of efficiency and productivity measures to sampling variation (Odeck 
2008). In this paper, we follow the homogeneous bootstrap algorithm outlined 
by Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000), computing bias-corrected efficiency esti-
mators from 1000 bootstrap replications using the FEAR 1.2 software package.  
In the last stage of the analysis, a series of one-way Analysis of Variances 
(ANOVA) tests were conducted to examine the differences in mean efficiencies 
and profitability between water company groups based on ownership type, 
corporate size and corporate size-ownership type criteria.  
 
Qualitative analysis 
The second part of the empirical research (subchapter 3.3) in the present 
dissertation comprises a qualitative case study to sketch out notions of how the 
setup and use of governance mechanisms shapes performance in water com-
panies under their particular (public, private, or mixed public-private) owner-
ship structure. The qualitative governance-performance analysis aims to provide 
answers to research questions two to seven (RQ2–RQ7) formulated in the 
previous subchapter. In the context of the mixed research method, the quali-
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tative case study can be viewed as the principal one, the results of which 
provide propositions formulated in section 3.4.6. 
The case study method is defined by Yin (1984, 2009) as an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a phenomenon, issue or problem within its real-life 
context ‘when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident.’ The present dissertation is concerned with the instrumental case study 
approach, where the cases are investigated precisely because they are ‘an 
example or instance of a problem that emerged, or is emerging from the relevant 
governance literature’ (Stewart 2012). The focus of the present dissertation 
relying on the governance-performance relationship in water service provision 
requires a close understanding of strategies, structures, actors, formalized 
governance procedures, informal management practices and routines in several 
organizations (e.g. local government, water company) – this sort of data can be 
provided by an in-depth qualitative case study.  
The qualitative study in this dissertation embodies primarily theory-building 
elements (vs. theory-testing in the preliminary quantitative study), since it aims 
to describe the governance practices and achieved performance regarding water 
services provision, and explore more generally the relationships between 
specific features of governance (mechanisms, actors or processes) and the 
(financial/non-financial) performance of water companies. Stewart (2012) sug-
gests that a multi-case study approach is ‘particularly valuable when relation-
ships between organizational structures, management processes and outcomes 
are under investigation.’ Therefore, the multi-case study approach is used in this 
dissertation, which according to Stake (2006) is a ‘special effort to examine 
something having lots of cases, parts or members.’ Like all multi-case studies in 
essence (Stewart 2012), the case study conducted here is also a comparative 
one, bringing together the differences and contrasts in water services gover-
nance from selected Estonian municipalities in order to identify and investigate 
relevant influencers of performance in water services. Moreover, a multi-case 
research approach makes it possible to use inductive methods (ibid.) to 
investigate the relative effectiveness of particular governance practices in the 
Estonian municipalities. Importantly, the evidence from a multi-case study is 
considered more robust, compelling and generalizable (Stavros and Westberg 
2009). 
The case-study research in the present dissertation, defined as descriptive 
and exploratory fieldwork, was conducted in two stages. At first a desk study 
was conducted in order to investigate relevant publicly available facts and 
figures on water services governance and performance in selected Estonian 
municipalities. In the second stage, there were a number of semi-structured 
interviews conducted with key governance actors involved in water services 
provision in these municipalities. The rationale for selecting the cases, data 
sources, characteristics of the interviews and interviewees will be provided in 
the next subchapter. However, the collected data were organized and analyzed 
along the process of interviewing. All interviews were tape-recorded and after 
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each visit, the interviews were played back, transcribed in a Word file then 
printed and organized chronologically into case catalogues. An open coding 
(Corbin and Strauss 1990) was conducted when reading the interview tran-
scriptions and designating the meanings of sentences in relation to the theory 
and literature. Hence, the codes were not pre-defined and they emerged during 
the data analysis. To organize and analyze the case data using the open coding, 
the Atlas.ti software (Muhr 2004) was applied. 
A significant issue in any multi-case study is the comparison between cases, 
or cross-case analysis (Stewart 2012). In the present dissertation, in line with 
Stake (2006), the process of cross-case analysis involved generating a case-
ordered matrix as shown in Table 27 (p. 210-214), which established a basis for 
comparing the cases under a number of governance and performance features.  
Finally, the general ideas of actor-network theory (ANT) (Latour 1987, 
2005) are applied in writing the case narrative and interpreting the case data. 
Tracking interactions or following circulations is a key element in the use of 
ANT as a research method23. However, the author has not always followed the 
actors in the way suggested in ANT and the notion of human and non-human 
actors is also applied at a more general level when explaining how the setup and 
use of governance mechanisms shapes performance in water services provision.  
 
 
2.3. Sample selection and data collection 
2.3.1. Sample and data for the quantitative analysis 
The sample of the quantitative efficiency study consists of 43 Estonian water 
companies that provide services to over 910 000 people, which accounted for 
68% of the total population in Estonia (as of 31 December 2007). To the rest of 
the population, water services are provided by multi-utility companies, 
industrial production companies, agricultural firms, nonprofit organizations or 
directly by local government agencies (departments). This sample consists only 
of those water companies that do not differ substantially in the services they 
deliver. They all follow the same production cycle (i.e. water extraction, puri-
fication and supply, as well as sewerage collection and treatment) as revealed in 
Figure 12 (p. 74), which makes it possible for them to be compared against each 
other. However, the water companies of the sample vary across ownership 
dimensions. Ownership categories established in this study include public, pri-
vate and mixed groups. In this context, public and private water companies are 
fully owned respectively either by local governments or private partners. If local 
governments and private partners have ownership in one and the same water 
company, the latter is here termed a mixed company. 
                                                                          
23  ANT is considered equally as a method and theory (Ritzer 2004); it is a tool to help 
describe something, not what is being described (Latour 2005).  
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Companies can be classified as small, medium or large on the basis of a 
number of criteria, including the number of employees, unit sales, sales reve-
nue, real assets, production capacity, market share and so on (Grossi 2008). The 
work of Wallsten and Kosec (2008) is taken into account in this quantitative 
empirical study; in other words, the size of categories are established on the 
basis of the population served by the water companies. Proceeding from the 
principle of equal sample distribution and examples from the literature, the 
following criteria were set for dividing the water companies into size groups: 
small companies serve 501–3 300 people; medium 3 301–10 000 people; large 
10 001–100 000 and very large companies provide water services to more than 
100 000 people. 
A panel dataset that includes information about all major water companies in 
Estonia from 2005 to 2007 has been used to test the effects of ownership struc-
ture and corporate size. While the precise number of water companies changed 
every year and there existed a certain lack of proper data, the size of the sample 
dataset differs slightly in the years under observation, containing 39 water com-
panies for 2005, 40 for 2006 and 43 companies for 2007. As a sample illustra-
tion, Table 6 shows the number of water companies by ownership status and 
size category in 2007. 
 
Table 6. Number of water companies in the sample in 2007 
Ownership type 
Corporate size 
Small Medium Large Very Large 
Public 11 8 10 – 
Private 5 4 1 – 
Public-private – 3 – 1 
Total 16 15 11 1 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
 
The selection of the input-output variables included in the DEA model for effi-
ciency assessment was a complicated exercise due to the limited set of non-
financial input data available. It was also decided to limit attention to models 
that involve no more than four variables due to the degree of freedom 
constraints. Following Thanassoulis (2000), Coelli and Walding (2005) and 
Walter et al. 2009, operational expenses (OPEX) were chosen as a single input 
variable for the DEA model. Here OPEX, measured in thousands of euros, 
stands for the operational expenses of the water companies as presented in their 
annual income statements24 (i.e. costs of goods sold, labour costs, other 
operating costs, depreciation), including also the amount of annual depreciation. 
                                                                          
24  In the annual reports the financial figures were provided in Estonian kroons (1 euro = 
15.6466 Estonian kroons) at that time. 
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Coelli and Walding (2005) support the idea of using depreciation as a rea-
sonable proxy for the aggregate quantity of capital used, if each company had a 
portfolio of assets with similar average asset lives. Depreciation rates used by 
the water companies are based on the useful life of their fixed assets; the calcu-
lations are audited by independent auditors as required by the Estonian 
Accounting Act.  
As presented by Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2008), in this quantitative study three 
outputs have been considered: population served (thousands of inhabitants), 
drinking water produced (measured in cubic metres per day) and treated sewage 
(measured in thousands of cubic metres per year). Some recent papers have 
emphasized that significant modelling improvement in measuring the efficiency 
of water companies can be accomplished if both the physical volume of water 
services and the number of connections are considered as outputs (Garcia and 
Thomas 2001, Saal and Parker 2006). Unfortunately, the available dataset does 
not provide information about the number of connections, and the number of 
people served is the best available proxy. Conversely, water production and 
sewage treatment account directly for the volume of two of the major services 
provided by the companies. Table 7 below includes several descriptive statistics 
for the DEA input-output data from 2005 to 2007. 
 
Table 7. DEA data description 
Variable Measurement unit Mean Standard deviation Min. Max. 
Outputs      
Population  
served Inhabitants 22 424 69 948 717 452 154 
Drinking water 
produced m
3 per day 3 522 11 818 78 77 530 
Sewage treated Thousands of m
3 
per year 2 135 7 274 7.4 47 522 
Inputs    
Operational 
expenses Thousands of euro 1 505 4 017 23.5 28 451 
Note: number of observations (n) = 118 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
 
Data on water company ownership structure and financial results were collected 
through the Estonian Business Registry from the annual reports of the water 
companies, which were all audited by independent auditors; data about drinking 
water production volumes and number of people serviced were requested from 
the Estonian Health Protection Inspectorate and data about treated sewage 
volumes from the Ministry of the Environment in Estonia. 
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2.3.2. Selection of case studies 
As noted in the literature, a case does not have any objective existence and the 
selection of cases is guided by the research purpose (Eisenhardt 1989b, Stake 
2006, Stewart 2012). Yin (2009) emphasizes that as opposed to statistical 
studies, a multi-case study draws on replication logic rather than sampling 
logic. Therefore, case selection for a multi-case study should be made so that 
they either predict similar results for all cases (literal replication) or provide 
contrary results for predictable reasons (theoretical replication). In this study, 
theoretical replication is used. 
The present multi-case study utilizes the experiences of three water com-
panies in different Estonian municipalities (towns) between 2000 and 2009 to 
interpret governance influence on performance of water services provision in 
practice. The main criteria for case selection were as follows: (1) the charac-
teristics of corporate governance should be different – hence, the selected case 
companies have different ownership structures – public, private and mixed 
public-private ownership; (2) the governance efforts have to be considerable in 
order to provide research material for the study; therefore, the size of the water 
companies (number of population serviced) and the range of provided services 
(including only companies that follow the whole water services production 
cycle shown in Figure 12) were considered when making the case selection. The 
three case companies were also included in the preliminary quantitative effi-
ciency study that provided some hints on potential differences in performance 
considerations. The key ownership and size characteristics of the selected water 
companies are drawn together in Table 8, which shows that with regard to size, 
case companies A, B and C belong to different size categories being respec-
tively very-large, large and medium-sized companies (Wallsten and Kosec 
2008).  
Moreover, case companies A (mixed ownership) and B (public ownership) 
are the two largest water companies in Estonia and are rich in complex 
corporate and regulatory governance issues. However, case company A is one 
of the few listed water companies with international ownership in Europe. 
Privately owned case company C, although significantly smaller than the 
other two case companies, has been actively involved in solving (through court 
disputes) conflicts of interests with the local government responsible for water 
services provision in the municipality. This provides a potentially extreme case 
of a performance eroding regulatory governance conflict in the Estonian water 
sector. 
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Table 8. Ownership and size characteristics of the three case companies 
Characteristic Unit A B C 
Ownership structure % 35 public,  
65 private 
100 public 100 private 
Population served Inhabitants 405 000 99 000 4 000 
Number of 
employees 
People 320 100 10 
Volume of drinking 
water produced  
m3 per year 25 000 000 5 200 000 170 000 
Volume of sewage 
collected 
m3 per year 22 600 000 4 600 000 160 000 
Length of water 
mains 
km 910 310 21 
Length of sewerage 
mains 
km 1200 340 20 
Note: the figures indicate approximate sizes in 2009 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
 
Finally, considering that local governments have been responsible and actively 
involved in water services provision in Estonia, the willingness of both the local 
governments and the water companies to participate in the research was 
important in the case selection. The names of the companies are, however, not 
addressed in the case narratives or the discussion in the present dissertation, 
since this was agreed with the interviewees.  
 
   
2.3.3. Data sources and collection for case study analysis 
The data were gathered from interviews, questionnaires and published 
materials, sector statistics, internal documents of case organizations25 and short 
observations during the period from May 2010 to July 2011. Therefore, the data 
collection procedure included conducting interviews, completing ques-
tionnaires, collecting documents and quantitative data files as well as making 
some observations in an annual general meeting. The case study relies both on 
primary and secondary sources. As the data for analysis was collected from 
multiple sources, it was possible to use triangulation (e.g. compare qualitative 
data with quantitative data) that provided insights regarding the governance 
practices and increased the validity of the findings.  
                                                                          
25  Here and hereinafter the term ‘case organizations’ stands for both the water company and 
the local government of a case.  
114 
In the first stage of the data collection a thorough desk study was conducted 
in order to investigate relevant publicly available documents and materials 
about the case organizations, such as news articles, annual reports and articles 
of association for the water companies, local government strategies, annual 
budgets and consolidated financial reports, minutes of local government 
sessions and local government regulations regarding water services. The list of 
studied documents is provided in Appendix 3. However, internet homepages of 
the case companies and local governments were explored for data about their 
corporate governance systems, and financial and non-financial performance. 
These data were complemented and verified using data from the case com-
panies’ audited annual reports collected electronically through the Estonian 
Business Registry. Data about drinking water quality was requested directly 
from the Estonian Health Protection Inspectorate and data about treated sewage 
in the water companies was obtained from the Ministry of Environment of 
Estonia. Articles from the media were used as supporting evidence on the 
activities of the case organizations and their historical background. For case 
company A, listed on the stock exchange, the internet homepage of the stock 
exchange was explored for information on the process of going public (initial 
public offering – IPO) and communication with stock investors in the water 
company. In the second stage of the case study, the document study was 
supplemented by information obtained through a number of face-to-face semi-
structured interviews conducted with top managers at the water companies and, 
politicians and senior officials directly responsible for water services provision 
in the local governments. The fieldwork took place in the case organizations. 
Table 9, summarizing the major features of the interviews, reveals that there 
were 13 tape-recorded interviews, which amounted to 18 hours of discussion 
and resulted in 285 pages of transcript made by the author.  
 
Table 9. Case study interviews characteristics 
 Case studies  
Total A B C 
Number of inter-
views 
6 5 2 13 
Interview duration 
total (h) 
8 6 4 18 
Pages of transcript 130 95 60 285 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
 
Most of the interviews lasted between 1.5 and 2 hours. Interviewees were 
selected considering the following criteria: (1) involvement in major corporate 
governance relationships in the water companies (e.g. management and the 
board) and/or, (2) involvement in water services strategic planning, economic 
115 
regulation and performance control in the local governments, (3) work-history 
and experience in their respective position. The interviewees work at different 
management levels in their case organizations, the positions of the interviewees 
summarized in Table 10. The interviewees with different positions and roles in 
water services provision reveal a broader spectrum of stakeholder interests and 
opinions regarding one and the same governance issue in influencing the per-
formance of water services provision in practice. Their participation in dis-
cussions and decision-making in the governance bodies of the water companies 
and/or local governments allow them to provide valuable insights into applied 
governance mechanisms and processes influencing the financial and non-
financial performance of the water companies. 
 
Table 10. Positions of interviewees 
Case  Number 
of 
interviews 
Professional positions of interviewees 
In the water company In the local government 
Case A 2 CEO – 
1 Member of the 
supervisory board 
Deputy major responsible for municipal 
services 
1 – CEO of the supervisory foundation 
over water companies 
1 – Head of the municipal engineering 
services board 
1 – Senior specialist of the municipal 
engineering services board 
Case B 1 CEO Member of the city council 
1 Chairman of the 
supervisory board 
Member of the city council 
1 Voter in the annual 
general meeting 
Deputy major responsible for municipal 
services 
1 Member of the 
supervisory board 
Member of the city council 
1 – Senior environmental specialist 
Case C 1 CEO/ 50% shareholder – 
1 – City major 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
 
The average tenure of the interviewees was approximately 10 years in their case 
organizations, which confirms the interviewees’ experience and awareness of 
governance practices and emerging performance issues in their organizations. 
Depending on the positions of the interviewees (i.e. CEO, member of board, 
mayor/deputy mayor, local government specialist) and considering the findings 
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from the desk study, different interview guides for the semi-structured inter-
views were prepared. The interview guides included 20–30 main questions, 
which were divided into 6 sections (see Appendix 4 for a detailed interview 
guide) focusing on the key elements of the water service governance and 
performance framework of analysis in Figure 18. The interview questions rely 
on the previously established theoretical framework and major research 
questions (RQ-s).  
Before each interview the interviewees were provided with a list of topics to 
be covered during the interview; however, they did not receive the interview 
questions in advance. At the beginning of each interview, the participants were 
asked for permission to record the interview. The interview started with some 
more general open-ended questions asking interviewees for their opinions 
regarding relevant themes before becoming more focused. However, during the 
interviews the order of questions remained somewhat flexible, depending on the 
emergent issues in the field. Four respondents, two from water companies and 
two from local governments, were asked to fill in a short questionnaire after the 
interviews, where they evaluated the importance of established financial and 
non-financial objectives (on a 5-point Likert scale) for their case organizations. 
The questionnaire (see a detailed questionnaire in Appendix 5), verifying the 
data collected earlier through the desk study and interviews, was used in cases 
A and B, where the local governments have a dual role and respectively a 
potential conflict of interests in the water companies. Moreover, during and/or 
after the field visits, some respondents were asked to provide documents and 
factual materials on issues discussed during the interviews, which was intended 
to avoid possible false interpretations. However, one field visit included a two-
hour observation of an annual shareholder’s meeting in case company A.  
 
 
2.4. Validity and reliability 
2.4.1. Validity and reliability issues of the quantitative analysis 
As noted earlier in subchapter 2.2. (p. 106), the first step in the quantitative 
analysis about the influence of ownership and corporate size on the efficiency of 
Estonian water companies involves the application of DEA to obtain year-by-
year efficiency scores for the sample companies. However, efficiency results 
from a DEA frontier are contingent on the homogeneity of the sample units (i.e. 
water companies) to be analyzed (Corton and Berg 2008). The homogeneity 
criterion implies that there are no outliers – a few extreme observations – in the 
sample (Banker and Chang 2006). Outliers are often caused by errors in 
measuring either the inputs or outputs (ibid.). Hence, detecting and removing 
the outliers from the sample is of vital importance, since nonparametric 
estimators such as DEA are sensitive to outliers. To do that in this quantitative 
research, Banker and Gifford’s (1988) procedure for identifying outliers was 
applied and two observations with super-efficiency scores higher than a pre-
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selected screen of 1.3 were eliminated from further analysis (Banker and Chang 
2006).  
In the second stage of the quantitative study, the efficiency scores from the 
DEA analysis were regressed using both established ownership and size 
variables. The concept of corporate size as such is a relative concept and 
companies can be classified small, medium and large based on a number of 
criteria (Grossi 2008). Several options for classification were considered by the 
authors; however, based on examples from the literature (Wallsten and Kosec 
2008) and developed regulatory practice (US, Canada) corporate size was iden-
tified through ‘population served.’ Nevertheless, a key characteristic of a large 
company is its large production volume, the basis for obtaining consistent 
economies of scale. Therefore, the volume of produced water as an alternative 
size measure was also explored, but in the case of the present sample, due to a 
significant correlation found between the number of people served and the pro-
duction volume, the production measure would have had minimal effects on the 
estimates when used in place of ‘population served.’ However, there was pro-
ceeded from the principle of equal sample distribution when dividing the water 
companies into size groups, which match with the ones used in some other 
water system surveys (Peda et al. 2011). 
In regard to the estimated model in the regression analysis, the purpose of 
using the bootstrapping approach was two-fold: first, to obtain bias corrected 
estimates and the confidence intervals for DEA-efficiency scores; second, to 
overcome the correlation problem of the DEA-efficiency scores. DEA is a non-
parametric technique, as noted in subchapter 2.2, and the use of a bootstrapping 
methodology helps to determine the statistical properties of the DEA estimators. 
Direct regression analysis would be invalid because of the dependency of the 
efficiency scores; hence, to overcome this problem, bootstrapped efficiency 
scores have been used in the regression. 
 
  
2.4.2. Validity and reliability issues of the qualitative analysis 
The issues of validity and reliability of the case study were tackled in the 
following ways in the present dissertation. To ensure external validity – that the 
results of the case study can be generalized to a theory and other cases in similar 
settings – the study focuses on companies from one and the same specific sector 
(i.e. water services sector). In order to allow for generalization from one case to 
another, thorough case descriptions (narratives) were written without tending to 
the author’s own explanations. To confirm the theoretical generalizations in the 
present multi-case study, the results are replicated (Yin 2009) in three water 
companies with different (public, private and mixed public-private) ownership 
structures. However, the three selected case studies were analyzed based on a 
common theoretical framework established before data collection. This 
increases external validity and makes it possible to prove or reject the theo-
retical expectations regarding governance-performance relationships in water 
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services provision. To provide traction to the three cases, their structure is built 
to reflect the ‘theoretically shaped analytical framework related to governance’ 
(Stewart 2012) as shown in Figure 18.  
In the context of governance research, Stewart (2012) argues that multi-case 
researchers dealing with issues of casual inference can overcome the often 
criticized ‘lack of tightness’ (see King et al. 1994), if they consider the case 
study ‘as a kind of natural experiment, and the experiment is well chosen in 
relation to the problem of interest.’ Then one can say that in similar cir-
cumstances he/she can be reasonably sure that ‘a similar outcome will occur’ 
(Stewart 2012). Hence, the results are generalizable to theoretical propositions, 
where the generalizability is reached through the process of abstraction (Yin 
2009). The present multi-case study uses the rhetoric of contextual generali-
zation, which according to Lukka and Kasanen (1995) rests on ‘a meaningful 
and convincing connection of the study with the real-world phenomena 
surrounding the case in question.’ To generate good results and create a better 
understanding of the governance and performance relationship, the author of the 
present study used ‘an iterative data-theory-data-theory path’ (Stewart 2012). 
To ensure construct validity and avoid subjective interpretation of the 
evidence, multiple data sources are used in all three cases as suggested by Yin 
(2003). The results from different sources (e.g. from interviews with different 
respondents, documents, reports, news articles etc.) were compared and data 
triangulation as a validity procedure (Creswell and Miller 2000) was conducted. 
The data triangulation provides stronger support for inferences about causal 
relationships (Denzin 1978) of how certain governance features lead to per-
formance influencing consequences as summarized in Table 27. Moreover, 
thorough descriptions of the particular context increase the internal validity 
regarding causality between the governance features and aspects of performance 
for the water companies in the present study. To mitigate the risk of being 
misled by the interviewee or the author’s false interpretation of the interview 
data, probing questions were asked from the interviewee and the same research 
issues were discussed with him/her from different angles during the interview. 
Moreover, to verify the data, the same issues were discussed later with other 
interviewees.  
To ensure the reliability of the case study – that the research can be repli-
cated by other researchers – Yin (2009) suggests creating a case study database 
and to map the research trail. Therefore, in the present qualitative research, for 
each of the three case studies, an electronic and a hard copy data catalogue were 
established, where data from all documented data sources were gathered. Hard 
copy documents, such as document print-outs, printed articles and annual 
reports were systematized in hard copy folders, while all electronic data files in 
different formats were organized in the Atlas.ti software. To be able to track 
back through the research process, an electronic research protocol was 
established by the author. This protocol includes notes on actions and emerging 
questions and issues as well as interim inferences regarding the different 
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research stages. The research procedures in the field were consistent across the 
case organizations (i.e. water companies and local governments). The prepared 
semi-structured interviews were tape-recorded and transcriptions made 
immediately after each field visit by the author. The data collected during the 
field visits (i.e. interview transcriptions, notes and documents) were organized 
in the database and analyzed to compare them with each other and evidence 
from previously collected materials. 
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3. EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE INFLUENCE  
OF GOVERNANCE ON THE PERFORMANCE  
OF WATER SERVICES PROVISION IN ESTONIA 
3.1. Overview of the Estonian water services sector 
Estonia, with a total population of approximately 1.32 million and total area of 
45 227 km2, is located on the east coast of the Baltic Sea and is one of the 
smallest countries in the EU. During the period under study 2000–2009, Estonia 
has passed both a period of fast economic growth and a period of deep reces-
sion. Estonia experienced one of the highest economic growth rates among both 
transition and OECD countries from 2000–2007, with an average annual rate of 
real GDP growth of 8.3% (OECD 2011d). In the years of economic boom 
particularly the construction industry experienced a remarkable upswing – the 
construction volume index increased 19% in 2005 and 29% in 2006 annually in 
Estonia. As a result of the high economic growth, Estonia converged rapidly to 
the income of levels of the EU average (OECD 2009); nevertheless, GDP per 
capita was still at a level of 64% of the EU27 average in 2009 (Statistics Estonia 
2011). Also inflation remained relatively high until the arrival of the economic 
crisis and yet in 2008 the consumer price index (CPI) rose by 10.6% in Estonia 
(OECD 2009). However, Estonia was one of the fist countries in the EU hit by 
the global financial and economic crisis in 2008. Solid economic growth in 
previous years was suddenly replaced with a dramatic economic downturn (–
5.1%) in 2008 and (–13.8%) in 2009 (Jõgiste et al. 2012), which affected 
revenues both in private and public sector entities. Considering the Estonia’s 
general macroeconomic context during the studied period 2000–2009, becomes 
relevant when exploring (subchapter 3.3.) how the setup of particular 
governance mechanisms has influenced the financial performance of the case 
companies.  
 
 
3.1.1. Operational framework 
In Estonia there are sufficient reserves of freshwater available (8 600 m3 per 
capita per year) and the water exploitation index remains at a relatively low 4%, 
indicating that no water scarcity is to be expected in the years ahead (Banhard 
2001, Puhas vesi…2010). Water is abstracted for different purposes: public 
supply, industrial production, cooling water for energy production, agricultural 
activities and mining activities. In most of the Estonian settlements the water 
needs are met by groundwater; however in two large towns, as well as by 
several industrial companies, surface water is mostly used (ibid.).  
Approximately 84% of the Estonian population is connected to the central 
water supply (Birk 2008) and 75% to the central sewerage system (Niine et al. 
2008). Due to increasing water prices and more accurate measurement of water 
121 
usage, domestic water consumption has declined from 187 litres per person per 
day in 1991 to approximately 100 litres per person per day at present in areas 
where a public water and sewerage network is available (Hukka 2004, Vee ja 
kanalisatsiooniteenuste…2010). With this figure Estonia lags behind most EU 
countries, where average daily water consumption per capita stands at approxi-
mately 150 litres (UNDEP/DEWA…2004, Executive Summary 2010).  
There is a relatively large number of small waterworks within the Estonian 
water supply sector. Of the 1 235 waterworks operating in 2007, only 21 pro-
duced drinking water volumes greater than 1000 m3 per day, but these never-
theless supplied 61% of the Estonian population. At the same time, 1 099 
waterworks or 89% of the total produced less than 100 m3 a day (Birk 2008). In 
total there are more than 200 companies either directly or indirectly related to 
water and sewerage services provision (Balslev Nielsen and Hoffmann 2003). 
The large number of water companies can be seen as a reflection of Estonia’s 
highly fragmented administrative territorial division: 193 rural municipalities 
and 33 cities, with fewer than 2 000 inhabitants in more than half of the munici-
palities (Ignatov 2004, Kohalik omavalitsus…2010). Like the municipalities, 
water companies differ widely in terms of corporate size; the largest providing 
services to more than 400 000 people, and the smallest companies only several 
hundred.  
In the mid-1990s, ownership of the former state owned water supply and 
wastewater facilities was transferred to local government bodies that became 
responsible for the provision of water and sewerage services. After the enact-
ment of the Commercial Code in 1995, most of the municipal water utilities 
were transformed into public limited companies owned by local government 
(Hukka 2004). Today water services in 90% of Estonian cities (i.e. regional 
centres) are also still provided by fully publicly owned water companies. How-
ever, in the smaller towns and rural municipalities, there also exist other provi-
sion modes such as specialised water companies with mixed (public and pri-
vate) ownership, production delegated to private companies or direct production 
by local government agencies (departments). The capital city of Tallinn is a 
different case; it sold the majority of shares in its water services company to 
international partners and later listed its shares on the stock exchange 
(NASDAQ OMX 2012)26. 
In addition to combined water and sewerage companies, there are also 
companies which solely specialise in water supply. In some municipalities, 
furthermore, water services are produced by multi-utility companies responsible 
for heating and other services as well. In addition, some industrial production 
companies, agricultural firms and nonprofit organizations provide water supply 
services in some districts of the country. Both the quantitative and qualitative 
study of this dissertation consists only of the combined water and sewerage 
                                                                          
26 Vinnari, E.M. and Hukka, J.J. (2007) provide an insight into the water company pri-
vatisation in Tallinn.  
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companies that all follow the same production cycle (i.e. water extraction, 
purification and supply, as well as sewerage collection and treatment). 
In Estonia, both publicly and privately owned water companies are private-
law-based profit-oriented legal entities and operate either in the form of private 
liability (osaühing) or public limited companies (aktsiaselts) (Commercial Code 
2009). Estonian corporate governance structures – as they apply to companies – 
are characterized by a two-tier system following the German model. According 
to this dualistic model, aside from the shareholders assembly, each company 
usually consists of a supervisory board27 and management (executive) board 
(Grossi and Reichard 2008). The supervisory board decides on the strategic 
issues of the company, oversees the company’s activities and usually nominates 
the CEO or management board. The size of the management board is not deter-
mined by the Commercial Code; it may also consist of a single individual – the 
CEO. The management board as the executive body of the company directs and 
represents the company. However, the management board has to follow the 
instructions of the supervisory board and needs its approval for transaction 
beyond regular economic activities (OECD 2011b). The supervisory board is 
the representative body of the shareholders; however the members of the super-
visory board do not need to be the shareholders. The supervisory board can 
range from a minimum of 3 to a maximum of 10 competent members, who are 
not allowed to be members of the management board and vice versa under the 
Commercial Code (2009). The representation of the local government as the 
owner within the companies’ governance bodies in Estonia is identical to that of 
other owners, with the number of votes generally proportional to its capital 
input within the company.  
 
 
3.1.2. Regulatory framework 
The overall regulation of water services in Estonia involves multiple public 
authorities, as shown in Figure 20, that are focused on the issues of the use of 
water sources, quality of drinking water, wastewater treatment quality, organi-
zation of water services provision and price control. On the highest level of the 
water services regulatory framework, legislation is prepared by the ministries 
and adopted by the parliament Riigikogu in Estonia. As a member of the EU 
from 2004, Estonia has to align its water sector legislation with respective EU 
directives and policies. However, due to the investment needs, Estonia during 
the accession negotiations was allowed to get complied with the EU water and 
wastewater requirements step-by-step as follows: the Urban Waste Water 
Directive (91/271/EEC) by the end of 2010, the Drinking Water Directive 
(98/83/EEC) by the end of 2013 and the Water Framework Directive 
(2000/60/EU) by 2015 (Reoveekäitluse arendamine…2007).  
                                                                          
27  According to the Commercial Code (2009), private limited companies with share capital 
less than 25 560 euro are not required to form a supervisory board.  
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Note: institutions in the dotted-line box were not involved in water services governance during 
the observed period of this study. 
Figure 20. Institutional structure of water services governance in Estonia (source: 
compiled by the author)  
 
 
Differently from the centrally organized water quality and environmental 
control (i.e. Health Protection Inspectorate and Environmental Inspectorate in 
Figure 20), the economic regulation of Estonian water companies was primarily 
left to local governments to arrange under stipulations within the national laws 
until 2010. The functions of local government included the organization of 
water and sewerage supply in its municipality, i.e. the rural municipality or city 
(Local Government…2010). The Public Water Supply and Sewerage Act 1999 
stipulated the rights and obligations of the state, local governments, water 
companies and clients. This was the main instrument for regulating relations 
between the water user and the water company, stating that public water supply 
and sewerage systems can be owned by a public or private entity, but in either 
case the water company has to ensure sufficient water supply and sanitation 
services (Public Water… 2010).  
Local governments are entitled to appoint a water company and approve its 
service area, or licensed territory, for water services provision. In its licensed 
territory the water company should ensure the functioning and maintenance of 
the public water supply and sewerage system. The water and sewerage system 
should be developed and constructed based on a public water supply and sewer-
age system development plan established by the local government for a period 
of at least 12 years (Public Water…2010). This development plan constitutes 
the primary long-term planning document for local government concerning 
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water services, and it is a requirement to include a time schedule and budget 
estimate for future (infrastructure) developments. 
Water services are delivered to water users (clients) based on a contract 
signed with the water company. Water sold from the public water supply should 
be measured using water meters, assuming the water company and the client 
have not agreed on any other method. The Public Water Supply and Sewerage 
Act and local government procedures together regulated the establishment of 
water prices. The act stipulated that local government establishes the prices 
based on a proposal received from the water company. In practice the price of 
water was usually established in cooperation between the local government and 
the water company (Banhard 2001). However the same Public Water Supply 
and Sewerage Act stipulated that the price for water supply and wastewater 
discharge services must be established so that the water company could: 
1) cover production costs, 2) comply with quality and safety requirements, 
3) comply with environmental protection requirements, and 4) operate with 
justified profitability. Also the water price could not be discriminatory with 
regard to different clients or client groups of the water companies (Public 
Water…2010).  
As such the Public Water Supply and Sewerage Act being the main regu-
latory instrument of water services provision in Estonia, was only lax frame-
work legislation, and did not provide any guidelines or give reference to any 
methodical approach for local governments on water costing or ‘justified’ 
profitability calculations to follow when establishing water prices (Peda et al. 
2011). Moreover, in Estonian municipalities, in order to meet the requirements 
of EU directives on water quality and environmental control (namely 98/83 EU, 
91/271/EEC), there were extensive investments of 1.13 billion euro needed for 
the modernisation of the water and sewerage treatment systems over the period 
2007–2013 (Reoveekäitluse arendamine…2007). In this context the water users 
in Estonia faced rapid price increases – from the middle of 2007 to the end of 
2009 the average price for water services for private individuals increased by 
27% in Estonia (Veehind 2010). In the end of 2009 the average price for water 
and wastewater was 2.01 euro/m3 for private individuals and 2.39 euro/m3 for 
legal entities in Estonia. Even if most of the necessary funding to Estonian 
municipalities comes from EU support funds, the need to cover concurrent costs 
is likely to further fuel price increases in the years ahead (Peda et al. 2011).  
Yet, not all water companies in Estonia could qualify for using EU support 
funds for the renovation and construction of their infrastructure. Those who 
qualified to use the EU support for these investments and those who did not, 
was based on ownership and size criteria. Firstly, the EU support was not 
applicable to water companies with a majority private ownership in Estonia 
(Avatud voorud 2010). Secondly, in small Estonian municipalities, the water 
companies had difficulties guaranteeing the required self-financing for EU 
financed development projects (Reoveekäitluse arendamine…2007), which had 
become a barrier for infrastructure renovation (Peda et al. 2011). Hence tight 
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budgets have restricted water companies’ access to capital (Mygind 2000/2001), 
whilst greater capitalization of water companies has allowed for greater lever-
age and better financing conditions for investments (Grossi 2008) in Estonia. 
The first step in tightening economic regulation of water companies in state 
level was made in 2010, when the Riigikogu adopted the Establishment of Price 
Restrictions on Monopolies Act (Monopolidele hinnapiirangute…2010) to 
counter monopolistic powers of the water companies. This change, however, 
remained beyond the period of time studied in the present dissertation. Never-
theless, according to the new act, water prices and profitability of the water 
companies (except the small ones) are regulated centrally by the Estonian 
Competition Authority under the same rules in the country now28. 
Finally, in Figure 20, the associations depicted down there, represent the 
interests of particular interests groups such as the water companies, organized 
citizens with interests in water issues or local governments. The interest groups 
have been involved in enhancing the professional knowledge of their members 
and representing their interests in the legislative processes related to water and 
water services.  
To sum up, in the studied period from 2000 to 2009 the Estonian water 
companies operated in a changing economic environment. Irrespective of the 
ownership structure, the water companies have provided water services in their 
designated areas as profit oriented business entities being subjects to local 
government sectoral strategies and economic regulations. Moreover, the 
Estonian water companies have been required to invest heavily into their water 
infrastructure in order to comply with the EU directives on water quality and 
environmental control. In the light of that, of importance to this research is the 
recognition that there was missing a strict centrally applied economic regulation 
of water companies to control water prices and monopoly profits in Estonia. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that there exists a variety of governance practices 
with different performance incentives and trade-offs in the highly fragmented 
Estonian water sector.  
 
 
3.2. Quantitative study of the influence of ownership 
and size on efficiency of Estonian water companies 
The question as to what is the most efficient form of ownership has long been 
debated in economics and a number of empirical studies comparing privately 
and publicly owned water company efficiency levels provide divergent results 
and are far from conclusive (see Table 5, p. 95). Yet, water companies, being 
                                                                          
28  Starting from 1 November 2010, all Estonian water companies operating in wastewater 
collection areas with a waste load of more than 2 000 population equivalents are obliged to 
present their price proposals to the Estonian Competition Authority for approval. By that 
time the Competition Authority was required to work out initial principles of price 
calculation for the water companies (Monopolidele hinnapiirangute…2010). 
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natural monopolies, are expected to obtain consistent economies of scale at 
large production capacities (Abbot and Cohen 2009) as discussed in subchapter 
1.3.1, which rather advocates establishing large companies to improve effi-
ciency (Kim 1987, Kahn 1988). However, the theoretical approaches discussed 
in subchapter 1.1.2 provided different insights and explanations for the per-
formance gaps regarding water services provision.  
In this subchapter the results of the quantitative efficiency analysis will be 
presented and the answer to the first research question (RQ1) will be provided. 
As it was noted in subchapter 2.2, throughout this analysis the efficiency scores 
computed under both the variable returns to scale (VRS) and the constant return 
to scale (CRS) assumptions were used. Efficiency under CRS was deemed to be 
overall efficiency, as it can be deconstructed into two components, VRS and 
scale efficiency (SE), providing an insight into the source of inefficiencies. 
VRS, also known as ‘pure efficiency’, has its boundary within CRS and reflects 
the managerial ability to organize inputs in the production process (Thanas-
soulis 2000). The ratio of these two efficiency measures (CRS/VRS) shows the 
scale impact on efficiency for each company (SE). However, Table 11 shows 
summary results for both the original first-stage input saving DEA efficiency 
scores and bootstrapped scores across the sample of water companies (see a full 
list of the scores across water companies and years is in Appendix 6). The 
presented scores are calculated after detecting outliers and removing them from 
further analysis.  
 
Table 11. Mean efficiency scores using a bootstrap 
Year Technology Original efficiency Bootstrap bias
Bias-corrected 
efficiency 
2005 VRS 0.6956 (13.15) 0.0898 0.6058 
 CRS 0.6311 (10.53) 0.0989 0.5323 
2006 VRS 0.6762 (15.38) 0.0897 0.5865 
 CRS 0.6352 (10.25) 0.0877 0.5475 
2007 VRS 0.7012 (14.63) 0.0867 0.6145 
 CRS 0.6187 (9.76) 0.0925 0.5262 
2005–2007 VRS 0.6912 (15.25) 0.0888 0.6024 
 CRS 0.6281 (10.17) 0.0929 0.5352 
Note: i. after outlier removal the number of observations is 38 in 2005, 39 in 2006, 41 in 2007 and 
118 in 2005–2007; ii. the value in parentheses shows the percentage of companies with original 
efficiency score of unity.  
Source: compiled by the author 
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Table 11 reveals that Estonian water companies operate at a relatively low aver-
age efficiency level. In the period 2005–2007, the bootstrapped mean efficiency 
score under VRS technology stood at only 60.2%, which means that on average 
the water companies could have reduced their operating costs by 39.8% whilst 
maintaining their output volume at the same level. In the case of the CRS 
approach, the average inefficiency is 46.5%. When comparing the efficiency 
scores on the basis of single years, no significant difference in means can be 
ascertained. These average DEA scores are similar to results for East Germany, 
where the mean pure efficiency was found to be 0.64 (Zchille et al. 2009), but 
remarkably lower than the 0.90 value for Australian water utilities (Coelli and 
Walding 2005) or 0.81–0.92 recorded for urban water utilities in Spain (García-
Valiñas and Muñiz 2007). The mean scale efficiency score (SE) between 2005–
2007 was 0.89, indicating that the average company should be able to reduce 
input use per unit of output by 11% if it is able to change its scale of operation.  
 
The effects of ownership form and corporate size  
In the second stage of the two-stage model, a truncated regression model has 
been formulated to control for ownership and corporate size effects on both pure 
(VRS) and overall (CRS) efficiency. However, space constraints mean that the 
detailed results below are reported only on the effects of VRS scores in Tables 
12 and 13, as ownership and corporate size do not have contradictory effects on 
the CRS scores. 
First, there are two types of independent variable specified that will be used 
without interaction in the regression model: ownership form (public, private, 
mixed) and corporate size (small, medium, large, very large). This will generate 
seven dummy variables with value 0 or 1 to be incorporated into the model. The 
public ownership form and small corporate size are characteristic of most of the 
sample water companies, and therefore, are used as references, which will be 
omitted from the regression. Table 12 below shows the bootstrap coefficient 
estimates resulting for the truncated regression model. 
 
Table 12. Parameter estimates categorized by size and ownership 
VRS Efficiency Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Medium .1227524 .0450461 2.73 0.006 .0344637 .2110412 
Large .1822957 .0497026 3.67 0.000 .0848804 .2797111 
Very Large .2225975 .1643111 1.35 0.176 –.0994465 .5446414 
Private .0388864 .0448520 0.87 0.386 –.0490219 .1267947 
Mixed .0696219 .0921148 0.76 0.450 –.1109198 .2501635 
_Cons .5043394 .0332476 15.17 0.000 .4391753 .5695036 
/Sigma .1864625 .0151700 12.29 0.000 .1567299 .2161951 
Note: Log likelihood = 41.482511; Number of obs. = 118; Wald chi2 (5) =18.25; 
Prob.>chi2=0.0026 
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The regression coefficients in Table 12 indicate that the size variables 
“Medium” and “Large” have a positive effect (sig. 0.05) on water company 
ciency. Thus, efficiency improves if corporate size increases from small to 
medium or large. However, private and mixed ownership forms do not have a 
statistically significant effect on water utility VRS and CRS efficiency. These 
results reveal that there is no confidence at a 95% level that any given owner-
ship form will be associated with a higher or lower efficiency level. 
The regression results presented above do not allow the comparison of own-
ership types within established size categories. To do so, the same truncated 
regression will be estimated with ownership and size interaction effects. The 
“Small_Public” interaction variable is used as a reference and is omitted from 
the regression. Table 13 below shows the results of estimating the equation with 
the interaction terms. 
 
Table 13. Parameter estimates according to size and ownership interactions 
VRS Efficiency Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Small_Private .1513417 .0585006 2.59 0.010 .0366826 .2660008 
Medium_Public .1926483 .0515110 3.74 0.000 .0916887 .2936079 
Medium_Private .1101252 .0707832 1.56 0.120 –.0286073 .2488577 
Medium_Mixed .2291532 .0878479 2.61 0.009 .0569744 .4013319 
Large_Public .2353010 .0521071 4.52 0.000 .1331730 .3374290 
Large_Private .1201991 .1125985 1.07 0.286 –.1004899 .3408881 
Very L._Mixed .3258042 .1305213 2.50 0.013 .0699872 .5816212 
_Cons .4637761 .0346894 13.37 0.000 .3957860 .5317661 
/Sigma .1788765 .0142896 12.52 0.000 .1508695 .2068835 
Note: Log likelihood = 45.508007; Number of obs. = 118; Wald chi2 (7) =27.36, 
Prob.>chi2=0.0003 
 
 
The positive regression coefficient of the “Small_Private” variable in Table 13 
suggests that small privately owned water companies are likely to be more effi-
cient (sig. 0.05) than publicly owned companies in the same size category. This 
result is consistent with the findings of Bhattacharyya et al. (1995) that small 
privately owned companies outperform publicly owned companies of a similar 
size. The results in Table 13 also reveal that large and medium-sized publicly 
owned companies and very large and medium-sized companies with mixed 
ownership are likely to have a higher efficiency score than small publicly 
owned water companies. This does not hold for large and medium-sized private 
companies that in all likelihood do not outperform small publicly owned 
utilities either at 5% or 10% significance levels.  
In order to shed some light on the differences in the mean of efficiency bet-
ween established size and ownership categories, a series of one-way ANOVA 
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and Bonferroni multiple comparison tests were conducted. Table 14 below 
summarizes the results of the analysis, reporting only statistically significant 
differences between the established comparison groups. First, the results 
presented in the third column of Table 14 show that there is no significant 
difference (sig. 0.05) in mean efficiency between water companies with dif-
ferent ownership forms. However, at a 10% significance level the companies 
with mixed ownership showed a higher mean efficiency than publicly owned 
companies. Secondly, as shown in the fourth column in the comparison between 
size groups, the small water companies demonstrated a significantly lower mean 
than the peers of medium and large categories, which is consistent with the 
regression results. Between other size categories, no statistically significant 
difference of one group outperforming others was found.  
 
Table 14. Results of Bonferroni multiple efficiency comparisons 
Variable ANOVA 
statistics 
Ownership 
form 
comparison 
Size 
comparison 
Size-ownership form 
comparison 
VRS 
efficiency 
F-stat: 
p-value: 
Significant 
differences: 
 
1.314 
0.273 
– 
5.903 
0.001 
Sml<Med; 
Sml<Lrg 
3.997 
0.001 
Sml_Pub<Med_Pub; 
Sml_Pub<Lrg_Pub 
CRS 
efficiency 
 
F-stat: 
p-value: 
Significant 
differences: 
 
2.779 
0.066 
Pub<Mix a) 
5.053 
0.003 
Sml<Med; 
Sml<Lrg 
5.394 
0.000 
Sml_Pub<Sml_Priv; 
Sml_Pub<Med_Pub; 
Sml_Pub<Med_Mix; 
Sml_Pub<Lrg_Pub; 
Sml_Pub<Very_Lrg_Mix a) 
Note: i. a) significant at 10% level; ii. Sml=small, Med=medium, Lrg=large, Very_Lrg=Very 
large, Pub=publicly owned, Priv=privately owned, Mix=mixed ownership; number of obser-
vations (n) = 118. 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
 
The final column in Table 14 reveals that the only size-ownership group that 
has a lower mean efficiency when compared with other peer groups is the 
“small-public” category. “Small” is the only size category where a significant 
difference between different ownership forms (Sml_Pub<Sml_Priv) in mean 
efficiency exists. While this difference becomes apparent under CRS techno-
logy, the inefficiency is partly caused by the relatively smaller size of publicly 
owned water utilities (0.84 SE) compared with the private companies (0.93 SE).  
Another noteworthy finding that is not presented in Table 14 is that small 
private companies also outperform small publicly owned companies when using 
the VRS approach, although this is not statistically significant. The difference 
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between the means of efficiency was 14.3% for the “small-private” group. The 
opposite resulted within medium and large categories, where publicly owned 
water companies show 7.5% and 10.1% higher mean efficiencies respectively 
than their private peers under VRS. Comparing overall efficiency within 
medium and large-sized groups, the differences in means are even greater: 
13.1% and 19.7% respectively in favour of publicly owned companies.  
In the light of the theoretical framework from subchapter 2.1, the remainder 
of the current subchapter focuses on discussing the results and exploring the 
possible reasons behind the differences in the computed efficiency scores. As 
previously noted in subchapter 2.3.1 (p. 109), the explored Estonian local 
governments do not provide public water supply services directly, but through 
legally distinct business entities, i.e. water companies. A practical governance 
question for the local governments concerns the decisions they can make on 
private versus public production (privatisation) and/or potential mergers of 
water companies (cooperation) in order to lower costs and improve the 
efficiency of water service production (Peda et al. 2011). However, before 
discussing the ownership and size effects, it must be noted that as the results of 
the efficiency analysis in Table 11 reveal, the Estonian water companies exhibit 
relatively low operational (technical) efficiency – an average pure (VRS) 
efficiency of 60.2% from 2005 to 2007 indicates that there is a lot of room 
(approx. 40%) for efficiency improvements in the companies at their current 
production volumes. This is in line with the theoretical expectations of the 
traditional economic model of monopoly and empirical survey results of 
regulatory effects on water utility performance (Parker 2003, Saal et al. 2007, 
Abbott and Cohen 2009), which advocate the implementation of tight economic 
regulation to ensure efficient water services provision.  
However, answering to the first research question (RQ1) – is there a 
significant difference in efficiency between the water companies with public, 
private and mixed public-private ownership – the results presented in Tables 12 
and 14 indicate that none of the given ownership forms (public, private, mixed 
at 95% confidence) can be associated with a greater or lower efficiency level 
across the whole sample. This supports the views of transaction cost and 
industrial organization theory, that there is no significant difference in 
efficiency between water companies with differing types of ownership. Hence, 
the arguments of property rights and public choice theories cannot be confirmed 
in the case of Estonian water companies. The results do not support the 
theoretical expectations of the existence of relatively less efficient behaviour in 
publicly owned companies. One explanation for this, is that in response to the 
lack of strict centrally applied economic regulations, locally various incentive 
programmes have been established which do not necessarily provide per se less 
incentives for cost saving in publicly-owned companies. This will be argued 
further in the coming parts of the current discussion. 
Transaction cost and industrial organization theory appear more useful in 
explaining why there is no significant difference in efficiency between publicly 
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and privately-owned water companies in Estonia, since both take into account 
the market structure and the nature of the services; that is, that water companies, 
irrespective of their ownership form, are natural monopolies with some 
industry-specific characteristics (Hukka and Katko 2003) that without 
regulation tend towards inefficiencies. The results of efficiency analysis support 
theoretical expectations stemming from transaction cost theory grounded in the 
idea that private sector participation in water services provision is associated 
with relatively higher transaction costs, which erode possible efficiency gains 
related to private compared to public provision. 
The study sample also included a small number (i.e. 10%) of water 
companies with mixed public-private ownership (see Table 6). Despite the fact 
that the difference is not statistically significant, the water companies with 
mixed ownership have the highest average pure efficiency at 0.70, while for 
both the solely privately and solely publicly owned companies, the figure is less 
0.59. In terms of efficiency, this result does not to support the opinion that 
mixed ownership includes the worst qualities of public and private ownership 
(Vining and Boardman 2008). However, the Estonian water companies with 
mixed ownership are still far from the efficiency frontier.  
Yet, as revealed in Table 7, there is a remarkable difference in the production 
volumes of the smallest and largest water company in the sample. Based on the 
theory of natural monopoly and assuming the presence of economies of scale, 
large water companies should operate at higher efficiency than small water 
companies. Results from Tables 12 and 14 confirm this position, showing that 
on average small water companies are significantly (sig. 0.05) less efficient than 
those of a medium or large size. It is worth noting even if the differences are 
statistically not significant, that the only very large water company from the 
sample presents an efficiency of 0.75 under the VRS approach, which is higher 
than the average efficiency of the small (0.52), medium (0.63) or large (0.67) 
categories.  
As it was described in subchapter 3.1.1 (p. 121), the large number of water 
suppliers with small production volumes is endemic in Estonia. The average 
scale efficiency of the small companies (0.88) proceeding from their CRS and 
VRS values indicates that efficiency could be improved by a margin of 12% if 
the companies, mostly operating with increasing returns to scale, could operate 
at their optimal size. In comparison, the very large water company has a scale 
efficiency of 0.96. Thus, it could be argued that the establishment of larger 
water companies through mergers or aggregation agreements between small 
water companies should be considered as an option by local governments in 
order to benefit from scale effects. However, it is remains outside scope of this 
dissertation to conclude exactly which water companies and from what kind of 
scale economies – capital equipment or ordinary business operations (Shih et al. 
2006) – would be most beneficial in Estonia. 
Finally, the influence of ownership on efficiency was assessed within the 
established size categories in the quantitative research. The results presented in 
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Tables 13 and 14 show that the interaction of size and ownership has diverse 
effects on efficiency in water companies and again do not confirm the views of 
property rights and public choice theories that private companies are 
unequivocally more efficient than publicly owned companies. In this context, 
public choice and property rights theories tend to remain too rigid (emphasizing 
the goals of bureaucrats, managers and owners) and do not capture the sector 
specifics (e.g. the lack of competition). 
To sum up the results of the quantitative analysis of panel data, it can be 
argued that private production per se is not unequivocally more efficient than 
public in Estonia, where centrally applied incentives for efficiency improvement 
are missing. However, the efficiency of Estonian water companies increases 
with their size. Moreover, it was noted earlier in subsection 1.3.1 that efficiency 
can be stated in technical terms or in economic terms, the former being a 
necessary condition for the latter (Herce 2004). In Table 15 the results of a 
linear correlation analysis reveal that there are positive and significant; however 
somewhat weak relationships between the average technical efficiency and net 
profit margin (return on sales) of water companies in the sample. 
 
Table 15. Results of the analysis on correlation between efficiency and profitability of 
water companies 
 Mean VRS efficiency 
2005–2007 
Mean CRS efficiency  
2005–2007 
Mean net profit margin 
2005–2007 
 
0.386 (0.010) 
 
0.342 (0.025) 
Note: the value in parentheses shows the level of significance; number of observations (n) = 118. 
Source: author’s calculations on the basis of research sample 
 
 
Finally, in order to shed some light on the differences in the mean of net profit 
margin between established size and ownership categories, a series of one-way 
ANOVA and Bonferroni multiple comparison tests were conducted too. Table 
16 below summarizes the results of the analysis, reporting only statistically 
significant differences between the established comparison groups (see 
Appendix 7 for descriptives of the mean of profitability). The results reveal that 
there is no significant difference (sig. 0.05) in mean profitability, like there was 
not it in efficiency, between water companies with different ownership forms.  
However, results from Table 16 (in the third column) show that on average 
the only very large water company in the sample is significantly more profitable 
than small-, medium- or large-sized water companies. Moreover, the same 
water company with mixed public-private ownership, as revealed in the final 
column of Table 16, is also relatively more profitable than small- and large-
sized publicly owned companies in average. Yet, interestingly medium- and 
large-sized water companies are not relatively more profitable than small-sized 
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water companies in the sample, even though they were relatively more efficient 
as shown in Table 14. Therefore, in order to shed some light from the 
perspectives of corporate and regulatory governance on the reasons behind the 
similarities and differences in the performance of water companies with 
different ownership structure, the multi-case study research follows. 
 
Table 16. Results of Bonferroni multiple profitability comparisons 
Variable ANOVA 
Statistics 
Ownership 
form 
comparison 
Size comparison Size-ownership form 
comparison 
Net profit 
margin 
F-stat: 
p-value: 
Significant 
differences: 
1.816 
0.167 
– 
5.906 
0.001 
Sml <Very_Lrg 
Med<Very_Lrg 
Lrg < Very_Lrg 
2.894 
0.008 
Sml_Pub<Very_Mix 
Lrg_Pub<Very_Mix 
 
Note: Sml=small, Med=medium, Lrg=large, Very_Lrg=Very large, Pub=publicly owned, 
Priv=privately owned, Mix=mixed ownership; number of observations (n) = 118. 
Source: compiled by the author  
 
 
3.3. Case study research of the influence  
of governance on performance  
in water services provision 
3.3.1. Case A 
Corporate governance structure and key actors 
Case company A was registered in 1997 as a public limited company with all 
shares belonging to the local government (hereafter ‘city government’). In 
January 2001, the city government sold 50.4% of its shares in company A to 
international private investors in order to secure investment funds to modernise 
the water infrastructure. All water and sewerage infrastructure assets (i.e. main 
networks, water purification station and wastewater treatment plant) necessary 
for water services provision in its service area belonged to company A. 
After the privatisation, with the inclusion in the ownership structure of a 
joint venture of two water multinationals the city government became the 
minority shareholder. In December 2003 one of the two water multinationals, 
jointly with an international financial institution, acquired the shareholding of 
its partner in their joint venture company (hereafter called ‘dominant share-
holder’) established for the privatisation. Subsequently in 2004, the share-
holders of company A decided to organize an international initial public 
offering (IPO) of shares in their water company29. Since 2005, the shares of 
                                                                          
29  The IPO was highly successful – the shares offered were six times oversubscribed.  
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company A have been listed on the stock exchange and freely tradable. The 
ownership structure of company A is presented in Figure 21. 
 
 
Figure 21. Shareholding structure of company A (source: compiled by the author)  
 
 
Operating as a public limited company, the following corporate governance 
bodies are established in company A: the shareholders assembly, supervisory 
board and management board as depicted in Figure 22.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Control delegation in company A (source: compiled by the author)  
 
 
The dominant shareholder of company A has been controlled by a publicly 
listed multinational British water company. 
The second largest shareholder in company A, the city government, has been 
headed by mayors from a centre-left political party, except for the short period 
Company A
City  government
34.7%
Dominant shareholder
35.3%
Free float
30.0%
Shareholders assembly 
Dominant shareholder: 35.3% 
City government: 34.7% 
Owners of free floating shares: 30.0% 
Supervisory board (9) 
4 members from dominant shareholder 
3 members from city government 
2 independent members 
Management board (3) 
CEO from dominant shareholder 
COO from dominant shareholder 
CFO appointed by the supervisory board 
Power delegation to the supervisory board 
Power delegation to the management board 
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from October 2004 – November 2005. The representatives of this political party 
in the city council voted against the privatisation of company A at the end of 
2000, before they came to power in December 2001. The city government 
consists of a mayor and six deputy majors, one deputy mayor responsible for 
the governance of municipal engineering services including water and 
sanitation. Since April 2007, the duties of the deputy mayor were performed by 
a member of the ruling party with a bachelor’s degree in law studies. He had 
started his political career in 2005 as a member of city council while working as 
a consultant in a private business. After becoming the deputy mayor of 
municipal engineering services (at age 27), he was nominated as supervisory 
board member by the city government. 
The shareholder’s agreement provides that the dominant shareholder shall 
have operational control over company A. The management board of company 
A has been composed of either three or four members from 2001 through 2009, 
all or the majority of them seconded by the dominant shareholder30, and all of 
them appointed by the supervisory board. The working hours, rates of compen-
sation, manner of performance and all other matters relating to the employment 
of the individuals seconded by the dominant shareholder (e.g. CEO, Chief 
Operating Officer – COO), are determined solely by the dominant shareholder, 
the supervisory board not reviewing the principles for the remuneration of those 
management board members. The CEO and chairman of the management board 
took office in 2008, before working as chief commercial officer in company A 
between 2004 and 2007. He has over 15 years experience in a variety of finan-
cial roles internationally within the utilities sector (e.g. in the UK). The other 
expatriated management board member, the COO, joined company A in 2006. 
He has extensive experience in the water business both in Europe and overseas 
with major experience in capital investment programme management, water and 
wastewater process engineering and operations. The third member of the 
management board and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is an Estonian not 
seconded by the dominant shareholder and has more than 14 years experience in 
company A at several levels within the finance department. The management 
board represents the company in its relations with third parties and is instructed 
by the supervisory board. 
 
Board composition and functional emphasis 
Pursuant to the articles of association from 2005, the supervisory board of com-
pany A consists of nine members, whose term lasts two years. On agreement 
from the shareholders, the city government and the dominant shareholder 
                                                                          
30  The articles of association state that the management board of company A consists of 
two to five members, elected for three years. According to a technical services agreement 
between company A and its international dominant shareholder, the latter provides certain 
management personnel for a certain fee to the water company.  
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agreed that the seats shall be divided such that the dominant shareholder shall 
have four seats, city government three seats and two seats shall be for 
independent members of the supervisory board (see Figure 22) as required by 
the stock exchange rules31. Five members of the supervisory board are elected at 
the shareholders’ general meeting; two members are appointed by the city 
government and two appointed by the dominant shareholder. 
The chairmen of the supervisory board in company A is nominated by the 
UK water multinational (dominant shareholder). The chairman was elected to 
this position in 2006 after working as the CEO of company A for more than 
four years. He has over 25 years experience in senior management positions in 
the water industry both in England and overseas. Over the years, the two 
members appointed by the dominant shareholder have all worked in managerial 
positions at the parent UK-based water multinational and possess a financial, 
legal or engineering background. The CEO of company A describes their main 
focus on the supervisory board: 
“They, like the independents, are looking to grow the business and ensure we can 
mitigate the risks the best we can. Really! Minimize the impact of any risks to 
the company.” 
The fourth seat held by the dominant shareholder on the supervisory board has 
been filled by individuals nominated by the international finance organization 
that has had an 8.8% indirect ownership stake (through the dominant share-
holder) in company A. These representatives of the financial organization have 
possessed extensive international investment and banking experience. The CEO 
of company A claims: 
“It’s always nice to have them on board because they can be the voice of reason 
and common sense”.  
The two independent supervisory board members were elected to their positions 
respectively in 2005 and 2007. One of them held the position of CEO in the 
largest telecom company in Estonia, the other worked as managing director of a 
leading car dealer in the Baltic states. They both hold a master’s degree, one in 
banking and the other in management, from recognised foreign universities. The 
CEO of company A comments on their role on the supervisory board: 
“They provide invaluable commercial insights into things we could be doing 
better as a company, excellent guidance during the budget and business plan 
approval process.” 
                                                                          
31  The stock exchange rules require that if more than 30% of the share capital of a company 
listed on the stock exchange is held by a single shareholder, then at least two members of the 
supervisory board must be independent. 
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All the supervisory board members appointed or nominated by the city 
government during the last decade have been active members of the political 
parties in power. Thus, since 2005 all three seats have been occupied by 
members of the ruling central party. One of the long-term representatives 
(2005–2010) on the supervisory board of company A was a professional 
politician, the chairman of the party faction in the city council and chairperson 
of several standing committees in the city council. He has a law degree. The 
other representative of the city government on the supervisory board since 2005 
is also a member of city council and has previously worked as a secretary 
general in the Ministry of the Environment. He holds a doctoral degree in the 
field of biology. The third member of the supervisory board nominated by the 
city government is the previously mentioned deputy mayor responsible for 
municipal engineering services in the city government. The CEO of company A 
claims:  
“The city members certainly add value to the company usually in the area of their 
knowledge and know-how. /…/ For example, we have political risks, you will 
get excellent advice on how to understand and how to manage the political 
risks.” 
The deputy mayor in municipal engineering services is the key person who 
brings the position of the city government to the supervisory board meetings. 
He claims: 
“I know more about the interests of the city government, about the priorities and 
problems.” 
Due to his duties in the city government, the deputy mayor appointed to the 
supervisory board has a dual role as (economic) regulator and owner in relation 
to company A. Both the deputy mayor and the CEO of company A argue that 
they usually deal with regulatory issues outside the supervisory board meetings, 
unless these need to have a supervisory board discussion due to their strategic 
nature. The deputy mayor claims: 
“We come to board meetings with issues that are clear and understandable for 
all.” 
The CEO complements: 
“We do not bring small day-to-day issues to the board. /…/ In that respect it has 
not hindered the performance of the board.” 
After going public in 2005, the supervisory board meetings have been held five 
or six times a year. The chairman of the board and most of the board members 
have attended more than 50% of the meetings during the time they have held 
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office. The supervisory board meetings have been organized and directed by the 
chairman of the board, the agenda and materials of the meeting are sent to the 
members in advance. A resolution of the supervisory board is considered 
adopted if more than half of the participating members of the board voted in 
favour, except for topics related to mergers and acquisitions or investments and 
undertaking financial obligations exceeding 639 100 euro, which shall be 
adopted by the unanimous vote of all participating members of the supervisory 
board. The deputy mayor and a member of the supervisory board claim: 
“There prevails a will of cooperation and almost all our decisions have been 
made unanimously. /…/ The interests and objectives are more or less the same 
for all.” 
The CEO of company A, who has participated in meetings of the supervisory 
board over the years, describes a change in the functional emphasis of the 
supervisory board: 
“Initially it was just a reporting function, thus there is something we have to go 
through and we did. It has got better all the time, and because we have 
independent directors in that. It’s very much a guiding room now that provides 
valuable commercial insights for the management board.” 
The deputy mayor, a member of the supervisory board says: 
“There is a live discussion. It’s not a place for nodding and putting stamps. The 
meetings are rather long, not less than three hours.” 
According to the decision of the general meeting of shareholders, the payment 
for supervisory board members has been set at 6400 euro per year for their job 
on the board. 
 
Regulatory institutions and key actors  
Directly under the city government, there are primarily two organizational units 
involved in water services provision in the city:  
1. Municipal engineering services board – among other duties arranges and 
controls the fulfilment of strategic development goals (e.g. infrastructure 
extension) in the public water supply and sewerage field. The department 
organizes cooperation with local water companies32, handles applications 
from citizens for compensation for connection fees and is responsible for 
arranging the construction and maintenance of storm water systems in the 
city. Since 1997, the board has been headed by an experienced and 
                                                                          
32  Besides company A servicing the main water services area in the city, there are also 
three other small private companies providing water services. 
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prominent senior official, holding a doctoral degree in engineering, who 
reports directly to the deputy mayor responsible for municipal engineering 
services in the city government.  
2. City enterprise board – among other duties responsible for reviewing 
requests for price adjustments by monopoly public services providers (e.g. 
water companies) before submitting those to the city government for 
approval. The enterprise board also executes ownership rights and holding 
shares for the city government in companies (e.g. in company A). In 
addition, the enterprise board handles applications and complaints from 
citizens related to the violation of their consumer rights. Since 2001, the 
enterprise board has been headed by an experienced senior official, who 
reports directly to the deputy mayor responsible for the development of 
entrepreneurship in the city.  
 
Moreover, in connection with the privatisation of company A in January 2001, 
the services contract signed between the city government and the water com-
pany provided for the creation of an independent body, the mandate monitoring 
unit, to monitor the company’s performance of its obligations under the 
contract. Considering that, more than a year later in March 2002, the city 
council made the decision to establish a foundation for executing independent 
supervision (hereafter ‘supervisory foundation’) over all water companies, not 
only company A, operating in the city. The supervisory foundation’s principal 
tasks under its statute included: (1) monitoring company A’s compliance with 
levels of service set out in the services contract, (2) monitoring tariffs and 
issuing recommendations to the city government regarding changes to them, 
and (3) advising the city government regarding the imposition of penalties if 
company A fails to comply with any of its obligations under the services 
contract33. The supervisory foundation’s mandate also includes the protection of 
consumer interests. The operation of the supervisory foundation is fully 
financed by the city government through regular payments from the city budget. 
In previous negotiations in 2002, representatives of the city government, the 
private investors and company A specified principles on how to compose a 
supervisory board for the supervisory foundation over water companies. The 
parties agreed that this board, which according to the statute consists of three to 
five members and all appointed by the city government, would have one 
member proposed by company A. Accordingly, from September 2002, there has 
been an attorney-at-law from a law firm representing company A on the board 
of the supervisory foundation. Another politically non-aligned person on the 
board was a senior manager of the city enterprise board, who has been on the 
board since its establishment. All other ten people, who have been appointed to 
                                                                          
33  Pursuant to a decision by the city council passed in May 2005, the supervisory 
foundation has expanded its monitoring and evaluation activities to all contracts executed 
between company A and the city government.  
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the board of the supervisory foundation through 2002–2009 (and beyond), have 
belonged to the political parties in power at the time. Three board members, 
including the chairman of the board, belong to the ruling central party. The 
chairman, an experienced politician, has worked in different positions under the 
city government during the last decade and has been part of the city council 
since 1996, before being elected to the Riigikogu (Estonian parliament) in 2011. 
The recent members of the board were appointed by the city government in 
December 2005 and August 2010 after they were elected to the city council in 
the list of the same ruling political party. At that time they were both university 
students aged 19.  
The supervisory foundation employs three people. The CEO, university 
degree in engineering, has worked in that position since the establishment of the 
foundation in 2002. He is neither a member of the city council nor of the ruling 
political party.  
 
Strategic planning and goals in water services 
Preparation of the first public water supply and sewerage network development 
plan (WDP) for 2001–2012 had only begun when the privatisation of company 
A took place in January 2001. Introduction of the updated plan from 2004 
claims that more capital is needed for the development of the water infra-
structure than stipulated in the services contract during the privatisation. More-
over, in the same document the city government admits that the privatisation 
should have been conducted based on the long-term water supply and sewerage 
development plan that could have avoided the problems arising under the 
services contract between the water company and the city government. 
The WDP 2004–2015 was approved by the city council in May 2004 and 
remained valid for six years. The preparation of this development plan involved 
the municipal engineering board under the city government hiring an external 
consultancy company. During their work, the consultants conducted interviews 
with the managers of the water companies and organized meetings with city 
officials from related departments (i.e. city planning, municipal engineering, 
environment and city enterprise) under the city government. All documents 
regulating to or determining water services provision in the city (e.g. the 
services, contract, development plans, conducted surveys etc.) had been made 
available to the consultants for their consideration when compiling the 
development plan. The CEO of company A comments on his involvement and 
focus in this planning process organized by the municipal engineering board: 
“We have professional discussions with them, but there is a slightly different 
agenda because it is not the city as the shareholder. There will always be things 
in there that are completely different to what our services agreement contains. /…/ 
If there is ever a mismatch between the two, we obviously communicate. It’s the 
city as shareholder that has approved our business plan. They themselves should 
not be mixing the two and should recognise the distinction between the two.” 
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The municipal engineering board, as the coordinating unit of the planning 
process, had asked the supervisory foundation to also provide their opinion on 
how the drafted WDP aligns with the contracts signed between company A and 
the city government. The members of the city government had usually become 
involved in the planning process during city government meetings, when the 
deputy mayor responsible for municipal engineering services presented them a 
draft WDP already agreed upon by the departments and the water companies.  
The WDP consisting 180 pages pointed out several key targets for the city 
government to achieve in water services provision as follows:  
 By 2010 all households could join public sewerage network in the whole 
collection area; 
 By 1 July 2007, the drinking water must comply with the requirements of the 
EU Drinking Water Framework Directive; 
 Nitrogen removal must be improved through the modernisation of the waste-
water treatment plant. The nitrogen concentration in the treated wastewater 
must be decreased to less than 10mg/l by 2010. 
 
The plan also provides an indication of the dynamics of water and sewerage 
prices for 2004– 2015, showing that compared to 1.02 euro/m3 in 2003, house-
holds were expected to pay 1.89 euro/m3 in 2010 and 2.14 euro/m3 in 2015. 
The city government expressed its aim to keep household expenditures on water 
and sewerage below 3% of their net income per household member.  
According to the WDP, total estimated investments were approximately 234 
million euros from 2004 through 2015. At the same time, company A, in line 
with the services contract, planned to invest 106 million euros in the water 
infrastructure, including 26 million euros to be funded by the city government. 
The WDP makes it clear that implementation of the investment programmes is 
contingent on (a) contracts signed between the city government and company A, 
and (b) funds available from the city budget. The CEO of company A 
concludes: 
“The city development plan is sometimes an input-based document. It’s very 
much about, what you must do. /…/ Our contract with the city government is 
actually governed by the services agreement, which is an output-based document. 
It says you must achieve this.” 
Services contract 
In connection with the privatisation of company A, the city government and 
company A signed a services contract in January 2001, which laid down 97 
detailed levels of service34 for the provision of drinking water, the collection, 
treatment and disposal of wastewater (including storm water), fire fighting 
                                                                          
34  The levels of service under the services contract comprise a collection of minimum 
performance standards covering company A’s obligations under this contract. 
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water services, surface water collection, customer service and other key opera-
tional matters. The contract, which was prepared by an international consul-
tancy company from the UK hired by the city government in July 2000, was 
signed for a 15-year period. The services contract, written in English, which is 
the official language of the contract’s text and interpretation, comprises 47 
pages in its main part plus annexes on 54 pages. The CEO claims: 
“This agreement is simple. I know exactly what I have to do /…/ if the city 
comes to assess us, all the indicators are there. We don’t have agency conflicts in 
this.” 
The levels of service mostly either replicate or refer to the relevant legislative 
quality requirements applicable to the activities of company A. The selected 
standards in Table 17 below are identified as particularly important to the 
company’s operations35.  
The services contract signed in 2001 stated the levels of service to be 
achieved in the initial period from 2001 to 2005. The levels for the next period 
(2006–2010) should be determined by the end of 2004. With amendments made 
in the services contract in 2002 and in 2005, the initial levels of service were 
extended to be applicable also during the period from 2006–2010. 
Besides the service requirements, the services contract also sets out the basis 
for the determination of water tariffs, and their adjustment in certain specified 
circumstances, which company A is entitled to charge its customers. The water 
price formula described in the contract includes a component called the K coef-
ficient, which is stated to reflect changes in necessary expenses to be made by 
company A to achieve the levels of service. Although company A is obliged to 
make the investments necessary to comply with the contractual levels of 
service, the contract is not prescriptive about the amounts which the company 
must invest for these purposes. The way in which company A achieves the 
specifically defined levels of service was left to the discretion of the 
management, therefore the contract is considered to be output not input driven. 
The CEO of company A concludes his position: 
“Output orientation is one of the strengths of the contract in some ways. All the 
risk and reward lies with the company. This motivates us to do things as effi-
ciently as possible.” 
 
 
 
 
                                                                          
35  The management of company A described the selected levels of services in Table 17 as 
particularly important to the operation of company A when preparing the international public 
offering of shares in 2005. 
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Table 17. The selected levels of service in the 2001 services contract for company A  
 Level of service Measure Target 
1. Water quality at 
the consumer’s 
premises 
% Compliance with EC Directive 98/83/EC of at 
least 95% of all samples and 97% of all 
bacteriological samples. 
2. Unplanned 
interruptions in 
water supply 
Hours No single interruption exceeds 12 hours. If 
water supply is interrupted for more than five 
hours, the company is required to provide its 
customers with an alternative source of water 
supply. 
3. Effluent quality at 
the wastewater 
treatment plant 
Pollution 
concentration 
load 
Full compliance with the existing and planned 
future standards regarding the discharge of 
effluent. 
4. Water losses % Reduction in water losses by at least 25% by 
2005 compared to 1999. Thereafter, maintain 
an economic level of water leakage. 
5.  Customer service Days All customer contacts and complaints 
monitored; all complaints addressed within 10 
working days, except for complaints regarding 
flooding of sewers. 
6. Sewerage network 
coverage 
% 189.6 km of new sewerage pipes to be 
constructed between 2001 and 2006, for the 
purpose of ensuring full coverage of the 
sewerage network in certain specified districts 
in the city 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
Determination of water price and compensation for investments 
According to the 2001 services contract, the water and sewerage price for each 
year is based on the tariff for the immediately preceding year, as adjusted in line 
with changes in the CPI and as adjusted by reference to a further variable, the K 
coefficient, agreed upon between company A and the city government for each 
year36. The tariff (i.e. the K coefficient) review should take place every five 
years. Besides, additional costs associated with any change in the law are not 
the responsibility of company A and can be recovered from customers through 
tariff adjustments in the following year.  
In the winning privatisation bid, the dominant shareholder had proposed to 
the city government that the (K) coefficient will equal zero in 2001, 2002 and 
2003; thereafter 15% both in 2004 and 2005. Thus, the K coefficient itself, 
                                                                          
36  The same price mechanisms expressed mathematically as following: T1=T0 x 
(1+ΔCPI+K+change of law), where T1 stands for the tariff of next period and T0 for tariff in 
current period.  
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without considering changes in the CPI, would have increased water prices by a 
total of 32.3% (i.e. 1.15 x 1.15) from 2001 through 2005.  
Only a few months after the privatisation, referring to the increase in 
consumer prices from July 2000 to June 2001, company A approached the city 
government with the first request to raise water and sewerage tariffs by 6.89% 
from January 2002. The request was approved at a slightly lower rate (e.g. water 
prices increased by 6.68% for residential and 6.87% for commercial customers) 
from February 2002. 
Protection against excessive tariff increases was declared as the primary aim 
of the new political coalition in the city government in April 2002, when the 
mayor initiated the re-negotiations of the services contract with both company 
A and its dominant shareholder. After 50 rounds of negotiations with more than 
100 working hours, after having discussed 12 versions of drafted amendment 
contracts, the parties came to a tripartite contract (hereafter ‘2002 amendment 
contract’) in September 2002. Based on the 2002 amendment contract, company 
A and the dominant shareholder agreed to maintain water tariffs during 2003 at 
2002 levels in return for determining the size of the K coefficient in advance for 
the years 2004 to 2010. The K coefficient agreed for the period 2004–2010 was 
as follows: 10% in each of 2004 and 2005, 6.5% in each of 2006, 2007 and 
2008; 2% in each of 2009 and 2010. Thus, agreement on the size of the K coef-
ficient would have raised water prices by a total of 52% from 2004 through 
2010. During the IPO in 2005, the management of company A revealed in the 
offering circular to potential financial investors that the 2002 amendment 
contract would provide the company with a ‘stable platform’ for conducting its 
operations. Nevertheless, in October 2003 based on a price request received 
from company A, the city government approved a 13.8% increase in the price of 
water from January 2004. This price adjustment, established on the basis of a 
decree from the city government, was reviewed by the city enterprise board and 
an opinion on the price request was also given by the supervisory foundation. 
In 1999, the city council had passed a regulation on the establishment of 
water and wastewater prices in the city, which authorises the city government to 
determine the prices based on requests from the water company. According to 
the 1999 regulation, revised in 2006 and 2007, the water company when sub-
mitting a request to raise prices has to present (1) a price calculation, (2) an 
audited financial report from the previous year, (3) a cost and revenue prognosis 
based on both current tariffs and on new applicable tariffs. During the review 
process, the city government is entitled to request detailed information on single 
cost items. This price regulation with its 2006 and 2007 amendments does not 
give any reference to the supervisory foundation, which is responsible for 
monitoring tariffs and issuing recommendations to the city government 
regarding changes to them. The CEO of the supervisory foundation comments: 
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“Our main focus in supervision is on non-economic objectives because the water 
price is fixed over a rather long period by the services agreement and we can 
control whether it is in fact in compliance with the terms of the agreement. We 
cannot interfere in the economic activities of the water company. ”  
The deputy mayor adds: 
“One cannot say that the city government does nothing, the city enterprise board 
reviews the requests carefully. But of course, in the services agreement there is a 
formula that is followed for price adjustments.” 
And the CEO of company A claims: 
“I would bet that the city government’s tariff approval process is better than in 
other municipalities. At least there is a framework around what the customer ser-
vice should be and what the tariffs should be. If our cost base changes by more 
than the CPI, that’s our risk. If our cost base changes by less than the CPI, that’s 
our gain.”  
The 2002 amendment contract also recorded the new agreement regarding the 
city government’s reimbursement of connection costs incurred by company A 
as part of the extension of its sewerage network. The initial contract had 
provided that the investment programme for network extensions should be 
completed by 2006; however, due to budgetary constraints, this programme was 
extended to the end of 2010 as stated later in the amendment contracts. In 
particular, the city government and company A with its dominant shareholder 
realized soon after the privatisation that they understood the contract differently 
in terms of who should finance the planned network extension programme. The 
topic of compensation payments for the network extension to company A 
became the most divisive issue during the contract renegotiation in 2002. How-
ever, the 2002 amendment contract concluded that the extent of network exten-
sions to be carried out by company A each year, pursuant to the services 
contract and any additional programmes, would be dependent on the availability 
of funds from the city budget. As a result of this contract, company A undertook 
construction activities to the extent the city government had allocated sufficient 
funds in its annual budget to meet the connection charges (comprising full 
construction cost including overheads, financing costs and applicable value 
added tax or VAT). In 2005, with another amendment contract the city govern-
ment, company A and the dominant shareholder agreed upon a new network 
extension programme, based on the principles agreed in the 2002 amendment 
contract. The parties also agreed upon new principles of reimbursement by the 
government for the network extension costs incurred by company A.37 
                                                                          
37  The compensation, the amount of the connection charge paid by the city government to 
company A depends on the date by which actual connection to the network occurred – 100% 
compensation, if the user connected within 12 months after the permit for use was issued, 
otherwise the city government compensated 80% of the costs.  
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A principal correction in the price formula was introduced with the 2007 
amendment contract, when the city government, company A and the dominant 
shareholder agreed and the city council in November 2007 approved, that: 
1. K coefficient would be 0% from 2011;  
2. Water and sewerage network extension costs will be compensated to com-
pany A through a development component (0.58 euro/m3 for 2008–2011 and 
0.39 euro/m3 for 2012–2017) included in the rates of the domestic tariff 
according to consumption in the extended services area.  
 
Since then the development component has been shown on the invoices issued 
by company A to its domestic clients; however, according to the contract its 
amounts are paid directly by the city government to the water company. A head 
of department in the municipal engineering services board claims: 
“It is drawn up as a development component, but in fact this is a connection 
charge we pay the real estate owners.”  
According to this 2007 amendment contract, all works set out in the network 
extension programme38 must be completed at the latest by 31 March 2011. The 
CEO of company A concludes: 
“The actual construction and investment decision is taken out of the city’s hands 
and it was given to the company. So, the consequence of that agreement – we are 
going to construct by this time and the city government will pay bills over a 
longer period of time.” 
Consequently, by approving the same 2007 amendment contract, the city coun-
cil also decided to prolong the exclusive right of company A to provide water 
and sewerage services in its services area until 2020. The exclusivity period was 
prolonged from its initial term November 2015 by an extra five years without 
the city government carrying out any competitive tender process. 
At the beginning of 2009, in light of fiscal austerity and the general decline 
in construction prices, the city government proposed that company A and the 
dominant shareholder review the rates of the development component estab-
lished in the services contract in 2007. After negotiations in July 2009, the city 
mayor, the deputy mayor, the CEO and the chairman of the board in company A 
concluded in a meeting that the network extension programme will be 
completed on time by 2011, but for 1/3 less funds (i.e. approx. 32 million euro 
less) than agreed in 2007 before the fiscal austerity measures. Consequently, the 
parties adjusted the development component and fixed the adjustments in the 
2009 amendment contract, which relieved the city government of payments for 
                                                                          
38  The contract was supplemented with a detailed list of streets with lengths of network 
sections to be constructed each year. Total cost of the network extension programme was 
expected to be approximately 95.8 million euro.  
147 
the development component for November – December 2009 and shortened the 
total payment period by three and a half years (from December 2017 to July 
2014). In a related press release, the city mayor declared this agreement as a 
‘big victory for the citizens, making it possible to reduce the budget burden in 
this field over the coming years.’ 
However, a few months later, at the beginning of September 2009, the city 
government established a temporary commission authorized to commence 
negotiations with company A on tariff reduction from January 2010. The mayor 
explained this in a press conference:  
“If we look at the services agreement, the water price should increase next year. 
We don’t consider this justified and we will argue against it.” 
This temporary commission comprised six members – four senior city officials 
plus two deputy mayors heading the commission. Among other members, the 
commission also included the senior manager of the city enterprise board, who 
belongs to the board of the supervisory foundation. A few weeks later the city 
government announced that as a result of the negotiations, company A has 
agreed to forego the 2% K coefficient from 1 January 2010 and consequently 
the water price for consumers under deflationary conditions would decrease by 
0.9% instead of an increase of 1.1% initially derived from the price formula (i.e. 
2% K coefficient – 0.9% CPI = 1.1% price increase). The deputy mayor, who 
had headed the price negotiations with company A, communicated the outcome 
as very successful for the city government in the media. At the same time, com-
pany A, through its head of communications added briefly to the public: 
“This decision was made between the shareholders during negotiations and we 
won’t comment on this in more detail.” 
On the same day, company A submitted an application to the city government 
to change the water tariff. Two days later, the city government approved the 
request from company A for new tariffs to apply from 1 January 2010.  
 
Budgeting and financing 
The annual planning and budgeting process in company A usually begins at the 
end of June, when the management board starts to discuss strategic directions 
for the coming years. The CEO specifies: 
“We certainly envision until the end of the contract. I am just racking the frame-
work.” 
Sometime in July/August a larger group of company managers, known as the 
leadership team, comes together to discuss the progress made towards the stra-
tegic objectives of company A. The CEO claims: 
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“As a group we discuss what we should do through those strategic objectives and 
we will re-develop those over the period of time. That information will feed 
people’s thinking for the financial elements of the budget and business plan.” 
After that meeting, special budget forms for operational and investment budgets 
with related instructions, time schedule and given assumptions are sent to the 
managers for completion by the planning and analysis department under the 
CFO. At that stage in the budgeting process, the management board gets 
involved through various iterations and discussions on priorities with the 
managers through September. The CEO, who has also previously worked as the 
CFO in the company claims that the annual budget of company A is mostly 
composed on the basis of the previous year’s figures: 
“We are only starting to do activity based costing /…/ We have to look to be 
more efficient. May be we can still do the same volume for less work or cost, if 
we organize ourselves differently.” 
The CEO usually proposes the budget plan to the supervisory board for 
approval in October. During that budget meeting the supervisory board mem-
bers mostly challenge the assumptions used for budget planning by the 
management board. The CEO adds: 
“They will challenge the inputs we have made, rather than the outputs. The 
assumption is the key! If you said your commercial sales will increase by 1%, 
what is this based upon? How will you derive the decision on a headcount? You 
said you are going to make these investments; well I need these investments to 
make a difference in the bottom-line and profit in the approved business plan 
period. How will any of these investments make a difference to the services?” 
During the budget approval in the supervisory board meeting, the deputy mayor 
representing the city government has also looked at how the budget makes it 
possible to fulfil the investment programmes and other obligations company A 
has to the city government. The deputy mayor claims that he has given his 
approval to all the proposed budget plans in the supervisory board meetings, 
though he has also expressed dissenting opinions on specific issues:  
“There are rather reasonable people on the board. Usually we have succeeded in 
discussing all the nuances before approving the budget in order to have a con-
sensus when voting.”  
Moreover, the CEO adds that the network extension programme once agreed 
upon with the city government has never been debated again in the board 
meetings. He concludes: 
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“There are three members representing the city as shareholders and they should 
make sure that our strategy is correct for delivering maximum value to the share-
holders.” 
There are several regular income flows from the city budget to company A, 
which derive from a number of agreements. Besides the development compo-
nent paid for the extension of the water and sewerage network (approximately 
8.9 million euros in 2010), the city government also pays for storm water to be 
conducted to the public sewerage system according to special contracts 
(approximately 3.9 million euros), the construction of storm water facilities 
(approximately 2.7 million euros) and the extraction of water from fire hydrants 
and public water extraction points (320 thousand euros). Due to the majority 
private ownership of company A, the company has not been able to qualify for 
EU support funds provided for water and sewerage infrastructure modernization 
in Estonia. Therefore, capital investments conducted by company A have been 
financed through bank credits, shareholder equity or compensations paid by the 
city government from the city budget. From 2001 to 2010, company A made 
capital investments of approximately 78 million euros, not including network 
extensions reimbursable by the city government. During the same period, the 
city government itself invested over 70 million euros39 in the construction of the 
water, sewerage and storm water networks from its annual budgets. The head of 
department in the municipal engineering services board, who is involved in the 
preparation of their budget bids for water services, explains the budgeting 
process in the city government:  
“Obviously we prepare larger initial budget bids for our finance department than 
the city budget would ultimately offer us. /…/ If we should not get enough funds 
for the agreed works, we will have to turn to the water company and request 
changes to the agreement.”  
 
Reporting and accountability 
On a quarterly basis, the members of the supervisory board receive a financial 
report from the CEO that makes it possible for them to have an overview of the 
financial performance of company A. The report includes a profit and loss 
statement, balance sheet and information on budget fulfilment. On a quarterly 
basis the management of company A also reports to the stock exchange, 
providing investors with key figures and comments on actual year-on-year 
financial performance. The CEO adds: 
                                                                          
39  Author’s calculation based on data from annual reports, annual city budgets and their 
amendments from 2001 to 2010. This amount mostly includes payments to company A for 
network construction.  
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“We don’t report against the budget to the stock exchange. We don’t give a 
budget or forecast information to any of our investors.” 
As opposed to other investors, the dominant shareholder also gets monthly 
financial reports from the management of company A. The CEO claims: 
“Because it’s a group company and we have always done this. There is no 
discussion about this.” 
After the end of each financial year, as required by the Estonian Commercial 
Code, the management of company A has prepared the financial statements and 
the management report, which then together with the management board’s pro-
posal for profit distribution have been presented to the board members and for 
their approval. The structure and the volume of the management (activity) 
reports changed in 200640, which was the first full year that company A was 
listed on the stock exchange. Since then the management reports of company A, 
presented over 11–13 pages at the beginning of the annual reports, consist of 
three parts: (1) chairman’s statement, (2) results of operations, and (3) corporate 
governance and corporate governance recommendations report. While the 
chairman’s report provides an overview of the company’s main achievements 
and events during the year, the second section of the management report (i.e. 
results of operations) reveals the main economic indicators with comments and 
comparisons across the previous five years. The same section also provides 
information on the distribution of share capital (by size and share ownership) 
and share price statistics since becoming listed. In the final part, which reports 
on corporate governance, and in accordance with the “comply or explain” prin-
ciple, the management of company A describes their management practices and 
confirms their compliance or otherwise with the corporate governance recom-
mendations. Company A complies with the vast majority of the recommen-
dations (i.e. 53 of 56)41.  
Moreover, besides this (simple) management report and mandatory financial 
statements submitted to the Estonian Commercial Register, each year since 
2002 the management of company A has also compiled a professionally 
designed and illustrated yearbook – an extended annual report providing a 
comprehensive overview of company A’s financial and non-financial  
 
                                                                          
40  Since 1 January 2006 the companies listed on the stock exchange are recommended to 
follow the “Corporate governance recommendations” issued by the financial supervision 
authority. 
41  There has been always non-compliance with the principles in the following areas: 
(1) company A publishes the overall management board remuneration, but not individual 
remuneration of the management board members; (2) the supervisory board does not 
regularly review the numeration of the management board members appointed by the domi-
nant shareholder; (3) only two of nine, not at least half of the members of the supervisory 
board, are independent.  
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performance during the year. The yearbook includes additional information on 
the delivery of the company’s strategic objectives and operating indicators, 
compliance with water quality standards and environmental regulations, levels 
of customer satisfaction, the company’s reputation in the community and staff 
characteristics. Table 18 below shows that the only observed performance 
dimension not covered in the management reports through all the years is 
related to the water tariffs and services affordability for the customers of 
company A.  
The annual report of company A, after being signed by the supervisory 
board, is presented to the shareholders for their approval at the annual general 
meeting (AGM). Before the AGM, the city government in one of its meetings 
discusses the annual results of company A and the board’s proposal on dividend 
distribution and authorizes one of the deputy mayors, either that responsible for 
entrepreneurship or municipal engineering services, to execute voting rights in 
the annual general meeting. 
Besides the mandatory annual reports presented to the city government as a 
shareholder every year, the management of company A is obliged to report to 
the supervisory foundation on compliance with the 97 levels of service from the 
services contract. The CEO of the supervisory foundation explains: 
“In the foundation we compare this report with comparable data we have 
collected ourselves during the year and compile our own report for the city 
government.” 
Thereafter the supervisory foundation submits the compliance report on com-
pany A’s performance to the city enterprise board and to the municipal engi-
neering services board with its own opinions and recommendations on possible 
sanctions. Both boards, under the city government, review the report from the 
supervisory foundation and form their positions including proposals on neces-
sary penalties for the consideration of the city government. The CEO of the 
supervisory foundation claims: 
“Almost every year we have proposed imposing some penalties on the water 
company, but the city government just issued a warning in the first year. If no 
improvement follows, then penalties have been imposed42.” 
                                                                          
42  In 2007 and 2009, the city government decided to impose penalties of 1300 and 980 
euros respectively on company A for exceeding the time limit for the liquidation of water 
interruptions.  
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In line with the 2007 amendment contract, once a year by the end of March, 
company A is also obliged to inform the supervisory foundation and thereby the 
city government on the completion of the network extension programme in the 
previous year (i.e. number of connections established, characteristics of the 
pipes used, cost of investment). In addition to the annually submitted reports, 
company A also provides the supervisory foundation with interim reports either 
on a regular basis (i.e. on the economic situation) or ad hoc upon the request of 
the foundation (e.g. on details of particular investments, quality etc). The CEO 
of the foundation notes: 
“On a quarterly basis they inform the city government about potential factors, 
which might reduce profits and harm the economic situation of the water 
company. If possible, the city government as investor could then remove obsta-
cles based on this information.” 
The city government and company A publish information for the general public 
on their websites on the internet, where citizens can find selected performance 
information on water services provision in the city. However, there is no com-
prehensive reporting by the city government to the city council or to citizens on 
the fulfilment of strategic objectives set in the WDP. As revealed in Table 19, 
company A publishes a variety of (comparable) non-financial and financial 
performance information, mostly in the form of yearbooks, environmental 
reports and operations reports on its internet homepage. The consolidated 
annual reports of the city government available on its internet homepage mostly 
reveal some financial information on the performance of company A. However, 
neither company A nor the city government and the supervisory foundation 
have published complete reports on company A’s compliance with all 97 
service levels from the services contract on their internet homepages. 
Company A does not disclose the remuneration for individual management 
board members in its reports, considering that sensitive and private information 
that would bring no benefit to the shareholders. The CEO of company A adds: 
“It’s not ideal. /…/ Payments for the performance objectives via different salaries 
and different percentages against them are all set by the remuneration 
committee.” 
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The remuneration committee was formed to advise the supervisory board on 
management remuneration issues and it comprises two members: the chairman 
of the supervisory board representing the dominant shareholder and one inde-
pendent supervisory board member. Moreover, the members of the management 
board seconded by the dominant shareholder receive remuneration and other 
related benefits43 for their work in company A directly from the dominant share-
holder, the matters related to their employment are not reviewed by the 
supervisory board. Nevertheless, in 2009 company A was recognised by 
NASDAQ OMX stock exchange with awards for the best annual report in the 
Baltics and the best investor relations in Estonia. 
 
Financial performance 
The financial results of company A have shown a strong and steady improve-
ment during the last decade. As revealed in Table 20 below, company A has 
been highly profitable through all the years since its privatisation in 2001. The 
net profit of company A has increased significantly from 1.5 million euros in 
2000 to 21.7 million euros in 2009.  
The profitability of company A increased drastically right after privatisation 
in 2001, when the net profit margin moved up to 40% against 5% a year before. 
Since then the net profit margin has remained between 30–45% for most years, 
while the operating profit margin steadily growing above the 50% level already 
reached 60% by 2009. The management of company A has continued to focus 
on the improvement of operational efficiency and cost control (e.g. 45% reduc-
tion in the number of employees between 2000 and 2003), which has only 
resulted in relatively small changes in operating costs (e.g. 21.5 million euro in 
2002 v. 21.7 million euro in 2008) in spite of a challenging inflationary envi-
ronment during the economic boom in Estonia between 2004–2007. At the 
same time, company A has benefited from a secure revenue stream established 
on the basis of the water tariff formula and the network extension programme as 
stated in the services contract and subsequent amendment contracts. 
 
 
 
                                                                          
43  These amounts are payable by company A to the dominant shareholder as part of the 
payments due pursuant to the 2001 technical services contract. Company A is required to 
pay to the dominant shareholder a base fee of 550 000 per contract year, increased in line 
with inflation. In addition, company A shall reimburse the dominant shareholder for all its 
costs arising from the provision of its management services under the technical services 
contract. 
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At the end of 2000, company A’s equity capital comprised 71.4 million euros, 
which included share capital of 54.3 million euros and investment reserves of 
10.2 million euros. In 2001, according to the privatisation agreement, the 
private shareholder paid 44 million euros (out of a total sales price of 85.1 
million euros) into the share capital of company A, which raised the equity 
capital of company A to 113.6 million euros (i.e. debt-to-assets approx. 25%) at 
the end of the year. However, by November 2001, the shareholders (i.e. the new 
private investor and the city government) had already decided to reduce the 
share capital by 61 million euros and to withdraw the amount from company A. 
Consequently, by the end of 2002, the equity capital dropped to 53.7 million 
euros. The CEO of company A at that time justified the buyback of shares due 
to the over-capitalization of the company, meaning that company A would 
benefit financially from restructuring the capital structure (i.e. replacing equity 
partly with debt capital). Shortly after the reduction of share capital was 
registered in September 2002, company A executed a loan agreement with an 
international financial organization in November 2002, pursuant to which the 
bank extended a loan facility in the amount of 80 million euros. Since then the 
debt-to-assets ratio of company A has remained between 0.5 and 0.6.  
For investors the management of company A has declared a commitment to 
real growth in dividends year on year. The dominant shareholder and the city 
government collected the first dividends (0.14 euros per share) from company A 
in 2001, which were distributed not only from the profits of the previous year 
(0.02 euros per share), but also from the profits accumulated during the pre-
privatisation period (see Appendix 10). Only one month after the privatisation, 
in February 2001, the newly appointed CEO of company A had already pro-
posed the shareholders distribute the first dividends in the amount of 11.6 
million euros. In the media, a member of the management board justified this in 
terms of the over-capitalization and large amount of free cash company A had 
on its bank accounts by saying: 
“Distribution of dividends is a good option to change that.” 
From 2001 to 2008, company A has distributed the majority of its profits to 
shareholders (see Appendix 10), the dividend payout ratio44 remained solid 
between 65–90%. Moreover, in 2009 when Estonia’s economy faced deep 
recession, the shareholders of company A earned record dividends on their 
ownership and the dividend payout ratio reached 147%. As in 2001, the share-
holders in 2010 withdrew more dividends from company A than its net profit in 
the previous year. Thus, company A paid a total of approximately 32 million 
euros in dividends in June 2010, over 11 million euros of this were paid to the 
city government. This dividend payment alone from company A exceeded the 
                                                                          
44  Dividend payout ratio is a fraction of the net income a firm pays to its shareholders in 
dividends. 
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total dividend income initially planned by the city government (i.e. 7.7 million 
euros) into the city budget for 2010. Soon after in the same month, the city 
council approved the first supplementary city budget of 1.9 million euros for 
2010, which included extra dividend revenue in the amount of 3.8 million euros 
beside declined income from taxes and fees. Hence, both the city government 
and the dominant shareholder have benefitted financially from partnership in 
company A during the last decade. They have both received more income from 
co-ownership in company A than their cash outflows regarding the water 
company (see Appendix 11). 
 
Non-financial performance 
The affordability45 of water services for the customers of company A has 
remained relatively good (see Appendix 8) despite water prices increasing by 
2.2 times between 2001 and 2009. Average water bills comprised approximately 
1.2–1.3% of the disposable income of the average household, which remains 
clearly below the threshold of 3–5% suggested by some international organi-
zations such as the World Bank or the OECD (OECD 2003). As shown in 
Appendix 8, the value of the affordability indicator for services provided by 
company A, measuring water prices against household capacity-to-pay, has also 
been below the Estonian average, the gap has increased in recent years. In 
regard to water prices established for businesses and other legal entities 
operating in the city, those have paid 2.3 times more per cubic meter of water 
and sewage than the residential clients of company A (see Appendix 9). While 
the residential water prices of company A have been close to the Estonian 
average, the commercial prices have been twice the average. 
In regard to access to water services, by the end of 2009, approximately 
99.6% of company A’s service area was covered by the water supply network 
and approximately 98% by the public sewerage network. By the end of the net-
work extension programme in 2010, 99.7% of company A’s service area had 
access to both the public water supply and the sewerage network.46 Access to 
the public water supply had not increased significantly since the privatisation of 
company A, when it was already over 98%. Somewhat less people, approxi-
mately 95% of the population were connected to the public sewerage network in 
2001.  
                                                                          
45  Affordability is a relative concept, where the amounts of water constituting a minimum 
threshold must be accurately estimates (Garcia-Valinas et al 2010). Hereinafter the 
affordability indicators for the Estonian water companies are calculated under the following 
assumptions: water consumption 90 l/day per capita; income measured as monthly net 
income per household’s member in city A and in counties, where cities B and C located.  
46  From 2001 to 2010 more than 6800 real properties have been given possibility to get 
access with public water and sewerage network of company A. In total 215 km of new 
sewage pipes, 33 km of water pipes and 78 km of storm water pipes have been laid since 
2001.  
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Moreover, since 2002, the city government has compensated households 
partly (i.e. 80%) or fully for the cost of connecting to the public water supply 
and sewerage system depending on when the actual connection to the network 
occurred after the permit to use the network was issued. With the introduction 
of the development component to the water tariffs, the city government has 
compensated households for 100% of the cost of connection for properties 
covered by the network extension programme since 2008.  
The quality of the drinking water supplied by company A has improved 
constantly over the last decade, and meets national and EU quality criteria. In 
2010, 99.6% of all water samples (i.e. 2901 samples of 2913) taken at the taps 
of the customers of company A complied with the quality requirements 
established for drinking water in Estonia.47 According to the services contract, 
at least 95% of all water samples are required to be compliant with the quality 
standards. However, in 2001 the respective figure was approximately 61%. 
However, company A has not been able to solve the problem of the relatively 
high concentrations of natural radionuclide (radium) in drinking water extracted 
from ground wells and meet the criterion of the total indicative dose stated by 
the EU Drinking Water Directive (i.e. 0.1 mSv per year). Approximately, 10% 
of the population in the city is supplied with drinking water extracted from 
ground wells, where the total indicative dose has in places exceeded the 
permitted level by 2–4 times. However, a special study conducted by the 
Estonian Health Board in 2010 concludes that the health risk from exposure to 
the radionuclide in the drinking water remains low in the city. 
Pollution in the Baltic Sea caused by the inefficient removal of nitrogen and 
low quality of effluent discharged into the reservoir was an issue for company A 
until 2005. After modernising the nitrogen removal process (total investment – 
3.5 million euros) in its wastewater treatment plant, the Baltic Marine Envi-
ronment Protection Commission (HELCOM)48 removed the city from its 
“hotspots” list as a polluter in 2006 because company A fully complies with the 
requirements for wastewater treatment. Besides, at the end of 2005, company A 
became the first company in Estonia to receive the EU EMAS (Eco-Manage-
ment and Audit Scheme) certificate.  
Finally, in terms of compliance with the 97 levels of service from the 
services contract from 2001 through 2009, company A has met either all or the 
vast majority (i.e. 96 out of 97) of them annually49. The non-compliance is 
related to the level of service on the maximum permitted length of unplanned 
                                                                          
47  The quality requirements are established under regulation no. 82 by the Minister of 
Social Affairs based on the EC Directive 98/83/EC. 
48  HELCOM is the governing body of the “Convention on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area” – more usually known as the Helsinki Convention 
(About HELCOM 2011). 
49  Among other levels of services, company A has clearly outscored the levels for water 
quality at consumer’s premises (99.3% against 95% target in 2009), level of leakages (16.6% 
against 26% target in 2009) and number of chokes (1089 against 2444 in 2009).  
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interruptions – company A has failed to solve all the water emergencies within 
the agreed 12-hour time limit50.  
 
Summary of the case study 
In the present case, the CEO and the chairman of the supervisory board with the 
deputy mayor(s) and the city mayor form a group of key actors that has driven 
the performance of water services provision in the city. Still, since the privati-
sation of company A in 2001, opportunities for the city government to influence 
the performance of the company have remained limited. The city government 
and the dominant shareholder as the winner of the privatisation had concluded 
contracts that, as major governance instruments regulating water services provi-
sion and corporate governance of company A, left the city government without 
control over the company. Both the management and supervisory board of com-
pany A have been headed by individuals expatriated from the British parent 
company and appointed by the dominant shareholder alone. The two inde-
pendent members of the supervisory board, like the representatives of the domi-
nant shareholder, are foremost seeking to grow the company. 
The politicians on the supervisory board of company A, like the deputy 
mayor responsible for governance of municipal engineering services, do not 
only represent shareholder interests (i.e. company value), but also because of 
their work at the city government or city council they represent the position of 
the city government as regulator. Such a dual role in board members is not con-
sidered ideal according to international corporate governance principles, which 
state that the situation can easily result in confusion and conflicts of interest 
between policy and ownership functions (OECD 2005). In the present case, the 
city government initiated a number of contract re-negotiations (often shortly 
before elections), which ended up with some short-term tariff freeze or re-
duction, but on account of extra cash-flows or other benefits ensured to com-
pany A in the future (e.g. prolongation of the services agreement without any 
tender in 2007). Thus, the members of the city government showing themselves 
as strong tariff negotiators on behalf of the citizens, in fact made deals with the 
representatives of the dominant shareholder, which have ensured increasing 
revenue streams that have strengthened the financial position of company A. 
Those who belong to the supervisory board of company A have agreed with the 
company’s profit targets, while always approving the annual budgets proposed 
by the CEO. 
The principal tasks of the supervisory foundation, established by the city 
council more than a year after the privatisation of company A, do not prescribe 
that the foundation perform the role of economic regulator. Moreover, in terms 
                                                                          
50  In 2010 company A had 355 of unplanned interruptions to supply and in case of one 
incident the cause of the leak or interruption took longer than 12 hours to establish. Both in 
2005 and 2007 company A had three such cases.  
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of independence from policymakers and water companies, the foundation is 
financed from the city budget, and has a representative of company A on its 
supervisory board. Most of the other board members, including the chairmen, 
have been active politicians from political parties in power all appointed by the 
city government. However, the last two appointments to the board of the foun-
dation, two young students, indicate that some other qualities rather than profes-
sionalism and experience in the water sector have been valued. 
The first WDP prepared by the city government remained a mandatory 
vision document required by national legislation, its long-term goals were not 
defined at the time of the privatisation of company A. Consequently, the actors 
involved in the preparation of updates to the WDP, proceeded rather from the 
services contract or company A’s business strategy approved by the city 
government as a shareholder in company A. 
The services contract between company A and the city government, the main 
regulatory mechanism in water services provision, has several distinct features. 
Firstly, the water tariffs are not handled apart from the expected services out-
come, although the contract is not prescriptive of the amounts that company A 
must invest for these purposes. The second key feature of the regulatory 
contract relates to the obligation on company A to report to the city government 
(i.e. supervisory foundation) on all 97 levels of service. Moreover, the managers 
of company A have actively communicated the company’s compliance with 
these service standards to the general public on the corporate website (see Table 
19) and in the media, as necessary. Going public in 2005 and reporting on 
compliance with the corporate governance recommendations of the stock 
exchange, have increased transparency regarding the corporate governance 
mechanisms and procedures of company A. 
All in all, both financial (shareholder perspective) and non-financial per-
formance (stakeholder perspective) have improved or not suffered during the 
period from 2001–2009. Among other possible reasons, the production of water 
services in company A has turned out to be a financial success because: 
 The services contract, where water tariffs are set for a longer period of time 
without any constraints on justified profitability, provides a strong incentive 
for efficiency improvement and profit maximization;  
 The agreed water tariff formula includes an inflation component that has 
provided protection against increases in production costs and possible losses 
of profitability in times of economic boom; 
 The services contract is an output oriented regulatory instrument (focusing 
on what must be achieved), which does not determine the inputs (invest-
ments, costs) company A should employ to reach the targets; 
 Professional profit-oriented management exists in company A with extensive 
international experience in the water industry. The managers have personal 
performance based incentives (profit rights) established solely by the domi-
nant shareholder;  
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 As a result of contract re-negotiations, the city government has paid for the 
network extension programme (i.e. for new connections and access to water 
services) from its own budget. Therefore, the city government had to cover 
carried out some unexpected transactions costs regarding the privatisation of 
company A. 
 
In light of the strong financial results of company A, the mixed public-private 
ownership has yielded remarkable financial income for the both major share-
holders (see Appendix 11). Each year the AGM of company A has decided to 
distribute dividends at a relatively high payout ratio. Nevertheless, as result of 
the investments, from the water users’ point of view, the water quality and 
access to the public water supply and sewerage network have improved. The 
non-financial performance of company A has also improved in terms of waste-
water treatment. Despite a remarkable water tariff increase between 2001 and 
2009, the affordability of water services has remained relatively good in com-
parison to the Estonian average (see Appendix 8). This can be partly explained 
by the relatively higher household income in the city, but also the commercial 
clients of company A paying a significantly (i.e. 2.3 times) higher price for 
water and sewage than residential clients. Hence, one group of water users has 
subsidized the other (see Appendix 9). 
All in all, in light of the present case, mixed ownership could be seen as a 
combination that mitigates some of the possible disadvantages of pure private 
ownership, such as the lack of accountability and distrust between partners. For 
the city government as owner, the partnership with the dominant shareholder 
has benefited them financially from the effective management of company A. 
However, from the point of view of the city government as service guarantor 
(contractor), it remains questionable whether the involvement of private part-
ners has ultimately hindered (e.g. no access to EU grants, reduction of share 
capital) or facilitated the development of water and sewerage systems in the 
city. In light of the contract re-negotiations, it is obvious that the situation has 
turned out to be somewhat different from the initial expectations of the city 
government, which has limited options to control water tariffs and investments 
as a result of the privatisation. 
 
 
3.3.2. Case B 
Governance structure and key actors 
Company B in its current legal form was established in 1997, when the munici-
pal water utility was transformed into a public limited company and since then 
it has been 100% owned by the city government. All the water infrastructure 
needed for water services production in the city belong to company B. It pro-
vides water services in one of the largest cities in Estonia; however, the com-
pany is significantly smaller than company A as revealed in Table 8 (p. 113).  
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Operating as a public limited company, company B has established the 
following corporate governance bodies: the shareholders assembly, supervisory 
board and management board as depicted in Figure 23.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Control delegation in company B (source: compiled by the author)  
 
 
The CEO, a single member of the management board, who is appointed by the 
supervisory board, represents and directs the company. The supervisory board 
consists of seven members, a chairman and six other members all named by the 
city government as the shareholders assembly for company B.  
Since 1996, a right-wing political party has collected the largest number of 
votes at local elections in the city. The city government consists of six members 
with one deputy mayor directly responsible for the provision of communal 
services, including water services in the city. This deputy mayor, a member of 
the right-wing political party, with a doctoral degree in economics, was active in 
the banking sector before entering politics some 14 years ago. He has also been 
a member of the Riigikogu (Estonian parliament) and a minister in the state 
government. He has proclaimed (e.g. during 2011 elections) his commitment to 
a liberal economic environment.  
Since 1999, the position of the chairman of the supervisory board in 
company B has been occupied by a publicly active businessman, owner of the 
leading manufacturer of packaging materials in the Baltic region. As a member 
of the abovementioned right-wing party, he has been active in the management 
of the local party organization, belonged to city council and has been elected to 
the Riigikogu. The chairman of the board, holding a doctoral degree in biology, 
belongs to a number of governance bodies in several other nonprofit organi-
zations and state-owned companies. He claims: 
Shareholders assembly 
City government: 100% 
Supervisory board (7) 
7 members appointed by the city government 
Management board (1) 
CEO/managing director appointed  
by the supervisory board 
Power delegation to the supervisory board 
Power delegation to the management board 
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“It’s important that you have something to give. I feel that I don’t have bright 
ideas anymore. The CEO has asked me not to leave.51” 
The CEO, an engineering graduate, has been connected to company B all his 
working life; he began his career here as a development manager in 1994. Since 
1997, when company B was registered as a public limited company, he has 
worked as the CEO and managing director. The CEO explains: 
“I can put my hand over my heart…what really holds me in the company is the 
possibility to technically develop a large area, which is not necessarily easy, but 
it is interesting.” 
As with the deputy mayor and the chairman of the supervisory board, the CEO 
is also a member of the ruling right-wing party. Since 1996, he has always been 
elected to the city council, and leads the faction of his party in the council. The 
CEO belongs to two standing committees in the city council, including the 
committee for municipal services, as advisory bodies to the city council. The 
committees review draft legislative acts, make proposals on them and initiate 
discussions. In 2008, he was also appointed as chairman of the supervisory 
board of a publicly owned water company in another municipality.  
An organizational unit under the city government, the bureau of environ-
mental service, is responsible for preparing and controlling the fulfilment of 
regulatory contracts signed between the city government and company B. This 
bureau, with one senior specialist involved in water services provision, also 
exercises formal control over the enforcement of the public water supply and 
sewerage act and local regulations for company B. The deputy mayor describes 
the duties of this senior specialist, who holds a university degree in amelioration 
and has 20 years experience at the city government, as follows: 
“She is more like a coordinator, who answers to incoming requests related to 
water services. For that she contacts with the water company, asks numbers and 
opinions and compiles official letters.” 
Board composition and functional emphasis 
The distribution of seats on the supervisory board of company B has been 
agreed between the coalition parties according to their proportional represen-
tation in the city council. Board members have been appointed by the city 
government as proposed by the political parties in power. As a result of the last 
two elections in 2005 and 2009, the right-wing party as the winner of the 
elections was entitled to propose four candidates to the supervisory board of 
company B. The other coalition partners, two centre-left parties, shared the 
                                                                          
51  The chairman of the supervisory board left this position in company B in December 
2010, three months after this interview with him.  
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remaining three seats in the supervisory board. Except for the chairman of the 
supervisory board, who did not participate in the 2009 local elections, all the 
other board members belong to their party factions in the city council. The 
deputy mayor responsible for communal services claims: 
“It’s good that the board members belong to the city council. Municipal compa-
nies are not classical organizations established only for making money. These 
people know what is possible in the city and their decisions are influenced by a 
broader perspective.” 
In addition, the CEO of company B considers the participation of the super-
visory board members in the work of the city council as an advantage from the 
point of view of company management: 
“This helps avoid incompetent attacks. At the board level, we can already have 
discussions and negotiations, not just instructions that now you have to do this 
and that. The board members can represent the company’s position also in the 
city council.”  
Six out of the seven supervisory board members either have a university degree 
in economics or are actively involved in other businesses. In addition to the 
chairman, the right-wing party has also nominated another businessman to the 
supervisory board, who owns a well-known food manufacturing company in 
Estonia. The same party has also nominated a doctor who owns a private clinic 
and a university lecturer with previous business experience to represent the 
party on the board. The deputy mayor as one of the leaders of the ruling right-
wing party explains: 
“We are lucky to have among us entrepreneurs, who have proved themselves 
under competitive conditions. Let’s say that these are people that also have a 
good political nose when it comes to social issues.” 
The second biggest coalition partner is represented by a university professor of 
economics, a former member of the Riigikogu and one biotechnologist. The 
smallest coalition partner has nominated an experienced politician (former 
deputy mayor of the city in the 1990s) with management expertise in various 
business sectors (e.g. banking, food industry). All supervisory board members 
have fulfilled their duties on the board for years; most of them were appointed 
between 2005 and 2007. The chairman of the supervisory board addresses the 
importance of the board’s stability in corporate governance: 
“If you change too many members at once and do it too often, they will not be 
able to understand the topic and take this job as a temporary duty. /.../ The more 
stable the political power in local government, the more can be achieved.” 
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Another supervisory board member from a centre-left coalition party concurs: 
“The majority of the board members have a theoretical or practical background 
in economics and business, so the board works correctly, with good quality and 
functionally. It is stable and people are used to doing their work.” 
The supervisory board of company B has gathered for its regular meetings 8–11 
times a year; all meetings are prepared by the chairman. A supervisory board 
member characterizes the role of the chairman: 
“He is the organizer, he is responsible, and he needs to keep his eyes on every-
thing. It’s easier for the other board members because with this chairman and 
CEO everything just works. It is good to sit on this board.” 
Supervisory board meetings are prepared and conducted according to an internal 
board regulation from 2002. There is neither specialisation between the super-
visory board members nor specialist advisory committees within the board. The 
supervisory board meetings and discussions usually last one to three hours, with 
all materials on the items in the agenda distributed to the board members 
beforehand. One supervisory board member describes the board discussions: 
“All the members are able to read financial reports. Questions are mostly about 
relationships – where one or another figure comes from? And why? How do we 
go further from here? It’s not a show, where we present how smart we are. When 
five members have their feet on ground and talk competently, there will be a 
good discussion.” 
Once a year the supervisory board approves the quarterly audit plans for 
company B and reports are prepared for the supervisory board on findings from 
the internal audits. Two or three times a year the supervisory board reviews and 
approves changes to the annual budget proposed by the CEO52. Every year the 
supervisory board reviews the list of unnecessary real-estate objects and 
authorizes the CEO to sell property. According to the statutes of the company, 
to sell immovable property and tangible fixed assets, or issue loans and guaran-
tees in the name of company B, a consensus among all the supervisory board 
members is required. 
Communication between the CEO and chairman of the supervisory board 
has not been limited to official board meetings, but they also communicate at 
other meetings (e.g. city council, party faction) and discuss issues related to 
company B, as necessary. The chairman of the supervisory board describes his 
cooperation with the CEO as a tandem effort: 
                                                                          
52  All changes in the annual budget that exceed 1300 euro are approved by the board.  
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“The CEO knows the system, the business. The board has not been needed there. 
But there are some things that are easier to arrange for me. I just make a few 
calls.” 
Both the CEO and the chairman of the supervisory board have declared their 
commitment to stand first of all for the interests of company B. They have not 
let party political interests dominate over economic and managerial issues in 
decision-making in company B. The chairman of the supervisory board claims: 
“Sometimes it is necessary that the board makes a decision that is different from 
the will of city. We stand for this company; it must be profitable and sustainable. 
I have told the CEO that he fights for this company like for his own, everything 
is carefully considered and made so efficient by him.” 
At the same time, the CEO and the chairman have experienced political support 
from different city governments when planning large-scale investments for the 
modernisation of the water infrastructure. The CEO claims: 
“If I made a phone call today and asked for a supporting letter from the city 
government in order to gather additional money for investments, there would not 
be any problems. They would ask when I need it by. Furthermore, we haven’t 
messed up anything either.” 
The deputy mayor responsible for municipal services in the city government has 
not been directly involved in the management of company B. He has visited the 
supervisory board meetings of company B only once. The deputy mayor 
concludes: 
“We, the members of the city government, prefer to stick to political governance, 
not to become board members in companies owned by the city.” 
Strategic planning and goals in water services 
The last public water supply and sewerage system development plan (WDP) for 
2007–2020 was approved by the city council in September 2006. The CEO and 
the supervisory board members of company B, except the chairman, 
participated in this council meeting, too. The proposed development plan was 
presented to the members of the city council by the deputy mayor responsible 
for communal services at the time. Previously the plan was discussed and 
approved by the committee for communal services at the city council, chaired 
by the CEO of company B, who answered the questions of the committee 
members, but abstained from voting.  
As in 2000, when the previous version of the WDP was drafted, the city 
government delegated the preparation of the plan to company B. The WDP for 
2007–2020 was compiled in company B with the support of an external con-
sultant hired by the company. There was also a senior specialist from the bureau 
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of environmental services under the city government involved as a coordinator 
in the preparation process; however, information on the current situation, future 
challenges and investment needs in water service production was known by 
company B. The CEO adds: 
“In principle we fulfilled the functions of the city. No city government could 
have such competences like a water company. It is nice to have responsibility 
and to be trusted.” 
The WDP consists of 54 pages and formulates some general goals for company 
B as follows: 
 Safe and secure water production – addresses protection and development 
needs in water catchment areas in order to ensure ground and drinking water 
quality. 
 Reliable and available water supply network for all households – all citizens 
should be able to join the public water supply network and have access to 
drinking water that meets EU quality standards. Under this point a 
measurable target is also set: the percentage of water network leakages is to 
be reduced to 10%.  
 Environmentally safe sewerage network – all citizens should be able to join 
the public sewerage network; sewage and storm water are to be treated 
according to established environmental norms. Storm water is to be 
canalized separately from wastewater so that energy costs are optimized. 
 Modern environmentally friendly wastewater treatment process and the pro-
duction of bio-energy – addresses the need to ensure the stability of water 
treatment, optimize the operation costs of the wastewater treatment plant, 
process leavings of the wastewater treatment that might be dangerous to the 
environment and establish a bio-energy production facility in the city. 
 Satisfied clients – addresses customer orientation when providing services to 
clients and emphasizes the importance of rapid problem solving.  
 Efficient organization and educated employees – addresses the role of open, 
effective and modern management; values the intellectual capital necessary 
for implementing new modern technical solutions and following the best 
customer service standards. 
 
Moreover, in the following sections, the WDP sheds light on how the goals will 
be achieved by pointing out planned activities at each stage of the production 
cycle with indicative time frames and approximate costs. The development plan 
ends with an appendix titled “Indicators for the evaluation of the fulfilment of 
the WDP,” which names 19 different performance indicators that can be used to 
assess the achievement of these goals. The proposed indicators, stemming from 
EU regulations, are expected to characterize the conditions of the water infra-
structure, the environment, quality, price and consumer issues in water services 
provision. Nevertheless, there are neither specific target values nor clear defini-
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tions of the performance indicators, which would make it possible to assess the 
progress of company B.  
According to the WDP, the total investments needed for water and waste-
water infrastructure development for 2007–2020 is approximately 91 million 
euros, which is about 12 times greater than the annual turnover of company B in 
2009. Most of the investments described in the development plan are to be 
financed by EU support funds, bank credits and the income of company B. The 
city government is expected to provide one half of the investments (i.e. 13 
million euros) needed for the construction of the storm water system in the city 
for 2007–2020. The WDP 2007–2020 does not provide any indication of the 
dynamics of future water tariffs in light of the planned investments. The deputy 
mayor describes the WDP as comprising a vision for water services: 
“If we sum up all investments in the development plan, then the total amount will 
be bigger than the funds available to us. It is a kind of dream, a goal that cannot 
be fulfilled 100%. It rather shows the direction, where we must move.” 
The CEO approaches the development plan as a document where all the major 
strategic goals of company B must be included; however, when drafting the 
plan he considered it a necessity for qualifying for EU support funds in the 
future. Consequently, all potential renovation and construction objects were 
included in the plan. The CEO claims: 
“In regard to the development plans, then you have some very serious big goals, 
but the rest is written to get the plan approved in the city council.” 
One supervisory board member from company B, an experienced member of 
the city council, concludes:  
“EU money is provided only for projects included in development plans. Not to 
miss anything, everything will be written there. So the plans become unrealistic; 
it is not possible to fulfil them completely.” 
Company B does not have a separate long-term strategic plan besides the WDP. 
Considering the four or five year medium-term perspective of the WDP, the 
CEO of company B presents the supervisory board a more detailed plan 
describing renovation and construction works for approval within the frame-
work of the annual budget.  
 
Services contract 
In 2001, the city government, represented by a deputy mayor, and company B, 
represented by the CEO, signed a 15-year services contract that regulates the 
rights and obligations of the parties in relation to water services provision in the 
city. The services contract, the main part consisting of six pages, confirms the 
170 
water company’s general obligation to ensure the provision of water and sewer-
age services to its customers. The contract also stipulates that company B must 
develop the water supply and sewerage network in compliance with related 
development plans approved by the city council (i.e. the WDP). As an appendix 
to the contract prepared in company B, there was attached a table of planned 
annual investments and objects for 2001–2015 based on the previous WDP 
2000–2012. For each investment object in the appendix potential sources of 
financing are marked (e.g. water tariff, city budget and grant funds).  
In terms of water quality and wastewater treatment standards, the services 
contract prescribes that company B has to meet the quality standard set in the 
national laws or other state level legal acts. There are no specific, measurable or 
time-bound customer service standards stipulated in the services contract. The 
contract does not provide any specific reaction time that company B must 
adhere to in liquidating water leakages or breakages, stating only that the 
company must react immediately in the case of a large-scale breakdown in 
water supply systems.  
In regard to establishing water prices and charges for connecting to the 
public water supply and sewerage system, the services contract briefly refers to 
the conditions of the public water supply and sewerage act and stipulates in a 
separate point that the city government will consider the WDP and the attached 
investment plan when establishing water prices in the future. 
 
Determination of water price and compensation for investments 
In April 1999, the city council passed a regulation on the establishment of water 
and wastewater prices (hereafter ‘water prices’), which has authorized the city 
government to determine the prices based on requests from the water company. 
Since then company B has prepared three requests for water price increases that 
have all been approved by the city government. Before the CEO submitted the 
requests to the city government, the supervisory board of company B discussed 
and approved them. Members of the supervisory board discuss possible adjust-
ments to water prices on a regular basis as part of the revenue planning for the 
next budget year. If the supervisory board comes to the conclusion that a price 
increase is needed in the future, the CEO is asked to prepare a detailed calcu-
lation and scenario analysis of the influence of potential water price adjustments 
for company B. 
While company B changed water prices almost every year in the 1990’s, 
during the last decade increases in water prices have occurred only after several 
years. A member of the supervisory board explains: 
“Until the company can manage at the current tariffs, we will not go for a price 
increase. We are not in pursuit of high profits. We want to provide a good service 
at a relatively low price, and still the water company must be profitable.” 
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The deputy major notes: 
“Changes in water prices influence people’s well-being. This is a political issue 
and one should deal with it as rarely as possible. But tariffs must allow a normal 
profit for the company in order to ensure sustainability.” 
At the beginning of 2001, water prices for residential consumers increased by 
28%; however, they still paid less than businesses and other organizations for a 
cubic metre of water and sewage in the city. According to the WDP 2000–2012, 
with reference to the public water supply and sewerage act, the water price for 
residential and commercial consumers was considered to be the same level by 
2002. The price gap was removed with the next price increase in February 2004, 
when the water price for residential customers was increased by 15% up to 1.31 
euros per cubic metre (including VAT). The CEO and CFO of company B 
instigated the price increase as necessary self-financing for infrastructure 
modernisation with EU support funds, warning that otherwise the European 
Commission would “freeze” the support funds available to the company. The 
last price adjustment from July 2006 raised water prices by 17%, which the 
CEO justified in the city government as being necessary to cover remarkable 
increases in some costs (e.g. pollution fees 2.8 times, electricity by 25%, fuel by 
60%, labour costs) since the previous price change in 2004. In addition, the 
price increase was motivated by ongoing infrastructure renovation projects that 
require additional self-financing from company B. The city government, even if 
not required, consulted with all the political parties represented in the city 
council before approving the price increase in 2006. Since then, company B has 
not applied for a price increase during the observation period. The CEO claims: 
“Every year we have been a bit more efficient and looked for opportunities for 
cost savings. And of course the arrival of the economic crisis gave us an oppor-
tunity to review costs.” 
Nevertheless, not all price requests presented by the CEO of company B have 
been approved by the politicians in the city government. In 1999, when the 
present CEO as a new manager in the water company approached the city 
government with a proposal to introduce a fixed monthly fee to the tariff 
structure, a political conflict erupted between the coalition partners in the city at 
that time – despite the supervisory board previously agreeing on the 
introduction of a fixed monthly fee in order to respond to the rapid decease in 
water consumption (33% over the last three years) and stabilize the cash flow 
for company B. All in all, because of political resistance, the tariff structure 
remained unchanged, and today residential users are charged for water services 
based only on cubic metres of water consumed. The deputy mayor concludes: 
“While water price is a politically sensitive issue, you can increase it when there 
is a will. You cannot do it before elections; it must be done right after elections.” 
172 
However, according to the regulation on the establishment of water and waste-
water prices from 1999, when applying for water price changes company B had 
to present the city government with (1) the motivation for any price change with 
related calculations, (2) last year’s audited annual report of the company, and 
(3) the cost and revenue forecast for the next year. The regulation does not 
specify how price calculations should be conducted and what costs should be 
included. The city government has not established any particular standardized 
application form for company B. In fact, the application has been supplemented 
with a cash-flow prognosis and budget forecast that considers all revenues and 
costs (i.e. operational costs, depreciation, financial costs and taxes). The CEO of 
company B is pleased that the responsibility for establishing prices was 
removed to the Estonian Competition Authority from November 2010. He says: 
“The local government is not competent in this field. Even our city, which has 
relatively more resources, is not able to assess price proposals reasonably. All the 
time they looked at it from a political point of view.” 
Budgeting and financing 
The financial manager (CFO) of company B is in charge of preparing the annual 
budget for the water company. He prepares the necessary budget forms and 
distributes them to the eleven departments of the company for completion with 
initial budget figures. Infrastructure specialists provide the initial investment 
figures for the next budget year based on previously defined strategic objectives 
and after considering unfinished renovations and emergency repairs. Conse-
quently, the CFO conducts meetings with the managers and specialists of the 
departments in order to identify opportunities for cost savings and efficiency 
improvements against actual results in previous budget periods. In total there 
are around 20 employees involved in the budget preparation in company B from 
July/August through to December until the supervisory board approves the 
budget for the next year. The CEO claims: 
“The budget preparation is a real breaking down. People have to do this by them-
selves; they are responsible for fulfilling their plans.” 
The investment budget comprises a list of renovation and construction objects 
together with rationales, budgeted costs and expected economic impact. The 
CEO explains the economic considerations behind the investment budget: 
“Some investments don’t have a direct economic effect, but they are needed for 
quality improvement. But some other, like the construction of the storm water 
system, reduce wastewater load and costs for us..” 
The supervisory board of company B focuses primarily on changes in major 
cost and income items, compared to the previous budget year, and on planned 
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investment projects, when discussing the budget proposed by the CEO. The 
CEO claims: 
“The board reviews the budget proposal, but trusts the specialists. They want to 
know why we do one or other investment. Actually I cannot say, which street is 
more important to renovate first. My specialists say that.” 
The annual budget for company B usually gets approved by the supervisory 
board in December, when the city council has agreed on the city budget and 
investment projects for the coming year. Such timing still allows the manage-
ment of company B to adjust the order of their infrastructure renovation list and 
synchronize the reconstruction of the water and sewerage network with other 
infrastructure (e.g. streets) construction works in the city. 
There is one regular income flow between company B and the city govern-
ment: the fee for storm water canalization and treatment paid by the city 
government to the water company. At the beginning of 2002, the city govern-
ment delivered the entire storm water system over to company B, which then 
became responsible for its maintenance and development. During the annual 
budgeting processes, the city government has included into the city budget an 
amount for the costs associated with the canalization and treatment of storm 
water (e.g. 256 000 euro in 2009) relying on requests received from company B. 
Still, the amounts have always been smaller than those requested by company B 
and remain significantly below the initially planned investment level of 640 000 
euro annually from 2007 to 2012 for the development of the storm water net-
work in the city. Nevertheless, half of the collected storm water was canalized 
via a separate network constructed by company B by 2009. The CEO points 
out: 
“If there is no money, we don’t do anything in this domain or we do just some-
thing for our profit. We get some money from the city for storm water, but many 
do not at all.” 
Company B, which owns all the water infrastructure assets in the city, is 
considered to be one of the most active users53 of EU grants for water and 
sewerage infrastructure modernisation in Estonia. From 1994 to 2009, a total of 
63.9 million euros has been invested in the water and wastewater infrastructure 
of company B. The management of company B prepared all the required docu-
ments and applied for the support funds and credits from international financial 
organizations (e.g. EBRD). The required self-financing for the investment 
projects financed through foreign grants has been, among other sources (e.g. the 
city government, central government), gathered from the reinvested profits of 
company B. 
                                                                          
53  Company B has been provided with different EU grants in amount of 31.2 million euro 
between 2000 and 2010. 
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By the beginning of the 1990s, the water and wastewater infrastructure in the 
city had deteriorated and it was the only large urban settlement in the Baltic 
countries without any wastewater treatment plant at all. In 1994, with the finan-
cial support of the Swiss Confederation, company B re-commenced the 
construction of its wastewater treatment plant (total investment – 9.14 million 
euros), which began mechanical treatment of the sewage in 1996. In 1998, after 
the construction of a new large-scale sewage collector, financed by credit from 
the EBRD, already approximately 80% of the sewage produced in the city was 
directed to the wastewater treatment plant. In 1999, biological treatment of 
sewage in the wastewater treatment plan was also launched. With EU funds 
available for Estonia another large sewage collector (5.8 million euros) was 
constructed by 2004, and since then, all wastewater is treated in the wastewater 
treatment plant. In the same year, company B, again with support of EU funds, 
started a large-scale investment project for the renovation of the network (19.8 
million euros) that resulted in more than 100 kilometres of new water and 
wastewater pipes across the city in 2006. By the end of 2008, the last local 
district within the city was connected to the central water and sewerage net-
work. In addition, between 1994 and 2009, two new water purification stations 
were constructed and, as part of small-sized investment projects, a total of 
approximately 200 kilometres of water and wastewater pipes had been reno-
vated in the city. By spring 2009, this was the first city in Estonia that met all 
the requirements of the EU directives (i.e. 98/83 EU, 91/271/EEC) on water 
quality and environmental control. 
 
Reporting and accountability 
For regular supervisory board meetings the members of the supervisory board 
receive a financial report from the CEO that makes it possible for them to get an 
overview of monthly financial results of company B. The report includes a 
profit and loss statement, balance sheet and information on budget fulfilment. In 
addition to the financial reports the CEO informs the supervisory board on 
progress in conducting planned development projects of the company.  
After the end of each financial year, as required by Estonian Commercial 
Code, the management of company B has prepared the annual accounts and 
management report, which then together have been presented to the board 
members for their approval. The structure and the volume of the management 
(activity) reports have not changed much over the last decade. The management 
reports, presented as two text pages in the beginning of the annual reports with-
out comparative data tables or figures included reveal some non-financial 
performance information on company B as summarized in Table 21  
below. 
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Table 21 shows that the performance information in the management reports is 
mostly related to annual production volumes (m3) and infrastructure renovation 
(km) and maintenance (times). It also reveals that the management reports of 
company B do not comprise measurable information on changes in the quality 
of water services, production efficiency or water services affordability in the 
city.  
Company B’s annual report, after being signed by the supervisory board 
members, is presented to the city government as the shareholders assembly for 
approval at the annual general meeting. Both, the chairman of the supervisory 
board and the CEO participate in these meetings, the chairman presenting an 
overview of the business activities of company B in the previous year. As a part 
of the meetings the chairman of the supervisory board also informs the city 
government on the work of the board (i.e. number of meetings conducted, 
important decisions made etc.) during the last year and presents a written report 
on this. This short report by the chairman of the supervisory board over two 
pages is attached to the annual reports of company B and submitted to the 
Estonian Business Register. 
Besides the mandatory annual reports, there is no interim reporting on finan-
cial results by the CEO or the chairman of the supervisory board to the city 
government. In regard to reporting on non-financial results, the specialists in 
company B provide the environmental bureau under the city government with 
data on regular basis on actual volumes of water intake (m3) and water usage 
(m3) for statistics to be gathered by the bureau. Because the services contract 
the city government and company B does not include any particular quality or 
customer service requirements, no related reporting obligation stems from it for 
company B either. According to the deputy mayor, the city government does 
not consider it necessary to exercise more control over company B: 
“Our business model relies very much on the trustworthy and ambitious man-
agement of the water company. The CEO, also a member of the city council, has 
been in local politics for a long time. This man is a doer…through that the trust is 
ensured. Besides, all the board members belong to the city council.” 
However, in line with the WDP 2007–2020, the committee of internal audits at 
the city council discusses and evaluates the fulfilment of this long-term 
development plan in one of its meetings at the beginning each year. In those 
meetings, the head of the municipal services department under the city govern-
ment together with the CEO or alone, makes a presentation on the development 
projects and answers questions from the committee members. To do that the 
CEO is previously asked to report to the city government on progress made by 
company B in infrastructure modernisation and achieving the strategic goals of 
the WDP. After the discussion, the audit committee at the city council has 
always agreed to accept the progress made by the city government and company 
B in developing the water and sewerage systems. A supervisory board member 
describes the discussions in the city council as follows: 
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“These are not substantial. Those who know what is the purpose of the develop-
ment plan hold it in derision. Opposition parties ask row by row, why haven’t 
you done exactly this and this, but actually they just try to present themselves.” 
The city government and company B publish information for the general public 
(i.e. consumers) on their websites on the internet, where citizens can find 
selected performance information on water services provision in the city as 
shown in Table 22. 
As shown in Table 22, company B only publishes non-financial performance 
information (i.e. management report from the last year complemented with 
quality indicators and water prices) on its internet homepage. Information on the 
financial performance of company B is missing there. The consolidated annual 
reports of the city government, published on its internet homepage, reveal both 
some non-financial and financial information on the performance of company 
B. Still, neither the city government nor company B present performance data 
consistently for longer periods to facilitate evaluating the progress made by 
them in water services provision. 
Nevertheless, it is the financial performance of company B that determines 
the CEO’s remuneration for his work in the company. The supervisory board 
has agreed that the salary of the CEO comprises both a fixed and a variable 
component. The variable pay amounting to 50% of the fixed one depends 
primarily on the profitability of company B, which is evaluated using budget 
figures on a quarterly basis. The chairman of the supervisory board claims: 
“If the budget is fulfilled and profitability is there, the board makes the decision. 
Problems with service delivery can emotionally influence the pay. Such package 
motivates him to perform and show results that we expect.” 
In addition, the CEO can earn extra bonuses at the end of year equal to two 
monthly salaries in the case of good corporate performance (i.e. meeting profit 
targets from the budget). With just one exception in the past, the CEO has 
earned all the quarterly and annual bonuses available to him in company B. The 
total amount of annual salary paid to the CEO, 51 900 euros in 2009, is revealed 
in the annual report of company B and is also published on the internet home-
page of the city government. 
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Financial performance 
The annual financial results of company B have been relatively volatile during 
the decade from 2000 to 2009. As revealed in Table 23, there can be distin-
guished two periods or stages in the dynamics of financial performance: 2000–
2003 when a loss was made and 2004 onwards when a profit was made.  
During the first period, each year from 2000 to 2003, company B incurred a 
loss. However, the operating revenue increased by 29% during that period and 
by 2003 the net loss was seven times smaller than in 2000. The change was 
partly contingent on a 28% increase in water prices for residential customers at 
the beginning of 2001. By extending the water and sewerage network, company 
B was also able to collect relatively more (+340% in 2001; +177% in 2002) 
revenues through connection charges. At the same time, the management of 
company B continued to take opportunities to improve efficiency by reducing 
water leakages (30% in 1999 vs. 13% in 2003) through the renovation of the 
pipe network, introducing new energy saving technologies and selling realestate 
unnecessary for water services production. 
Moreover, the financial department of company B responsible for corporate 
cash-management was allowed under a special supervisory board regulation to 
buy and sell the bonds of both Estonian and international foreign companies 
from 2003. The value of the security portfolio owned by company B had 
increased by more than double by the end December 2003 against 2000 (see 
Table 23). Company B has been rather well capitalized with its owner’s equity 
comprising 70%–86% of total liabilities and equity capital.  
At the beginning of the second period in 2004, company B was allowed to 
convert 2.2 million euros in non-paid pollution fees (as “other operating 
revenues”) into revenues after concluding some agreed infrastructure 
constructions. In 2002, company B made an agreement on the non-payment of 
pollution fees with the Ministry of the Environment and was committed to 
investing 1.92 million euros by 2004 in its sewerage and wastewater treatment 
plant on account of the fee relief. Consequently, company B finished 2004 with 
an approximately 2 million euro net profit against a 246 thousand euro net loss 
the year before. Moreover, in 2005 after finishing the construction of its second 
large wastewater collector, all wastewater in the city was being treated in the 
wastewater treatment plant and the amount of pollution fees paid by company B 
decreased by more than four times (i.e. –200 thousand euros). However, as a 
result of cash-management, company B earned an all-time high in interest 
income of 191 thousand euros on its security portfolio in 2005. 
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Financial results in 2006 differed significantly from the results of previous and 
forthcoming years – the largest operational revenue of almost 9.6 million euros 
and 4.2 million euros in net profit. In that year, company B sold a 57.5% stake 
in a subsidiary, where a majority stake was acquired in 2001. This subsidiary as 
a holding-firm had mediated and was responsible for the administration of an 
international credit programme from the 1990s aimed at the modernisation of 
the wastewater treatment systems in a number of Estonian municipalities among 
others in the case city. The CEO of company B explains the motivation behind 
the decision to acquire the majority stake in this holding company:  
“Every year we paid more and more administration fees for our credit to that 
company. For us it was cheaper to buy these shares and readjust the company. 
/…/ We saw the potential.” 
Company B earned 2.2 million euros profit from selling the shares of its 
subsidiary (i.e. 11 times more than their book value) in a public auction in 2006. 
Consequently, company B repaid all its investment loans ahead of schedule 
from the profit earned. The CEO states: 
“What we did, was that we just reorganized the firm, increased its value and 
brought it to the market. We managed to free our own business from some long-
term costs.”  
In the middle of 2006, the last water price increase (+17%) took place, which 
together with a general rise in water consumption increased corporate operating 
revenues by 13.8%. In 2007, when the Estonian economy was booming for the 
last year before the global economic crisis, company B continued to increase it 
sales revenues from water production (+5.1%), from wastewater collection 
(+8.1%) and from connection charges (+200%). At the same time, under infla-
tionary conditions inherent to the rapid economic growth, the operating costs of 
company B increased by 17% in 2007. After repaying the investment loans, the 
financial income of company B significantly exceeded the financial costs (i.e. 
12 times in 2007) without any losses from financial investments so far. 
In 2008 and 2009, the economic boom was replaced by the economic 
recession in Estonia. As opposed to previous years, the 2008 annual report 
warns of a calculated loss (–115 thousand euros) on particular bonds in the 
security portfolio; however, company B earned approximately 110 thousand 
euros in financial income in 2008. By the end of 2009, company B had largely 
realised its security portfolio. The 2009 annual report reveals a calculated loss 
of 50 thousand euros on bond investments. At the beginning of 2011, company 
B commenced bankruptcy procedures against the Estonian holding company, 
which was not able to redeem its bonds in the amount of 404 000 euros. The 
CEO of company B claimed in the media that during the last 12 years the 
company had earned 4.4 million euros as financial income (12% yield) on 
different bonds, which has allowed them to keep water prices 20% lower and 
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enabled them to build storm water systems in the city. The newly elected 
chairman of the supervisory board, a previous supervisory board member, 
argued in the media: 
“Everyone, who has dealt with securities, knows that one cannot always win.” 
All in all, the city government and the supervisory board declared satisfaction 
with the financial performance of company B in their statements. Company B 
has never distributed dividends to its shareholder, instead the city government 
has reinvested the earned profits back into the company (e.g. for constructing 
storm water systems). The chairman of the supervisory board points out: 
“If you distribute dividends, you need to pay a lot of taxes to the state. By 
leaving the profits in the water company, the city can get back more for that 
money.” 
The city government is not considering changes in the ownership structure of 
company B. The deputy mayor responsible for water and sewerage services 
provision says:  
“It’s the last thing to happen. I don’t know what should force us to do that.” 
Non-financial performance 
During the decade observed in this study, the water prices increased more than 
70% for residential customers of company B; however, the price level remained 
below the Estonian average in 2009. The average water bill comprised 
approximately 1.2–1.4% of the average household’s disposable income (see 
Appendix 8), which remains clearly below the recommended threshold of  
3–5%. As shown in Appendix 8, the value of the affordability indicator has 
been below the Estonian average for company B, this gap having increased. 
Moreover, water prices established for legal entities operating in the city are the 
same as for residential customers (see Appendix 9). 
In regard to access to public water services, 99.9% of the population is 
connected to the central water supply and sewerage system of company B. As a 
result of network extension, the access rate has increased by five percentage 
points during the last 10 years. Under conditions established by the city council, 
the charges for connection are paid by those being connected to the public water 
supply and sewerage system. Hence, the city government does not compensate 
the cost of connection charges to households for joining the public sewerage 
system. However, since 2001, households can apply for a credit (interest rate  
5–6%, term up to 10 years) from a specialised municipal foundation in order to 
finance their connection charges.  
The pollution of reservoirs caused by untreated wastewater was still a 
serious issue for company B in 2004. Since then all wastewater produced by 
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citizens and companies in the city gets treated in the wastewater treatment plant 
and meets all established environmental standards. The quality of drinking 
water, especially the high concentration of iron, was an issue for water users 10 
years ago. Even in 2005 and 2006, the concentration of iron in the drinking 
water did not meet the standards everywhere in the city. Still, the quality of 
drinking water improved step-by-step after the construction of two water puri-
fication stations and the replacement of water pipes. By 2007, the problem with 
the concentration of iron was mostly solved. In terms of microbiological and 
chemical quality indicators, the quality of the drinking water meets all the 
national and EU quality standards in the city.  
 
Summary of the case study 
In the present case, the CEO and the chairman of the supervisory board as key 
actors form a tandem team, which in interaction with other supervisory board 
members and the city government, directs the performance of water services 
provision. The CEO has the power and economic incentives (i.e. profit rights) 
available to pursue the efficient management of company B. The supervisory 
board has a clearly stated role in power delegation by executing real control 
(approval) rights over the CEO in company B. It is the supervisory board, where 
representatives of the coalition parties agree on the strategic business objectives 
of company B, and the CEO is accountable to the supervisory board for 
achieving them. The shareholders assembly (politicians of the city government) 
has distanced itself from the management of company B, fulfilling only its 
mandatory duties (e.g. approving annual statements) according to the law. The 
formal corporate governance structure builds only one part of the broader 
context in which the CEO and the chairman of the supervisory board (members 
of the same ruling political party and the city council) communicate with each 
other and represent their interests.  
 The CEO with all his experience in company B took this office in 1997 
aiming to turn it into a modern profitable flagship water business. In order to 
reach this aim, the renewal of the water infrastructure and production facilities 
was seen as an inevitable precondition, which all key actors agreed upon. The 
city government and the appointed supervisory board members (i.e. politicians) 
were mostly interested in ensuring good quality drinking water and the treat-
ment of wastewater, but they strongly shared the idea (ideology) that publicly 
owned companies should earn a profit in order maintain financial sustainability. 
The efforts of the entrepreneurial CEO to apply for international credits and 
grants were supported by the city government, even if an increase in water 
prices was an imminent condition set by the financiers. The stability of the 
political coalition in power has made it possible to keep the supervisory board’s 
composition unchanged and committed to performance over the years in 
company B. In terms of decision-making on the supervisory board, where most 
of the board members had a business background or a university degree in 
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economics, rational economic considerations have prevailed over populist ideas 
or direct party political interference. Moreover, the city government as the 
owner of company B has not been in pursuit of dividend payments from its 
ownership and has reinvested all the profits back into the water company.  
All key actors looked at the process of long-term planning through the 
preparation of the WDP as a kind of bureaucratic requirement that must be met 
in order to apply for grants. The strategic plan is seen as a vision where the link 
between goals and funds is tenuous. The plan was developed by the CEO and 
his management team, which in fact comprised the competence centre of water 
services provision for the city government. The CEO like the supervisory board 
members considers the WDP as a wish-list of future investments that the 
management can refer to when preparing annual investment budgets.  
The contractor-provider relationship between the city government and 
company B is regulated by a services contract, which does not stipulate any 
specific and measurable customer service or quality targets for company B. 
Consequently, no related reporting obligation stems from the contract for 
company B. Regular performance reporting from company B to the city 
government is limited to (a) the annual report to the annual general meeting 
with a focus on financial results54 and (b) the report to the environmental bureau 
on the fulfilment of strategic WDP goals with a focus on annual investment 
projects. Transparency and accountability for performance to the general public 
has been relatively low both on the part of the management of company B and 
the city government (see Table 22, p. 178). The environmental bureau under the 
city government has a limited capacity to exert control role over company B and 
the only responsible specialist in the bureau fulfils a support function for the 
management of company B in communication with external partners (e.g. state 
agencies).  
Discussions of price adjustments on the supervisory board have focused 
primarily on their potential effects on the company’s cash flow (i.e. input) in 
light of future construction and renovation works (i.e. outputs). Influenced by 
the political desire to avoid customer dissatisfaction (i.e. among voters) with 
price increases, water price adjustments have not been considered on an annual 
basis by the supervisory board, but after several years and under inflationary 
conditions to ensure cost recovery for company B over a relatively longer 
period of time. Under the conditions of relatively liberal price regulations (no 
specific contractual price formula) with the politicians on the supervisory board, 
there has not been any conflict between the city government (i.e. regulator) and 
the management of company B in the last decade, when the latter has requested 
water price increases. Consequently, company B has managed to earn profits 
                                                                          
54  Management report compiled by the CEO as a part of the company annual report mainly 
provides some figures on production volumes, on conditions of water supply and sewerage 
network (e.g. interruptions, chokes) and short information on conducted and on-going 
investment projects.  
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(shareholder perspective) and improve water and wastewater quality (stake-
holder perspective) in the city. Moreover, the affordability index in case B is 
clearly below the Estonian average and that without cross-subsidizing residen-
tial prices at the expense of commercial prices. Among other possible reasons, 
the financial performance of company B has improved, because: 
 Company B finished most of its large investment projects before the 
economic boom, when the construction prices were relatively high. 
Consequently, the customers of company B pay relatively less for water 
services, which makes price adjustments possible in the future, if necessary 
to finance new developments.  
 Because the city government as a shareholder has reinvested all profits into 
company B and has additionally paid for storm water collection and 
treatment from the city budget, company B has been able to cover the related 
costs. 
 Driven by the desire to avoid relatively high interests and administration fees 
for investment loans, company B acquired the majority ownership in the 
consultancy firm that after a reorganization was sold to private investors at a 
remarkable profit. Consequently, company B immediately repaid, prior to 
the due dates, all long-term investment loans and released itself from related 
interest costs. 
 The entrepreneurial managers of company B have constantly invested the 
company’s free cash into bonds (local and international), which have gene-
rated extra financial income. However, during the economic crisis, company 
B suffered losses from bond investments, which raises the question of how 
conservative or risk averse a publicly owned water company should be. 
 
However, the performance of company B has improved over the years without a 
strong accountability system established between company B and the depart-
ments under the city government. The present governance practice rests on the 
trust between the members of the city government and the tandem team of the 
CEO and the chairman of the supervisory board. The CEO has gained the trust 
of the politicians in power through the performance shown by company B over 
the years and with his active participation in the work of the city council and 
local party organization.  
All in all, this case reveals that public ownership of a water monopoly with-
out direct party political interference in executive and supervisory board 
decision-making, when supported by elements of performance management 
typical of the private sector (e.g. results-based pay), could lead to relatively 
good financial and non-financial performance. The public ownership of 
company B facilitated (e.g. access to capital, smooth price adjustment) rather 
than hindered the development of water and sewerage systems in the city. 
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3.3.3. Case C 
Governance structure and key actors 
Case company C was founded in 1993 during the restructuring of a construction 
materials factory under going privatisation, when the factory’s auxiliary opera-
tions, including water services provision for a neighbouring city, was separated 
from the core business and transferred to a separate legal entity. After privati-
sation, company C, which was established to operate water and wastewater 
systems, ended up in the hands of local private individuals. As a result of the 
privatisation and the subsequent acquisition of other assets, the majority of the 
water and sewerage infrastructure assets located in the city belongs to company 
C. However, the city government has a stake in fixed assets since they own 
some water and wastewater pipes, a few bore-hole pumping stations, a water 
purification station and a wastewater treatment plant. The city, serviced by 
company C, was a typical mono-functional settlement in the Soviet period. It is 
one of the smallest cities in Estonia, and the population has decreased annually 
by 1% over the last decade. 
The current shareholders, two Estonian private individuals owning 50% 
each, entered the company in April 2001 by acquiring first 64% of its shares 
from individuals who had owned the company since its privatisation. The 
purchase transaction was completed within a few days after the current CEO 
proposed buying the shares of company C. As the CEO explains: 
“Previously, I had only seen the financial figures of the company. Then I came to 
the company, looked around…Oh! For that price it could be even bought.” 
Company C operates in the legal form of a public limited company, and 
according to the Commercial Code, in addition to the shareholders assembly, 
has established a supervisory board and a management board as shown in 
Figure 24.  
One of the two shareholders, taking care of the daily management in com-
pany C, is a member of the management board (i.e. the CEO) and the other has 
taken the position of chairman of the supervisory board. In total, the supervisory 
board consists of three members, including the chairman, a project manager 
working for the company and one external member. The members of the super-
visory board gather for meetings once a quarter, but according to the articles of 
association, the CEO is not dependent on the decisions of the supervisory board. 
The CEO admits that the supervisory board is viewed as a legal formality 
required by the law and company C could easily operate in the form of a private 
limited company without the supervisory board. He illustrates the role of the 
supervisory board as follows:  
“In the case of unpleasant issues, it is always good to say that the board has 
discussed it and decided.” 
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Figure 24. Control delegation in company C (source: compiled by the author) 
 
 
The shareholders in company C share a common work history in a former 
government agency responsible for the privatisation of state owned companies 
in the second half of the 1990s. From that time they both embody miscellaneous 
expertise in reorganizing, merging and selling companies in different industries. 
The chairman of the supervisory board is active in another, family owned water 
company located in another region of the country, where he works as an 
environmental specialist and is a member of the management board. However, 
the owners of company C meet three to five times a week to discuss business 
issues. They have common business interests through co-ownership in an infra-
structure construction company and a multi-utility company, where each owns 
half the shares. 
The work of the city government is organized by the city mayor – first voted 
to this position by the city council in 2002. Later he was reappointed as mayor 
after local elections in 2005 and 2009 by the city council. The mayor graduated 
from a technical university as an engineer, and since then has worked first as an 
advisor in construction and utility services for the city government. Considering 
his background and the fact that there are no deputy mayors in the city govern-
ment, the mayor himself has been actively involved in water services 
governance. In addition to the mayor, one construction specialist is responsible 
for solving water and sewerage infrastructure development issues at the city 
government on a daily basis.  
During the last decade, the 15 seats in the city council have been divided 
between three to five political parties or electoral alliances; most of mandates 
collected by a centre-left party. In the 2005 local elections, the present mayor 
was elected to the city council in the list of the winning centre-left party, which 
Shareholders assembly 
Private shareholder 1: 50% 
Private shareholder 2: 50% 
Supervisory board (3) 
3 members appointed by the shareholders 
Chairman: shareholder 1 
Management board (1) 
CEO/managing director: shareholder 2 
Power delegation to the supervisory board 
Power delegation to the management board 
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he left four years later, just a few months before the 2009 elections. Personally 
for him, now as a member of a right-wing party, the 2009 elections were a 
success, since he more than doubled the number of votes he collected in 
comparison with previous elections.  
 
Strategic planning and goals in water services 
The recent public water supply and sewerage system development plan (WDP) 
2009–2025 was approved unanimously by the city council in February 2010. As 
opposed to 2002, when the previous version of the development plan was pre-
pared, this time the city government hired an external consultancy company in 
November 2008 to prepare the plan because the requirements set for the plan 
had become stricter. At the time the consultant was preparing the new WDP, 
company C and the city government were arguing over water prices in the 
courts, as the city government had rejected a number of price increases pro-
posed by the water company since May 2008. During the preparation of the 
WDP, the city government initially avoided any detailed price mechanism being 
written into the new development plan. The mayor was afraid that the water 
company could use this during the ongoing lawsuit to justify the requested price 
increases. However, while price determination was a mandatory part of the 
WDP required by the state authorities, price dynamics for the years ahead was 
included in the final version of the plan. The mayor instructed the consultant 
that the WDP must clearly state that the level of future water prices depends on 
the volume of investments in modernising the water and wastewater system. 
The investments needed to renovate and build water and wastewater infra-
structure in the city was calculated by the consultant based on technical infor-
mation along with investment priorities received from the CEO of company C. 
The city government did not make changes into this part of the investments 
proposed by the consultant. The WDP, consisting of more than 100 pages, 
emphasizes the following key issues regarding water services in the city: 
 Most of water pipes are older than 30 years and partly exceed their life 
expectancy. Leaks and wasted water resources is the inevitable consequence.  
 Concentration of radionuclide in the drinking water exceeds permitted norms 
by 4 to 10 times. 
 The water supply system does not ensure the required water volume during 
hours of heavy water consumption and in the case of fire.  
 In some districts of the city, wastewater is directed into ditches without any 
treatment. 
 
A list of renovation and construction works to be conducted in the city is pro-
vided to resolve the majority of these problems, which are chronologically 
divided into three priority stages: 2009–2013, 2014–2020 and 2021–2025. The 
WDP states that the division of future renovation activities into these stages was 
carried out according to how each activity helps meet the water quality and 
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environmental requirements stemming from the EU directives. The expected 
results of the (re-)construction activities are mostly described through direct 
output measures such as a number of kilometres renovated or constructed water 
and wastewater pipes in certain areas (streets) in the city.  
The CEO of company C approached the preparation of the WDP as require-
ment for qualifying for EU support in the future; therefore, all potential reno-
vation and construction objects were included in the list of necessary works sent 
to the consultant drafting the plan. The CEO argues: 
“You just never know. It’s like a beauty contest! But does this city really need 
huge developments with billions or hundreds of millions of kroons invested? I 
think not. The whole city is already covered with a water and wastewater net-
work.” 
The final draft of the current WDP for 2009–2025 was ready in May 2009; 
however, the approval process was postponed. In October 2009, local elections 
took place, and newly elected members of the city council started to discuss the 
WDP when it was presented to them by the mayor. The consultant who had put 
the development plan together was invited to explain the plan to the members of 
the city council. The CEO of company C did not participate in that city council 
meeting. The plan was finally approved in a city council meeting in February 
2010. 
Company C does not have a separate long-term strategic plan. In terms of 
planning, every autumn the CEO and an engineer working for the company 
prepares a list of renovation objects for the coming years. Priority is given to 
deteriorated assets of higher risk of damage or leakage in the water and waste-
water network. Considering, the actual amount of funds available to company 
C, the CEO sets a renovation target for the coming year. 
 
Services contract 
There is no valid services contract between the city government and company 
C, since the previous agreement expired in 2008. In June 2009, a new version of 
the contract, the main part consisting of four pages for regulating the rights and 
obligations of the parties, was drafted and discussed between the mayor and the 
CEO. However, no agreement was reached between them. 
The principal divergence between the parties stems from a proposal made by 
the mayor that the contract additionally stipulates a reaction time for the 
liquidation of water leakages and breakages by company C. The proposed three-
hour limit in the case of accidents with significant influence and two working 
days in normal cases were unacceptable for the CEO of company C at the 
present level of water prices. The CEO claimed that ensuring a readiness to 
react and repair damage from accidents within the proposed three-hour limit 
would mean extra costs for company C that must be included in the water 
tariffs. This debated reaction time was one of the few specific quantitative 
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performance measures of service quality in the drafted services contract. The 
other was related to the maintenance of the pipe network, stipulating that 1/5 of 
the water pipes and 1/7 of the wastewater pipes must be washed through 
annually. In terms of water quality and wastewater treatment standards, the draft 
agreement referred to general requirements to be met as stated by laws or other 
state level legal acts. Therefore, there were no specific, measurable and time-
bound customer service standards stipulated in this draft agreement. 
However, there are other types of regulatory contracts (right of superficies, 
usufruct and rent) signed between the city government and company C, as 
discussed further on page 203, regulating the use of infrastructure assets, which 
belong to the local government, but are required for water services provision by 
the water company.  
 
Determination of water price and compensation for investments 
In June 2000, the city council had passed a regulation on the establishment of 
water and wastewater prices that, remaining unchanged for nine years, 
authorizing the city government to determine prices based on requests from the 
water company. The first requests for price changes from the present CEO after 
he had acquired company C were approved smoothly by the city government. 
So in July 2002, the city government agreed to introduce a fixed monthly 
charge for the residential (1.06 euro) and commercial customers (1.28 euro) of 
company C. The residential water users had previously only paid based on their 
actual consumption (at 1.05 euro/m3) for water services. The decision to 
establish a fixed element in the tariff structure was in reaction to a sharp 50% 
decrease in water consumption in 2002 compared to 2001 after consumption 
based volumetric water prices were introduced. Both the mayor, at that time 
working as consultant at the city government, and the CEO justified the new 
tariff structure in the media with the need to recover fixed costs in company C 
and maintain the network irrespective of actual consumption volumes.  
However, in 2004, the city government refused for the first time to approve a 
water price increase requested by company C, reducing it to an amount that the 
CEO did not consider sufficient. Therefore, in light of the looming construction 
boom in Estonia, the CEO decided to obtain additional revenues for the water 
company from the construction sector. A separate construction department was 
established inside company C.  
In October 2007, new water prices were approved (1.51 euro/m3 for resi-
dential and 2.29 euro/m3 for commercial consumers), which were again lower 
than those requested by the CEO of company C. Seven month later, in May 
2008, company C approached the city government with another request for a 
price increase (to 4.26 euro/m3), which was refused and the water prices 
remained unchanged. The basis for commencing court proceedings was 
established. In July 2008, company C sued the city government asking the court 
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to void this decision and oblige the city government to establish water prices 
according to its request. The CEO claims: 
“There was no other way left for us anymore. We were over a barrel. We 
couldn’t give up and had to go till the end. The city was like a wall in front of 
us.”  
The city council’s price regulation from 2000 had stipulated that when applying 
for a price change, company C must present the city government with (1) a 
price calculation, (2) its actual production volumes for the last year and 
predicted volumes for the application period, and (3) an explanation regarding 
increased costs. The city government was entitled to ask for additional data on 
single cost items. The same regulation also included that the established water 
prices must allow company C to (1) recover production and operating costs, and 
(2) guarantee a justified profitability for company C making it possible to renew 
the infrastructure and recover loan payments and interest costs according to 
agreed plans. Such a wording in the established price regulation put in force by 
the city council had left room for divergent interpretations on the justified costs 
of company C to be included in water prices before and during the lawsuit.  
In February 2008, after the expectations of the city government and company 
C on water prices had diverged again during the last price adjustment, the city 
government decided to hire an independent consultant to obtain an expert 
opinion on the real costs of water services provision and a justified water price 
for the city. A tripartite contract between the city government, company C and a 
leading consultancy firm in this field was signed to complete this task. To 
conduct the necessary analysis, the consultant gathered information from the 
city government and visited the CEO in order to collect data on the production 
costs of company C. The expert presented a version of his report to the mayor 
and the CEO in April 2008, also providing an indication of possible water 
prices. The mayor was not satisfied with the report, considering it half-ready, 
and asked the consultant to amend it. However, in May 2008, when the CEO 
applied for the next water price increase, he enclosed a copy of this report (not 
yet accepted by the mayor) with the application. The requested prices, 180% 
higher for residential and 85% higher for commercial consumers, were derived 
from the price calculations and cost estimates presented in the draft report. The 
city government refused the request for a water price increase as unwarranted in 
June 2008 – the mayor having been displeased that the report, which he 
considered half-ready, was attached to the request.  
For the next one and a half years, from July 2008 to December 2009, the city 
government and company C became entangled in legal disputes – the major 
events from this are illustrated on a time line in Figure 25. Both parties involved 
external lawyers to support their representatives, the mayor and the CEO 
respectively, in court.  
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In November 2008, the court of first instance rejected the complaint by com-
pany C against the city government’s decision not to approve their request for a 
price change. This court decision supporting the positions of the city govern-
ment stated that the price request was not sufficiently warranted as required in 
the city council’s 2000 regulation on establishing prices. Moreover, the attached 
expert report could not be considered a proper document, as it was not 
complete, and finally, since the 2003 services contract between company C and 
the city government had expired in January 2008, the water company was not 
entitled to apply for a price increase at all. 
The next day, after the court had announced its decision, the CEO submitted 
a new request for a water price increase to the city government. Compared to 
the first application, the price in this request was lower (3.39 euro/m3 instead of 
4.26 euro/m3). When this application was also rejected by the city government 
as not sufficiently warranted in December 2008, company C immediately 
responded with the third price request in seven months, also submitting a 
complaint to the court against this second negative decision from the city 
government. In January 2009, the city government refused the third request for 
a price increase with the same explanation. Meanwhile, the lawyer for company 
C had submitted an appeal to the court of second instance (court of appeal) 
against the judgement given in the court of first instance. 
A positive court solution for company C appeared in March 2009, when the 
court of appeal decided to void the decision of the court of first instance from 
November 2008 as well as the decision of the city government from June 2008. 
The court of appeal justified its decision by pointing out the following key 
aspects: (1) company C was entitled to rely on the attached expert report when 
asking for a price increase because the 2000 regulation on establishing prices 
does not specify what evidence and in what format the evidence must be 
provided to justify a price request. The attached report was prepared based on 
data collected both from the city government and company C, and included a 
partial price calculation and justification for increasing prices; (2) company C 
must be considered, as the water company, entitled to apply for price 
adjustments, while in fact it was providing water services in the city irrespective 
of the expiry of the services contract between the parties; (3) the city 
government had not practically (economically) analyzed the price request, and 
rejected it only on formal grounds, without asking for additional information 
from the applicant or requesting shortcomings to be corrected in the price 
request. According to this resolution by the court of appeal, the city government 
had to review the price request from company C within a month. The mayor 
says: 
“More than a year had past since the last price review, and the costs had actually 
also increased by that time… It was necessary to make a decision regarding this.” 
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The review process got started after the Supreme Court refused to discuss the 
appeal from the city government. Company C persisted in its requests and 
provided additional arguments to the city government that the increase in input 
prices (e.g. electricity tariffs, environmental fees, labour costs), the need to 
improve customer service, the need for reliability in water delivery and ensuring 
wastewater collection and treatment were all justification for the requested price 
increase. In June 2009, the city government decided to increase water prices 
from October of the same year, though not by as much as initially requested by 
company C. The water prices were increased by 24% for residential and 15% 
for commercial clients. One month later, in July, a new decision on price 
increases, 7% for residential and 5% for commercial consumers from November 
2009, was passed by the city government. Company C reacted to these 
decisions with a complaint to the court this time also demanding compensation 
(approx. 110 thousand euros) for damages caused by the inactivity of the city 
government.  
As opposed to June 2008, now a year later, the city government had care-
fully considered the economic arguments presented by company C in justi-
fication of its price increase and prepared an explanatory memorandum to its 
decision of June 2009. A revised report of the price analysis ordered from the 
consultant in February 2008 was finally accepted in March 2009, and now the 
city government used this to justify its decision on the price adjustment. Relying 
on a comparative cost analysis of selected water companies in the report, the 
city government claimed that the production and labour costs against sales are 
unreasonably high in company C, and that it should use its resources more effi-
ciently when providing water services in the city. Presenting annual turnover, 
the amount of transactions with related parties, labour costs and the net profit of 
company C, the city government concluded that the company had been run at an 
unreasonably large loss (65 thousand euros) in 2007, while a related construc-
tion firm, owned by the same individuals, had earned a profit (66 thousand 
euros). In 2007, sales to this construction firm had resulted in approximately 
67% of company C’s annual turnover. The mayor claims: 
“It looked to us like the water company was trying to include costs others than 
those related to water and wastewater services in the tariffs. /…/ The decision we 
made on the price change in June 2009 was not so easy to void anymore.” 
Since the beginning of the legal proceedings, company C had submitted four 
complaints to the courts against the city government by September 2009, now 
one of them had been settled by the city government with its decisions from 
June and July 2009. Both the CEO and the mayor had realized that there was 
little benefit from the disputes in court, while the judgements given never stated 
anything on the justified price level in the city. The mayor concludes: 
“This situation was absurd!”  
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The CEO notes: 
“This would have been an endless process. /…/ The court just said that the prices 
have to be reviewed by the city government.” 
In November 2009, soon after the local elections, a commission consisting of 
members of the city government and the owners55 of company C started 
negotiations out of court with the aim of agreeing on justified water prices and 
putting an end to the lawsuits. A trade-off was reached after hours of discussion 
over four meetings by the end of December 2009. The city government 
proposed a form of price request on an Excel sheet, comprising a list of price 
components (i.e. primarily eight groups of costs divided into 57 line-items) for 
products (water vs. wastewater) and consumer groups (residential vs. 
commercial) that was filled out during the negotiations. The request form also 
included a section on predicted production volumes (in cubic metres), where the 
data could be taken from for unit cost and price calculations. At the first 
meeting, the city government declared that a justified profitability56 included in 
the water price could be 10%, which after several disputes became part of the 
final compromise. After the necessary approvals from the commissions of the 
city council, the city government established the newly agreed water prices – 
approximately 22% higher for private and over 15% higher for commercial 
consumers starting from April 2010. The sheet with price components agreed 
upon during the negotiations between the city government and company C was 
added to the city council resolution as an explanatory memorandum. The CEO 
comments on the agreement: 
“Thanks to the court case and solution agreed by the end, the whole atmosphere 
is much better for us now. We gave up quite a lot… however; at least we have 
got the price that satisfies us.”  
Nevertheless, this settlement on water prices ignored one comment by the 
consultant, pointed out in the report to the city government, that the value of the 
depreciation component should be calculated fully or in part, on the replacement 
value of infrastructure assets in order to ensure sustainable cost recovery 
through the prices. The consultant had given the expert opinion on the 
replacement value and the expected lifetime of the water and sewerage 
infrastructure assets in the city. Still, the table of agreed costs for water services 
provision in company C that served as the basis of the price compromise reveals 
                                                                          
55  Company C was represented by the CEO, the chairman of the supervisory board and a 
lawyer. The city government was represented by the mayor, city secretary and three 
members of the city government. 
56  In fact the value of the ‘profit component’ in the water prices is calculated as percentage 
of the included costs, therefore representing 10% mark-up, not 10% net profit margin for 
company C. 
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that the value of the depreciation component is derived from the amount of 
annual depreciation recorded on the books of company C. In terms of infra-
structure assets, there appears a significant gap between the annual depreciation 
figures calculated on replacement value and the depreciation costs actually 
included in the water prices (see Appendix 12). The water prices agreed after 
the court disputes and negotiations by the end of 2009 are expected to recover 
only a relatively small part (approx. 21%) of the capital costs needed for 
sustainable infrastructure management and water services production in the city.  
 
Budgeting and financing 
The CEO, supported by an engineer and an accountant, has been is in charge of 
preparing annual plans and the budget for company C. The budgeting process 
usually starts in September and ends in December. For an investment budget, a 
priority list of infrastructure objects to be repaired and reconstructed during the 
coming year is put together by the CEO and the engineer. With years of 
experience in renewing water and sewerage infrastructure in the city as well as 
in other municipalities, the CEO and the engineer are familiar with approximate 
construction prices, which they rely on when making an initial estimate of the 
repair works. Considering company C’s ability to finance its operations at 
established water prices, the CEO confirms a final amount for the annual 
repairs, which determines the final choice of infrastructure objects included in 
the reconstruction plan for the next year. According to the articles of asso-
ciation, the shareholders assembly, not the supervisory board, approves the 
annual budgets of company C. 
From 2008, company C has not used any long-term bank credits to finance 
the repair and renovation works. The CEO had avoided bank credits because 
commercial banks had hardened their loan conditions (e.g. asking additional 
guarantees) during the economic crisis for companies not earning a profit, like 
company C which had operated at a loss since 2007. The CEO comments: 
“It’s cheaper to borrow from my own investment firm than from banks. We have 
survived hard times and we can also gather the amount needed annually without 
the help of banks.” 
There are two regular income flows between company C and the city govern-
ment: rent paid by company C and compensation (96 000 euro in 2009) paid by 
the city government for canalizing rainwater from the streets into the waste-
water network. The rent is one of the single largest cost items (23 008 euro) in 
the 2010 budget of company C. The rental payments proceed from the 2007 
rental agreement concluded for 2008–2012, which was part of the arrangements 
settled to acquire external funds for the water and wastewater infrastructure 
renovation in the city. There have been two major investment projects executed 
in the city: the construction of a new water purification station (1999; total cost 
of 409 thousand euro) and the renovation of the wastewater treatment plant 
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(2009; total cost of 1.02 million euro). In both cases it was the city government 
that prepared all the required documents and applied for the support funds 
because according to the regulations of the time, only publicly owned water 
companies or local governments in Estonia qualified for grants covering up to 
90% of the water infrastructure renovation costs. Also, the necessary 10% self-
financing was partly borrowed by the city government from commercial banks. 
As required in the grant conditions, both renovated water infrastructure objects 
are owned by the city government. At the same time, the water purification 
station and water pumping stations, a relatively small proportion of the water 
(3890 meters) and wastewater (4252 meters) network and sewage pumping 
stations are all rented back to company C under a rental agreement valid until 
2012. Through the rental payments from company C, the city government has 
recovered its 10% down-payment for constructing the water purification station 
as well as recovering the self-financing provided for the renovation of the 
wastewater treatment plant. Moreover, the wastewater treatment plant is located 
on a plot of land belonging to company C, which has established on it a right of 
superficies to the city government’s benefit until 2020. In connection with the 
right of superficies, company C again holds a usufruct, which gives the water 
company the right to use the property (i.e. the wastewater treatment plant) for 
the same period. It has been agreed between the parties that the superficiary 
(city government) shall not make any payments for the right of superficies to 
the owner of the land (company C).  
The amount of annual rental payments has been a negotiation issue between 
company C and the city government contingent on the size of the investments 
(self-financing) provided by the city government for water and sewerage infra-
structure modernisation. Two years after the construction of the new water puri-
fication stations in 2001, when the CEO had acquired shares in company C, 
rental payments amounted to 32 thousand euros a year. In 2006, company C 
paid 6400 euros to the city government as rent; the amount increased to 23 
thousand euros57 from 2009 in connection with the renovation of the wastewater 
treatment plant. This last trade-off on the rent increase was not easy to reach 
and it revealed a serious conflict that ended up in the lawsuit over water prices 
between the parties less than a year later. In 2007, when the city government 
and the CEO started negotiations on how to gather and recover the 10% self-
financing for the renovation of the wastewater treatment plant, the city govern-
ment initially proposed that company C itself could provide the required 102 
thousand euros58. The CEO of company C was to agree with the proposal, but 
only on condition that the city government would support his request for water 
price increases. The CEO explains: 
                                                                          
57  There is stipulated in the rent agreement the amount of annual rental payments is 
reviewed once a year and if changed, an appendix of the agreement on new payment 
conditions will be signed not later than a month before the beginning of next fiscal year.  
58  In 2008 city budget there was budgeted 76.7 thousand euro as rent from company C, 
however, the actually received amount remained less than 14% of that by end of the year. 
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“This was a rather large amount for us. I said OK, we can go and take a loan, but 
let’s also adjust the water price accordingly to cover the credit. Nothing came out 
of it.” 
The city government and several members of the city council during the nego-
tiations objected to the CEO’s proposal on the respective water price increase 
because they expected at first some investments to be made by company C. The 
mayor concludes: 
“It seemed to us that something had got out of hand, while the city government 
prepared projects, the company did nothing. The roots of the 2008–2009 lawsuits 
over water prices can be traced back to this moment.”  
However, from 1999 to 2009, a total of over 1.9 million euros has been invested 
in water and wastewater infrastructure in the city. The majority of the funds 
have been received as grants based on investment plans and applications 
prepared by the city government. Company C started to apply for support funds 
in 2008, after privately owned water companies became entitled to apply for 
grants with 10% self-financing, having succeeded with one application for a 
sewerage construction project worth 130 thousand euros.  
 
Reporting and accountability 
On a quarterly basis the CEO receives a financial report from the accountant of 
company C that provides him an overview of the corporate financial per-
formance. This financial report includes a profit and loss statement, balance 
sheet and a review of costs for making a precise cost allocation. For the precise 
cost allocation, the CEO checks the use of materials by requesting explanations 
from the specialists responsible. After some manual adjustments, the report on 
actual costs allocated between the products (water or wastewater) and service 
areas allows the CEO to compare the costs with the amounts incorporated into 
the water prices according to the compromise with the city government in 
December 2009. The CEO claims: 
“I don’t examine every single percentage of budget fulfilments. I look at the 
general picture. By the middle of the year, whether we have spent half or more of 
what we had planned for reconstruction and repair works.” 
After the end of each financial year, the annual accounts and management 
report are prepared by the CEO, which then together have been approved by the 
supervisory board and the AGM. The structure and the volume of the manage-
ment (activity) reports have not changed much over the last decade. The 
management reports are one page at the beginning of the annual reports and 
reveal only some information on the financial performance of company C as 
summarized in Table 24. 
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Table 24 shows that the management reports did not include any measurable 
data on the non-financial performance of company C and the provided per-
formance information only related to some key financial performance indi-
cators. Moreover, the 2009 annual report did not present financial performance 
indicators anymore either.  
Company C has not submitted any reports to the city government on a regu-
lar basis either on its financial or non-financial performance. According to the 
draft version of the services contract offered by the city government, once a 
year company C is obligated to provide an overview of (1) its activities con-
ducted during the current year, and (2) plans for the coming year. Based on the 
same draft contract, company C is also obliged to provide correct financial data 
and documents upon request to the city government and, ensure city officials 
have access to the company’s infrastructure sites for supervisory purposes. 
However, the CEO has declared that he does not see any need for such a 
contract between the parties, while the water prices are regulated by the 
Estonian Competition Authority from November 2010. 
The city government and company C publish information over their websites 
on the internet for the general public (i.e. consumers); which, however, does not 
comprise any data on the financial and non-financial performance of water 
services provision as shown in Table 25. 
The only performance related information they provide to the general public 
over the internet is the current water prices in the city.  
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Financial performance 
The financial results of company C have been relatively volatile over the decade 
between 2000 and 2009. As revealed in Table 26, under the present ownership 
structure three periods can be distinguished in the dynamics of company C’s 
financial performance: 2001–2004, 2005–2007 and 2008–2009.  
During the first period, company C made a profit from annual sales between 
312 and 367 thousand euros in all years until 2004. In 2001, after the current 
shareholders had acquired the water company, the CEO decided to revalue 
tangible fixed assets upward by 229 thousand euros, which as extraordinary 
revenue caused a substantial one-off increase in the annual net profit. With this 
upward revalue, the book value of the infrastructure assets increased 20 times; 
this was in order to present their fair market value as stated by the auditor in the 
annual report. Consequently, the capital structure on the balance sheet also 
changed drastically by the end of 2001, when equity capital constituted 
approximately 72% of total capital (i.e. liabilities and equity combined) instead 
of only 9% a year earlier.  
During his first years in company C, the CEO focused on taking oppor-
tunities to improve its efficiency and profitability that the previous shareholders 
had not fully realized: reparation of major water leakages, reduction in the 
number of employees, introduction of monthly fixed charges as a new compo-
nent in the tariff structure and closing several public water extraction points that 
citizens were using free of charge. In one of the articles in the media from 2002, 
the CEO pointed out his position: 
“The goal of the water company as a private company is to earn a profit.” 
Despite efforts made by the CEO, the operating profit margin of company C 
constantly declined by two percentage points per year dropping from 11% in 
2001 to 5% in 2004. The net profit margin, as revealed in Table 26, was 4% in 
2004. Consequently, the CEO decided to look for extra income for company C 
from other fields of activity by entering into the construction industry, which 
had just begun to boom in Estonia. The CEO claims: 
“We had everything needed for construction and so we established a construction 
brigade in the company.” 
The second period from 2004 to 2007 was a period of economic boom in 
Estonia. On account of the construction activities, company C doubled its 
annual sales to 652 thousand euro in 2005, increasing it yet again in 2006. 
Income from the provision of water and wastewater services comprised 25–30% 
of the annual sales during this period. Company C ended its first full financial 
year in the construction business with a net profit of 101 thousand euros in 
2005, which was a remarkable 8.2 times the net profit for the previous year. The 
net profit margin reached 15% in 2005. The CEO claims: 
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 “All this profit came from the construction activities, and that let us subsidize 
water services. But in the city government they wondered why we wanted to 
increase water prices while the company is earning a profit. To make this clear, I 
established a separate company for the construction activities.” 
Consequently, after the establishment of the separate construction company, the 
profitability of company C decreased significantly in 2006 and 2007 as revealed 
in the final column of Table 26. Moreover, company C made a loss of 65 thou-
sand euros in 2007, while the construction company earned 66 thousand euros 
in net profit in the same year. There was no drop in the annual sales of company 
C because now the water company had begun selling construction services (e.g. 
renting excavators with excavator operators) to the construction company. In 
2006, sales to the construction company comprised approximately 37% of total 
annual sales for company C, and in 2007 this percentage was already as high as 
67%. The CEO explains: 
“The construction company had one big project and we invoiced it through the 
water company leaving some 400 thousand kroons (approx. 25.6 thousand euros) 
there for nothing. Just, to support the provision of water services.”  
However, the city government wondered whether the management of company 
C was actually transferring profit from the water company to the construction 
company and running the former intentionally at a loss in order to justify the 
requests for an increase in water prices. By the beginning of the third period, 
2008–2009, the economic boom was replaced by a deep economic recession in 
Estonia. Step-by-step company C withdrew from doing business with the 
construction company as its sales fell to 20% of the annual turnover in 2008 and 
to zero in 2009. As in 2007, company C was not able to recover its costs in 
2008 or 2009 as the amount of total costs exceeded annual sales. As revealed in 
Table 26, the annual sales of company C had fallen back to 2003 and 2004 
levels, but the company was now operating at a loss with a net profit margin of 
–11% in 2008 and –9% in 2009. Even though the CEO reduced operating costs 
in proportion with the drop in sales, respectively 48% in 2008 and 11% in 2009, 
the costs remained higher than in the pre-boom period of 2001–2004. 
The present shareholders collected their first dividends from company C in 
2002, when 10 thousand euros (i.e. 35% of annual net income) was paid out as 
dividends. The dividend payout ratio increased over the next two years up to 
52% by 2004, while the profitability trend continued downwards. The share-
holders distributed dividends on a yearly basis until 2006, which was the last 
profitable year for company C. As revealed in Table 26, the owners collected 
86.3 thousand euros as dividends from company C, while making capital 
investments of 390 thousand euros in the company for 2001–2009. However, 
134 thousand euros of that was provided to company C by the environmental 
investment centre as a grant in 2009.  
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Non-financial performance 
During the decade under observation, the water prices had doubled for the resi-
dential customers of company C. Due to relatively sharp increases in the water 
prices in the last years (32% in 2009), the affordability of water services has 
worsened for households in the city. Instead of 1.6% in 2008, an average water 
bill comprised approximately 2.1% of the average household’s disposable 
income in 2009 (and even 2.7% in 2010), which remains below the threshold of 
3–5%. The value of the affordability indicator has been above the Estonian 
average for company C, the gap increasing in recent years (see Appendix 8). 
The water prices established for legal entities operating in the city have been 
20–40% higher than those for residential water users. Moreover, by 2010, they 
paid approximately 30% above the Estonian average for a cubic metre of water 
and wastewater (see Appendix 9). The gap was a tiny 3% in 2007 and 2008, 
when the city government had refused to accept the price increases requested by 
company C. 
In regard to access to water services, approximately 95% of the population is 
connected to the public water supply and sewerage system, the option of con-
necting has been made available for all households in the city. The access rate 
for the public water supply has not changed significantly during the last two 
decades because the majority of the housing-stock, multi-storey apartment 
houses built in the Soviet period, had always been connected to the public water 
supply. Somewhat less people, 89% had connection to the public sewerage net-
work by 2009. Under conditions established by the city council for connecting 
to the public water supply and sewerage system, the connection fees are paid by 
those being connected to the public water supply and sewerage system.  
The quality of the drinking water was the most crucial issue for water users 
10 years ago, when tap water was rusty and notorious for containing a gas mix-
ture of methane and radioactive radon. In addition, the concentration of barium, 
a heavy metal, exceeded established standards for drinking water at that time. 
These problems were solved step-by-step after the construction of the new 
water purification station in 1999, and all drinking water provided by company 
C was treated in the purification station by 2002. The water quality provided by 
company C meets the criteria in all quality categories, with one exception, 
which the company, similar to company A, has never been able to meet – the 
content of radionuclide (radium). The permissible concentration stated by the 
EU Drinking Water Directive is 0.1 mSv per year, but the water extracted by 
company C has had concentrations 4–10 times higher (0.44–0.95 mSv/year). 
Both the CEO and the city mayor recognise the possible health risks related to 
radioactive overdoses, but in the present case they consider it a pseudo-problem 
without a real solution.  
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Summary of the case study 
In the present case, the CEO and the mayor as key actors form a tandem team 
that through interactions within the established regulatory frameworks direct the 
performance of company C. The CEO running this closely held owner-managed 
water company has both the power and incentive to make efficient decisions. 
The supervisory board of company C has a symbolic role in the power dele-
gation, and is seen as a mandatory body to have without executing any real 
control (approval) rights over the CEO. It is the shareholders assembly level 
where the CEO and the chairman of the supervisory board as owners agree on 
strategic corporate objectives. Moreover, the formal corporate governance 
structures build a relatively narrow part of the general context in which the CEO 
and the chairman of the supervisory board as business partners communicate 
with each other. 
The CEO entered company C with the aim of increasing its efficiency, 
making it profitable and earning dividends; however, without properly 
considering the peculiarities of water services production and the potential risks 
associated with water price establishment under lax regulations. The city mayor 
was primarily interested in improving the quality of drinking water and 
renovating the amortized wastewater treatment plant considering it important 
that possible increases in water prices depend on actual investments made by 
the water company in modernising the water supply and sewerage infra-
structure. He was concerned that water prices would go up while company C 
operating at a relatively high profit with dividends paid to its shareholders out 
of the company. 
Similarly, both parties looked on the process of long-term planning, when 
preparing the WDP, as a sort of bureaucratic requirement to be met in order to 
apply for grants in the future, not as a real option to discuss and mutually agree 
on key objectives involving coherent price determination for water services. 
The same issue, handling price apart from the expected services outcome, 
appeared in the context of defining service standards for water services 
provision in the services contract. First, there is no valid services contract 
between company C and the city government stipulating quality standards the 
water company must comply with when providing water services. Secondly, 
when drafting the unsigned new version of the contract, the mayor aimed to 
include a few standards (e.g. reaction time to accidents) similar to those in 
larger water companies, but without considering the extra water tariffs neces-
sary as income to develop the required capabilities (constant readiness) in 
company C.  
However, in the context of lax price regulations, without clear principles, 
formulae and instructions for how the water price requests must be presented 
and what price changes are contingent on, price development has remained 
unpredictable for the key actors. Consequently, financial performance 
(shareholder perspective) and related non-financial performance (stakeholder 
perspective) have suffered during the observed period. Among other possible 
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reasons, the provision of water services in company C has not turned out to be a 
financial success because: 
 The revenues (water prices) have been dependent on the mayor’s will and 
the CEO’s negotiation skills rather than changes in actual production costs. 
No price mechanism was established that would consider the influence of 
inflation on costs during the economic boom in 2005–2007.  
 For one and a half years the city government and company C argued over 
water prices in different courts without achieving the expected results. A 
compromise between the parties was reached during negotiations out of 
court, when they first decided to agree on a framework (form) for deter-
mining the costs and profitability of company C. 
 There was a lack of accountability from company C to the city government, 
which resulted in a serious lack of trust between the partners hindering the 
necessary cooperation. All in all, there was weak control by the city govern-
ment as regulator (contractor) over company C as service provider. 
Consequently, in the context of a lack of trust and uncertainty over possible 
price adjustments to cover incurred expenses, the CEO took a conservative 
approach to making investments. In the last years, company C already faced 
problems when seeking to acquire capital from commercial banks, while the 
banks required additional guarantees, unacceptable for the CEO, before lending 
money.  
Another consequence of the poor governance (mechanisms) and long-term 
planning is that the established water prices did not ensure the sustainability of 
the present infrastructure, while the depreciation costs included in the water 
tariffs recover only a relatively small part (21%) of the capital costs necessary 
to maintain the infrastructure for the years ahead. 
Considering the capital constraints on company C, the city government took 
a leading role in organizing grants and credits to solve problems with water 
quality and wastewater treatment. After conducting two major renovation pro-
jects (water purification station and wastewater treatment plant), all citizens are 
now supplied with clean drinking water that meets all quality criteria, except the 
content of radionuclide, and wastewater is now treated according to the 
requirements of the EU directive. This can be considered the most significant 
achievement in water services provision in the city. However, the private 
ownership of company C did not facilitate this process by providing the neces-
sary financing; on the contrary, the grants for infrastructure modernization, 
which required a relatively low level of self-financing (i.e. 10%) were provided 
only to publicly owned water companies or local governments. Therefore, the 
city government and company C signed a package of contracts that stipulate 
ownership, usage and financial rights and obligations related to operating these 
infrastructure facilities. The rental payments from company C to the city 
government were meant to recover the amount of self-financing provided by the 
city government when applying for the grants; however, the rent amounts varied 
significantly across the years and influenced the financial results of company C. 
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The size of the rental payments was another source of conflict between the 
mayor and the CEO that resulted in the court dispute over water prices. 
A conceptual change from the citizens’ viewpoint regarding water 
consumption occurred in 2001–2002, after the present shareholders acquired 
company C and drinking water became a commodity for water users. This was a 
result of actions (e.g. water metering, fixed charges, closing public water 
extraction points) taken jointly by the CEO and the mayor. The residential 
customers of company C pay relatively more for water services than households 
in many other municipalities in Estonia as a percentage of their disposable 
income, this affordability index having worsened sharply in recent years. How-
ever, the affordability index still remains below the suggested 3% threshold.  
 
 
3.4. Discussion on the influence of governance  
on the performance of water services provision  
3.4.1. Governance patterns and the performance  
of water companies 
The aim of this research was to provide a more in-depth understanding of how 
the Estonian water companies under different ownership regimes are governed 
and how the different patterns of governance influence the financial and non-
financial performance of water services provision in Estonian municipalities. In 
terms of water services governance, particular interest was given to interactions 
between water companies and local governments and how they proceed to 
achieve their divergent goals. The main findings of the multi-case study 
research are summarized in Table 27 (p. 210–214), which in light of the 
theoretical governance framework established in subsection 2.1 (Figure 18, 
p. 101) make it possible to draft notions about how the setup and use of 
governance mechanisms would shape performance in water services provision. 
The findings in Table 27 provide propositions formulated in subchapter 3.4.6. 
The discussion in subchapter 3.2, based on the results of the quantitative 
analysis, indicated that privatisation of water companies should not be con-
sidered as guarantee to relatively more efficient provision of water services in 
Estonian municipalities. In the light of the results it could be argued that the 
local governments should rather consider the specifics of water monopoly (e.g. 
scale efficiency) and focus on designing proper governance mechanisms, if 
willing to improve the efficiency of water services provision. However, effi-
ciency is relevant, but as argued in subchapter 1.3.1 (p. 79–82), it remains only 
a narrow indicator of performance in water services provision (Hukka and 
Katko 2003) and there are other performance targets (e.g. water quality and 
affordability) the local government as service guarantor (contractor) needs to 
focus on as well. Therefore, in the context where ownership per se is not 
expected to lead to better outcomes in water services provision, it becomes 
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relevant to understand which governance tool under particular ownership 
structures could be established, and how the design and implementation of them 
makes it possible to achieve various non-financial and financial performance 
targets.  
Local governments can have two sets of governance mechanisms in use to 
direct the water services provision in water companies: corporate governance 
tools (e.g. boards) and regulatory governance tools (e.g. services contracts). In 
cases A and B, where local governments have retained (respectively minority 
and majority) ownership in the water companies, both types of governance tools 
are in use. In case C, where a privately owned company produces water 
services, the local government has only regulatory governance instruments 
available for influencing the performance of water services provision in the city. 
Thus, as a starting point for further discussion, it can be outlined that the 
selection of governance mechanisms available to local governments to intervene 
in water services production is determined by the ownership structure of the 
water companies (i.e. it can be viewed as endogenous).  
However, before going on to discuss the setup and use of different gover-
nance mechanisms for influencing the performance in the three case companies, 
it must be pointed out that the different ownership structures embody distinct 
interests. Due the different ownership structures of company A, B and C (as 
depicted at the beginning of Table 27), their primary corporate objective is 
different. The private owners controlling companies A and C were first of all 
interested in financial profit and dividends, which they distributed every year 
the companies earned a profit. However, the sole public owner of company B 
has been primarily interested in the non-financial performance of the company 
(water quality and services affordability) and never withdrawn dividends from 
the company. Nevertheless, keeping company B profitable is also considered an 
important objective for the public owner (local government). In company A, the 
local government as a minority owner has voted for dividend payouts like the 
private owners in annual general meetings, while during the years as a service 
provider (regulator) it actively stood up for decreases in water prices (i.e. cor-
porate revenues). Hence, to answer research question 2 – what are the primary 
objectives of different types of owners – it can be stated that the private owners 
of the water companies tend to be primarily interested in financial performance, 
while the public owners rather in achieving non-financial objectives. 
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3.4.2. Corporate governance features and  
their consequences on the performance 
Board composition 
Boards are central to the corporate governance discussion (Clarke 2007, 
Thomsen 2008), and the presumption that boards matter in decision-making can 
be approached from multiple theoretical perspectives (Maassen 2002). Never-
theless, in many cases, board structure and board behaviour are determined by 
other corporate governance mechanisms in combination with firm-specific 
variables (Thomsen 2008). The case studies reveal that corporate boards can 
have lots of formal authority, but in fact their real authority can be limited, as 
stressed by Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Tirole (2001). In the cases explored 
here, the real authority of the supervisory board is often determined by board 
contingencies, such as a services contract, local government regulations or 
shareholder activism. Of importance to this discussion is the recognition that 
there is an interrelation between different corporate governance mechanisms, 
and the board contingencies influence the board’s contribution to company 
performance (Jensen 1993, Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  
As shown in subchapter 1.1.3, recommendations in various corporate 
governance codes (Combined Code 2003; OECD 2004, 2005) are to a great 
extent concerned with board structures and board functions. In corporate 
governance literature publicly owned monopolies are often associated with 
inefficiencies and the inability to meet growing demands (Shirley and Nellis 
1991, Araral 2008) because of political pressures to keep prices below costs 
(Harris 2003) or other undue hands-on politically motivated ownership 
interference (Boycko et al. 1996, OECD 2005). The three case companies have 
different ownership structures and respectively a different proportion of local 
government representatives among the supervisory board members – 3 of 9 
seats in company A (34.7% public ownership), 7 of 7 in company B (100% 
publicly owned), 0 of 3 in the supervisory board of the fully privately owned 
company C. Accordingly, company B would be expected to provide the greatest 
opportunities for local politicians to interfere in pursuit of party political 
interests; however, in reality this risk is filtered (a) through professional 
requirements (business/economist background) set for the supervisory board 
members, and (b) due to the fact that members of the city government do not 
belong to the supervisory board. Moreover, the stability of the political coalition 
in case B has made it possible for the supervisory board members that also 
belong to the city council to continue their work on the board over a longer 
period of time and to acquire knowledge of the peculiarities of the water sector. 
If in case B the city government has delegated its representation in the 
supervisory board only to members of the city council, then in case A a deputy 
mayor responsible for the governance of municipal engineering services is 
actively involved in the work of the supervisory board. In the public governance 
literature such situations where the owner of the company is the same as the 
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regulator are often associated with conflicts of interest (Shirley and Nellis 1991, 
Argento et al. 2010). This can lead to a confusion of roles and incentives if 
stakeholders are required to be both actors within a purchaser-provider contract 
and strategic partners (McQuaid 2010). However, in case A the city government 
is only a minority shareholder in the water company and possibilities for any 
intervention or political interference in day-to-day management are limited due 
to (services and shareholder) contracts signed during the privatisation. The 
deputy mayor in case A seems to reflect the dual role (Grossi and Reichard 
2008) of local government as owner and regulator at the same time; however, in 
fact the abovementioned board contingencies leave him primarily in the role of 
owner (investor) representative in the company (e.g. advising the board on 
political risks related to the central government).59 In order to act as regulator, 
the city government can propose re-negotiations of the (services) contract to 
representatives of the dominant private shareholder outside supervisory board 
meetings, who would agree to the new conditions if those are expected to add 
extra (firm) value in the long run.  
In case company C, where the ownership is equally shared between two pri-
vate persons, the city government has no representatives on the supervisory 
board. Moreover, the supervisory board has only a symbolic role in power dele-
gation (e.g. budget approved directly by shareholders) without any real contri-
bution options or control rights over the CEO, who owns half the company. 
Notwithstanding, the city government without any ownership and profit rights 
in company C, has only been interested in its social objectives (e.g. service 
quality and affordability to citizens), which often conflict sharply with the 
economic objectives of the company shareholders. 
In a comparison of board characteristics (Maassen 2002), there appear some 
rough similarities between case A and case B in terms of the supervisory board 
members’ educational background or work experience. More specifically, in 
both cases the majority of supervisory board members, including the chairmen, 
are active business managers, prominent entrepreneurs or economists. For them 
the efficiency and profitability of the companies they are concerned with are 
elementary conditions for defining performance. Service quality is not seen as 
exclusionary term to corporate profitability, rather than complementary, which 
in case A is used by the management to justify or legitimate the corporate 
profits. In case B, where all the supervisory board members belong to the city 
council, they are clearly interested in efficiency improvements (cost control) in 
order to postpone price increases for users and keep the water price relatively 
low, which could be recognised as a sign of good governance for different 
constituencies. Publicly owned company B, as opposed to companies A and C, 
has never distributed dividends to shareholders and has reinvested all profits 
back into the company. 
                                                                          
59  The deputy mayor comes from a political party in opposition to the political coalition of 
the central government. 
217 
In the context of company C, the background of the CEO and the chairman 
as key actors (the two shareholders) is relevant for comparison. At the moment 
they acquired ownership of the water company, they both had miscellaneous 
expertise in reorganizing, merging and selling companies in different industries, 
but not a deep knowledge of water sector specifics and the risks related to 
governance arrangements. This contrasts sharply with case A, where the private 
shareholders and expatriated managers, when joining the water company, 
possessed extensive international industry expertise on how to manage a water 
business effectively and establish relationships with regulators. As opposed to 
all his Estonian colleagues, the CEO of company A, expatriated from the UK, is 
completely familiar with international governance practices and the possible 
effects of economic regulations applied to (private) water monopolies 
elsewhere. The CEO of publicly owned company B is a strongly business-
oriented manager, a member of the city council, who has a long working 
experience in different positions in the water company. To sum up, the cases 
indicate that through their corporate governance bodies, companies A and B 
have a relatively wider (economic, industry and political) knowledge base for 
this context than that of company C.  
Interestingly, in light of the German two-tier corporate governance model 
applied in Estonian water companies, all three CEOs have a distinct direct rela-
tionship with the (dominant) shareholder that facilitates cooperation between 
them. The expatriated CEO of company A is seconded by the dominant share-
holder (UK water multinational); consequently, he obviously carries and 
represents the business interests of that shareholder. The CEO of company B is 
a member of the city council, the superior authority in the city government, and 
leads the faction of his party in the council. Membership in the city council 
provides the CEO with another floor for communication with other political 
parties, making it possible to tackle political issues related to water services 
provision and to protect the company’s interests on the political battle field. In 
case C, as noted earlier, the CEO himself owns half the company and the 
chairman holds the other half, making them close business partners in pursuit of 
financial goals. As opposed to case B, the CEO is not a member of the city 
council or any political parties, which could help interweave the financial goals 
with political considerations.  
In conclusion, and answering to research question 3 (RQ3) – what 
characteristics do the members of supervisory and management board embody – 
it can be stated that the boards of water companies A and B include members 
that have relatively wide private sector management experience, good 
knowledge of water industry specifics and/or an influence in local politics. 
Moreover, company A with a mixed public-private ownership and through the 
representatives of its dominant shareholder embodies unique international 
experience in water company management and governance. Company C, as 
opposed to companies A and B, does not have local government representatives 
among its shareholders, and the supervisory board does not include individuals 
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actively involved in local politics. The members of supervisory and manage-
ment board of company C, as opposed to companies A and B, have relatively 
narrower management experience and knowledge of water services peculiarities 
from relatively smaller local utility companies.  
 
The roles of the boards 
The corporate governance literature distinguishes different roles for boards, 
which from different theoretical perspectives can be divided into three main 
categories (Zahra and Pearce 1989, Gopinath et al. 1994, Jonnergård et al. 1997, 
Hung 1998): control, service and strategic roles. As noted in section 1.1.3, the 
roles of the board can be analyzed from a conflict perspective (e.g. agency 
theory) as well as a consensus perspective of board involvement (e.g. steward-
ship theory) in decision-making (Maassen 2002). In cases A and B, relation-
ships between the supervisory board and the management (CEO) embody 
elements of both perspectives. Obviously, a core function of these supervisory 
boards is to exercise control over the management – they develop and 
implement internal control mechanisms (e.g. financial reports, internal audits, 
and authority rights) to avoid any misuse of company property and make sure 
that the managers use their powers to pursue the targets set for them. But in 
both cases the supervisory boards also have an important service role to fulfil – 
co-opting relevant influencers from their business environment (Mintzberg 
1983). In case A, the representatives of the city government, including the 
deputy mayor responsible for the provision of communal services, have been 
involved in unanimous decision-making (e.g. approving profit plans and 
dividend payouts), which from the management’s perspective diffuses the risk 
that they might use their political or (limited) regulatory powers against the 
company. The same holds for case B, where the supervisory board, co-opting 
rather influential business-minded representatives of the ruling parties in the 
city council, diffuses the risk of political populist interference in decision-
making (e.g. in water pricing). Consequently, party political interests do not 
dominate over the economic and managerial decision-making rationale in 
company B. In terms of the strategic roles of the boards (Zahra and Pearce 
1989), in case A and B, the supervisory board members contribute to corporate 
planning, conducted by the management, by probing managerial assumptions 
about the company and its environment, and by ensuring that agreement exists 
among executives on the strategic direction of the company (Zahra 1990). A 
principal difference in the roles of the supervisory boards lies in the extent to 
which they have a say in adjustments to water prices. In case A, the tariff 
formula and tariff levels are determined in a written services agreement and 
regulatory issues are discussed outside board meetings, while in case B it is the 
supervisory board where preliminary decisions on water price adjustments are 
made. Since all the supervisory board members and the CEO are members of 
the city council belonging to the political parties in power, the mutual 
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agreements on price changes achieved in supervisory board meetings have 
always been smoothly approved by the city government afterwards. Thus, the 
supervisory board decision is a crucial step in the whole price establishment 
process. As opposed to cases A and B, in case C the supervisory board only 
plays a symbolic role and does not fulfil control, service and strategic roles.  
 
CEO alignment 
Relationship between the CEO and the chairman is considered pivotal for 
effective boardroom performance in a number of theoretical and practical 
studies (Westphal 1999, Ng and De Cock 2002, Kakabadse et al. 2006). As 
noted by Kakabadse et al. (2006) ‘effective governance application is dependent 
on the chairman and CEO nurturing a supportive and transparent relationship 
and manner of interaction’. It is inherent in all three case studies that interaction 
between the CEO and the chairman is not limited only to formal supervisory 
board meetings and official reporting duties. In all the cases there is “something 
else” beyond the CEO-chairman relationship, which is common to these 
governance actors: expatriates with experience in the same UK water company 
in case A, membership of the same political party faction in the city council in 
case B or shared business interests in some other jointly owned firms in case 
C. These links have facilitated partnerships, which according Coupar and 
Stevens (1998), is a question of building mutual trust, of recognising differences 
and finding common ground. The importance of trust is often emphasized in the 
context of effective delivery relationships between organizations and indi-
viduals (Gambetta 1998, McQuaid 2010). With regard to trust, the case studies 
provide support for the idea that trust between key actors (e.g. between CEO 
and chairman in case B) is a vital component in public governance, and the 
absence of trust can be deeply corrosive (e.g. between CEO and mayor in case 
C), as also pointed out by Clarke (2007). As expressively indicated by case B, 
trust can promote decision-making (e.g. smooth approval of price request in city 
government) and cohesiveness. Lack of trust can lead to adverse results, as 
shown in case C, if either or both parties do not trust the other. 
Westphal (1999) suggests that ‘in fact board effectiveness and ultimately, 
firm performance may be enhanced by close, trusting CEO–board relationships 
combined with moderate to high levels of CEO incentive alignment.’ In the 
context of agency theory, as discussed in subchapter 1.1.2, the alignment of the 
agent’s (CEO) interests with the principal’s (board) interests is necessary to 
alleviate agency problems (e.g. moral hazard or adverse selection) related to the 
self-seeking nature of the agents (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Agency problems could be alleviated by the board by making 
the CEO’s pay contingent on corporate outcomes because then the rewards for 
both depend on the same actions, and therefore, the conflicts of self-interest 
between principal and agent are reduced (Eisenhardt 1989a). Both in case A and 
case B, those who employed the CEO (i.e. the dominant shareholder directly 
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and the supervisory board respectively) had established incentive mechanisms 
and made the compensation for the CEO dependent upon corporate financial 
performance. Thus, despite differences in ownership structures, all three CEOs 
have profit rights in the water companies they manage motivating them to be 
efficient and to achieve the financial targets set by their superiors. 
In conclusion, and answering to research question 4 (RQ4) – what are the 
roles of the boards in influencing performance – it can be stated that in 
companies A and B with supervisory board members embodying relatively 
comprehensive knowledge and experience, the supervisory board executes 
control over the CEO (management board), approves (financial) performance 
targets (under proposals by the CEO) and co-opts influential stakeholders (e.g. 
politicians) from the surrounding business environment to influence corporate 
performance. Moreover, in fully publicly owned company B, the functional 
emphasis of the supervisory board is wider and its role even more significant in 
influencing corporate performance than in company A with its mixed public-
private ownership. More specifically, in case B it is the supervisory board that 
appoints the CEO and sets up an incentive scheme for the alignment of their 
goals. Furthermore, in company B as opposed to company A, the supervisory 
board is actively involved in discussing and reviewing water prices, and their 
decisions and proposals considered by the city government when officially 
establishing the water prices. In company C, as noted before, the supervisory 
board is not a de facto employed corporate governance mechanism by the 
shareholders, and is simply used to authorize the CEO’s or the shareholders 
instructions, if necessary. 
However, a distinct feature that influences the use of the supervisory board 
as a formal control mechanism is the presence of strong trust between the key 
corporate governance actors – chairman of the supervisory board and the CEO – 
in all the three water companies. Relying on trust as an informal control mecha-
nism, they rather act as stewards (a lot) outside the official supervisory board 
meetings than as principal and agent (narrowly) within the official corporate 
governance structures for influencing the performance of the water companies. 
Therefore, the contribution of the supervisory board meetings remains respec-
tively smaller in controlling and directing the managers in pursuit of the 
corporate performance targets.  
 
 
3.4.3. Regulatory governance features and  
their consequences on the performance 
Regulatory mechanisms 
It was discussed in subchapter 1.2.2 that the aim of a local government as 
contractor (service purchaser) is to ensure the supply of high quality public 
services at reasonable prices (Reichard 2007, Grossi and Reichard 2008). 
Furthermore, in the contractor-provider relationship weak institutional environ-
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ments might make it possible for both counterparties to behave opportunisti-
cally resulting in conflicts between them (Casarin et al. 2007, Grossi and 
Reichard 2008). In the same vein, Shirley and Menard (2002) argued that many 
of the agency problems inherent in water supply can be alleviated through the 
design of regulatory contracts, which can reduce information asymmetry, align 
incentives and signal credible commitment from both parties.  
In the case studies explored here, the local governments in each situation, 
where there was neither strict centrally applied economic regulation nor a regu-
latory agency for the water companies in Estonia (Peda et al. 2011), fulfilled the 
role of economic regulator through variously designed regulatory instruments 
compiled themselves or in cooperation with the water companies (e.g. services 
contracts, board resolutions, local government decrees). As the case studies 
consequently show, the local governments as regulators have different degrees 
of real control over the water tariffs and service quality in Estonian munici-
palities.  
Agency theory is useful for explaining the governance relationships between 
the water companies and the city governments. As described in subsection 
1.1.2, the agent is considered to have information that is not in the possession of 
the principal, and that the agent’s behaviour is usually not completely 
observable, which generates problems with measuring performance (Hughes 
1994, Walsh 1995, Doherty and Horne 2002). To mitigate opportunistic 
behaviour by water companies, it is suggested that clear performance measures 
complemented with incentives and sanctions are stipulated in the regulatory 
contracts (Shirley and Menard 2002, Brown et al. 2006). If in case A the 
contractor-provider relationship is regulated by a detailed services contract that 
stipulates both a simple water price mechanism for the years ahead and a 
number of services standards (i.e. 97 levels of service) the water company has 
to comply with, then in the other two cases the analogical regulatory contracts 
are only declarative by nature without specified service requirements or water 
price formulae. The quality-of-service regulation is seen to complement the 
price regulation (Ehrhardt et al. 2007), especially in cases where private sector 
participation takes place, in order to avoid the water companies having an 
incentive to compromise the quality of services as a cost-cutting measure 
(Foster 2005). In case A, the output oriented services contract (a) prescribes the 
obligation of the water company to supply information on its compliance with 
the service standards on a regular basis, and (b) has relatively good clarity in 
terms of the responsibilities of the parties, which ultimately has avoided 
obvious agency conflicts between the water company and the city government.  
A bundle of potential problems related to poorly designed services contracts 
(or lack of them) become apparent in case C, where the contract (until it was 
valid) included neither specified quality-of-service stipulations, price formulae 
nor reporting obligations for the water company. First of all, the contract 
remained only declarative in terms of the service quality and water prices under 
the divergent (economic and social) interests of the counterparties, the regu-
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latory discretion fostered conflicting interpretations the parties placed on the 
rules. Secondly, without any obligation of the water company to report periodi-
cally on financial and non-financial (including technical) information, the 
company had a strong incentive to abuse the advantage by undersupplying or 
distorting the information when requesting approval for price increases from the 
local government (Foster 2005). Thus, the local government faced a funda-
mental regulatory problem, and information asymmetry about the true costs of 
providing the water services to a particular service level. Due to the private 
ownership of the water company, the city government did not have the option of 
gathering the necessary information using shareholder rights that would have 
been possible in the case of public ownership as shown in case B. 
In case B, the services contract between the city government and the 
(publicly owned) water company is not a thoroughgoing regulation either; how-
ever, there were not any serious regulatory disagreements between the counter-
parties because the role of economic regulator was actually allocated to the 
supervisory board representing primarily the interests of the water company. 
The supervisory board (resolutions), instead of the services contract, arranged 
the alignment of divergent social and economic objectives related to water 
services provision in the city. Moreover, as case B reveals, the outcome has 
been good water quality at high affordability rates while the water company is 
earning a moderate profit. Thus, contrary to recommendations from the public 
governance literature (Reichard 2007, Grossi and Reichard 2008) to make a 
clear distinction between the two different roles of local governments (i.e. 
guarantor and owner), incorporation of these roles in the (supervisory) board 
can also mitigate rather than create potential tensions and conflicts.  
 
Price regulation method 
As noted in subchapter 3.1.2, the main regulatory instrument of water services 
provision in Estonia – The Public Water Supply and Sewerage Act – is only a 
framework legislation, and does not provide any guidelines or give reference to 
any methodological approach to water costing or ‘justified’ profitability calcu-
lations to follow when establishing prices. The case studies explored here show 
that the price mechanisms and procedures used for determining water prices 
have provided the shareholders of the water companies with different levels of 
certainty and rates of return on their capital invested.  
In case A, the local government, by signing the services contract during the 
privatisation of the water company, adopted a form of price regulation described 
by the formula CPI+K, where the water and sewerage price is allowed to rise by 
the retail price index plus a K coefficient. This price formula is similar to the 
one introduced by OFWAT during the privatisation of water and sewage 
utilities in England and Wales (Cowan 1998). It is noteworthy, that the  
K coefficient in case A has never been negative to reflect productivity improve-
ments, as would be the idea of a price-cap regulation (Renzetti and Dupont 
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2004), but was set between 0% and 15% during the privatisation, later 
negotiated lower between 0% and 10% for the years of this study. Considering 
that during the privatisation, the counterparties (i.e. the city government and the 
dominant shareholder) also agreed on the investments that the water company 
would undertake, then in light of the fixed price increases, this type of price 
regulation is actually not much different from the rate-of-return regulation. Still, 
as opposed to the rate of return regulations historically popular in the US 
(Renzentti and Dupont 2004), the Estonian regulations did not prescribe what 
the ‘justified’ rate of return should be and so did not determine any fixed 
ceiling.  
At the same time, the services contract in case A is not prescriptive about the 
amounts which the water company must invest to comply with the levels of 
service, which certainly motivates the company to meet the standards at given 
water tariffs as (cost) efficiently as possible. Or, as the CEO of company A said 
during an interview that “all the risk and reward lies in the company.” Conse-
quently, this rather simple price formula agreed during the privatisation of com-
pany A, which includes a positive K coefficient and allows the company to 
include changes to CPI automatically in water prices, has provided the water 
company with a secure revenue stream and significantly higher profitability 
than in cases B and C.  
In cases B and C, as opposed to case A, there is no clear price formula 
stipulated either in the services contracts or in any other local government 
regulations (e.g. decrees). The water price regulations established by these local 
governments mostly repeat the lax national framework regulation, without 
specifying the costs to be covered and giving indications on justified profit-
ability to be included in the water prices. It was noted in subchapter 1.3.2 that if 
a ‘cost-plus’ contract is agreed upon, in which the water company is compen-
sated for costs above those that could be predicted in the contract, then the local 
government bears all of the risk and must find some way to make the company 
accountable for reporting costs honestly (Kinnunen 2004, Renzetti and Dupont 
2004, Foster 2005). As described in subchapter 3.3.3, there has been no regular 
reporting established between the city government as regulator (principal) and 
the water company (agent) in case C, which caused information asymmetry 
between the parties and resulted in serious disagreements about the true costs 
related to water services provision in the city. Consequently, in case C, the city 
government began to regulate the prices by only selectively approving the price 
proposals of the water company, so that without clear rules of the game between 
the counterparties this impaired the predictability of price development for the 
water company. Under relatively high inflation, company C was not able to 
increase its revenues in line with changes in the CPI, unlike company A, and 
operated at a loss. As discussed above, such information asymmetry was not 
present in case B, where the supervisory board members as acting regulators 
had a thorough overview of the real costs of the water company on a regular 
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basis and adjusted the water prices as necessary to ensure a moderate profit for 
the water company.  
Price review 
Estonian local governments establish water prices based on a proposal received 
from the water company. Approving the proposal can be a pure formality (e.g. 
case A), when the water prices are determined previously with stipulations of 
written regulatory contracts between the parties. Or, alternatively, it could also 
be the only real option for the local government to intervene in price adjust-
ments (e.g. case C), when such previously signed contracts are missing. Either 
way, the determination of water prices, can indeed be viewed as a game played 
out over time between the regulator and regulated company, as characterized by 
Parker (2003). In case A, the city government has initiated a number of re-
negotiations of services contract with the water company and its dominant 
shareholder in order to intervene in price determination and to present itself as 
the regulator. Changes in the contract signed during the privatisation become 
possible only if the private owner agrees to them or the parties find a mutually 
beneficial compromise. To do that, changes in water prices have become 
something to trade against changes in other clauses of the services contract (e.g. 
exclusive prolongation of the contract term) that would strengthen the com-
pany’s position in the market. So, in case A, where the price negotiations have 
been initiated by the city government with the aim to talk them down, it is the 
water company together with its dominant owner, relying on a thorough 
services contract that has the final say on water price adjustments.  
The situation is different in case C, where the services contract does not 
determine the water price for the years ahead and the price increases proposed 
by the water company become the object of negotiations – they are open to 
regulatory discretion. It is the water company that has to justify and convince 
the city government, which has the final say in price determinations, in urgency 
of the asked water price increases. The decisions of the city government to 
reject the requests for price increases from the water company as unjustified, 
and the inability of the counterparts to come to a mutual agreement have 
primarily harmed the financial performance of the water company. From the 
perspective of water users, in case C, the inevitable increase in water prices was 
postponed only for a while, in order to occur more steeply later on. 
In case B, which is different again, there are no real price negotiations held 
between the city government and the water company, and as previously noted, 
the CEO has to primarily convince the supervisory board members that price 
increases are necessary to maintain stable financial results. Later, the price 
requests have always received approval by the city government. 
In summary, and answering to research question 5 (RQ5) – how does the 
set up and use of regulatory contracts and institutions influence performance – 
the case study provides support for the opinions expressed by a number of 
authors (Parker 1999, Hukka and Katko 2003, Foster 2005, Shirley 2006) in 
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subchapter 1.3, that the private provision of water services under weak regu-
latory conditions can be risky and result in failures. Divergent interpretations of 
unclear rules in regulatory contracts and the lack of control options left to the 
regulator can damage relations with the water company to the point where 
dialogue completely breaks down and discussions can only continue in court, as 
occurred in case C. In the same vein, case A provides support for the idea that 
under private management of water services provision, the presence of strict 
contracts, which clearly stipulate the rights (benefit) and obligations (deliver) of 
the water companies, can mitigate performance eroding regulatory conflicts. 
However, lax regulatory contracts would not necessarily cause agency conflicts 
in the case of public ownership as in case B. The aim of using tight regulatory 
contracts – clear rules for achieving the desired performance objectives – can be 
achieved by the local government as regulator through the (supervisory) board. 
The financial performance of the water companies is largely determined by 
the method of price regulation applied, which in all three cases follows the idea 
of the rate-of-return approach without stipulated limits on the returns. However, 
a principal difference between the price mechanisms used is that for company A 
price adjustments over the years take place under a formula, which in light of 
increasing CPI has automatically ensured a respective increase in water tariffs 
(i.e. also in operating revenues). For companies B and C, no such automatic 
price adjustment (i.e. increased operating revenues) is prescribed in the regu-
latory contracts, and changes in water prices have ultimately been dependent on 
single decisions by the local governments. Hence, under information asymmetry 
between the water company and its regulator (local government) evolving 
distrust and conflicts can lead to regulatory discretion in reviewing water prices, 
which can harm the water company’s ability to cover its costs and make 
investments for service improvement as seen in case C. 
 
EU regulations 
The EU directives (98/83 EC, 91/271/EEC) on water quality and environmental 
control described in section 1.3.4 have imposed large costs on local water 
authorities throughout Europe (Parker 2003, Hall and Lobina 2007) by requiring 
huge capital investments in water and sewerage infrastructure. The basis of the 
resource-based view, that size as well as type of capital are important features of 
financial resources that can affect the implementation of the company strategy 
(Barney 1991), turned out to be useful for exploring the case studies in terms of 
how the local governments and the case companies solved the task  
of modernizing their water infrastructure and providing water services in 
compliance with the abovementioned EU directives.  
The case study shows that the ownership structure (and size) of the water 
company determined access to funds available for water infrastructure 
modernization in Estonia. Since the EU support funds had not been applicable 
to water companies with majority private ownership in Estonia (Avatud voorud 
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2010), out of the three case companies only company B could take advantage 
(i.e. low costs) of the EU grants to renovate its infrastructure. In case C, the 
local government and the water company arranged a special package of 
contracts that stipulated ownership, usage and financial rights and obligations 
regarding particular elements of infrastructure, which made it possible to 
renovate the most critical facilities (i.e. the water purification station and the 
wastewater treatment plant) with (90%) help from the support funds. In case A, 
where the city government had previously privatised the majority of its water 
company, the water company was not able to qualify for EU grants, and conse-
quently, it financed the investment projects through bank credits, shareholder 
equity or compensations (e.g. network extension programme) paid by the city 
government from the city budget. Therefore, not private, but public ownership 
facilitated the modernization of water and sewerage infrastructure in the case 
studies explored here, which erodes one of the main rationales for private sector 
involvement in public services provision. Moreover, private ownership can be 
associated with extra costs for taxpayers in the municipality, when a relatively 
large part of all infrastructure investments made (e.g. 47% in case A) is paid 
directly from annual city budgets. However, in light of research question 5 
(RQ5), as the case studies show, irrespective of ownership structure, close 
cooperation between the contractor and the provider (i.e. local government 
support) is required in order to secure financing for necessary water and waste-
water infrastructure modernization and improvements in (non-financial) per-
formance.  
 
 
3.4.4. Accountability features and their consequences  
on the performance 
Managerial accountability 
Earlier in subchapter 1.1.1, it was argued that it is complicated to draw a clear 
distinguishing line between governance and management perspectives in the 
public sector and, that public management and governance issues are inextri-
cably linked (Schedler and Siegel 2005, Hartley and Skelcher 2008). Still, 
governance was mostly viewed as a framework for value creation, while 
management answers the question of how value creation within this framework 
is executed. In other words, in the context of the case studies explored here, if 
governance (recent discussion) had much to do with the case companies’ 
authority regarding water services production, then management (circle of 
arrows in Figure 18 to be discussed next) is largely about using resources for 
delivering performance in water services provision. 
As also noted in the discussion earlier, in agency theory managers are 
perceived as agents that should act in the interests of the shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). Stakeholder theory by contrast and as presented in 
subsection 1.1.2, supports the idea that the managers, having a unique position 
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in the firm (Hill and Jones 1992), should take care of the needs of all 
stakeholders and not only of the shareholders (Freeman et al. 2010). But 
stakeholder theory also states that not all stakeholders are equally important in 
the firm (Freeman 1984). Therefore, in the next part of the discussion, various 
aspects of the accountability of the CEO and the supervisory board of the water 
companies to their multiple stakeholders will be explained by bringing together 
aspects from the literature on stakeholder theory (Hill and Jones 1992, Näsi 
1995, Freeman et al. 2010) in order to shed light on the stakeholders’ relative 
power and importance in pursuit of performance in water service provision 
(Collier 2008b). 
It was argued in subchapter 1.1.1 that although there is still some confusion 
around the term “accountability” (Mulgan 2000, Budding 2008), it can be sum-
marized in two major questions: what is the actor accountable for and to whom 
(Bovens 2006). Based on the nature of the accountee (i.e. to whom), the 
following major types of accountability can be described based on public 
governance literature (Dubnick and Romzek 1987, Glynn and Murphy 1996, 
Bovens 2006): managerial, political and social accountability. In the case 
companies explored here, CEOs were primarily held responsible for achieving 
particular performance targets, and this coincides with a broader trend –  
the shift from process-oriented accountability to performance-oriented 
accountability (OECD 1997, Schwarz 2002), which is noted in NPM literature. 
In terms of managerial accountability, the CEOs of all three case companies 
report financial results on a quarterly-basis to their superiors, which have 
approved the company’s annual budget. In companies A and B, the CEO 
presents reports on budget fulfilment and financial accounts (e.g. balance sheet, 
income statement) to the supervisory board. Besides company A, the CEO also 
submits financial reports to the dominant shareholder on a monthly basis. In 
company C, the CEO will discuss the results with the other shareholder in the 
company because annual budgets are approved by the AGM.  
The quarterly financial reports are the primary control instruments for super-
visory board members in companies A and B, where financial results are a key 
topic of discussion in supervisory board meetings. From the managers’ 
perspective, these financial reports are relevant because their remuneration is 
dependent on corporate financial results presented for board evaluation. In 
addition, budget fulfilment makes it possible to ensure the trust of the board. In 
company C, the budget does not perform such a role because the CEO as share-
holder does not get bonuses based on quarterly financial results, but in the form 
of dividends at the end of year and only if the company has earned a profit. 
The management of company A, unlike company B, also informs the share-
holders of interim financial results because they are listed and therefore required 
to report such results by the stock exchange. As opposed to giving an account to 
the supervisory board members, the management never presents actual financial 
results against budget estimates to small investors through the stock exchange. 
However, regular reporting to the stock exchange in pursuit of investor 
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confidence and higher share value has made company A significantly more 
transparent than companies B and C for the general public. 
Accountability initiatives are usually neither completely voluntary nor 
entirely predetermined (Van Dooren et al. 2010). In the annual reports of the 
case companies explored here, prepared by their management for the super-
visory board and AGM approval, there is a remarkable difference in the type of 
performance information that is included and how it is presented for the users of 
those annual reports. As presented in subchapter 3.3, in case B and C, the 
annual reports comprised only mandatory annual accounts and a relatively poor 
management (activity) reports on a few pages without measurable and com-
parable information on changes in efficiency or the quality and affordability of 
water services (see Tables 21 and 24), which could be of interest to water users. 
As argued by Van Dooren et al. (2010) in subchapter 1.1.4, comparisons of 
current with past performance are useful for account giving. So in company A, 
besides the management report and mandatory financial statements, there is also 
a professionally designed and illustrated yearbook – an extended annual report 
providing a comprehensive overview of the company’s financial and non-finan-
cial performance for the year. The yearbook, first introduced years before going 
public, can be viewed as targeted marketing material from the management 
aimed to build a positive image of the company (e.g. it demonstrates achieve-
ments, but says nothing about water prices) not only in the eyes of a relatively 
large number of shareholders but also the general public (e.g. media, customers, 
public agencies). 
 
Political accountability 
Within democracies, political accountability is considered an extremely impor-
tant type of public accountability (Bovens 2006), which is about responsiveness 
to external stakeholders (Budding 2008). As noted in subsection 1.1.1, 
accountability can be described in this context as a chain of principal-agent 
relationships (Strom 2000, Bovens 2006), where at one end of the chain there 
are voters and at the other end executive public servants (Bovens 2006). In 
company B, the previously explained managerial accountability of the CEO to 
the supervisory board, which comprises only elected members of the city 
council, can be viewed as an example of political accountability. Moreover, the 
CEO himself is an elected member of the city council. Thus, in a certain sense, 
the CEO as a member of the city council has rendered account directly to the 
voters at election time (ibid.). This can be seen as one explanation for why the 
city government has rather distanced itself from the management of company B. 
Besides, the CEO, the chairman of the supervisory board, the mayor and the 
deputy mayor responsible for communal services, all belong to the same 
political party in power, which also functions as an important informal political 
forum (Bovens 2006). The CEO and the chairman give an account to the city 
government only once a year, when they together present the annual report to 
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the mayor for signing. As the deputy mayor said during an interview, the city 
government does not consider exercising more control mechanisms over the 
water company necessary because “our business model relies very much on 
trustworthy and ambitious management.” To sum up, due to membership in the 
city council (accountability relationship with voters) and in the political party in 
power (trust), the CEO has enjoyed considerable autonomy from the city gov-
ernment (i.e. from politicians executing power). However, the trust-based gov-
ernance model in case B foresees that the bureau under the city government, 
which should exercise control over the enforcement of national and local water 
regulations, is actually not staffed and has only one senior specialist involved in 
these issues. As the deputy mayor also said in an interview “this person is more 
like a coordinator.” Because the services contract between the city government 
and company B, as opposed to case A, does not stipulate any specific levels of 
service for the water company, there is no respective account giving on non-
financial performance from the CEO to the city government (or its units) as 
regulator either. 
In company A, the CEO’s accountability to the supervisory board, which 
comprises three political members of the city council or the city government, 
could also be viewed as an example of political accountability. However, this is 
a rather weak example because the CEO is primarily accountable to the repre-
sentatives of the dominant shareholder that according to the shareholders’ 
agreement exerts control over the management (e.g. seconds the CEO, remu-
nerates the CEO, gets more frequent financial reports). Nevertheless, a stronger 
chain of political accountability is established under the services contract, which 
requires the management of the water company to report on compliance with 
the levels of services to a special supervisory foundation, an arm of the city 
government. As described earlier in subchapter 3.3.1, most of the board mem-
bers of this supervisory foundation, including the chairman, are active in poli-
tics (e.g. city council, state parliament) and come from the political party in 
power in the city government. The supervisory foundation was established after 
the privatisation of company A as a monitoring unit, not as an economic regu-
lator. It has the right to make recommendations to the city government on sanc-
tions to be applied against the water company in case of non-compliance with 
the stipulations of the services contract. Thus, considering all the above-
mentioned, and that the possibility of sanctions is a constitutive element of 
accountability, which form the difference between the non-committal provision 
of information and being held account (Mulgan 2003, Strom 2003, Bovens 
2006), it can be argued that through the supervisory foundation, the CEO of 
company A is politically accountable to the city government for the non-
financial performance of the company. 
In company C, as opposed to companies A and B, the CEO does not report 
to the city government (or its units) either for the non-financial or financial per-
formance of the water company. With one relevant exception (i.e. the final 
decision on water prices), the city government did not have control mechanisms 
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(e.g. services contracts, sanctions, awards) in use in order to hold the CEO to 
account for the performance that was expected by the city mayor as a 
‘significant other’ (Bovens 2006). However, the unclear regulatory rules (e.g. 
requirements on cost data) and poor accountability instruments (e.g. overall 
annual accounts) in use by the city government did not help the CEO in pursuit 
of his economic interests (i.e. revenues through the increase in water prices) in 
the contractor-provider relationship. This facilitated opportunistic behaviour on 
both sides and a stalemate in decision-making regarding water prices was the 
imminent result. Consequently, in case C, the water company was not able to 
cover its costs at the given water tariffs. Therefore, in light of case C, it could be 
argued that greater transparency and established accountability to the city 
government as the regulator should also be in the interests of the water company 
in order to avoid the conflicts that can harm the company’s financial 
sustainability. 
However, another interesting accountability chain, that also illustrates the 
strategic management of water services provision in Estonian municipalities, 
appears when exploring how the local governments set their long-term goals in 
the public water supply and sewerage system development plans (WDP), and 
how they later report against these goals. As discussed in subchapter 3.1.2, the 
local governments should develop their water systems in all municipalities 
based on these primary long-term plans approved by the city council (Public 
Water Supply…2010). In all the cases explored here, the managers of the water 
companies that possess the professional know-how and competence had a 
crucial role in providing the external consultants, hired to prepare the plans, 
with the necessary (input) information on the current conditions and 
development needs of the water systems. Moreover, in case B, it was the 
corporate management itself who arranged the preparation of this long-term 
development plan and mostly determined the performance targets for the city 
government. In companies B and C, the CEOs considered the WDP more like a 
vision document, which has its practical value when the water company applies 
for EU grants – if your project is not listed in the development plan, you will 
not qualify to apply for a grant60. In case A, the development plan makes it 
additionally clear that the implementation of incorporated investment programs 
is contingent to the contracts signed during the privatisation, and later between 
the city government and the water company. Or, as the CEO of company A 
claimed during an interview, “the city as shareholder has approved our business 
plan and they should not be confusing them.”  
In regard to giving account to the members of the city councils about moving 
towards the strategic goals approved in the development plans, then only in case 
B, did the CEO of the water company along with a specialist under the city 
government make a general overview to a committee of the city council once a 
                                                                          
60  Consequently, many renovation or construction objects were potentially incorporated in 
the development plans. 
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year. In the other two cases, there is no such requirement for the water company 
to give an account of achievements against the goals in their development plan 
to the city council or city government. To sum up, preparing these strategic 
development plans could primarily be viewed as a mandatory legal requirement 
to be met by the local governments, but not as a governance tool to make the 
managers of the water companies, who in fact develop the water systems in 
their cities, more accountable for their performance to the elected represen-
tatives in the local government. Moreover, this would be complicated because 
the water companies’ own action (business) plans and budgets are not clearly 
integrated with these long-term development plans approved by the city 
councils through performance indicators. 
 
Social accountability 
It was noted in subsection 1.1.1, that carried by the debate on corporate social 
responsibility and the perceived trust in government, the need for more direct 
and explicit accountability relations between public agencies and their clients or 
citizens is stressed in general (McCandless 2001). The internet has opened up 
new opportunities for enhancing social accountability (Bovens 2006) because 
having a website and continuously improving its content is a means of ensuring 
public transparency (OECD 2010a). The websites of the case companies differ a 
lot in terms of what performance data is presented to web visitors and how. The 
performance information published on their web pages is described in more 
detail in subchapter 3.3 (see Tables 19, 22 and 25); however, in general terms, 
company A, relatively speaking, provides the most comprehensive comparative 
overview of its financial and non-financial performance and corporate gov-
ernance principles. It seems that in company A, which is listed on the stock 
exchange, web-based communication in three languages to different stake-
holders – clients, stock investors, media – has become part of a wider commu-
nication strategy for maintaining trust and increasing share value. Interestingly, 
at the same time, the supervisory foundation, a special monitoring unit over 
water companies established by the city government after the privatisation of 
company A, does not provide any information to the general public on company 
A’s compliance with the levels of service from the services contract. 
Company B’s website remains significantly less informative on performance 
with less content. The publicly owned company B does not publish any finan-
cial data (e.g. annual reports are not available) on the website and the selected 
data on water quality, production volumes and water prices is not presented in a 
comparative way as it is by company A. However, the website of company C is 
almost without any content at all, providing only information on company 
contacts, currently valid water prices and news on coming procurements. 
Hence, the publicly listed company A is clearly the most transparent water 
company among the case companies with comprehensive performance data 
available for its stakeholders. Publicly owned company B avoids publishing any 
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financial data for the general public on its website. The governance and 
performance of company C through its website remains hidden from the general 
public. It was noted in section 1.1.1 that the publication of performance 
information tends to increase pressure on organizations, which seems to hold 
true in the context of recent national regulatory arrangements (i.e. the 
establishment of central economic regulations in 2010) in order to reduce the 
profitability of company A. Thus, there can be relatively ‘high stakes’ related 
with external accountability for the organization (Van Dooren et al. 2010). 
All in all, and answering to research question 6 (RQ6) – how do the 
accountabilities make it possible for the governance actors to achieve their 
objectives in the water company – it can be stated that the given managerial 
accountabilities to the shareholders or their representatives on the supervisory 
boards of the case companies made it possible for the CEOs to create trust 
towards their efforts and obtain freedom for managerial decision-making. 
Moreover, in companies A and B, the account-giving to the supervisory boards 
for financial results makes it possible for the CEO to earn corporate profit-
related bonuses, motivating them to increase the efficiency of the companies. 
For the ‘significant other’ the established managerial accountability systems 
made it possible to reduce information asymmetry, execute control over the 
CEO and direct him towards achieving the corporate (financial) objectives. 
The established political accountability chains indicate that realistic and 
clearly measurable non-financial performance objectives (indicators) from the 
local strategic development plans (e.g. WDP), budgets and regulatory contracts 
need to be linked to allow the local governments as contractor (regulator) to 
direct the performance of water companies towards long-term objectives. How-
ever, the use of such performance indicators allows performance monitoring, 
evaluation and applying sanctions in the case of the water company’s non-
compliance with agreed performance targets (e.g. case A). Otherwise, results 
reporting, if any, can be considered simply (formal) information sharing (e.g. 
reporting on the WDP goals in case B) without obvious effects (effective 
decisions) on the performance of water services provision. However, the lack of 
political accountability (as in case C) can lead to political discretion in local 
government decision-making, which can harm the financial performance of the 
water company and the viability of the services provision. 
Finally, social accountability and transparency can be viewed as a practical 
means for improving corporate image and trust in the eyes of the general public, 
which tends to be considered relatively more relevant in publicly listed 
companies (company A). Being relatively more transparent (on the internet) and 
accountable to the general public for its (good) performance makes it possible 
for corporate managements to communicate desired messages to external 
stakeholder groups (e.g. high service quality to citizens). However, relatively 
high transparency means that the external stakeholders can respond to any 
available performance information (e.g. also high profits), which can spur 
undesired performance influencing actions by them (e.g. public dissatisfaction 
233 
resulting in stricter regulations). Therefore, remaining relatively less transparent 
in terms of corporate financial and non-financial performance (like in case B 
and C) allows the managers of the water companies to work ‘undisturbed’ in the 
interests of their principals (e.g. shareholders) in terms of performance. 
 
 
3.4.5. Trade-offs between financial and  
non-financial performance 
Performance for public service bodies is typically constructed with reference to 
the metrics of effective implementation, productivity, service outcomes and 
client satisfaction (de Bruijn 2002). It was noted in subchapter 1.3.1 that the 
affordability and quality of the delivered water services as dimensions of non-
financial performance are what water users ultimately care about. At the same 
time, from the shareholder perspective, the water companies as business entities 
operating under commercial law are expected to earn a profit. The case studies 
explored here reveal different trade-offs between the financial and non-financial 
results in water services provision. In terms of the quality of drinking water and 
effectiveness of wastewater treatment during the observed period there has been 
a recognisable improvement in all three cases. Previous quality and environ-
mental problems have been resolved and the supplied drinking water and treated 
wastewater now meet EU standards in all cases61. However, differences appear 
in the affordability of water services between the three cases, where households 
pay significantly less (1.3%) of their average disposable income for water 
services in cases A and B than in case C (2.7%). As shown in Appendix 8, the 
gap in water services affordability has increased rapidly in the case towns in 
recent years. Nevertheless, the affordability index remains below the threshold 
of 3–5% suggested by some international organizations such as the World Bank 
or OECD (OECD 2003) in all three cases. Still, in cases A and C, there exists 
cross-subsidizing between residential and commercial consumers – the commer-
cial consumers pay respectively 2.3 and 1.3 times more than the residential 
consumers. Only in case B is there no gap in water prices between the different 
consumer groups. 
A drastic difference between water companies appears in terms of their 
financial performance, i.e. profitability. While company A has always been 
profitable with a net profit margin between 30–45% for most of the years since 
privatisation, the publicly owned company B’s net result has been volatile 
during the same period – from a loss at the beginning of the observed period to 
moderate profitability (e.g. net profit margin 8–9%) in the last years. In case C, 
the water company’s profitability has also been rather volatile during the same 
period; however, a moderate profit (e.g. net profit margin 3–9%) at the 
                                                                          
61  There is an exception regarding concentration of natural radionuclide in the drinking 
water, that exceeds the norms in case A and C.  
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beginning of the period has become a loss (e.g. net margin –9%) in the last 
years. Consequently, the shareholders in company A have been able to 
distribute dividends that they have made every year at a solid (65–90%) 
dividend payout ratio. In case B, the publicly owned water company has never 
distributed dividends to its shareholder – to the city government. In case C the 
two private shareholders of the water company withdrew dividends each year 
(payout ratio 35–52%) the company earned a profit. Thus, there is a principal 
difference in approach to dividend payout between the water companies, where 
all or the majority of the shares belong to private shareholders (companies A 
and C) and the publicly owned company B.  
To sum up, in case A, the water services are provided by the water company 
in compliance with EU quality and environmental regulations, there is good 
service affordability for consumers and strong profitability for shareholders. In 
case B, the compliance with quality standards and good service affordability are 
ensured in return for moderate corporate profits. In case C, the quality require-
ments are met at significantly lower affordability of water services, while the 
water company is not able to recover its operating costs. Answering to research 
question 7 (RQ7) – what are the trade-offs between financial and non-financial 
performance in the water companies – it can be stated that in companies A and 
C, which are under private owners, there is a biased trade-off between the 
financial and non-financial performance either towards one or other of the per-
formance dimensions in comparison with publicly owned company B. 
Moreover, the biases in the performance of water services provision have given 
rise to legitimacy issues. Specifically in case A the relatively higher profitability 
of the water company caused some dissatisfaction among the citizens and 
politicians, which ended up with tightened and centrally applied economic 
regulations in 2010, as noted in subchapter 3.1.2. In case C, however, the weak 
financial performance of the water company was part of the legitimacy issue 
that appeared during conflict over water price establishment, when the city 
government was not willing to increase water prices without seeing the water 
company change its service quality. 
 
 
3.4.6. Theoretical implications 
Based on the arguments given in the previous part of the discussion, the 
following subchapter serves to provide propositions to contribute to the theory 
about how the ownership structures, dependent on the governance mechanisms 
applied, can influence the performance of water services provision.  
In summary of the previous discussion, the results of the case study analysis 
presented in Table 27, makes it possible to present three different governance 
patterns on how the water companies, each with a different ownership structure, 
are governed and how the different patterns influence their financial and non-
financial performance. In case A (mixed public-private ownership with private 
majority), the governance approach to water services provision can be referred 
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to as rule-based via contracts, where strict and detailed contracts as central 
regulatory instruments leave relatively less room for discretion in decision-
making. In case B (public ownership), the governance approach can be referred 
to as trust-based via the board, where the decisions made by supervisory board 
members, relatively less restricted by detailed rules, determine the performance 
of water service provision. In case C (private ownership), the governance 
approach could be seen as discretion-based without a contract and board, 
where the rival interests of the governance actors (e.g. CEO and mayor) 
constantly compete with each other without clear ex ante rules of the game. 
With regard to performance, in each case there is a different trade-off between 
the financial and non-financial results influenced by the setup and use of 
governance mechanisms by the actors when pursuing their distinct interests.  
Different ownership structures embody distinct goals, patterns of authority, 
responsibility and economic incentives. A widely accepted view is that private 
companies will outperform ceteris paribus publicly owned companies (Meggin-
son and Netter 2001). Since the publicly owned company form is peculiar to the 
public sector, it has been seen as pre-modern and associated with the assumed 
deficits of traditional public administration (Wettenhall 2001). It was claimed in 
subsection 1.1.2 that the theoretical basis for this view derives largely from the 
aspects of property rights theory (Alchian 1965, Demsetz 1967, De Alessi 1983, 
Asher et al. 2005) and public choice theory (Tullock 1965, Niskanen 1968, 
Ostrom and Ostrom 1971, Stretton and Orchard 1994), where the combination 
of poor supervision and self-interested managers is expected to create mana-
gerial discretion and inefficient behaviour in publicly owned companies.  
In the context of privatisation, Vickers and Yarrow (1988) indicate in section 
1.3.4 that in the case of water companies as natural monopolies ‘the degree of 
product market competition and the effectiveness of regulatory policy typically 
have rather larger effects on performance than ownership per se.’ Indeed, the 
findings of the quantitative research in the present dissertation (subchapter 3.2.) 
revealed that ownership does not influence performance per se, but as the case 
study (subchapter 3.3.) showed, the effects of ownership on performance are 
related to the governance structures applied in each case. 
Regulation is considered relatively more important if the service provider is 
a profit-oriented private monopoly, while the publicly owned monopolies are 
perceived to act in the public interest (Vinnari 2006). Agency theory, discussed 
in subchapter 1.1.2, provides the main theoretical framework for analyzing 
interactions between the government authorities responsible for public services 
provision and publicly or privately owned entities involved in the provision of 
public services (Doherty and Horne 2002, Grossi and Reichard 2008). A core 
question in agency theory is about how to design contracts between the princi-
pal and the agent under conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information 
when the interests of the principal and the agent diverge (Sappington and 
Stiglitz 1987). In other words, in light of the externalization (Doherty and 
Horne 2002, Torres and Pina 2002, Dexia Crediop 2004, Reichard 2007) in 
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water services, there emerges a question about how the relationships between 
the local government as contractor (regulator) and the private partner as service 
provider should be regulated in order to enable the government to reach the 
public goals it sets. 
Brown et al. (2006) point out market characteristics as a key factor 
influencing the shape of contractual relationships, considering that efficient 
markets make it possible to avoid agency problems. Araral (2008) suggests that 
the monopoly characteristics of water supply imply the need for price, quantity 
and quality regulation. Shirley (2006) characterizes water supply as being 
mysterious; that is, missing information is pervasive. Lane (1999) in his 
discussion of the theoretical considerations of contractualism, emphasizes some 
potential advantages of using contracts in the public sector – contracting 
involves the stipulation of a clear condition about what has been agreed to, what 
is to be delivered, who is to pay and what additional obligations have been 
consented to? Hence, the advantage of contracting stems from incorporating 
both supply and costs into one contract (ibid.), which in the context of water 
services means that both the level of service and the water price (mechanism) 
are stipulated in the regulatory contracts. Foster (2005) argues that 
complementing water price stipulations with quality-of-service regulations has 
tended to be much more significant in cases where private sector participation 
has taken place because the private water companies may have the incentive to 
compromise the quality of the service as a cost-cutting measure. 
In the context of agency theory, what the principal wants to avoid is the 
worst outcome – paying a high compensation to an agent who shirks. But how 
much is high? And is the agent really shirking when there are no clear per-
formance targets agreed? Under lax or missing regulation, opportunism will 
sooner or later occur. In fact, as case C with private provision reveals, without 
tight services contracts, both sides – the local government (mayor) and the 
water company (CEO) – can behave opportunistically. The local government 
may reject price proposals when those do not match its expectations, regardless 
of whether the water company is actually able to recover its costs or not. By 
blaming the water company, the local government attempts to rid itself of 
responsibility and gives the impression of firmness and control (Lane 1999). 
The CEO of the water company again may choose the ‘shirk’ strategy for the 
simple reason that it is expected to pay off properly. And if the government 
should figure this out, it could be possible to deny it.  
Case C indicates that a series of agency problems is inevitable, if the funda-
mentals have not been correctly established in the relationship with the private 
provider. Executing control can be defined as a process to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the achievement of objectives (COSO 2008). To the extent 
that being in control is crucial, the first question that needs to be answered is 
what one wants to achieve – one has to define targets (Van Dooren et al. 2010). 
In order to mitigate opportunistic behaviour by the agent, clear performance 
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measures, complemented with incentives and sanctions, should be stated in the 
contracts by the principal (Brown et al. 2006, Van Dooren et al. 2010).  
Secondly, clarity in conditions (e.g. service quality indicators, tariff setting) 
and priorities is crucial in order to avoid misinterpretations and future conflicts. 
For example, a water tariff design should be easy to explain, understand and 
implement. Moreover, even the most carefully designed water tariff could 
require certain trade-offs because all the performance objectives cannot 
probably be met simultaneously (e.g. full cost recovery versus high service 
affordability) (OECD 2010b, OECD 2010c).  
Last, but not the least problem stemming from weak regulatory contracts is a 
lack of transparency and accountability for performance, if the reporting obli-
gations are not specifically stipulated or they are missing altogether as in case 
C. Information is power and the water company has strong incentives to abuse 
this strategic advantage by undersupplying or distorting the information 
supplied (Foster 2005). Moreover, the standard financial reports cannot be 
readily interpreted for regulatory purposes unless they are prepared according to 
special regulatory accounting guidelines. Therefore, reporting requirements 
(data, format, frequency) should be stated in contracts as precisely as possible in 
order to mitigate the fundamental problem of regulation – asymmetric infor-
mation. 
At the heart of accountability is also the right of appeal (Parker 1999). The 
OECD (2010c) suggests that services contracts should include formal dispute 
resolution procedures. Case C showed that under a lack of transparency and 
accountability, solving conflicts through the courts costs a lot of time and 
money, while during the stalemate in regulatory decision-making the viability 
of water services provision can be impeded. Therefore, accountability mecha-
nisms are to be established between the local government and its private partner 
in the beginning of the cooperation in order to avoid distrust and mitigate 
conflicts from possible opportunistic behaviour from either or both parties. 
Thus, based on the findings and the previous discussion of the dissertation, it 
could be proposed that:  
 
Proposition 1: Water services provision by a privately owned company 
without  a clear ex ante written set of rules is likely to cause agency 
problems between the local government and the company, which can 
impede regulatory decision-making and consequently harm the viability 
of the water services provision. 
 
Still, the challenge to compile a contract that motivates the agent to pursue the 
principal’s interests in public services provision is not only related to private, 
but also publicly owned companies. However, a built-in problem of public 
services provision by publicly owned companies relates to conflicts of interest, 
when the local government acts as both the contractor (regulator) and owner at 
the same time (Shirley and Nellis 1991, Grossi and Reichard 2008, Araral 
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2008). Consequently, the managers of publicly owned companies with multiple 
principals have to strike a balance between a number of financial (e.g. profit) 
and non-financial (e.g. reasonable price) objectives.  
In the case of multiple divergent objectives, managers can justify the failure 
to meet one target as the cost incurred by their attempts to meet some other 
(Mallin 2004). From the governance perspective, a feasible solution for the 
local government as principal would be to specify the balance between the 
various objectives (Health and Norman 2004) of its water company. In practice, 
information asymmetry can become an obstacle again for a local government. 
The need to reduce information asymmetry between the regulated firm and the 
regulator is one of the main arguments for specialized regulatory agencies. 
Bartle and Vass (2007) argue that this cannot solve the problem, but creates 
another information asymmetry within the public authority between the 
government department and the regulatory agency. Moreover, constructing a 
quasi-market for the allocation of goods and services by means of the contractor-
provider split may become just as artificial as a bureaucracy (Lane 1999). 
In the case of public ownership, a visible governance tool in the hands of the 
local government for directing water services production is the corporate board. 
In the governance literature, the (supervisory) board is seen primarily as a 
shareholder representative body; however, in the specific context of publicly 
owned companies, as revealed in case B, there could be arguments for giving 
the (supervisory) board a role in balancing financial and non-financial 
objectives related to public services provision. First, some regular reporting 
routine is usually established (i.e. written reports, hearings) from the CEO and 
the (supervisory) board members already. Secondly, the reports are usually not 
limited to financial data but complemented with contextual non-financial 
information too. Even if the (supervisory) board members focus merely on 
meeting financial targets, they also have to consider non-financial assumptions 
(e.g. customer characteristics, legislation) in planning and monitoring in order 
to meet the financial targets. Thus, irrespective of the local government 
departments and monitoring units, in a way the (supervisory) board members 
tackle the problem of information asymmetry in the water company anyway and 
look for a trade-off between divergent financial and non-financial objectives. 
This provides good reason not to establish another institution (principal) to 
control the managers of the publicly owned water company. 
The main counterargument for why the balancing exercise could not be 
entrusted to the (supervisory) board members in publicly owned companies is 
based on the view that these companies suffer from political interference being 
useful in keeping politicians in power (Boycko et al. 1996, Araral 2008). Thus, 
the question is how to keep the (supervisory) board away from party political 
interventions and staff it with members able and motivated to direct the water 
company towards balanced financial and non-financial results and ensure the 
viability of water services provision. Case B indicates that a solution could be to 
name the (supervisory) board members among elected members of the city 
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council interested in achieving social objectives, who in their professional life 
are influential and respected entrepreneurs, business managers or economists. 
Both the business and social views are embodied in the (supervisory) board 
members and their influential position in society, or the city council helps to 
prevent political interventions from party offices. Thus, based on the previous 
discussion and findings of the case study, it can be proposed that: 
 
Proposition 2: In a publicly owned water company the board can fulfil 
the dual role of local government effectively, if distanced from party 
politics and staffed with business-oriented representatives from municipal 
council to balance financial and non-financial objectives regarding water 
services provision. 
 
Obviously the combination of financial (economic) and non-financial (social) 
objectives generates complexity and ambiguity in the management of publicly 
owned companies. Therefore, clear objectives are advocated so that the agent 
knows what the principal is expecting from him (Thomas 1998, Llewellyn 
1998, Koppell 2003, Van Dooren et al. 2010). What additionally seems to be 
especially important in the case of publicly owned companies is that the 
manager (CEO) understands well the surrounding political context because the 
(divergent) objectives for public services provision can be established not only 
by the (supervisory) board but also within political domains (e.g. city council). 
Case B reveals that the CEO’s active membership in the city council, if 
complemented with a professional business-like management approach and 
profit rights in the water company, can facilitate the achievement of both good 
non-financial and financial results in water services provision. Therefore, based 
on the findings of the case study it can be proposed that: 
 
Proposition 3: The management of a publicly owned water company by 
a member of a municipal council with professional know-how and profit 
rights in the company embodies the interests and potential to ensure the 
combination of good non-financial and financial performance in water 
services provision. 
 
The regulatory relationship between the local government and the water 
company is inherently evolving and cannot be specified fully ex ante in any 
contract (Parker 1999). Discussions and contacts beyond official reporting 
deadlines is necessary in order to reinforce trust (Bovens 2006) that Lapsley and 
Kilpatrick (1997) have called the heart of effective regulation of utilities. 
Moreover, case B shows that shared informal norms can replace ex ante tight 
rules (e.g. monitoring by city government or departments under it) in the case of 
public ownership, when trust is reinforced and control ensured through other 
mechanisms, like the manager’s and (supervisory) board members’ activism and 
visibility in the political domain (e.g. in the city council). Van Dooren et al. 
240 
(2010) suggest that governing through trust and values represents one of the 
cheapest and most effective approaches to governance. The difficulties come, of 
course, if the governors change; for example, there is a change in the governing 
coalition and there is a new set of values to guide decisions (Peters 2010). Still, 
based on the findings of the case study, it can be proposed that: 
 
Proposition 4: Trust reinforced by the management and board members 
of a publicly owned water company in the political domain, may enable 
the local government to avoid using mechanistic and relatively costly 
control instruments for ensuring the required financial and non-financial 
performance in water services provision. 
 
The results of mixed public-private ownership on company performance are not 
clear from the theoretical perspective (Bös 1991, Ehrlich et al. 1994, Oum et al. 
2006, Marra 2006, Vining and Boardman 2008). Bös (1991) suggested that 
mixed ownership may facilitate the role of the government as a ‘steward’ in 
private firms dominated by a strategic investor or where there is a lack of 
market discipline. Mixed ownership is argued to be an optimal combination 
mitigating the disadvantages of pure public and private ownership (Schmitz 
2000), but it may also embody the worst of both worlds (Vining and Boardman 
2008). With regard to agency theory, case A provides support that retaining 
some ownership allows the public authority to gather more information about 
the actual costs (i.e. supervisory board materials) of the company and mitigate 
information asymmetry (Schmidt 1996). Argento et al. (2010) emphasized that 
the problem of interest conflict, when local government has a dual role of 
contractor (regulator) and shareholder, also applies to mixed ownership 
companies, including those listed on a stock exchange. Case A illustrates the 
distress of local government stemming from a minority ownership in the water 
company under private management and a tight services contract (e.g. fixed 
prices and levels of service), which does not make it possible to dictate 
(flexibly) financial or non-financial targets to the company management. As a 
key advantage of the mixed public-private ownership, the local government as 
shareholder can benefit from efficient and professional private management 
through strong distributed dividends, which would not have been available in 
the case of full private ownership. 
Grossi (2007) points out that a company with mixed ownership can be a 
potential conflict point between the partners. Conflict may arise when social 
value – satisfaction in the administered community – is not adequately recon-
ciled with economic value. Case A reveals that if the company or the share-
holders has not violated any of the tight contracts (e.g. services contract, share-
holder agreement) signed between the parties, there will not arise obvious con-
flicts between the partners. This does not mean that there cannot be any critical 
politically motivated opinions on valid services contracts communicated by 
local politicians from the city government or council to their electorate. Thus, 
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the creation of a clear regulatory system is critical for accomplishing each 
partner’s distinct objectives. Therefore, it can be proposed that: 
 
Proposition 5: Water services provision by a company with mixed 
ownership under private management constrained by a tight services 
contract provides a governance framework that can lead to a combination 
of good non-financial and relatively greater financial performance in 
water services provision. 
  
Moreover, case A also showed that water services provision under a tight 
services contract by a company listed on the stock exchange is likely to lead to 
greater transparency, since the agreement specifies performance indicators, 
reporting and monitoring mechanisms and being listed provides the motivation 
(in pursuit of share value) to communicate both the financial and non-financial 
results publicly. 
All in all, the three different ownership structures (mixed, public and private) 
have a different influence on the performance of water companies, which, 
dependent on applied governance mechanisms, can be both negative and posi-
tive. A water company can be tied to a local government either by a contractual 
relationship (private ownership) or by both a contractual relationship and an 
ownership relationship (public and mixed ownership). Private ownership, which 
is considered to be advantageous for high performance, tends to result in failure 
without a strong regulatory governance regime (i.e. strict regulatory contracts 
and accountability procedures). The private management of a water company 
(with mixed public-private ownership) can lead to relatively greater per-
formance if the rights (e.g. water prices) and obligations (e.g. accountability) 
between the partners are clearly fixed in strict regulatory contracts. Public 
ownership, which is often considered to be old-fashioned and ineffective, can 
lead to good performance even without strong contractual arrangements when 
the water company is tied to the local government on a professional basis via a 
(supervisory) board; in other words, if populist political pressures are not pre-
sent and the board is the main governance mechanism composed of members of 
the municipal council with extensive business knowledge. 
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CONCLUSION 
Performance improvement in public services is recognised as a goal for many 
governments, and has resulted in a variety of public governance reform initia-
tives in Western democracies. The externalization of public services delivery as 
an important feature of public governance reform agendas has created a range of 
corporate forms and managerial solutions (e.g. agencies, government-owned 
companies, public-private partnerships etc.) in pursuit of greater performance. 
However, current knowledge about how governance arrangements actually 
influence the performance of public services is scarce and fragmented, since 
there is relatively few studies exploring the relationship between governance 
and performance in the public sector compared to the private sector. Moreover, 
empirical studies largely test links between particular easily measurable ‘hard’ 
governance attributes (e.g. the size of the board) and financial results (through 
quantitative research methods), while they neglect the issue of relationships 
between the governance actors related to decision-making processes. Therefore, 
by applying a more holistic research approach, this study aimed to provide an 
in-depth understanding of how local governments set up and use governance 
mechanisms for public services provision and how the different governance 
patterns determine financial and non-financial performance in public services. 
The present dissertation seeks to contribute to the scientific debate on 
governance-performance relationships through research conducted in the 
Estonian water sector.  
The present dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter creates 
the theoretical basis for the research. In the second chapter, the research frame-
work and research methods along with data collection principles are introduced. 
The third chapter consists of the empirical analysis followed by discussions of 
the study results. 
 
 
Theoretical background for finding the relationship 
between governance and performance  
The theoretical part of the dissertation connected different streams of gover-
nance and performance literature, such as corporate governance, regulatory 
governance, public services management, performance measurement and 
management, to propose a theoretical framework for analyzing the influence of 
governance on performance in the context of water services holistically. The 
key aspects of this framework are pointed out below. The first theoretical 
subchapter began by providing the main concepts applied in the study – 
corporate governance, accountability and performance. Since governance, 
accountability and performance are broad and varied concepts their various 
dimensions were discussed, and based on the discussion, some theoretical 
relationships between them indicated. Of importance to this dissertation was the 
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recognition that while in general corporate performance can be influenced 
through establishing a corporate governance and accountability system, 
differences in corporate governance and accountability practices can also result 
in differences in performance. Corporate governance and accountability were 
viewed as a framework that embodies a set of mechanisms influencing how the 
governance actors interact with each other in public services companies. 
Through these interactions (e.g. in reporting, decision-making) the performance 
of a single organization or a network of organizations can be achieved. 
The conceptualization was followed by a review of the main theories related 
to corporate governance in order to understand the different interests of gover-
nance actors and the role of ownership in determining corporate performance. 
Agency theory, stakeholder theory and stewardship theory provided various 
(e.g. conflict versus consensus) perspectives on the interests of governance 
actors regarding corporate performance. Through different theoretical 
approaches, these theories addressed the importance of goal alignment between 
the governance actors in determining corporate performance. Moreover, 
property rights, public choice theory, transaction cost and industrial organi-
zation theory used together made it possible to provide deeper insights into the 
ownership-performance relationship. Property rights and public choice theory 
suggested that privately owned companies are likely to outperform publicly 
owned companies, while transaction cost and industrial organization theory 
emphasized that the influence of ownership on performance depends on the 
nature of the industry the company is involved in.  
Thereafter, in light of the interests of governance actors stemming from the 
corporate governance related theories, the present study turned to explore the 
main functions of corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. coordination and 
safeguarding) that can be viewed as a response to agency problems in a com-
pany. It was discussed that various corporate governance mechanisms interact 
and may be used as substitutes or complements in a company. Importantly it 
was found that corporate governance mechanisms may improve corporate per-
formance through better coordination and supervision over managers. Among 
other governance mechanisms, the (supervisory) board appeared as a central 
governance mechanism available for shareholders’ use in pursuit of their per-
formance objectives in a company. Of importance to this research was the 
recognition that board contingencies, elements and roles in combination can 
influence how the board members fulfil their roles and ultimately how the board 
influences corporate performance.  
A relevant part of the present study sought to explore the theoretical 
requirements for performance measurement and management systems to supply 
stakeholders with appropriate performance information in controlling and 
influencing corporate performance. It was noted in the literature that infor-
mation asymmetry is the cornerstone of agency conflicts and the availability of 
performance-related information plays an important role in aligning the interests 
of governance actors through established governance mechanisms. The 
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discussion of the present study indicated that clearly stated objectives and 
appropriate performance measures are needed for controlling and influencing 
corporate performance. Moreover, in order to ensure accountability for 
(multifaceted) performance and enhance the achievement of various interrelated 
goals, it becomes important to link different management processes through a 
systematic use of performance measures. However, considering that different 
actors may be accountable for the achievement of different (long-term and 
short-term) goals, it was argued that a performance measurement and manage-
ment system seeks to enhance coherence between them.  
The second theoretical subchapter took the governance-performance 
discussion further into the context of public services provision by expanding the 
focus from governance interactions within a single company to interactions 
between a public services company and local government. It discussed the fact 
that as result of externalization in public services, the services are being pro-
vided by specialist companies with public, private or mixed public-private 
ownership structure. The changed role of local government was to act as a 
contractor (service purchaser) that plans and monitors the public services 
provided by those specialist companies. This change introduced a set of specific 
governance mechanisms – contracts – into the public governance system to 
influence performance in public services provision. However, a fundamental 
conflict of interests influencing corporate performance relates to the dual role of 
local governments as contractor (mainly interested in non-financial per-
formance) and owner of the company providing the public services (mainly 
interested in financial performance). Setting up mechanisms that make it 
possible to solve the conflicts stemming from the contradictory financial and 
non-financial interests of the local government was argued to be a major 
challenge in public sector corporate governance. All in all, it was suggested that 
different institutional choices of externalization embody promises of per-
formance improvement regarding efficiency and effectiveness in public services 
provision; however, the effects are largely dependent on other governance 
arrangements (e.g. contracts) and the particular industry context (e.g. level of 
competition). The empirical results of previous studies indicated that the results 
of externalization in public services are contingent and there does not exist a 
single performing governance solution across public services companies. In 
order to formulate propositions to contribute to the theory and with practical 
implications, it was necessary to acquire a deep insight into and consider the 
characteristics of particular public services.  
Consequently the third theoretical subchapter of the present dissertation 
remained focused on the governance-performance relationship in a specific 
public services sector – water services. The discussion of relationships between 
governance and performance in water services addressed the notion of a natural 
monopoly and closely related specific features of water companies. The 
discussion raised a number of specific questions regarding the economic 
regulation of monopoly water companies as one of the major governance 
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concerns for achieving efficient and effective water services provision. The 
discussion explored the fact that the different regulation methods for controlling 
the behaviour of water companies embody different degrees of incentive for 
performance improvement. The introduction of regulatory contracts was viewed 
as a tool for establishing the rules of the game, which makes it possible for the 
local government to influence performance in water services provision. More-
over, the introduction of separate regulatory agencies was recognised as an 
attempt to insulate the management of water companies from political inter-
ference (by local governments) that can erode the performance of water services 
provision. All in all the regulatory governance initiatives sought to introduce 
some market-like management pressure on monopoly water companies to push 
them towards greater efficiency and effectiveness in their operations. The 
results of the empirical studies were divergent and did not provide conclusive 
evidence on the superiority of public or private ownership regarding the per-
formance of water companies. They revealed that the improvement of financial 
and non-financial performance in monopoly water services provision depends 
largely on the type and strictness of the control, and that for successful exter-
nalization in water services, it is important to have proper governance insti-
tutions in place, which are able to mitigate information asymmetry for ensuring 
the achievement of the often divergent performance goals of the different gov-
ernance actors (e.g. service quality and profits).  
Finally, the discussions of governance, performance and their relationships 
in public services provision and more particularly in water services were incor-
porated into a tentative framework to be used as the basis for research questions 
that allow us to analyze the influence of governance on the performance of 
water companies in the empirical part of this dissertation. 
 
 
The research methodology and data 
The empirical research of the present dissertation was conducted using both 
quantitative and qualitative research methods; therefore, it embodied elements 
of a mixed-method research. The first part of the empirical research comprised a 
quantitative analysis of the influence of ownership and corporate size on the 
technical (operational) efficiency of Estonian water companies. The quantitative 
analysis of this dissertation proceeded in three major steps. The first step of the 
analysis involved the application of a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to 
obtain year-by-year efficiency scores for the sample water companies. In the 
DEA, operational expenses as a single input variable and three output 
variables – population served, drinking water produced and sewage treated – 
were considered. After obtaining the DEA scores, the average impact of 
external factors (i.e. ownership form and corporate size) was estimated. This 
was accomplished through the second-stage parametric regression analysis, 
where the external factors were regressed on the derived efficiency scores, 
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which are truncated; that is, limited to an interval of [0, 1]. The routine followed 
here was the maximum likelihood estimation of a truncated regression model 
complemented by bootstrap simulations. In the last stage of the analysis, a 
series of one-way Analysis of Variances (ANOVA) tests were conducted to 
examine the differences in mean efficiencies and profitability between water 
company groups based on ownership type, corporate size and corporate size-
ownership type criteria. 
A panel dataset that included information about all major water companies in 
Estonia from 2005 to 2007 was used to test the effects of ownership structure 
and corporate size. The sample of the efficiency study consisted of 43 Estonian 
water companies that did not differ substantially in the services they deliver. 
However, the water companies of the sample varied across ownership and size 
dimensions. Ownership categories established in this study included public, 
private and mixed public-private groups. Proceeding from the principle of equal 
sample distribution and examples from the literature, the following criteria were 
set for dividing the water companies into size groups: small companies serve 
501–3 300 people; medium 3 301–10 000 people; large 10 001–100 000 and 
very large companies provide water services to more than 100 000 people.  
The second part of the empirical research of the present dissertation 
comprised a qualitative case study research to present notions of how the setup 
and use of governance mechanisms shapes the performance in water companies 
under their particular (public, private or mixed public-private) ownership struc-
ture. The present research concerned an instrumental case study approach and 
embodied mainly theory-building elements (vs. theory-testing in the preliminary 
quantitative study) since it aimed to describe the governance practices and 
achieved performances regarding water services provision, and explore more 
generally the relationships between specific features of governance (mecha-
nisms, actors or processes) and (financial/non-financial) performance in the 
water companies. The present longitudinal multi-case study utilized the experi-
ences of three water companies in different Estonian towns between 2000 and 
2009. Two of the case companies are the two largest water companies in 
Estonia rich in complex corporate and regulatory governance issues, while the 
third is relatively smaller and provides an extreme example of the evolution of a 
performance eroding regulatory governance conflict in the Estonian water 
sector.  
The empirical case study, defined as a descriptive and exploratory fieldwork, 
was conducted in two stages. In the first stage of the data collection, a thorough 
desk study was conducted in order to investigate relevant publicly available 
documents and materials about the case organizations, such as news articles, 
annual reports and articles of association for the water companies, local 
government strategies, annual budgets and consolidated financial reports, 
minutes of local government sessions and local government regulations 
regarding water services. In the second stage of this empirical research, a 
number of semi-structured interviews were conducted with key governance 
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actors involved in water services provision in these municipalities. The 
interviews were conducted with the top managers of the water companies and 
politicians and senior officials directly responsible for water services provision 
in/under the local governments. The fieldwork took place in the case 
organizations (i.e. water companies or city governments) and there were 13 
tape-recorded interviews, which amounted to 18 hours of discussion and 285 
pages of transcript. Most of the interviews lasted between 1.5 and 2 hours.  
The case study research relied on primary and secondary sources. As the 
data for analysis was collected from multiple sources, it was possible to use 
triangulation (e.g. compare qualitative data with quantitative data) that guaran-
teed insights regarding the governance practices and increased the validity of 
the findings. The data were gathered from interviews, questionnaires and pub-
lished materials, sectoral statistics, internal documents from the case organi-
zations and short observations during the period from May 2010 to July 2011.
  
 
Empirical findings and generalizations of the results 
Seven research questions were formulated based on the theoretical argumen-
tations drawn together in the framework depicted in Figure 18. Considering the 
performance expectations from theoretical perspectives of corporate gover-
nance, the first research question was formulated to examine the influence of 
ownership structure on the efficiency of water companies per se. The remaining 
six research questions, answered as a result of the comparative case study, were 
set to find out how water companies under different ownership regimes were 
governed and how the different patterns of governance influenced their financial 
and non-financial performance. Research questions 2, 3 and 4 were targeted at 
defining distinct features of corporate governance mechanisms, while research 
question 5 on regulatory governance mechanisms influencing performance in 
the water companies. And finally, research question 6 concentrated on 
accountabilities for performance between the governance actors, while research 
question 7 aimed to describe the trade-offs reached between financial and non-
financial performance in the water companies.  
 
 
RQ1: Is there a significant difference in efficiency between water com-
panies with public, private and mixed public-private ownership? 
The analysis revealed that none of the given ownership forms (public, private, 
mixed) can be associated with a greater or lower efficiency levels across the 
sample. Hence, the results did not support the theoretical expectations (from 
property rights and public choice theories) of the existence of relatively less 
efficient behaviour in publicly owned companies. Moreover, the influence of 
ownership on efficiency was assessed within the established size categories 
(small, medium, large and very large), where the results again did not confirm 
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the views that private companies are unequivocally more efficient than publicly 
owned companies. However, the results indicated that on average small water 
companies are significantly less efficient than medium or large companies. 
 
 
RQ2: What are the primary objectives of the different types of owners in 
the water companies? 
The answer to this question outlined an important difference in the primary 
performance interest of the different types of owners in the water companies. 
Based on the analysis it can be stated that the private owners of the water com-
panies tend to be primarily interested in financial performance, while public 
owners are rather interested in the achievement of non-financial objectives. 
 
 
RQ3: What characteristics do the members of supervisory board and 
management board embody in the water companies? 
The results of the analysis indicate that the board members of the water com-
panies embody different knowledge and practical experience. It can be stated 
that the supervisory and management boards of the water companies with mixed 
public-private and public ownership included members that had relatively broad 
private sector management experience, a good knowledge of water industry 
specifics and/or an influence in local politics. Moreover, the company with 
mixed public-private ownership, through the representatives of its dominant 
shareholder, embodied unique international experience in water company 
management and governance. In the privately owned water company, as 
opposed to the other two case companies with mixed public-private and public 
ownership, the supervisory boards did not include individuals actively involved 
in local politics. Also, the board members of the private company had relatively 
narrower management experience and knowledge of the peculiarities of water 
services from relatively smaller local utility companies.  
 
 
RQ4: What are the roles of the boards in influencing the performance of 
the water companies? 
The study revealed that in the companies with mixed public-private and public 
ownership, where the supervisory board members embodied relatively broad 
knowledge and experience, the supervisory board executed control over 
management, approved performance targets (under proposals by the CEO) and 
co-opted influential stakeholders from the surrounding business environment to 
influence corporate performance. Moreover, in the fully publicly owned 
company the functional emphasis of the supervisory board was wider and its 
role even more significant in influencing corporate performance than in the 
company with mixed public-private ownership. Specifically, it was the 
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supervisory board that had appointed the CEO and set up an incentive scheme 
for their goal alignment. Furthermore, in the publicly owned water company, as 
opposed to the company with mixed public-private ownership, the supervisory 
board was actively involved in discussing and reviewing water prices, and their 
decisions and proposals were considered by the city government when officially 
establishing water prices. In the privately owned case company, the supervisory 
board was not a de facto corporate governance mechanism employed by the 
shareholders.  
However, a distinct feature that influenced the use of the supervisory board 
as a formal control mechanism was the presence of strong trust between the key 
corporate governance actors – chairman of the supervisory board and the CEO – 
in all three water companies. Therefore, the contribution of the supervisory 
board meetings remained respectively smaller in controlling and directing the 
managers in pursuit of corporate performance targets.  
 
 
RQ5: How does the setup and use of regulatory contracts and institutions 
influence the performance of the water companies? 
The study provided support for the opinion that the private provision of water 
services under a weak regulatory arrangement can be risky and end-up in 
failure. Moreover, in the case of the private management of water services 
provision, strict contracts that clearly stipulated the rights (benefit) and the 
obligations (deliver) of the water companies made it possible to mitigate 
performance eroding regulatory conflicts. However, the study revealed that lax 
regulatory contracts would not necessarily lead to agency conflicts in the case of 
public ownership of the water company because the aim of using tight contracts 
was reached through the supervisory board by the local government as 
regulator. 
It also appeared that the financial performance of the water companies was 
largely determined by the method of water price regulation, which in all three 
cases followed the idea of the rate-of-return approach without stipulated limits 
on returns. A principal difference between the price mechanisms used was that 
for the company with mixed public-private ownership, the price adjustments 
took place under a price formula that ensured an automatic increase in water 
tariffs dependent on inflation. For the two other companies, all changes in water 
tariffs were ultimately dependent on single decisions by the local governments. 
In the context of the privately owned water company, it appeared that under 
information asymmetry between the water company and its regulator (local 
government) evolving distrust and conflicts can lead to regulatory discretion in 
water price review, which can harm the water company’s ability to cover its 
costs and make investments for service improvement. 
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RQ6: How do the accountabilities make it possible for the governance 
actors to achieve their objectives in the water company? 
The analysis revealed that the given managerial accountabilities to the share-
holders or their representatives on the supervisory boards of the case companies 
made it possible for the CEOs to create trust in their efforts and obtain freedom 
for managerial decision-making. The accountabilities made it possible to reduce 
information asymmetry, execute control over CEOs and direct them towards 
achieving corporate (financial) objectives. Moreover, the account-giving to the 
supervisory boards for financial results made it possible for the CEO to earn 
corporate profit-related bonuses motivating them to increase the efficiency of 
the companies. 
The established political accountability chains indicated that realistic and 
clearly measurable non-financial performance objectives (indicators) from local 
strategic development plans, budgets and regulatory contracts need to be linked 
to allow the local governments as contractor (regulators) to direct the per-
formance of water companies towards long-term objectives. A lack of political 
accountability could lead to political discretion in local government decision-
making, which could harm the financial performance of the water company and 
the viability of the services provision. 
Finally, social accountability and transparency could be viewed as a practical 
means for improving corporate image and trust in the eyes of the general public, 
which tends to be considered relatively more relevant in publicly listed compa-
nies. However, relatively high transparency means that the external stakeholders 
could respond to any available performance information, which could spur 
undesired performance influencing actions by them. Therefore, remaining rela-
tively less transparent in terms of corporate financial and non-financial per-
formance allowed the managers of the water companies to work ‘undisturbed’ 
in the interests of their principals (e.g. shareholders) on performance. 
 
 
RQ7: What are the trade-offs between financial and non-financial per-
formance in the water companies? 
It appeared that in the case companies under the control of private owners, there 
was a biased trade-off between the financial and non-financial performance 
either towards one performance dimension or the other in comparison with the 
publicly owned company. Moreover, the biases in the performance of water 
services provision have given rise to legitimacy issues. Specifically, in the case 
of the company with mixed public-private ownership, the very strong financial 
performance caused some dissatisfaction among the citizens and politicians, 
which resulted in tightened and centrally applied economic regulations. In the 
case of the company with private ownership, however, the weak financial 
performance of the water company was part of a legitimacy issue when the city 
government was not willing to increase water prices. 
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To summarize, the results of the case study analysis made it possible to out-
line three different governance patterns – rule-based via contracts, trust-based 
via the board and discretion-based without a contract and board – to describe 
how the water companies, each with a different ownership structure, were 
governed and how the different patterns influenced financial and non-financial 
performance. With regard to performance, in each case there was a different 
trade-off between the financial and non-financial results influenced by the setup 
and use of governance mechanisms by the actors when pursuing their distinctive 
interests.  
Based on the arguments given in the discussion of empirical findings, five 
propositions contributing to the theory were subsequently presented about how 
the ownership structures dependent on applied governance mechanisms can 
influence the performance of water services provision as follows:  
 
Proposition 1: Water services provision by a privately owned company 
without a clear ex ante written set of rules is likely to cause agency prob-
lems between the local government and the company, which can impede 
regulatory decision-making and consequently harm the viability of the 
water services provision. 
 
Proposition 2: In a publicly owned water company the board can fulfil 
the dual role of local government effectively, if distanced from party 
politics and staffed with business-oriented representatives from municipal 
council to balance financial and non-financial objectives regarding water 
services provision. 
 
Proposition 3: The management of a publicly owned water company by 
a member of a municipal council with professional know-how and profit 
rights in the company embodies the interests and potential to ensure the 
combination of good non-financial and financial performance in water 
services provision. 
  
Proposition 4: Trust reinforced by the management and board members 
of a publicly owned water company in the political domain, may enable 
the local government to avoid using mechanistic and relatively costly 
control instruments for ensuring the required financial and non-financial 
performance in water services provision. 
 
Proposition 5: Water services provision by a company with mixed 
ownership under private management constrained by a tight services 
contract provides a governance framework that can lead to a combination 
of good non-financial and relatively greater financial performance in 
water services provision.  
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All in all, the observed ownership structures had a different influence on the 
performance of the water companies, which depending on the governance 
mechanisms could be both negative and positive. Private management of a 
water company (with mixed public-private ownership) could lead to relatively 
greater performance, if the rights and obligations between the partners are 
clearly fixed by strict regulatory contracts. Public ownership, which is often 
considered to be old-fashioned and ineffective, could lead to good performance 
even without strong contractual arrangements when the water company is tied 
with the local government on a professional basis via the board. 
 
 
Practical implications of the research 
The empirical findings of this study suggest that policymakers, regulators and 
managers of water companies involved in water services provision should 
consider the setup and use of governance mechanisms in many situations more 
thoroughly in order to influence performance. The argument here is that the 
performance of water services provision can be directed more systematically 
based on enhancing knowledge about the features and consequences of using 
particular governance mechanisms. This makes it possible to be more effective 
in achieving the targeted financial and non-financial performance objectives. At 
a more detailed level, this study presents the following policy implications and 
recommendations to practitioners in water services provision. 
Firstly, a practical governance question for local governments concerns the 
decisions they can make on private versus public production (privatisation) 
and/or potential mergers of water companies (cooperation) in order to lower 
costs and improve the efficiency of water service production. The results of the 
empirical study indicate that Estonian water companies exhibit relatively low 
efficiency and the companies with private sector participation are not 
significantly more efficient than the companies with full public ownership per 
se. Hence, mere privatisation itself is not the key to solving efficiency problems 
in the water sector. Moreover, since the general efficiency level is low in the 
Estonian water sector, the regulator(s) should consider applying price regulation 
methods that embody clear incentives for efficiency improvements in the water 
companies. However, the results of the efficiency analysis indicated that the 
efficiency of Estonian water companies increased with size. Therefore, it is 
suggested that the establishment of larger water companies through mergers or 
aggregation agreements between small water companies should be considered 
as an option by local governments in order to benefit from scale effects. How-
ever, it will require a separate examination to conclude exactly which water 
companies and from what kind of scale economies – capital equipment or 
ordinary business operations – would be most beneficial in Estonia. 
Secondly, the study suggests that if local governments decide in favour of 
the privatisation of their water companies, there should be a clear ex ante 
written set of rules regarding water tariffs and the quality of services in 
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regulatory contracts between the local government and the company in order to 
avoid performance eroding agency conflicts and to direct the company towards 
the desired performance levels. Moreover, accountabilities should be agreed 
upon between the local government as regulator and its private partner at the 
beginning of the cooperation in order to avoid distrust and mitigate conflicts 
from possible opportunistic behaviour from one or both parties. Otherwise, 
divergent interpretations of unclear rules (objectives) in regulatory contracts and 
a lack of control options for the regulator can harm governance relationships 
with the water company and result in performance deteriorating discretion in 
regulatory decision-making. 
Thirdly, the study suggests that in publicly owned water companies, the 
supervisory board can fulfil the dual role of local governments effectively if 
distanced from party politics and staffed with business-oriented representatives 
from the municipal council to balance economic and social objectives regarding 
water services provision. Hence, the local government appointing the members 
of the supervisory board should carefully consider their professional knowledge, 
business experience and political activism in the local community to ensure that 
both the business and social views are represented in the board to ensure a 
balanced performance. By doing that, the major counterargument for public 
ownership of public services companies – corporate performance eroding politi-
cal interference – can be mitigated. However, it appeared that Estonian local 
governments have not compiled written ownership strategies on companies 
under their ownership, which would enhance clarity and transparency regarding 
the interests of local governments as shareholders in public services companies. 
Clear ownership strategies, such as used in the Nordic countries, e.g. in Sweden 
or Norway (The state as…2012, The government’s ownership…2012), can 
contribute to mitigate potential conflicts of interest stemming from the dual role 
of (local) governments in publicly owned public services companies. 
Fourth, the study suggests that when setting up and using governance 
mechanisms one should consider how these contribute to maintaining and 
building trust between the key governance actors in and around the water 
companies. This is because, as the case studies revealed, the established 
governance systems did work until there was trust, and stopped functioning 
properly when there was no trust. Moreover, discussions and contacts between 
the governance actors beyond official reporting deadlines should be considered 
necessary in order to reinforce trust and facilitate decision-making. However, 
trust reinforced beyond the official governance routines can also replace ex ante 
tight mechanistic and relatively costly control instruments ensuring the 
necessary financial and non-financial performance in water services provision. 
Finally, the study suggests that policymakers, regulators and managers of 
water companies involved in water services provision, should focus on 
achieving both a good financial and non-financial performance when setting up 
and using governance mechanisms in water services. Moreover, it becomes 
important to reach a balanced trade-off between these two dimensions of per-
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formance in water companies, since biased trade-offs between financial and 
non-financial performance towards one or the other direction can give rise to 
legitimacy issues. 
 
 
Limitations and suggestions for future research 
This section discusses the limitations of the conducted study and explores 
avenues for future research in the area of governance-performance relationships 
in water services. The limitations are mainly related to the chosen research 
approach and case selection, while further research suggestions concern 
expanding and specifying the established framework for analyzing the influence 
of governance on the performance of a public services company. 
Firstly, in terms of the quantitative study, as noted before, the selection of 
the input-output variables included in the DEA model for efficiency assessment 
was a complicated exercise due to the limited set of non-financial input data 
(e.g. quantity of used capital) available. Therefore, operational expenses 
measured in euros and including the amount of annual depreciation were con-
sidered a reasonable proxy for the quantity of inputs used for water services 
production in the sample companies. It must be admitted that even though the 
routine for detecting outliers was applied and the sample consisted of compa-
nies with similar production cycles specialized in water services provision, there 
still remains the potential that for some of the sample companies the amount of 
operational expenses taken from their annual income statements includes 
expenses other than those related to water services provision. This can partly 
distort the value of efficiency scores calculated for the water companies.  
Secondly, the multi-case study was exploratory in nature, and therefore, 
inherent limitations should be recognised. The resulting governance-per-
formance patterns in water services can be considered as preliminary patterns 
mapped based on a small number of case studies. Hence, additional studies need 
to be conducted in order to validate the findings in a larger sample of water 
companies. However, the small number of water companies included in the case 
study was justified by the aim of providing in-depth insights into how gover-
nance arrangements can influence performance in water companies. Moreover, 
the established framework for analyzing the influence of governance on the 
performance of water companies (Figure 18) does not allow us to measure the 
influence of governance on performance in water services, but rather helps us 
understand the complexity of the relationship between them by simplifying and 
systematizing the issues in this domain. It should be also noted that the 
established research framework focusing on the governance-performance rela-
tionship does not involve other possible influencers of performance from the 
operational environment of the water companies.  
Thirdly, another limitation of the case study, as also pointed out earlier, is 
that governance-performance causality is complex and performance itself can 
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influence the governance arrangements. Moreover, the literature suggests a 
number of alternative hypothetical causalities between public governance forms 
and performance (e.g. they are unrelated). The issue of causality is of high 
importance in corporate governance-performance research because without a 
strong causal link, there is no basis for suggesting that governance influences 
performance, and not vice versa. However, in the corporate governance litera-
ture to date, there is no consensus on the nature of the causality in the gover-
nance-performance relationship, leaving this issue open for further research.  
The explicit focus of this study relied on water companies. It must be 
acknowledged that in the case of other (non-utility) public services companies, 
the applicable governance mechanisms can be somewhat different; however, the 
proposed research framework can be used as a starting point for further research 
on the influence of governance on performance in other public services sectors. 
Nevertheless, this governance-performance framework assumes that (local) 
governments have externalized the provision of public services to companies, 
which have to consider the achievement of both financial and non-financial 
performance objectives. 
Moreover, further studies could focus on enhancing our understanding of 
combining various (formal and informal) governance mechanisms to direct and 
control the performance of regulated utility companies (e.g. water and 
electricity companies) in more detail. The comparative perspective could be 
extended through other Baltic states as well as neighbouring Nordic countries. 
Last but not least, a longer horizon and broader view of the performance of 
water services provision should be provided in future research. Instead of 
particular non-financial and financial performance measures from previous 
periods, the long-term viability of water utilities and ability of local govern-
ments to ensure access to affordable good quality water services in the years 
ahead need to be assessed considering the differences in the established 
governance regimes. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. The production model of performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bouckaert and Halligan (2008) 
 
 
Socio-economic situation (1) as the starting point induces a need (2) for action by the 
public sector (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008). Through the political system priorities are 
set. The priorities, following the model, are translated into objectives (3) of the organi-
zation or programme. The confrontation of the objectives with the needs allows the 
assessing of the relevance (7) of the pursued policies (Van Dooren et al. 2010).  
Inputs (4) are allocated to organizations and programmes to conduct activities 
(5) that yield outputs (6) – products or services as result of the production process. 
Economy (8) is the ratio of a monetary input over another input. The ratio of the input 
over the outputs is efficiency (9) (Van Dooren et al. 2010). Outcomes can be inter-
mediate (usually in the short term) (13) or final (usually in the long term) (14). The 
outcomes, particularly the final outcomes, are influenced by the environment (15). The 
ratio of output over effect is the effectiveness (12), while the ratio of the input over the 
effects is the cost-effectiveness (10). The confrontation of needs and outcomes allows 
assessment of the sustainability and utility (11) of the organization or the programme 
(ibid.).  
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Appendix 2. Groups of primary and secondary stakeholders  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Freeman et al. (2007) 
 
Stakeholders are defined narrowly (i.e. the inner circle) and broadly (i.e. in the outer 
ring) illustrating the idea of primary and secondary stakeholders (ibid.).  
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Appendix 4. Interview guide for the case study  
 
Respondent: the CEO of company B 
 
I Planning – setting objectives 
 
1. For introduction, what are the key objectives for the water company today? 
 
2. What are the main strategic plans the company follows in organizing water services 
provision? 
 
3. How are these strategic plans made? 
a. Who participate in the planning process? What are the participants’ roles in this 
process? 
b. What data is used as input for setting objectives? Where is the data gathered 
from? 
c. How are the objectives prioritized? 
 
4. How do you establish links (create coherence) between the objectives of city gov-
ernment and water company in their different plans? 
a. How does the water company inform the city government about changes in its 
corporate objectives and targets? 
b. Does the supervisory board (that consists of politicians) discuss the main stra-
tegic plans related to water services provision? 
 
 
Budgeting and financing 
 
5. How is the (annual) corporate budget made?  
a. Who participate in the budgeting process? What are the participants’ roles? 
b. What budgeting methods are used? 
c. How do you link the (non-financial) performance objectives from the previously 
discussed plans with budget resources? 
d. What information and how is changed between the city government and the 
water company during the budget process? 
 
6. How do you budget corporate revenues, this means, consider possible changes in 
water prices?  
a. Does the regulator (city government) provide its expectations regarding water 
prices to the management during the budgeting process?  
b. If yes, how and when? 
 
7. How are profit targets formulated in the budgeting process? 
a. How and when does the shareholder (city government) provide its profit expec-
tations to the management during the budgeting process? 
 
8. Have all members of the supervisory board voted for the budgets proposed by the 
management? 
a. If no, what has caused different opinions? 
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9. What type of cash-flows has been established between the city government and the 
water company?  
a. Does the city government pay any subsidies to the water company? 
b. What will follow, if the city government or the water company does not have 
enough funds to fulfil its contractual obligation in water services? 
 
10. What are the roles of the water company and the city government in applying for the 
EU grants and organising necessary self-financing for investments? 
 
 
Corporate boards  
 
11. What is functional emphasis of the supervisory board? 
a. What are the main roles of the board? 
 
12. What are main characteristics of members of both the supervisory and the manage-
ment board? 
a. What interests and qualities do the members embody? 
b. Under what criteria and by who are the members of the boads selected?  
 
13. How is the work of the supervisory board organized? 
a. How often do the members get together?  
b. How are the board meeting organized? 
c. What is the role of chairman? 
d. What orders and guidelines do the board members get from the shareholder (city 
government)? 
 
14. How has the participation of politicians in the boards influenced the decisions made 
by the boards? 
a. Has it enhanced or hindered the financial and non-financial performance of the 
water company? How? 
 
15. Is remuneration of the members of supervisory board and management board (CEO) 
depending on corporate performance? 
a. How, if yes? 
 
 
Regulatory governance 
 
16. How is the relationship between the water company as service provider and the city 
government as contractor regulated? 
a. What conditions (obligations and rights) are stipulated in the services agree-
ments? 
b. How often and when do the parties review the conditions of the agreements? 
c. Who usually participate in the (re-)negotiations of the agreements? 
 
17. How are the dual roles of city government (as contractor/guarantor and owner) dis-
tinguished in the water company? 
 
294 
18. What price regulation method and how is applied to the water company? 
a. What costs and to what degree are included in the tariffs? 
b. How does the water company motivate its proposals for price adjustment? 
 
19. How often and when do you review water prices? 
 
20. In the city government, how and who analysis the requests for price adjustment? 
 
21. What are the strengths and potential weaknesses of present regulatory practice 
between the city government and the water company? 
a. What have been the major disagreements between the parties related to? What 
has caused them? 
 
Accountability 
 
22. To whom and for what performance are the management board and supervisory 
board accountable in water services? 
a. How often and in what format is the account-giving (reporting) organized? 
b. Where and by whom are results discussed? 
c. What are the consequences of account-giving? 
 
23. To whom and for what performance is the city government/department accountable 
in water services? 
a. How often and in what format is the account-giving (reporting) organized? 
b. Where and by whom are results discussed? 
c. What are the consequences of account-giving? 
 
24. What are the key performance indicators you concentrate mostly in your work?  
 
 
Performance 
 
25. How has financial and non-financial performance changed during the observed 
years? 
 
26. Why did you decide to acquire a consultancy firm? How did this deal influence the 
performance of the water company? 
 
27. What have been the critical (success) factors influencing the financial and non-
financial performance of the water company? 
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Appendix 5. Sample questionnaire for the case study:  
the importance of set performance objectives 
Respondent: the CEO of company A/deputy mayor/senior specialist in the city 
government 
 
Please, evaluate the importance of following objectives for [name of the case organi-
zation] on a 5-point scale (1– not at all important; 2 – fairly unimportant; 3 – neither 
important nor unimportant; 4 – fairly important; 5 – very important).  
 
Level of importance  
1.  All households connected to public water and sewerage 
network by___ 1 2 3 4 5 
 
2.  The part of streets with storm water network: _% by 20XX 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.  Drinking water quality meets required standards _% by 
20XX 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
4.  To keep the leakage level at _% in the city 1 2 3 4 5 
 
5.  To compensate connection costs to those who will join the 
public sewerage network 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
6.  To keep households’ costs on water services below __% of 
their net income 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
7.  To finish water and sewerage network construction in areas 
where missing by the end of 20XX  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
8.  To reduce the content of organic compounds in water 
delivered to the network by _%  1 2 3 4 5 
 
9.  To improve the water treatment system so that it can treat 
additional _% of water volume given to the network 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
10.  To ensure that all districts in the city can be supplied with 
water from two alternative water sources 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
11.  To renew existing sewerage network at least by _ km a year  
 1 2 3 4 5 
12.  To ensure that all companies could get connection to public 
sewerage network 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
13.  To reduce the number of breaks and time of reaction to 
liquidate the breaks in the city 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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14.  To ensure that wastewater is treated on required level 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
15.  There is a high level customers service provided to customers 
of the water company  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
16.  To increase the efficiency of water company  
 1 2 3 4 5 
17.  To ensure to the required rate of return on investments to 
shareholders  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
18.  To increase the value of company (shares)  
 1 2 3 4 5 
19.  To guarantee annual dividends to shareholders 
 1 2 3 4 5 
20.  To reduce the pollution of reservoirs while investing into 
storm water cleaning systems 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
21.  To get increases in water price compensated to low income 
population of the city 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
22.  To avoid situations where sewerage systems cause overflows 
of living and business areas 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
23.  To expand operations of the company in neighbouring 
municipalities 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
24.  To reduce the number of customer complaints from today’s 
level 1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix 6. Full list of efficiency scores of the DEA analysis 
 
Company VRS efficiency (bias-corrected) CRS efficiency (bias-corrected) 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 
1 0.3368 0.3891 0.3313 0.2861 0.3373 0.3098 
2 0.4646 0.3468 0.3916 0.3613 0.3211 0.3304 
3 0.5983 0.5705 0.5458 0.2862 0.3349 0.3152 
4 0.6337 0.4627 0.5834 0.6277 0.4642 0.4337 
5 0.6637 0.7130 0.9043 0.6341 0.7120 0.8973 
6 0.7529 0.7749 0.8679 0.5825 0.7477 0.7082 
7 0.5201 0.3517 0.5351 0.4406 0.3490 0.3984 
8 0.5714 0.6221 0.6647 0.3810 0.4015 0.4439 
9 0.1621 0.1310 0.2209 0.1558 0.1275 0.1720 
10 0.4013 0.4904 0.4590 0.3766 0.4622 0.4568 
11 0.2601 0.2312 0.2208 0.1682 0.1804 0.1880 
12 0.4735 0.4910 0.3432 0.4723 0.4915 0.3251 
13 0.4285 0.4654 0.5596 0.3854 0.4069 0.5385 
14 0.8832 0.7771 0.8144 0.6759 0.7460 0.6794 
15 0.4129 0.4649 0.5630 0.3723 0.4546 0.5411 
16 0.8119 0.7910 0.7843 0.8464 0.8173 0.7904 
17 0.7491 0.6014 0.6926 0.6973 0.5878 0.6665 
18 0.7799 0.6467 0.7013 0.7515 0.6415 0.5927 
19 0.6145 0.6201 0.8248 0.6043 0.6240 0.8023 
20 0.7656 0.7746 0.8792 0.7766 0.8068 0.7431 
21 0.5942 0.3258 0.5470 0.4778 0.2989 0.4880 
22 0.2995 0.2758 – 0.3022 0.2759 – 
23 0.6296 0.5919 0.5676 0.3385 0.5866 0.5573 
24 0.6503 0.6311 0.7030 0.6335 0.6188 0.6819 
25 0.7685 0.6916 0.8249 0.7468 0.6667 0.8091 
26 0.8446 0.8784 0.7351 0.7842 0.7746 0.5921 
27 0.7518 0.7424 0.7528 0.7204 0.7202 0.7113 
28 0.4468 0.3914 0.5351 0.4012 0.3517 0.5117 
29 0.6748 0.5581 0.5876 0.6824 0.5727 0.6019 
30 0.5012 0.6673 0.7696 0.4320 0.6514 0.5566 
31 0.8592 0.8937 0.6606 0.5592 0.8242 0.4692 
32 0.4431 0.5942 0.4830 0.4329 0.5836 0.4754 
33 0.6663 0.9165 0.8512 0.6636 0.9074 0.8443 
34 0.7567 0.7698 – 0.7258 0.7950 – 
35 0.8093 0.6250 0.6116 0.5694 0.5372 0.5598 
36 0.6323 0.4127 0.6935 0.6169 0.2390 0.3338 
37 0.7984 0.7980 0.9013 0.7684 0.7930 0.8767 
38 0.6084 0.8039 0.5597 0.4899 0.7757 0.4845 
39 – 0.5902 0.8071  0.3665 0.4039 
40 – – 0.3892   0.2316 
41 – – 0.7760   0.6311 
42 – – 0.2242   0.1972 
43 – – 0.3283   0.2241 
Source: author’s calculations on the basis of research sample (with FEAR 1.2. software package) 
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Appendix 8. Water services affordability for  
households in the case study 
 
Source: compiled by the author based on data from websites of the Estonian Water Works Asso-
ciation, Statistics Estonia and case companies 
 
 
 
Appendix 9. Differences in commercial and  
residential water prices of case companies 
 
Note: all prices with value added tax (VAT) included.  
Source: compiled by the author based on data from websites of the Estonian Water Works Asso-
ciation and case companies 
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Appendix 10. Earnings and dividends per share in company A 
  
Source: compiled by the author based on data from annual reports 
 
 
    
Appendix 11. Cash-flows related to company A and  
its shareholders 2001–2010 (million euros) 
  
City 
government
Dominant 
shareholder Company A 
Privatisation – share capital increase 
(2001) – –44.0 44.0 
Privatisation – payment to city budget 
(2001) 41.1 –41.1 – 
Reduction of share capital (2002) 30.1 30.6 –60.7 
IPO of shares (2005) 26.5 26.9 –1.7 
Dividends (2001–2010) 46.8 47.6 –120.0 
Connection fee & network extension 
(2001–2010) –69.6 – 69.6 
Storm water treatment (2001–2010) –31.9 – 31.9 
Fire hydrants (2001–2010) –1.7 – 1.7 
Total 41 20 –35 
Source: compiled by the author (adjusted from Vinnari and Hukka 2007) 
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Appendix 12. Inclusion of depreciation costs into the water prices in 
company C (euros) 
Group of tangible  
fixed assets 
Annual 
depreciation on 
replacement 
value 
Depreciation cost 
included in water 
prices 
Rate of 
depreciation 
cost recovery 
 
Water infrastructure owned 
by company C 57 097 8 181 14.3% 
Wastewater infrastructure 
owned by company C 52 013 13 293 25.5% 
Water infrastructure owned 
by the city government 46 152 3 835 8.3% 
Wastewater infrastructure 
owned by the city 
government 57 747 19 173 33.2% 
Total 213 010 44 482 20.9% 
Note: figures in the second column are the estimates by the consultant in 2008 prices; figures in 
the third column from an explanatory memorandum to the decision of the city government on the 
price increase from April 2011. 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
 
 
The total amount of capital expenses (44 482 euro) incorporated into water 
prices, as presented in the third column, consists of the rental payments (i.e. 
3835 + 19173 = 23 008 euro) from company C to the city government for the 
use of infrastructure owned by the city government and depreciation costs (i.e. 
8181 + 13293 = 21474 euro) on assets in company C. The last column shows 
that the water prices agreed after the court disputes and negotiations by the end 
of 2009 are expected to recover only a relatively small part (approx. 21%) of the 
capital costs needed for sustainable infrastructure management and water 
services production in the city.  
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Ettevõtte valitsemise ja tulemuslikkuse vaheline  
seos veeteenuste osutamisel Eesti kohalikes 
omavalitsustes 
Töö aktuaalsus 
Avalikus sektoris läbiviidud reformide tulemusel korraldatakse avalike teenuste 
osutamist erinevalt. Kui traditsiooniliselt on avalikke teenuseid pakutud otseselt 
avaliku sektori asutuste poolt, siis järk-järgult on avalike teenuste osutamine 
muutunud killustatumaks ja lepingulistel suhetel põhinevaks. Arusaam, et riik 
või kohalik omavalitsus peab tingimata ise tegelema avalike teenuste osuta-
misega elanikele, on muutunud. Osborne’i ja Gaebleri (1992) poolt esitatud 
põhimõte „tüürida, mitte sõuda” kirjeldab valitsusasutuste koordinatsiooni- ja 
kontrollifunktsiooni avalike teenuste osutamise korraldamisel, mitte vajadust 
olla tingimata otseseks teenuse osutajaks. Valitsuse osalusega ettevõtete, ava-
liku ja erasektori koostöö ehk averuse62 (ingl. public-private partnership), lepin-
gulise delegeerimise (contracting out) või erafirmade kasutamine avalike 
teenuste osutamisel on levinud praktika, milles valitsused on sageli näinud 
lahendust avaliku sektori kulutuste kasvuga seonduvatele väljakutsetele (Pollitt 
et al. 2001, Doherty ja Horne 2002, Torres ja Pina 2002, Dexia Crediop, 2004, 
Reichard 2007, Grossi 2007). Selle tulemusena on avaliku ja erasektori vahe-
liste piiride eristamine muutunud keerukamaks ning valitsuse roll poliitikate 
teostamisel teisenenud (Kjaer 2004, Newman 2005). Need muutused avalikus 
sektoris seostuvad tihedalt aruteludega avalike teenuste osutamise tulemus-
likkuse üle (Hartley ja Skelcher 2008, Skelcher 2008, Osborne 2010) ning 
annavad alust küsimusele, kuidas on omavahel seotud valitsemine (governance) 
ja tulemuslikkus (performance). Van Dooren et al. (2010) väitel on avaliku 
sektori valitsemise reformid demokraatlikes Lääne riikides algatatud just tule-
muslikkuse suurendamise nimel.  
Rahvusvaheliselt tõusis avaliku sektori tulemuslikkuse teema esile 
1990ndatel (Hood 1991, Pollitt ja Summa 1997, Talbot 1999) ning on püsinud 
seal kesksel kohal tänaseni (Bouckaert ja Halligan 2008). Veelgi enam, tule-
muslikkuse mõõtmine avaliku sektori organisatsioonides on muutunud üha 
intensiivsemaks hõlmates peaaegu kõiki avalikke teenuseid (ibid.) ning võib 
eeldada, et avaliku sektori tulemuslikkuse suurendamise vajadus jääb aktuaal-
seks ka tulevikus. Eeskätt annab selleks eelduseks alust ülemaailmsest majan-
dussurutisest tingitud surve valitsussektori eelarvetele, mis sunnib valitsusi 
tõstma oma piiratud ressursside kasutamise tõhusust (efficiency) ja korrigeerima 
osutatavaid avalikke teenuseid (Levine 1978, Pandey 2010). Samas elanike 
                                                                          
62  Sõna „averus” tunnustati kui ühte võitjat 2010. aasta augustis Vabariigi Presidendi välja-
kuulutatud sõnavõistlusel. 
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ootused ja nõudmised avalike teenuste kvaliteedi osas pigem kasvavad kui 
kahanevad, mis tõstab teenuste standardeid, millest lähtuvalt avalikkus ja 
meedia avalike teenuste osutamise tulemuslikkust hindab (Hartley ja Skelcher 
2008). Seega, vajadus pakkuda kvaliteetsemaid avalikke teenuseid etteantud 
eelarve tingimustes jätkuvalt kasvab (Van Dooren et al. 2010). Seda arvestades 
panustab käesolev ettevõtte valitsemise ja tulemuslikkuse vaheliste seoste uuri-
misele keskenduv doktoritöö uurimisvaldkonda, mis eeldatavalt kujuneb 
aktuaalseks ja oluliseks avalike teenuste jätkusuutlikkuse tagamise seisukohalt.  
Senised teadmised sellest, kuidas avalikke teenuseid osutama volitatud 
ettevõtte valitsemine (corporate governance) tegelikult mõjutab selle ettevõtte 
poolt osutatavate teenuste tulemuslikkust, on kasinad ja killustunud, sest erine-
valt erasektoris nimetatud valdkonnas rohkelt teostatud uuringutest on neid seo-
seid avaliku sektori kontekstis uuritud vähe (Hill ja Lynn 2005, Skelcher 2008). 
Veelgi enam, selle valdkonna empiirilistes uuringutes kontrollitakse peamiselt 
seoseid teatud lihtsasti mõõdetavate ettevõtte valitsemisega seotud näitajate (nt. 
ettevõtte nõukogu liikmete arv) ja finantstulemuste vahel kvantitatiivseid 
uurimismeetodeid kasutades, jättes aga kõrvale küsimuse otsustusprotsessides 
osalevate institutsioonide ja isikute vahelistest suhetest (Heracleous 2001, 
Edwards ja Clough 2005). Nii ei võimalda sellised lähenemised luua praktilist 
arusaamist, kuidas toimub tulemuslikkuse kujundamine. Seepärast, kasutades 
terviklikumat lähenemisviisi on käesoleva doktoritöö eesmärgiks luua põhja-
likumat arusaamist sellest, kuidas kohalikud omavalitsused kujundavad ja kasu-
tavad erinevaid valitsemise mehhanisme (governance mechanisms) avalike tee-
nuste osutamisel ja kuidas erinevad valitsemise mustrid mõjutavad rahalist 
(financial) ja mitterahalist (non-financial) tulemuslikkust avalike teenuste 
osutamisel. Käesolev doktoritöö arendab valitsemise ja tulemuslikkuse vaheliste 
seoste alast diskussiooni, täites antud valdkonna kirjanduses olevat tühimikku 
Eesti veesektoris teostatud uuringute kaudu. Võttes arvesse veeteenuste osuta-
misega seonduvaid erinevaid ja sageli vastuolulisi huvisid, võimaldab vee-
sektori näide luua üldisemat arusaamist avaliku sektori valitsemise ja tulemus-
likkuse seoste keerukusest. Veeteenused on eluliselt tähtsad nii elanike tervise 
ja looduskeskkonna säilitamise kui ka majandusarengu seisukohast. Lisaks on 
vee-ettevõtete puhul majanduslikust seisukohast tegemist loomulike monopoli-
dega (Parker 1999, Van Dijk 2008, Berg ja Marques 2011). Jättes praktikas 
arvestamata need erinevad veeteenustega seonduvad aspektid ja loomata sobivat 
valitsemise raamistikku (koordineerimise ja kontrollisüsteemi), võivad vee-
teenuste tulemuslikkuse suurendamisele suunatud algatused (nt. erastamine) olla 
vähetulemuslikud või lõppeda läbikukkumisega, nagu on juhtunud mitmel pool 
maailmas (Hall et al. 2004, Casarin et al. 2007, Vinnari ja Hukka 2007). 
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Uurimuse eesmärk ja ülesanded 
Käesoleva doktoritöö eesmärgiks on luua põhjalikum arusaamine sellest, 
kuidas ettevõtte valitsemise mehhanismide (corporate governance mechanisms) 
ülesehitus ja kasutamine mõjutavad veeteenuste osutamise rahalist ja mitte-
rahalist tulemuslikkust Eesti kohalikes omavalitsustes. Doktoritöö arendab tea-
duslikku diskussiooni avaliku sektori võimuorganite muutuvast rollist avalike 
teenuste osutamisel ja valitsemise mehhanismide kujundamisest, et mõjutada 
avalike teenuste osutamise tulemuslikkust. Regulatiivse valitsemise (regulatory 
governance) kontekstis keskendub doktoritöö üksikasjalikumalt vee-ettevõtete 
ja kohalike omavalitsuste vastastikusele koostoimele ning sellele, kuidas osa-
pooled saavutavad sageli erinevaid eesmärke. See teadmine aitab poliitikate 
kujundajaid, regulaatoreid ja teisi osapooli strateegiate arendamisel ja võima-
luste leidmisel, et parandada veeteenuste ja teiste sarnaste avalike teenuste 
osutamise tulemuslikkust. 
Eesmärgi saavutamiseks püstitatakse järgnevad uurimisülesanded: 
1) uurida seoseid töös kasutatavate peamiste kontseptsioonide (s.o. ettevõtte 
valitsemine, vastutavus ja tulemuslikkus) vahel ja tuua välja ettevõtte valitse-
mise teoreetilistest lähenemistest tulenevad ootused tulemuslikkuse kohta; 
2) uurida teoreetilisi lähtekohti, kuidas ettevõtte valitsemise ja tulemuslikkuse 
juhtimise mehhanismide ülesehitus ning kasutamine võivad mõjutada 
otsustamist ja sellest tulenevalt tulemuslikkust; 
3) uurida avalike teenuste osutamise delegeerimist ja veeteenuste osutamise 
spetsiifikat käsitlevat kirjandust, et mõista valitsemise ja tulemuslikkuse 
vaheliste seoste kompleksust veesektoris; 
4) selgitada Eesti veesektori eripära ning võtta kokku Euroopa Liidu ja riiklike 
regulatsioonide peamised tunnusjooned, mis moodustavad raamistiku vee-
teenuste osutamiseks Eesti kohalikes omavalitsustes; 
5) analüüsida kvantitatiivse uuringu kaudu erinevate omandistruktuuride mõju 
vee-ettevõtete tõhususele; 
6) analüüsida võrdleva juhtumiuuringu kaudu, kuidas rakendatud ettevõtte ja 
regulatiivse valitsemise mehhanismid erineva omandistruktuuriga vee-ette-
võtetes mõjutavad nende rahalist ja mitterahalist tulemuslikkust; 
7) sünteesida uuringute tulemusi, et teha ettepanekuid valitsemise süsteemi 
parandamiseks suurendamaks tulemuslikkust Eesti veeteenuste sektoris. 
 
 
Töö uudsus 
Ettevõtte valitsemise ja tulemuslikkuse vahelisi seoseid uurivates teadus-
artiklites kasutatakse peamiselt kvantitatiivseid uurimismeetodeid, eelkõige 
regressioonanalüüsi. Uuringud, mis kirjeldavad statistilisi seoseid valitsemise ja 
tulemuslikkuse aspekte iseloomustavate muutujate vahel, ei võimalda luua 
põhjalikumat arusaamist valitsemise protsessidest, mis põhjustavad teatud 
käitumist ja viivad konkreetse tulemuslikkuseni (Heracleous 2001, Edwards ja 
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Clough 2005, Skelcher 2008, Tosi 2008, Ahrens et al. 2009). Sageli eeldatakse, 
et avaliku sektori ettevõtete juhid ei püüdle ettevõtte suure kasumlikkuse poole, 
kuid miks seda ei tehta, jääb selgusetuks ilma konkreetsetes ettevõtetes koha-
peal läbiviidavate uuringuteta. Seetõttu kasutab käesolev doktoritöö uudset 
kombineeritud kvantitatiivset ja kvalitatiivset uurimismeetodit (mixed method 
research), et luua põhjalikum arusaamine sellest, kuidas ettevõtte valitsemise 
mehhanismid mõjutavad tulemuslikkust. Kui uuringu kvantitatiivne osa sisaldab 
regressioonanalüüsi ja selles uuritakse, kas erinevus ettevõtete omandistruk-
tuuris viib tõenäoliselt erinevusteni nende tõhususes, siis uuringu kvalitatiivne 
osa koosneb võrdlevast juhtumiuuringust (comparative case study), milles 
selgitatakse välja valitsemise mustrid erinevate omandistruktuuride korral ning 
analüüsitakse nende mõju tulemuslikkusele. 
Vajadust rakendada enam juhtumiuuringut, mis võimaldab luua põhjalikuma 
arusaamise tulemuslikkuse kujunemisest veeteenuste osutamisel, on rõhutanud 
mitmed teadlased (vt. Shirley 2008, Araral 2008). Kirjanduses võib leida palju 
uuringuid, mis võrdlevad avaliku ja erasektori omanduses olevate vee-ettevõtete 
tulemuslikkust (vt. Renzetti ja Dupont 2004, Abbott ja Cohen 2009, Walter et 
al. 2009, Berg ja Marques 2011) ökonomeetriliste mudelite abil, kuid nagu 
osundab Araral (2008), leidub väga vähe tõsiseid uuringuid, mis uurivad 
teenuse hinda, kättesaadavust ja kasumlikkust veeteenuste kontekstis. Käesolev 
doktoritöö tuginedes võrdleva juhtumiuuringu meetodile analüüsib erinevalt 
varasematest veesektoris läbiviidud omandistruktuuri ja tulemuslikkuse uurin-
gutest valitsemise mõju nii rahalisele (nt. kasumlikkus) kui mitterahalisele 
tulemuslikkusele (nt. teenuse kättesaadavus, veekvaliteet) ning selgitab kompro-
missi saavutamist nende kahe tulemuslikkuse dimensiooni vahel. Integreerides 
valitsemist ja tulemuslikkust käsitleva kirjanduse erinevad suunad (ettevõtte 
valitsemine, regulatiivne valitsemine, avalike teenuste juhtimine, tulemus-
likkuse mõõtmine ja juhtimine), on käesolevas doktoritöös pakutud välja uuen-
duslik raamistik (vt. joonis 18, lk. 101), mis võimaldab selgitada ja analüüsida 
valitsemise mõju tulemuslikkusele avalike (taristu-) teenuste osutamisel 
terviklikult. 
Üheks põhjuseks, miks tasub uurida valitsemise mõju tulemuslikkusele just 
veesektoris, on selle spetsiifiline olukord Eestis, kus veeteenuseid osutab 
suhteliselt suur arv erineva omandistruktuuriga (avaliku sektori, erasektori, 
avaliku ja erasektori ühises omanduses olevaid) vee-ettevõtteid, mis tegutsevad 
kohalike omavalitsuste mitmesugustes majandusliku reguleerimise (economic 
regulation) tingimustes. Pealegi tegutsevad Eestis avaliku sektori omanduses 
olevad ettevõtted ja eraettevõtted sama äriseadustiku ja raamatupidamisseaduse 
alusel, mis pakub võimalust võrrelda ja analüüsida erasektorile omaste ettevõtte 
valitsemise ja juhtimisalaste algatuste ülekandumist avaliku sektori ettevõtetele, 
mida sageli peetakse suhteliselt mahajäänumaks ja ebaefektiivsemaks. 
Lõpuks, nagu märgivad Walter et al. (2009) oma kirjanduse ülevaateartiklis, 
on Põhja- ja Ida-Euroopa vee-ettevõtete tulemuslikkuse kohta teostatud vähe 
teaduslikke võrdlevaid uuringuid. Autorile teadaolevalt ei sisalda neist ükski 
307 
avaliku ja erasektori omanduses olevate vee-ettevõtete valitsemise mehha-
nismide ja tulemuslikkuse aspektide vaheliste seoste analüüsi ei Eestis ega Balti 
regioonis laiemalt. Seega võib käesoleva doktoritöö üheks uudsuseks pidada 
asjaolu, et selles vaadeldakse rahalise ja mitterahalise tulemuslikkuse kujune-
mise aspekte Eesti vee-ettevõtetes. Kuigi doktoritöö empiirilised uuringud on 
viidud läbi ühes riigis, pakuvad need mitmekülgseid lähenemisi ja laiemat 
arusaamist valitsemise ja tulemuslikkuse vahelistest seostest vee-ettevõtete 
kontekstis. 
  
 
Töö ülesehitus ja teoreetiline taust 
Doktoritöö koosneb kolmest peatükist nagu on näidatud joonisel 1. Esimene 
peatükk moodustab uurimuse teoreetilise baasi, millest tulenevad uurimis-
küsimused töö empiirilise osa jaoks. Teises peatükis koondatakse esimese 
peatüki teoreetilise diskussiooni peamised järeldused koos uurimisküsimustega 
valitsemise-tulemuslikkuse uurimisraamistikku ning kirjeldatakse ja põhjen-
datakse kasutatavat uurimismetoodikat. Töö kolmas peatükk sisaldab empiirilist 
analüüsi ja arutelu uuringu olulisemate tulemuste üle, mida ühildatakse teo-
reetiliste seisukohtadega.  
Doktoritöö teoreetiline osa koondab valitsemist ja tulemuslikkust käsitlevast 
kirjandusest erinevad suunad (ettevõtte valitsemine, regulatiivne valitsemine, 
avalike teenuste juhtimine, tulemuslikkuse mõõtmine ja juhtimine), et luua teo-
reetiline raamistik analüüsimaks valitsemise mõju tulemuslikkusele veeteenuste 
kontekstis terviklikult. Selle raamistikuga seonduvad olulisemad aspektid on 
toodud välja alljärgnevates lõikudes. 
Teoreetilise osa esimene alapeatükk algab töös kasutatavate peamiste kont-
septsioonide – ettevõtte valitsemine, vastutavus (accountability) ja tulemus-
likkus – tutvustamisega. Kuna valitsemine, vastutavus ja tulemuslikkus on laia-
haardelised ja mitmekülgsed kontseptsioonid, siis arutatakse nende erinevate 
dimensioonide üle ja selle arutelu põhjal esitatakse teoreetilised seosed nende 
kontseptsioonide vahel. Käesoleva doktoritöö seisukohast on oluline tõdemus, 
et kui tulemuslikkust saab üldiselt mõjutada ettevõtte valitsemise ja vastutavuse 
süsteemi kujundamise kaudu, siis erinevused ettevõtte valitsemise ja vastu-
tavuse praktikas võivad põhjustada erinevusi tulemuslikkuses. Ettevõtte valitse-
mist ja vastutavust on käsitletud kui raamistikku, mis sisaldab teatud mehha-
nismide kogumit, mõjutamaks, kuidas valitsemise osalised (governance actors) 
avalikke teenuseid osutavates ettevõtetes vastastikku toimivad. Läbi nende 
interaktsioonide (nt. otsuste tegemisel) saab suunata ühe konkreetse organisat-
siooni või organisatsioonide võrgustiku tulemuslikkust. 
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Doktoritöö peatükid            Tulenev teadmine 
Joonis 1. Doktoritöö ülesehitus (allikas: autori poolt koostatud) 
 
 
Sissejuhatus
Pe
at
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k 
1 
Analüüsi teoreetilised alused 
 Peamised kontseptsioonid ja 
ettevõtte valitsemisega 
seonduvad teooriad 
 Muutused avalike teenuste 
osutamises ja ootustes 
tulemuslikkuse osas 
 Veesektori spetsiifika ning 
ettevõtte valitsemise ja 
tulemuslikkuse vaheliste seoste 
keerukus veeteenuste osutamisel 
Uuringudisain ja 
uurimisküsimused 
 Uurimisküsimused ja -raamistik 
 Kombineeritud uurimismeetod 
 Valimi koostamine ja andmete 
kogumine 
 Valiidus ja usaldusväärsus 
Empiirilised uuringud 
 Eesti veeteenuste sektori 
ülevaade 
 Kvantitatiivne uuring 
omandistruktuuri ja ettevõtte 
suuruse mõjust Eesti vee-
ettevõtete tõhususele 
 Kvalitatiivne juhtumiuuring 
valitsemise mõjust veeteenuste 
osutamise tulemuslikkusele 
 Tulemused ja arutelu järelduste 
üle 
 Uuringu praktiline tähtsus 
Pe
at
ük
k 
3 
 Ettevõtte valitsemise ja 
tulemuslikkuse vahelise seose 
komplekssus 
 Teoreetilised ootused seoses 
valitsemise osaliste huvide ja 
omandistruktuuri rolliga ettevõtte 
tulemuslikkuse kujundamisel 
 Avalike teenuste osutamise 
delegeerimine tulemuslikkuse 
parandamiseks; teenuse ostja ja 
osutaja rolli eristamine 
valitsemises  
 Valitsemise mehhanismid vee-
ettevõtete monopoolse võimu 
kontrollimiseks ja tulemuslikkuse 
suunamiseks 
 Tõendid varasematest uuringutest 
valitsemise ja tulemuslikkuse 
vaheliste seoste kohta veeteenuste 
osutamisel 
 Reguleeritavate vee-ettevõtete 
valitsemise ja juhtimise raamistik 
empiiriliseks analüüsiks 
 
 
 
 Eesti veeteenuste sektori eripärad 
 Omandistruktuuri ja ettevõtte 
suuruse mõju vee-ettevõtete 
tõhususele  
 Kolm erinevat mustrit vee-
ettevõtete valitsemisel 
 Omandistruktuuri mõju 
veeteenuste osutamise 
tulemuslikkusele sõltuv 
valitsemise mehhanismide 
rakendamisest 
Pe
at
ük
k 
2 
Kokkuvõte
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Järgnevalt analüüsitakse töös peamisi ettevõtte valitsemisega seonduvaid 
teooriaid, et mõista valitsemise osaliste erinevaid huvisid ja omandivormi rolli 
ettevõtte tulemuslikkuse kujundamisel. Agenditeooria (agency theory), huvi-
gruppide teooria (stakeholder theory) ja järelvalveteooria63 (stewardship theory) 
osundavad erinevatele perspektiividele (konflikt versus konsensus) seoses 
valitsemise osaliste huvidega tulemuslikkuse osas. Läbi erinevate lähenemiste 
rõhutavad need teooriad valitsemises osalejate eesmärkide ühildamise tähtsust 
ettevõtte tulemuslikkuse määramisel. Lisaks käsitledes koos käsutusõiguse 
teooria (property rights theory), avaliku valiku teooria (public choice theory), 
tehingukulude teooria (transaction cost theory) ja tööstusorganisatsiooni teooria 
(industrial organization theory) keskseid aspekte, osutub võimalikuks põhja-
likuma teoreetilise arusaamise loomine omandivormi ja tulemuslikkuse seosest. 
Kui käsutusõiguse teooria ja avaliku valiku teooria kohaselt on eraomandis 
olevad ettevõtted tõenäoliselt tulemuslikumad kui avaliku sektori omanduses 
olevad ettevõtted, siis tehingukulude teooria ja tööstusorganisatsiooni teooria 
rõhutavad, et omandivormi mõju tulemuslikkusele sõltub tööstusharu ise-
loomust, milles ettevõtete tegutseb.  
Teooriatest tulenevate valitsemise osaliste erinevate huvide valguses 
uuritakse doktoritöös seejärel peamiste valitsemise mehhanismide funktsioone, 
mida võib vaadelda kui lahenduste otsimist volitaja (principal) ja agendi (agent) 
vahelistele probleemidele (agency problems). Töös arutletakse, et erinevate 
valitsemise mehhanismide vahel on interaktsioon ja neid mehhanisme võib 
kasutada teineteise asendamiseks või täiendamiseks. Olulise aspektina selgus, et 
valitsemise mehhanismide oskuslik kasutamine võib parandada ettevõtte tule-
muslikkust läbi parema koordinatsiooni ja järelevalve juhtide tegevuse üle. 
Ettevõtte valitsemise mehhanismide seas omab keskset kohta ettevõtte nõukogu 
(board), mida aktsionärid saavad kasutada oma eesmärkide saavutamiseks 
(tulemuslikkuse tagamiseks) ettevõttes. Käesoleva doktoritöö seisukohast on 
oluline tõdemus, et nõukogu elemendid (board elements), rollid (roles) ja 
mõjurid (contingencies) võivad üheskoos ära määrata, kuidas nõukogu liikmed 
täidavad oma funktsioone ja lõpuks, kuidas nõukogu mõjutab ettevõtte tule-
muslikkust. 
Seejärel jätkatakse doktoritöös tulemuslikkuse mõõtmise ja juhtimise 
süsteemidele esitatavate teoreetiliste nõudmiste uurimist, mis on olulised huvi-
gruppidele (ettevõtte tulemuslikkuse kontrollimiseks ja mõjutamiseks) vajaliku 
tulemusinformatsiooni tagamise seisukohast. Kirjanduses on märgitud, et infor-
matsiooni asümmeetria on volitaja ja agendi vaheliste konfliktide nurgakiviks ja 
tulemuslikkusega seotud informatsiooni kättesaadavusel on oluline roll nende 
eesmärkide ühildamisel valitsemise mehhanismide abil. Käesolev doktoritöö 
toob välja, et selgelt määratletud eesmärgid ja asjakohased tulemuslikkuse 
mõõdikud on vajalikud ettevõtte tulemuslikkuse kontrollimiseks ja mõjuta-
                                                                          
63 Nimetust ‘stewardship theory’ on eesti keelde tõlgitud ka kui haldus- ehk administrat-
siooniteooria (Vutt 2006). 
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miseks. Veelgi enam, selleks et tagada vastutavus (mitmekülgse) tulemus-
likkuse eest ja parandada mitmesuguste omavahel seotud eesmärkide saavuta-
mist, on oluline omavahel seostada ettevõtte erinevad juhtimisprotsessid tule-
muslikkuse mõõdikute süsteemse kasutamise teel. Arvestades, et erinevad 
osalised võivad olla vastutavad erinevate (pika- ja lühiajaliste) eesmärkide 
saavutamise eest, leitakse doktoritöö teoreetilise osa esimese alapeatüki lõpus, 
et tulemuslikkuse mõõtmise ja juhtimise süsteem võib suurendada sidusust 
nende vahel.  
Teoreetilise osa teine alapeatükk viib valitsemise ja tulemuslikkuse vahelise 
seose arutelu avalike teenuste osutamise konteksti, laiendades fookust valitse-
mise interaktsioonidelt ettevõtte tasandil, interaktsioonidele avalikku teenust 
osutava ettevõtte ja kohaliku omavalitsuse vahel. Töös arutletakse, et avalike 
teenuste osutamise delegeerimise tulemusena osutatakse neid teenuseid spet-
sialiseerunud avaliku sektori, erasektori või avaliku ja erasektori ühise osa-
lusega ettevõtete poolt. Kohalike omavalitsuste roll avalike teenuste osutamisel 
on muutunud ja nende ülesandeks on olla teenuse tagajaks (service guarantor), 
mis plaanib ja kontrollib teenuste osutamist spetsialiseerunud ettevõtete poolt. 
Sellise muutusega on kaasnenud spetsiifiliste valitsemise mehhanismide – 
lepingute – kasutuselevõtmine avalike teenuste osutamisel, et mõjutada nende 
tulemuslikkust. Fundamentaalne huvide konflikt, mis mõjutab avalikku teenust 
osutava ettevõtte tulemuslikkust seondub kohaliku omavalitsuse võimaliku 
kahese rolliga selles: üheltpoolt kui ostja (peamiselt huvitatud mitterahalisest 
tulemuslikkusest) ja teisalt kui omanik (peamiselt huvitatud rahalisest tulemus-
likkusest). Töös arutletakse, et selliste mehhanismide loomine, mis võimal-
daksid lahendada kohaliku omavalitsuse vastakatest rahalistest ja mitteraha-
listest huvidest tulenevaid konflikte, on avaliku sektori ettevõtete valitsemise 
üheks peamiseks väljakutseks. Kokkuvõttes järeldatakse, et erinevad institut-
sionaalsed valikud avalike teenuste osutamise delegeerimisel kätkevad võima-
lusi avalike teenuste osutamise tõhususe ja mõjususe (effectiveness) suurenda-
miseks, kuid see sõltub suuresti teistest valitsemise mehhanismidest (nt. lepin-
gutest) ja konkreetsest tööstusharu kontekstist (nt. konkurentsitasemest). 
Varasemate empiiriliste uuringute tulemused näitavad, et avalike teenuste osuta-
mise erasektorile väljadelegeerimisega kaasnev tulemuslikkus on muudest 
teguritest sõltuv ning ei ole ühte sobivaimat valitsemise lahendust kõigi ava-
likke teenuseid osutavate ettevõtete jaoks. Selleks, et formuleerida teooriatesse 
panustavaid ettepanekuid ning anda praktilisi soovitusi juhtidele, on vajalik 
mõista ja võtta arvesse konkreetse avaliku teenuse eripärasid. 
Eeltoodust tulenevalt keskendub teoreetilise osa kolmas alapeatükk valitse-
mise ja tulemuslikkuse vahelise seose analüüsimisele spetsiifilises veeteenuste 
sektoris. Arutelus vee-ettevõtete valitsemise ja tulemuslikkuse üle käsitletakse 
loomuliku monopoli tingimusi ja sellega seonduvaid vee-ettevõtete eripärad. 
See arutelu tõstatas mitmeid spetsiifilisi küsimusi seoses monopoolsete vee-
ettevõtete majandusliku reguleerimisega, mida võib pidada üheks peamiseks 
valitsemisega seonduvaks kaalutluseks, et saavutada tõhus ja mõjus vee-
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teenuste osutamine. Arutelu käigus selgitati välja, et erinevad regulatsiooni-
meetodid vee-ettevõtete käitumise kontrollimiseks sisaldavad erineval määral 
stiimuleid tulemuslikkuse parandamiseks. Teenuslepinguid käsitletakse kui 
vahendeid, et leppida kokku „mängureeglites”, mis võimaldaksid kohalikel 
omavalitsustel mõjutada veeteenuste osutamise tulemuslikkust. Veelgi enam, 
eraldiseisvate regulaatorite (regulatory agency) loomist käsitletakse kui katset 
eraldada vee-ettevõtete juhtimine kohalike omavalitsuste poolsest poliitilisest 
sekkumisest, mis võib õõnestada veeteenuste osutamise tulemuslikkust. Kokku-
võttes on regulatiivse valitsemise algatused suuresti suunatud turukonkurentsile 
iseloomuliku surve tekitamisele vee-ettevõtete juhtimisel, et suunata neid 
suurema tõhususe ja mõjususe poole oma tegevustes. Varasemate empiiriliste 
uuringute tulemused lahknevad ja ei sisalda veenvaid tõendeid, et avaliku 
sektori või eraomanduses olevad vee-ettevõtted oleksid suhteliselt tulemus-
likumad. Uuringute tulemused osutavad, et rahalise ja mitterahalise tulemus-
likkuse paranemine sõltub monopoolsete veeteenuste osutajate üle rakendatava 
kontrolli tüübist ja rangusest. Veeteenuste osutamise edukaks delegeerimiseks 
on vajalik sobivate valitsemise institutsioonide olemasolu, mis võimaldaksid 
vähendada informatsiooni asümmeetriat, et tagada erinevate osaliste sageli 
vastakate eesmärkide (nt. teenusekvaliteet versus kasumlikkus) saavutamine 
(tulemuslikkus). 
Lõpetuseks on aruteludest valitsemise, tulemuslikkuse ja nende vaheliste 
seoste kohta avalike teenuste, ja iseäranis veeteenuste osutamisel arendatud 
uurimisraamistik ja -küsimused, mis võimaldavad doktoritöö empiirilises osas 
analüüsida valitsemise mõju vee-ettevõtete tulemuslikkusele. 
 
 
Uurimismetoodika ja andmed 
Käesoleva doktoritöö empiiriline uuring viibi läbi kvantitatiivseid ja kvali-
tatiivseid uurimismeetodeid kasutades, mistõttu sisaldab see kombineeritud 
uurimismeetodi elemente. Empiirilise uuringu esimene osa sisaldas kvantita-
tiivset analüüsi omandivormi ja ettevõtte suuruse mõju kohta Eesti vee-ette-
võtete tehnilisele (tegevus-)tõhususele (technical efficiency). Selle teostamine 
koosnes kolmest alljärgnevast sammust. Esiteks viidi läbi andmeraja analüüs 
(data envelopment analysis – DEA), et leida erinevate aastate lõikes valimisse 
kuuluvate vee-ettevõtete suhtelised tõhususe näitajad. DEA analüüsil kasutati 
ühte sisendmuutujat (input variable), vee-ettevõtete tegevuskulud, ja kolme 
väljundmuutujat (output variable):  ettevõtete poolt teenindatavate elanike arv, 
toodetud joogivee maht ja töödeldud reovee maht. Pärast DEA skooride arvuta-
mist, hinnati väliste tegurite, s.o. omandivormi ja ettevõtte suuruse keskmist 
mõju tõhususele. Selleks teostati kvantitatiivse uuringu teise sammuna regres-
sioonanalüüs, milles nimetatud välised tegurid regresseeriti eelnevalt leitud ja 
seejärel bootstrap-simulatsiooni käigus korrigeeritud tõhususeskooridega, mis 
on lõigatud (truncated) ja piiratud intervalliga [0, 1]. Nimetatud analüüsi käigus 
leiti lõigatud muutuja mudeli (truncated regression model) parameetrite 
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hinnangud suurima tõepära (maximum likelihood) meetodil. Kvantitatiivse 
uuringu viimase sammuna teostati ühefaktoriline dispersioonanalüüs (one-way 
analysis of variances – ANOVA), mille käigus hinnati statistiliselt oluliste 
erinevuste olemasolu vee-ettevõtete keskmises tõhususes ja kasumlikkuses 
omandivormist, suurusest ja omandivormi-suuruse interaktsioonist lähtudes.  
Eelnimetatud kvantitatiivse uuringute teostamisel kasutatud paneelandmed 
sisaldasid informatsiooni kõigi olulisemate Eesti vee-ettevõtete kohta perioodil 
2005–2007. Valim sisaldas andmeid 43 Eesti vee-ettevõtte kohta, mis osutasid 
suuresti sarnaseid teenuseid. Samas erinesid valimisse kaasatud ettevõtted 
omandistruktuuri ja suuruse poolest. Omandistruktuuri alusel jagunesid vee-
ettevõtted kolme gruppi: avaliku sektori, erasektori ning avaliku ja erasektori 
ühises omanduses olevad ettevõtted. Lähtudes võrdse jaotuse põhimõttest ja 
teistest kirjanduses toodud näidetest, jaotati vee-ettevõtted suuruse alusel kolme 
gruppi järgmisel: väikesed ettevõtted osutavad teenuseid 501–3300 inimesele, 
keskmise suurusega 3301–10000 inimesele, suured ettevõtted 10001–100000 
inimesele ning väga suured ettevõtted osutavad veeteenuseid enam kui 100000 
inimesele.  
Doktoritöö empiirilise uuringu teine osa koosneb kvalitatiivsest juhtumi-
uuringust, et luua põhjalikumat arusaama sellest, kuidas valitsemise mehha-
nismide ülesehitus ja kasutamine kujundab erineva omandivormiga vee-ette-
võtetes tulemuslikkust. Selles uuringus kasutati instrumentaalse juhtumiuuringu 
lähenemist sisaldades teooria arendamise elemente. Juhtumiuuringu eesmärgiks 
on võrrelda valitsemise praktikaid ja saavutatud tulemuslikkust vee-teenuste 
osutamisel ning uurida üldisemalt seoseid valitsemise spetsiifiliste aspektide 
(mehhanismid, osalised või protsessid) ja (rahalise/mitterahalise) tulemus-
likkuse vahel vee-ettevõtetes. See kestvusuuring (longitudinal study) keskendub 
kolme vee-ettevõtte kogemusele erinevatest Eesti linnadest perioodil 2000–
2009. Kahe väljavalitud ettevõtte puhul on tegemist Eesti kahe suurima vee-
ettevõttega, mis annab võimaluse süveneda mitmesugustesse keerukatesse ette-
võtte ja regulatiivse valitsemisega seotud probleemidesse. Kolmas väljavalitud 
vee-ettevõte on suhteliselt väiksem, kuid selle puhul on tegemist äärmusliku 
näitega regulatiivse valitsemise konfliktide mõjust veeteenuste osutamise tule-
muslikkusele Eesti veesektorist. 
Käesolevat empiirilist juhtumiuuringut võib määratleda kui kirjeldavat 
(descriptive) ja avastuslikku (exploratory), mis viidi läbi kahes etapis. Andmete 
kogumise esimeses etapis uuriti põhjalikult uuringusse kaasatud organisat-
sioonidega seotud avalikult kättesaadavaid dokumente (nt. kohalike oma-
valitsuste strateegiad ja määrused, teenuslepingud jmt) ja muid materjale (nt. 
ettevõtete põhikirjad ja majandusaasta aruanded, ajaleheartiklid jmt), mis 
seonduvad veeteenuste osutamisega. Juhtumiuuringu teises etapis viidi läbi 
poolstruktureeritud intervjuud peamiste veeteenuste osutamisega seotud osa-
listega väljavalitud linnadest. Intervjueeritavateks olid vee-ettevõtete tippjuhid, 
nõukogu liikmed, linnavalitsuse liikmetest poliitikud ja veeteenuste korralda-
mise eest vastutavad linnaametnikud. Juhtumiuuringus osalenud vee-ettevõtetes 
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või linnavalitsustes viidi läbi 13 salvestatud intervjuud, mis sisaldavad kokku 18 
tundi vestlust ja mille põhjal valmis 285 lehekülje pikkune transkriptsioon. 
Enamus intervjuudest kestis poolteist kuni kaks tundi.  
Uuring tugineb nii esmastele kui teisastele allikatele. Kuna andmed koguti 
mitmest allikast, oli võimalik nende analüüsimisel kasutada triangulatsiooni, 
mis võimaldas paremat arusaamist valitsemise praktikatest ja suurendas 
uuringutulemuste valiidsust. Andmeid koguti intervjuude, küsimustike, aval-
datud materjalide, organisatsioonisiseste dokumentide, valdkondliku statistika 
ja lühikeste teostatud vaatluste kaudu perioodil mai 2010 – juuli 2011.  
 
 
Töös püstitatud uurimisküsimused ja põhitulemused 
Diskussioon valitsemisest, tulemuslikkusest ja nende vahelistest seostest avalike 
teenuste ja iseäranis veeteenuste osutamisel, viis doktoritöö alapeatükis 2.1. 
toodud analüüsiraamistiku loomiseni ja seitsme uurimisküsimusi formuleeri-
miseni. Võttes arvesse ettevõtte valitsemise teoreetilistest perspektiividest tule-
nevaid ootusi tulemuslikkuse osas, formuleeriti esimene uurimisküsimus selgi-
tamaks välja omandivormi mõju vee-ettevõtete tõhususele per se. Ülejäänud 
kuus uurimisküsimust, millele sai vastused leitud võrdleva juhtumiuuringu 
kaudu, püstitati, et selgitada välja, kuidas erineva omandivormiga vee-ette-
võtteid valitsetakse ja kuidas erinevad valitsemise mustrid mõjutavad nende 
rahalist ja mitterahalist tulemuslikkust. Teine, kolmas ja neljas uurimisküsimus 
on suunatud ettevõtte valitsemise mehhanismide erilaadsetele aspektidele ja 
viies uurimisküsimus regulatiivse valitsemise mehhanismide tunnustele, mis 
mõjutavad vee-ettevõtete tulemuslikkust. Lõpetuseks keskendub kuues uurimis-
küsimus vastutavusele ja tulemuslikkuse üle aruandluse korraldamisele valitse-
mise osaliste vahel ning viimane seitsmes uurimisküsimus on suunatud saavu-
tatud kompromissidele rahalise ja mitterahalise tulemuslikkuse vahel vee-
ettevõtetes.  
 
K1. Kas avaliku sektori omanduses, eraomanduses ning avaliku ja era-
sektori ühises omanduses olevate vee-ettevõtete tõhusus erineb oluliselt? 
Analüüs näitas, et ühtegi vaadeldud omandivormi ei saa seostada suurema või 
madalama tõhususega olemasoleva valimi korral. Seega uuringu tulemused ei 
toetanud teoreetilisi seisukohti (käsundusteooriast ja avaliku valiku teooriast), et 
avaliku sektori omanduses olevad ettevõtted on suhteliselt vähem tõhusad. 
Lisaks hinnati omandivormi mõju tõhususele ka ettevõtte suuruse kategooriate 
(väike, keskmine, suur ja väga suur) lõikes, kus tulemused samamoodi ei kinni-
tanud arvamust, et eravõtted on üheselt tõhusamad kui avaliku sektori oman-
duses olevad ettevõtted. Samas osundasid tulemused, et väikesed vee-ettevõtted 
on keskmiselt oluliselt vähem tõhusad kui keskmise suurusega või suured 
ettevõtted.  
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K2. Mis on erinevat tüüpi omanike peamised eesmärgid vee-ettevõtetes? 
Vastus sellele küsimusele tõi esile olulise erinevuse erinevat tüüpi omanike 
peamises huvis seos vee-ettevõtetega. Analüüsi põhjal saab väita, et vee-
ettevõtete eraomanikud olid peaasjalikult huvitatud rahalisest tulemuslikkusest, 
samas kui kohalikud omavalitsused olid omanikena huvitatud pigem 
mitterahaliste eesmärkide saavutamisest.  
 
 
K3. Milliseid tunnused iseloomustavad vee-ettevõtete nõukogu ja juhatuse 
liikmeid?  
Analüüsi tulemused osundavad, et vee-ettevõtete juhtorganite liikmetel olid 
erinevad teadmised ja praktilised kogemused. Ilmneb, et osaliselt või täielikult 
avaliku sektori omanduses olevate vee-ettevõtete nõukogudes ja juhatustes olid 
liikmed, kellel oli suhteliselt laialdane juhtimiskogemus erasektorist, head 
teadmised veesektori spetsiifikast ja/või mõjuvõim kohalikus poliitikas. Enamgi 
veel, osaliselt avaliku sektori ja osaliselt erasektori omanduses olev vee-ettevõte 
kätkes endas emafirma kaudu unikaalset rahvusvahelist kogemust vee-ettevõtete 
juhtimisel ja valitsemisel. Täielikult eraomanduses oleva vee-ettevõtte nõu-
kokku, erinevalt kahest teisest juhtumiuuringusse kaasatud ettevõttest, koha-
likke poliitikuid ei kuulunud. Samuti oli eraomanduses oleva vee-ettevõtte 
nõukogu ja juhatuse liikmetel oluliselt väiksem juhtimiskogemus ja teadmine 
veeteenuste eripärast, mis pärines suhteliselt väiksematest kommunaalteenuseid 
osutavatest ettevõtetest.  
 
 
K4. Millised on nõukogu ja juhatuse rollid vee-ettevõtete tulemuslikkuse 
mõjutamisel?  
Uuringu tulemused näitavad, et osaliselt või täielikult avaliku sektori oman-
duses olevates vee-ettevõtetes, kus nõukogu ja juhatuste liikmetel oli suhteliselt 
laiaulatuslikumad teadmised ja kogemused, teostas nõukogu kontrolli juhatuse 
tegevuse üle, kinnitas (juhatuse esimehe ettepanekul) konkreetsed eesmärgid ja 
koopteeris mõjukaid huvigruppide esindajaid ettevõtte väliskeskkonnast mõju-
tamaks ettevõtte tulemuslikkust. Täielikult avaliku sektori omanduses olevas 
vee-ettevõttes olid nõukogu funktsioonid ulatuslikumad ning selle roll ettevõtte 
tulemuslikkuse mõjutamisel veelgi olulisem kui osaliselt avaliku ja osaliselt 
eraomanduses olnud vee-ettevõttes. Nii nimetas just nõukogu ametisse juhatuse 
esimehe ja lõi vajaliku stiimulite skeemi (incentive scheme) omavaheliste 
eesmärkide ühildamiseks. Lisaks oli täielikult avaliku sektori omanduses olevas 
vee-ettevõttes, erinevalt avaliku ja erasektori ühises omanduses olnud ette-
võttest, nõukogu aktiivselt seotud aruteludega veehinna muutmise üle ning 
nõukogu otsuseid ja ettepanekuid veehinna kohta arvestati linnavalitsuse poolt 
veehinna ametlikul kehtestamisel. Täielikult eraomanduses olevas vee-ette-
võttes aga aktsionärid ei kasutanud nõukogu kui valitsemise mehhanismi de 
facto.  
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Olenemata toodud erinevustest, mõjutas sarnaselt kõigis kolmes vee-ette-
võttes nõukogu kasutamist formaalse kontrollimehhanismina asjaolu, et pea-
miste ettevõtte valitsemise osaliste (nõukogu esimees ja juhatuse esimees) vahel 
oli tugev usaldus. Sel põhjusel jäi nõukogu koosolekute panus juhatuse kont-
rollimisel ja eesmärkide saavutamise poole suunamisel ka vastavalt väiksemaks.  
 
  
K5: Kuidas mõjutab veeteenuse osutamist reguleerivate lepingute ning 
regulatiivsete institutsioonide ülesehitus ja kasutamine vee-ettevõtete 
tulemuslikkust?  
Analüüsi tulemused toetavad seisukohta, et veeteenuste osutamine eraettevõtete 
poolt nõrga regulatiivse raamistiku tingimustes võib olla seotud riskiga ja 
lõppeda läbikukkumisega. Juhtumi puhul, kus vee-ettevõtet kontrollis era-
omanik, kuid erastamisel oli sõlmitud kohaliku omavalitsuse ja vee-ettevõtte 
vahel ranged lepingud, mis sätestasid selgelt vee-ettevõtte õigused (tulu) ja 
kohustused (varustamine), ei tekkinud osapoolte vahel tõsiseid vee-teenuste 
osutamise tulemuslikkust õõnestavaid konflikte. Samas näitas juhtumiuuring, et 
selliste rangete lepingute puudumine ei pruugi põhjustada volitaja ja agenda 
vahelisi konflikte veeteenuste osutamisel, kui vee-ettevõte on avaliku sektori 
omanduses ja lepingu asemel saab kohalik omavalitsus regulaatorina ees-
märkide saavutamiseks kasutada ettevõtte nõukogu.  
Samuti ilmnes, et vee-ettevõtete finantstulemused sõltusid suuresti veehinna 
reguleerimiseks kasutatud hinnameetodist, mis kõigil kolmel uuritud juhtumil 
oli suunatud vee-ettevõtte kasumlikkuse kontrollimisele (rate-of-return 
approach), kuid jättis sätestamata selge piirmäära monopoolsete vee-ettevõtete 
põhjendatud kasumile. Põhimõtteline erinevus uuritud kolme vee-ettevõtete 
hinnamehhanismis seisnes selles, et osaliselt avaliku sektori ja osaliselt era-
omandis oleva vee-ettevõtte puhul toimus veehinna korrigeerimine regulaarselt 
lepingus kokkulepitud valemi alusel, mis tagas veetariifide automaatse suure-
nemise võttes arvesse eelmise aasta inflatsiooni. Ülejäänud kahe juhtumi-
uuringusse kaasatud vee-ettevõtte puhul sellised hinnavalemid puudusid ja kõik 
muutused veetariifides sõltusid lõplikult kohaliku omavalitsuse eraldiseisvatest 
otsustest. Täielikult eraomanduses oleva vee-ettevõtte juhtum näitas, et infor-
matsiooni asümmeetria tingimustes vee-ettevõtte ja regulaatori vahel arenev 
usaldamatus ja konfliktid võivad viia regulatiivse diskretsioonini veehinna 
määramisel, mis võib kahjustada vee-ettevõtte suutlikust katta oma kulusid ja 
teha investeeringuid teenuse kvaliteedi tõstmiseks.  
 
 
K6. Kuidas vastutavus võimaldab valitsemise osalistel saavutada oma ees-
märke vee-ettevõttes?  
Analüüsi tulemused näitavad, et vee-ettevõtete tegevjuhtide vastutavus tule-
muslikkuse eest aktsionäride või viimaste huve esindavate nõukogu liikmete ees 
(managerial accountability) võimaldas juhtidel luua usaldust oma tegevuse 
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suhtes ja saada vabadust juhtimisotsuste tegemiseks. See vastutavus võimaldas 
vähendada informatsiooni asümmeetriat, teostada kontrolli tegevjuhtide üle ja 
suunata neid ettevõtte (rahaliste) eesmärkide saavutamise suunas. Veel enam, 
aruandmine nõukogule finantstulemuste osas võimaldas tegevjuhtidel teenida 
ettevõtte kasumlikkusest sõltuvaid boonuseid, mis motiveeris neid suurendama 
ettevõtete tegevuse tõhusust.  
Poliitilise vastutavuse (political accountability) kontekstis ilmnes, et oma-
vahel tuleb seostada erinevates kohalike omavalitsuste strateegiates, eelarvetes 
ja (teenus-)lepingutes olevad realistlikud ja mõõdetavad eesmärgid (tulemus-
indikaatorid), et kohaliku omavalitsused kui regulaatorid saaksid suunata vee-
ettevõtteid enda pikaajaliste eesmärkide saavutamise suunas. Poliitilise vastu-
tavuse puudumine võib viia poliitilise diskretsioonini otsuste tegemisel kohaliku 
omavalitsuse võimuorganites, mis omakorda võib halvendada vee-ettevõtte 
finantstulemusi ja teenuse osutamise jätkusuutlikust. 
Lõpetuseks selgus uuringust, et sotsiaalset vastutavust (social account-
ability) ja läbipaistvust (transparency) võib vaadelda kui praktilisi vahendeid 
ettevõtte maine ja usaldusväärsuse suurendamiseks avalikkuse silmis, mida 
kaldus pidama suhteliselt olulisemaks väärtpaberibörsil noteeritud vee-ettevõtte. 
Suhteliselt suurem läbipaistvus tähendab samas, et välistel huvigruppidel on 
võimalik reageerida saadavale ettevõtte tulemusinformatsioonile, millega 
võivad kaasneda mittesoovitavad ettevõtte tulemuslikkust mõjutavad tegevused 
nende huvigruppide poolt. Seetõttu, jäädes suhteliselt vähem läbipaistvaks 
ettevõtte rahalise ja mitterahalise tulemuslikkuse osas, on ettevõtte juhtidel 
võimalik ’segamatult’ tegutseda oma volitajate (nt. aktsionäride) huvidest 
lähtuvalt.  
 
 
K7. Millised on kompromissid rahalise ja mitterahalise tulemuslikkuse 
vahel vee-ettevõtetes?  
Uuringust ilmnes, et eraomanike kontrolli all olevates vee-ettevõtetes, erinevalt 
täielikult avaliku sektori kontrolli all olevast vee-ettevõttest, oli rahalise ja 
mitterahalise tulemuslikkuse vahel saavutatud kompromiss ühe tulemuslikkuse 
dimensiooni suhtes nihkes. Veelgi enam, need nihked veeteenuste osutamise 
rahalise ja mitterahalise tulemuslikkuse vahel toovad esile legitiimsuse 
probleemid. Nii põhjustas avaliku ja erasektori ühises omanduses oleva vee-
ettevõtte suur kasum rahulolematust poliitikute ja kohalike elanike seas, mis viis 
senisest rangemate keskvalitsuse poolt kehtestatud hinnaregulatsioonide 
loomiseni. Samas täielikult eraomandis oleva vee-ettevõtte puhul oli just ette-
võtte kahjum osa legitiimsuse probleemist, kui linnavalitsus keeldus veehinda 
tõstmast.  
Kokkuvõtlikult, juhtumiuuringu tulemuste põhjal osutus võimalikuks visan-
dada kolm erinevat valitsemise mustrit, s.o lepingute kaudu reeglitel põhinev, 
nõukogu kaudu usaldusel põhinev ning lepingute ja nõukoguta diskretsioonil 
põhinev valitsemine, et kirjeldada, kuidas erineva omandivormiga vee-ette-
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võtteid valitseti ja kuidas need erinevad valitsemise mustrid mõjutasid rahalist 
ja mitterahalist tulemuslikkust. Tulemuslikkuse osas saavutati kõigis kolmes 
vee-ettevõttes erinev kompromiss rahalise ja mitterahaliste tulemuste vahel 
mõjutatuna valitsemise mehhanismide ülesehitusest ja kasutamisest osaliste 
poolt oma huvide kaitsmisel. 
Tuginedes juhtumiuuringu empiiriliste tulemuste arutelu käigus esitatud 
väidetele, sõnastati alljärgnevat viis teoreetilisse diskussiooni panustavat väidet, 
kuidas omandistruktuur sõltuvalt kasutatud valitsemise mehhanismidest võib 
mõjutada veeteenuste osutamise tulemuslikkust: 
 
Väide 1. Veeteenuste osutamine eraettevõtte poolt ilma ex ante kokku-
leppimata kirjalike reegliteta viib tõenäoliselt volitaja-agendi probleemi-
deni kohaliku omavalitsuse ja ettevõtte vahel, mis võib takistada 
regulatiivsete otsuste tegemist ja sellest tulenevalt kahjustada veeteenuste 
osutamise jätkusuutlikust. 
 
Väide 2. Avaliku sektori omanduses olevas vee-ettevõttes võib nõukogu 
efektiivselt täita kohaliku omavalitsuse kahest rolli, kui nõukogu on 
distantseeritud parteipoliitikast ja koosneb kohaliku omavalitsuse voli-
kokku kuuluvatest majandusliku suunitlusega liikmetest, et tasakaalus-
tada veeteenuste osutamisega seonduvaid rahalisi ja mitterahalisi ees-
märke.  
 
Väide 3. Avaliku sektori omanduses oleva vee-ettevõtte juhtimine koha-
liku omavalitsuse volikogu liikme poolt, kellel on vajalikud professio-
naalsed teadmised ja kelle tasu sõltub ettevõtte kasumlikkusest, kätkeb 
huvi tagada nii hea rahaline kui mitterahaline tulemuslikkus veeteenuste 
osutamisel. 
  
Väide 4. Usaldus, mida tugevdab avaliku sektori omanduses oleva vee-
ettevõtte juhatuse ja nõukogu liikmete osalemine kohalikus poliitikas, 
võib võimaldada kohalikul omavalitsusel loobuda kasutamast formaalseid 
ja suhteliselt kulukamaid kontrollimehhanisme, et tagada nõutud rahaline 
ja mitterahaline tulemuslikkus veeteenuste osutamisel. 
 
Väide 5: Veeteenuste osutamine avaliku ja erasektori ühises omanduses 
oleva vee-ettevõtte poolt, mille juhtimist teostab eraomanik range teenus-
lepingu alusel, moodustab valitsemise raamistiku, mis võib viia hea 
mitterahalise ja suhteliselt suurema rahalise tulemuslikkuseni veeteenuste 
osutamisel.  
 
Kokkuvõtteks, vaadeldud omandivormidel on erinev mõju vee-ettevõtete tule-
muslikkusele, mis sõltuvalt kasutatud valitsemise mehhanismidest võib olla 
negatiivne või positiivne. Erasektori juhtimise all olev vee-ettevõte (sh. avaliku 
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ja erasektori ühise omanduse korral) võib saavutada suhteliselt suurema 
tulemuslikkuse, kui partnerite vahelised õigused ja kohustused on selgelt 
fikseeritud rangete lepingutega. Avaliku sektori omanduses olevad ettevõtted, 
mida sageli peetakse vanamoelisteks ja ebaefektiivseteks, võivad saavutada hea 
tulemuslikkuse ka ilma rangete lepinguliste korraldusteta, kui vee-ettevõte on 
seotud kohaliku omavalitsusega nõukogu kaudu professionaalsusele tuginevalt. 
 
 
Töö praktiline tähtsus 
Üldiselt näitasid käesoleva doktoritöö tulemused, et poliitikud, regulaatorid ja 
vee-ettevõtete juhid, kes on seotud veeteenuste osutamisega, peaksid paljudes 
olukordades kaalutlema valitsemise mehhanismide ülesehituse ja kasutamise 
mõju tulemuslikkusele senisest põhjalikumalt. Vee-teenuste osutamise tule-
muslikkust on võimalik suunata süsteemsemalt, kui tugineda täienevatele tead-
mistele konkreetsete valitsemise mehhanismide eripäradest ja kasutamise 
tagajärgedest. Nii on võimalik olla tõhusam ja mõjusam seatud rahaliste ja 
mitterahaliste eesmärkide saavutamisel. Detailsemalt võib käesoleva doktoritöö 
põhjal välja tuua järgmised soovitused veeteenuste reguleerimise ja osutamisega 
tegelevatele praktikutele. 
Esiteks, praktiline veeteenuste osutamise korraldamisega seonduv küsimus 
hõlmab otsuseid, mida kohalikud omavalitsused saavad teha seoses vee-ette-
võtete erastamise ja ühendamisega, et vähendada kulusid ja suurendada tõhusust 
veeteenuste osutamisel. Empiiriliste uuringute tulemused näitavad, et Eesti vee-
ettevõtted tegutsevad suhteliselt madala tõhususega ja erasektori osalusega vee-
ettevõtted ei ole iseenesest oluliselt tõhusamad kui täielikult avaliku sektori 
omanduses olevad ettevõtted. Seega ainuüksi erastamine ei lahenda tõhususega 
seonduvaid probleeme veesektoris. Kuna üldine tõhususe tase on Eesti vee-
sektoris suhteliselt madal, siis regulaator(id) peaksid kaaluma veehinna regu-
leerimisel selliste meetodite rakendamist, mis sisaldavad selgeid stiimuleid 
tõhususe suurendamiseks vee-ettevõtetes. Samas näitasid analüüsi tulemused, et 
vee-ettevõtete tõhususus suureneb koos ettevõtte suurusega. Seetõttu võib anda 
soovituse, et kohalikud omavalitsused peaksid kaalutlema võimalusi suuremate 
vee-ettevõtete loomiseks läbi ühinemiste ja kasutama koostöövõimalusi, et 
saada kasu mastaabiefektist. See eeldaks eraldi analüüsi teostamist selle üle, 
millised konkreetsed vee-ettevõtted ja mis tüüpi mastaabisäästust (nt. 
investeeringutelt või igapäevaselt majandustegevuselt) Eestis enim võidaksid.  
Teiseks toob käesolev uuring välja, et kui kohalikud omavalitsused otsus-
tavad erastada oma vee-ettevõtted, siis tuleks vee-ettevõtte ja kohaliku oma-
valitsuse vahel ex ante sätestada kirjalike lepingutega selged reeglid veetariifide 
ja nõutava teenusekvaliteedi kohta, et vältida osapoolte erinevatest huvidest 
tingitud konfliktide tekkimist ning et oleks võimalik suunata ettevõtet soovitud 
tulemuslikkuse poole. Veelgi enam, koostöö alguses peaksid kohalik oma-
valitsus ja eraomanikust partner leppima kokku vastutavuse ja aruandmise 
põhimõtetes, et hoida ära usaldamatuse tekkimist ja vältida osapoolte võima-
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likust oportunistlikust käitumisest tuleneda võivaid probleeme. Vastasel korral 
võivad lepingu ebamääraste reeglite (eesmärkide) erinevad tõlgendused ja regu-
laatori kontrollivõimaluste puudumine kahjustada valitsemissuhteid veefirmaga 
ja päädida tulemuslikkust vähendava diskretsiooniga regulatiivsete otsuste 
tegemisel. 
Kolmandaks juhitakse töös tähelepanu, et avaliku sektori omanduses olevas 
ettevõttes võib nõukogu efektiivselt täita kohaliku omavalitsuse kahest rolli, kui 
nõukogu jääb distantseerituks parteipoliitikast ja koosneb kohaliku omavalitsuse 
volikokku kuuluvatest majandusliku suunitlusega liikmetest, et tasakaalustada 
veeteenuste osutamisega seonduvaid rahalisi ja mitterahalisi eesmärke. Seega 
peaks kohalik omavalitsus hoolikalt arvesse võtma vee-ettevõtte nõukogu 
liikmeteks määratavate isikute erialaseid teadmisi, ärikogemust ja poliitilist 
aktiivsust kohalikul tasandil, et tagada nii äriliste kui sotsiaalsete kaalutluste 
esindatus nõukogus ning saavutada tasakaal rahalise ja mitterahalise tule-
muslikkuse vahel. Nii toimides on võimalik leida lahendus peamisele vastu-
argumendile, miks avalikke teenuseid osutavad ettevõtted ei peaks olema koha-
like omavalitsuste omanduses, s.o. ettevõtte tulemuslikkust vähendav partei-
poliitilistest eesmärkidest lähtuv sekkumine juhtimisse. Samas selgus, et Eesti 
kohalikel omavalitsustel puudub kirjalik omanikustrateegia nende omanduses 
olevate ettevõtete kohta, mis suurendaks selgust ja läbipaistvust seoses kohalike 
omavalitsuste kui aktsionäride huvidega avalikke teenuseid osutavates ette-
võtetes. Selged omanikustrateegiad nagu need on kasutusel Põhjamaades (nt. 
Rootsis või Norras) võiksid hoida ära potentsiaalseid huvide konflikte, mis 
tulenevad kohaliku omavalitsuse kahesest rollist (aktsionär ja teenuse tagaja) 
enda omanduses olevas avalikke teenuseid pakkuvates ettevõtetes. 
Neljandaks rõhutavad uuringu tulemused, et valitsemise mehhanisme kujun-
dades ja kasutades tuleks võtta arvesse seda, kuidas need aitavad säilitada ja 
luua usaldust peamiste valitsemise osaliste vahel. See on oluline, sest nagu 
juhtumiuuringu tulemused näitasid, kasutatud valitsemise mehhanismid toimisid 
kuni oli usaldus ja lakkasid korralikult funktsioneerimast, kui usaldus kadus. 
Lisaks tuleb pidada oluliseks arutelusid ja kontaktide säilitamist valitsemise 
osaliste vahel väljaspool ametlikult kokkulepitud aruandmistoiminguid, et 
tugevdada usaldust ja hõlbustada otsuste tegemist. Kokkuvõttes võib niimoodi 
tugevdatud usaldus asendada ex ante formaalseid ja suhteliselt kulukamaid 
kontrollimehhanisme vajaliku tulemuslikkuse tagamiseks veeteenuste osuta-
misel. 
Lõpetuseks, uuringu tulemused toovad esile, et poliitikud, regulaatorid ja 
vee-ettevõtete juhid peaksid keskenduma nii hea rahalise kui mitterahalise 
tulemuslikkuse kindlustamisele, kui loovad ja kasutavad valitsemise mehha-
nisme veeteenuste osutamisel. Veel enam, oluline on saavutada tasakaal nende 
kahe tulemuslikkuse dimensiooni vahel vee-ettevõtetes, sest vastasel korral 
võivad tõusta esile vee-teenuste osutamisega seonduvad legitiimsuse prob-
leemid. 
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Uuringu piirangud ja soovitused edasisteks uuringuteks 
Käesoleva uuringu piirangud seonduvad peamiselt valitud uurimismeetoditega 
ja organisatsioonide valimisega juhtumiuuringuks. Soovitused edasisteks uurin-
guteks toonitavad vajadust laiendada ja täpsustada loodud teoreetilist raamis-
tikku, mille alusel analüüsida valitsemise mõju avalikke teenuseid osutava 
ettevõtte tulemuslikkusele. 
Esiteks tuleb kvantitatiivse uuringu kohta märkida, et tõhususe hindamiseks 
DEA mudelisse sisend- ja väljundmuutujate valimine oli raskendatud andmete 
piiratud kättesaadavuse tõttu vee-ettevõtete mitterahaliste sisendite (nt. kapitali 
koguse) osas. Seepärast on käesolevas doktoritöös Eesti vee-ettevõtete tõhususe 
analüüsimisel kasutatud sisendmuutujana mitterahaliste näitajate asemel nende 
ettevõtete tegevuskulusid (koos põhivara kulumiga) väljendatuna eurodes. 
Siinkohal tuleb möönda, et kuigi analüüsi teostamise käigus avastati ja eemal-
dati valimist mõningad ekstreemsete näitajatega ettevõtted (outliers) ning valim 
koosnes üksnes sarnase tootmistsükliga vee-ettevõtetest, siis jääb ikkagi alles 
võimalus, et mõnede valimisse kuuluvate vee-ettevõtete tegevuskulude summad 
(võetud nende kasumiaruannetest) sisaldavad ka kulusid, mis ei ole seotud vee-
teenuste osutamisega. See võib osaliselt moonutada vee-ettevõtete kohta arvu-
tatud tõhususe näitajate väärtust.  
Teise piiranguna tuleb arvestada, et käesoleva doktoritöö võrdlev juhtumi-
uuring oli avastusliku iseloomuga, mistõttu on sel omad nõrkused. Töö 
tulemusena väljatoodud valitsemise-tulemuslikkuse mustreid veeteenuste 
osutamisel võib pidada esialgseteks, mis on joonistunud välja suhteliselt väikese 
arvu organisatsioonide põhjal. Seetõttu on vaja teostada täiendavaid uuringuid, 
et valideerida saadud tulemusi suuremas hulgas vee-ettevõtetes. Samas on 
uuritavate vee-ettevõtete väike arv põhjendatud eesmärgiga luua põhjalikum 
arusaamine, kuidas valitsemise korraldamine võib mõjutada tulemuslikkust vee-
ettevõtetes. Doktoritöös esitatud raamistik analüüsimaks valitsemise korral-
damise mõju vee-ettevõtete tulemuslikkusele ei võimalda mõõta valitsemise 
mõju veeteenuste osutamise tulemuslikkusele, vaid pigem aitab luua arusaamist 
nende vahelise seose keerukusest, lihtsustades ja süstematiseerides antud vald-
konnas esilekerkinud küsimusi. Samuti tuleb märkida, et loodud uurimis-
raamistik keskendudes valitsemise ja tulemuslikkuse seosele ei hõlma teisi 
võimalikke vee-ettevõtete tulemuslikkuse mõjureid nende tegevuskeskkonnast. 
Kolmandaks tuleb juhtumiuuringuga seonduvalt rõhutada asjaolu, et põhjus-
lik seos valitsemise ja tulemuslikkuse vahel on kompleksne ja tulemuslikkus ise 
võib mõjutada valitsemise korraldamist. Veelgi enam, kirjanduses on osundatud 
erinevatele alternatiivsetele hüpoteetilistele kausaalsustele (nt. seos puudub) 
valitsemise vormide ja tulemuslikkuse vahel avalikus sektoris. Põhjuslikkuse 
küsimus omab suurt tähtsust ettevõtte valitsemise ja tulemuslikkuse uuringutes, 
sest ilma tugeva põhjusliku seoseta puudub alus väita, et valitsemine mõjutab 
tulemuslikkust, ja mitte vastupidi. Siiski puudub ettevõtte valitsemist käsitlevas 
kirjanduses konsensus valitsemise ja tulemuslikkuse vahelise põhjusliku seose 
kohta, jättes selle küsimuse vastamiseks edasiste uuringute teostajatele. 
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Käesoleva doktoritöö uuringud keskendusid üksikasjalikult vee-ettevõtetele. 
Kuigi muude avalikke teenuseid osutavate ettevõtete puhul võivad kasutatavad 
valitsemise mehhanismid mõnevõrra erineda, siis väljapakutud uurimisraamis-
tiku saab kasutada lähtekohana ka uuringutes, mis analüüsivad valitsemise mõju 
tulemuslikkusele muude avalike teenuste kontekstis. Siiski eeldab loodud 
valitsemise-tulemuslikkuse raamistik, et kohalikud omavalitsused on delegeeri-
nud avalike teenuste osutamise ettevõtetele, mis peavad arvestama vajadusega 
saavutada rahalisi ja mitterahalisi eesmärke.  
Edasised uuringud võiksid keskenduda sellele, et luua põhjalikumat aru-
saamist sellest, kuidas kombineerida erinevaid (formaalseid ja mitteformaalseid) 
valitsemise mehhanisme suunamaks ja kontrollimaks reguleeritud avalikke 
teenuseid osutavaid ettevõtteid tulemuslikumalt. Võrdlusanalüüsi võiks kaasata 
ettevõtteid ka teistest Balti riikidest ja Põhjamaadest. Lõpetuseks saab veel ühe 
uurimissuunana välja tuua, et edaspidi võiks vaadelda tulemuslikkust laiemalt ja 
pikemas ajaperspektiivis. Vaadeldud varasemate aastate rahaliste ja mitteraha-
liste tulemusnäitajate asemel tuleks tulemuslikkust hinnata läbi veeteenuse 
osutajate pikaajalise elujõulisuse ja kohalike omavalitsuste suutlikkuse tagada 
hea kvaliteediga veeteenuste kättesaadavus tulevastel perioodidel võttes arvesse 
erinevusi veeteenuste valitsemises. 
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